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  • provisions of Section 4(1)(c) of the Bihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act, 1956 (hereinafter called the Act).2.
  • U.P Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1954,
  • SECTION 11 CONTRACT ACT
  • sub-section (1) of Section 3
  • Section 5 of the U.P Act
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citation codes
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  • provisions of Section 4(1)(c) of the Bihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act, 1956 (hereinafter called the Act).2.
  • U.P Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1954,
  • SECTION 11 CONTRACT ACT
  • sub-section (1) of Section 3
  • Section 5 of the U.P Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff filed a suit claiming a declaration of absolute title to certain lands in two villages (Solhanda and Naugarh Bihta in Gaya district) and sought a declaration that a deed of gift dated 2.2.73, purportedly executed by one Baliram Singh in favour of the defendants, was illegal, void, inoperative and not binding on the plaintiff. The plaintiff's title rested on a registered deed of gift in his favour from a proforma defendant who was alleged to be the nearest heir of Baliram Singh (who died on 10.2.70). The defendants resisted the suit, relying on the deed of gift and contending it was genuine, valid and operative.

A notification under Section 3(1) of the Bihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act, 1956 (the "Act") had been published in the Official Gazette for the area where the lands lie. Both parties initially maintained that the suit had not abated under Section 4(1)(c) of the Act and the hearing should proceed. Evidence for both sides was led and the case was fixed for argument.

The suit was later transferred to the Court of the 2nd Additional Subordinate Judge, Jehanabad. That court, noting that the suit appeared prima facie to have abated under Section 4(1)(c) of the Act, issued notices on 10.3.78 asking parties to show cause why the suit should not be held to have abated. After hearing parties on the show-cause notices, the subordinate Judge passed an order holding that the suit had abated. The present application by the plaintiff challenges that order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the suit, which seeks a declaration of title to land and a declaration that a deed of gift is illegal, void and inoperative, abated under Section 4(1)(c) of the Bihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act, 1956, following publication of a notification under Section 3(1) in respect of the area.
  2. Whether a suit that seeks to set aside a deed (i.e., to declare it illegal, void or inoperative) is excluded from the operation of Section 4(1)(c) where the deed can be cancelled or must be "actually set aside" by a competent court before losing legal effect, as opposed to being a document that is wholly or partially invalid and can be disregarded by any court or authority.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's (Plaintiff's) Arguments

  • The learned Advocate for the petitioner, Sri Lakshman Saran Sinha, contended that the suit was essentially one for setting aside the deed of gift and that such a suit could cease to have legal effect only after the deed was actually set aside by a competent court; therefore it was not a suit "for declaration or adjudication of any right in regard to which proceedings can or ought to be taken under this Act" and should not abate under Section 4(1)(c).
  • The petitioner relied on the Supreme Court decision in Gorakh Nath Dubey v. Hari Narain Singh (A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 2451) and its interpretation by a Full Bench of the Patna High Court in Ramkrit Singh v. The State of Bihar (1979 B.B.C.J. 259) in support of the contention that suits to set aside deeds requiring actual cancellation fall outside the abatement provision.

Respondents' (Defendants') Position as Reflected in the Opinion

  • The defendants contended that the deed of gift was genuine, valid and operative.
  • It is recorded that both parties maintained that the suit had not abated under Section 4(1)(c) and asked that the suit hearing proceed (i.e., both parties contested the abatement issue before the lower court).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Gorakh Nath Dubey v. Hari Narain Singh, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 2451 The Supreme Court drew a distinction between (a) documents wholly or partially invalid so they can be disregarded by any court or authority, and (b) documents that must be actually set aside before they cease to have legal effect. It held that consolidation authorities could adjudicate on documents that are wholly/partially invalid and that such claims fall within the corresponding abatement provision (Section 5 of the U.P. Act corresponding to Section 4 of the Bihar Act). The court relied on this principle to hold that where a plaint alleges that a deed is wholly invalid (forgery, lack of capacity), the deed can be disregarded and the claim falls within Section 4(1)(c) (i.e., the suit abates). The court also used the case to distinguish suits that require actual cancellation of a document.
Ramkrit Singh v. The State of Bihar, 1979 B.B.C.J. 259 (Full Bench) The Full Bench interpreted Gorakh Nath's decision to mean that a composite suit will not abate insofar as it seeks reliefs independent of title determination; and it clarified that suits to set aside documents that require actual cancellation are outside the scope of the abatement provision, whereas suits asserting documents to be wholly or partially invalid are covered by abatement. The court proceeded on the footing of this Full Bench interpretation: it accepted the bifurcation (documents that must be cancelled vs documents that are void/invalid) and applied the Full Bench's interpretation to decide whether the present plaint alleged a void document (covered) or a document requiring cancellation (not covered).
Unidentified report: 1977 B.B.C.J. 701 Held that a suit for recovery of possession and mesne profits was covered by Section 4(1)(c) because such suits necessarily involve declaration of right or interest in the land. The court cited this report as support for the proposition that suits seeking declaration of title or rights in land (including possession/mesne profit suits) fall within Section 4(1)(c) and thus can abate when a consolidation notification has been published.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by setting out Section 4(1)(c) of the Bihar Consolidation Act, which provides that upon publication of a notification under Section 3(1) every suit "for the correction of records and every suit and proceedings in respect of declaration of rights or interest in any land lying in the area" pending in any court shall stand abated on an order being passed to that effect by the court before which it is pending.

The court analyzed the principal relief claimed in the plaint — a declaration of absolute title to the suit land — and held that this relief plainly falls within a "suit in respect of declaration of right or interest in any land" covered by Section 4(1)(c). The court noted authority (1977 B.B.C.J. 701) that recovery/possession suits are covered because declaration of right or interest is a necessary element of such suits.

The analysis then turned to whether the portion of the suit seeking a declaration that the deed of gift was illegal, void and inoperative was a separate, independent relief not caught by Section 4(1)(c). Citing the Full Bench view in Ramkrit Singh, the court recognized that composite suits may survive in relation to independent reliefs unconnected with title determination. However, the court examined the phrasing of the relief and concluded the declaration attacking the deed was essentially a necessary antecedent finding required before the grant of the declaratory title relief — i.e., it was instrumental to the title claim rather than fully independent.

Even if treated as an independent relief, the court applied the Supreme Court's distinction in Gorakh Nath Dubey. The court examined the factual allegations in the plaint: (1) that the deed had never been executed by Baliram Singh (forgery); (2) that Baliram Singh was not mentally competent at the time of execution (having lost understanding and being unconscious); (3) undue influence and coercion by the defendants; and (4) irregular presentation before the Registering Officer due to influence. The court reasoned:

  • Allegations that the donor was unconscious or lacked understanding (invoking Section 11 of the Contract Act) would, if proved, render the deed void for want of contractual capacity.
  • Allegations of forgery, if established, would render the deed void (not merely voidable).
  • While undue influence might make a deed voidable, allegations of lack of capacity or forgery make it void ab initio and thus a document that can be disregarded by any court or authority without the need for formal cancellation.

Given that the plaint, on its face, alleged facts that would render the deed void (and therefore a document which "is wholly or partially invalid so that it can be disregarded"), the court concluded that the claim regarding the deed fell within the ambit of Section 4(1)(c) and the suit so far as it sought declaration of title and the attendant declaration regarding the deed had abated.

The court explicitly rejected the petitioner's contention that the suit was a conventional cancellation suit outside the abatement provision, finding that the pleaded grounds made the deed void and thus within the Gorakh Nath category that consolidation authorities/operations could cover.

Finally, the court noted that the Full Bench decision in Ramkrit Singh clarifies that abatement under the consolidation provision is not perpetual: once consolidation operations in the area are closed, the abated suit would revive and survive.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The application is without merit and is DISMISSED. The subordinate Judge's order holding that the suit had abated under Section 4(1)(c) was sustained by the court.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The suit (to the extent it seeks declaration of title to the lands and the attendant declaration that the deed of gift is illegal, void and inoperative) stands abated in view of the publication under Section 3(1) and the operation of Section 4(1)(c) of the Bihar Consolidation Act. The plaintiff's application challenging the abatement was dismissed and there was no order as to costs because there was no appearance for the opposite party.
  • Temporal consequence: The abatement is not permanent. As clarified (following the Full Bench in Ramkrit Singh), on the close of consolidation operations in the area the abated suit would survive (i.e., revival of proceedings is possible after consolidation operations conclude).
  • Precedential note: The court applied established precedents (Gorakh Nath Dubey and the Full Bench interpretation in Ramkrit Singh) and did not purport to lay down a new legal principle beyond applying those authorities to the facts before it.
Application dismissed.

    Paras Singh v. Baikunth Singh Opp. Party.

    Shivanugrah Narain, J.:— This application by the plaintiff is directed against the order dated 2nd Additional sub-ordinate Judge, Jehanabad; holding that the suit had abated in view of the provisions of Section 4(1)(c) of the Bihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act, 1956 (hereinafter called the ‘Act’).

    2. In the aforesaid suit, the principal relief, claimed by the plaintiff was “for declaration of his title as absolute owner of the lands in suit on declaration that the said deed of gift dated 2.2.73 purported to be executed by the said Baliram Singh in favour of the defendants is illegal, void and in-operative and not binding on the plaintiff.” The lands were situate in two villages, namely, Solhanda and Naugarh bihta, both in the district of Gaya.

    3. The plaintiff claims title to the suit property on the basis of a registered deed of gift executed in his favour by the proforma defendant who according to the plaintiff was the nearest heir of said Baliram Singh who died on 10.2.70 According to the plaintiff, the deed of gift dated 2.2.73 purported to have been executed by Baliram Singh in favour of the defendants 1st party was void and inoperative for reasons which will be set out presently and, therefore, conferred no title upon the defendants 1st party.

    4. The suit was resisted by the defendants 1st party on the basis of the aforesaid deed of gift purported to have been executed by Baliram Singh. The defendants contended that the deed of gift was genuine, valid and operative. It is common ground that a notice under Section 3(1) of the Act had been published in the Official Gazette in respect of the area within which the lands are situate. Both the plaintiffs and the defendants maintained that the suit had not abated under the provisions of Section 4(1)(c) of the Act and the hearing of the suit be proceeded with. The evidence of both the parties was adduced, and the case was fixed for argument. In the meantime; the case came up on transfer to the Court of the 2nd Additional sub-ordinate Judge, Jehanabad, and the transferee court being of the opinion that it appeared prima facie that the suit had abated in view of the provisions of Section 4(1)(c) of the Act, by his order dated 10.3.78 directed issue of notice to the parties to the suit seking them to show cause as to why the suit should not be held to have abated. Both the parties appeared and filed show cause and after hearing the parties, the learned sub-ordinate Judge has passed the impugned order holding that the suit had abated.

    5. Sri Lakshman Saran Sinha the learned Advocate for the petitioner contends that the court below erred in holding that the suit had abated in as much as this was a suit for setting aside a deed of gift which could cease to have legal effect only after it was actually set aside by a competent court and, therefore, was not a suit or proceeding “for declaration or adjudication of any right in regard to which proceedings can or ought to be taken under this Act.” In support of this contention, Sri Sinha has placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in (1) Gorakh Nath Dubey v. Hari Narain Singh (A.I.R 1973 S.C 2451) and the interpretation upon it by a Full Bench of this court in (2) Ramkrit Singh v. The State of Bihar (1979 B.B.C.J 259).

    6. Before I refer to these decisions, it is necessary to set out the relevant statutory provision i.e, Section 4(1)(c) of the Act, which runs as follows:—

    “Upon the publication of the notification under sub-section (1) of Section 3 in the Official Gazette the consequences, as hereinafter set forth, shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, from the date specified in the notification till the close of the Consolidation operation, ensue in the area to which the notification relates.

    (a) xxxx

    (b) xxxx

    (c) “every proceeding for the correction of records and every suit and proceedings in respect of declaration of rights or interest in any land lying in the area or for declaration or adjudication of any other right in regard to which proceedings can or ought to be taken under this Act pending before any court or authority whether of the first instance or of appeal, reference or revision, shall, on an order being passed in that behalf by the court or authority before whom such suit or proceeding is pending stand abated.”

    7. It is, therefore, a specific mam date of Section 4(1)(c) of the Act that every suit “in respect of declaration of right or interest in any land lying in the area” which is pending in any Court shall stand abated on an order being passed on that behalf by the Court before which it is pending.

    8. I have already quoted the principal relief claimed by the plaintiff in the suit. The relief claimed being for declaration of title to the suit land it is certainly a suit “in respect of declaration of right or interest.” in land. It is not disputed that the suit lands he in the area in respect of which a notification under Section 3 of the Act has been published. In 1977 B.B.C.J, 701 a suit for recovery of possession and mesne profit was held to be covered by Section 4(1)(c) of the Act because in every suit for recovery of possession or mesne profits a declaration of right or interest in respect of the lands the possession of which or mesne profits in respect of which are sought to be recovered has necessarily to be made. The title of the plaintiff in the suit land cannot be declared without declaring his right or interest in the land. I would presently refer to the decision of the Supreme Court relied upon but that case is clearly not an authority for the preposition that a suit in which the relief of declaration of title of the land lying in the area in respect of which notification under Section 3 of the Act has been published in the official Gazette, has specifically been sought is not covered by Section 4(1)(c) of the Act. The suit, so far as the declaration of title to the suit land is concerned; is, therefore, clearly covered by Section 4(1)(c) of the Act and was rightly held to have abated. The question however, remains whether the suit also abated in so far as it relates to the declaration that the deed of gift purported to have been executed by said Baliram Singh is illegal, void and inoperative and not binding on the plaintiff also. In Ramkrit Singh's case Supra it was held that a composite suit which is so far as it seeks relief or reliefs unconnected with the declaration and determination of title to the land does not abate under Section 4(1)(c) of the Act in relation to the aforesaid independent relief or reliefs (at page 268 of the report). Now, can it be said that the relief regarding declaration that the impugned deed of gift is an independent relief unconnected with the declaration of title to the land. The relief has been couched in words which indicate that the only real relief claimed is the declaration of title to the land. The use of the words “declaration of title to the land on declaration that the said deed of gift is illegal, void and inoperative” clearly indicates that the further declaration sought that the “said deed of gift dated 2-2-73 is illegal, void and inoperative and not binding on the plaintiff” is in the nature of a finding which has to be recorded before the relief prayed i.e, the declaration of title to the suit land can be granted.

    9. Even assuming that this is a Separate relief, I am of the opinion that the suit for this relief would also be covered by Section 4(1)(c) of the Act. The decision of the Supreme Court in Gorakh Nath Dubey v. Hari Narain Singh Supra veiled upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner is a clear authority for the proposition that a claim by the plaintiff that a certain document was wholly or partially invalid and could be disregarded by any court or authority could be adjudicated upon by the Consolidation Court under the U.P Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1954, and, therefore, a suit in which such a claim was made was covered by Section 5 of the U.P Act aforesaid, which corresponds Section 4 of the Act, and, therefore, abates. In that case Beg, J. as he then was, speaking for the Supreme Court observed as follows:—

    “We think that a distinction can be made between cases where a document is wholly or partially invalid so that it can be disregarded by any court or authority and one where it has to be actually set aside before it can cease to have legal effect. An alienation made in excess of power to transfer would be, to the extent of the excess of power, invalid. An adjudication on the effect of such a purported alienation would be necessarily implied in the decision of a dispute involving conflicting claims to rights of consolidation proceedings. The existence and quantum of rights claimed or denied will have to be declared by the Consolidation authorities which would be deemed to be invested with jurisdiction, by the necessary implication of their statutory powers to adjudicate upon such rights and interests in land, to declare such documents effective or ineffective, but, where there is a document the legal effect of which can only be taken away by setting it aside or its cancellation, it could be urged that the consolidation authorities have no power to cancel the deed, and, therefore, it must be held to be binding on them so long as it is not cancelled by a court having the power to cancel it.”

    10. The aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court apparently did not specifically decide whether the suit to set aside a document which has to be actually set aside before it can cease to have legal effect did not abate, but the decision of the Supreme Court has been so interpreted by a Full Bench of this Court in Ram Krit Singh's case (at page 268 of the report) and, therefore, I must proceed on the footing that a suit to set aside a document which has to be actually set aside before it can cease to have legal effect, is outside the scope of the provision relating to the abatement of the suit but if the suit is to set aside a document which is wholly or partially invalid so that it can be disregarded by any court or authority, it is covered by the provision relating to the abatement of suit.

    11. Sri Sinha strenuously contended that it was a suit to set aside the deed of gift which was a document which was not wholly or partially invalid so that it can be disregarded by any court or authority to set aside the document but was a document which had to be actually set aside before it can cease to have legal effect. I am, however, unable to agree. The grounds on which the impugned deed of gift is said to be void and inoperative set forth in the plaint were firstly that the deed of gift dated 2-2-73 had never been executed by Baliram Singh, secondly that at the time of execution Baliram Singh was not in a fit state of body and mind and was ailing since long and had lost his power of understanding and thirdly that he was completely under the influence and coercion of the defendants at the time the deed is purported to have been executed. It was also asserted that the deed was not presented before the Registering Officer legally as the officer was also under the influence of the defendants. Now the allegation about undue influence and coercion may make the deed of gift a voidable document. But the allegation that at the time the deed was executed Baliram Singh was unconscious and had lost all powers of understanding will, if established, make the deed void because Baliram Singh would then be a person not competent to contract within the meaning of Section 11 of the Contract Act. The allegation that the document was a forgery if substantiated also make the deed void and not merely voidable.

    12. Therefore, on the allegations in the plaint the impugned deed of gift was a void document. It is well settled that a void document does not require to be set aside before it can cease to have legal effect and can be disregarded by any court or authority. Therefore, assuming that this was a suit for cancellation of the impugned deed of gift, the deed of gift was to use the words of the Supreme Court in Gorakh Nath Dubey case Supra “a document which is wholly or partially invalid so that it can be disregarded by any court or authority” and not one “which has to be actually set aside before it can cease to have legal effect.” The decision of the Supreme Court relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner is, therefore; of no avail to him.

    13. In the result the application is without merit and it is, accordingly, dismissed. As there is no appearance on behalf of the opposite party there will be no order as to costs.

    14. Before, I part with the case, I want to clarify that the abatement, as pointed out by Full Bench of this Court in Ramkrit Singh's case Supra will not be binding for all time and that on the close of consolidation operations in the area, the abated suit would survive.

    Application dismissed.

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    Comments

    Paras Singh v. Baikunth Singh Opp. Party.
    (Apr 26, 1979)