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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, Ranjit Singh, occupied shop No. 18 and the chaubara above it in a small building comprising three shops (Nos. 16, 17, and 18) on the ground floor, which is an evacuee property. The respondent, Kundan Lal, occupied shop No. 16, while Rattan Singh occupied shop No. 17 and the roof above. The Managing Officer initially held the property indivisible and allotted it entirely to Ranjit Singh based on compensation values. Appeals by Kundan Lal and Rattan Singh against this order were dismissed by an Assistant Settlement Commissioner on December 14, 1959. Subsequently, Kundan Lal obtained a revision order on May 19, 1960, from a Settlement Commissioner empowered by the Chief Settlement Commissioner, declaring shop No. 16 separable and transferable to him, while the staircase access to the upper floor was to remain with Ranjit Singh. Ranjit Singh then petitioned the Government of India under section 33 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954, but received a response on November 5, 1960, indicating no interference with the May 19 order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Government of India, under section 33 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954, is required to provide the petitioner an opportunity of being heard before rejecting his application for revision.
  2. Whether the property in question could be partitioned and allotted in parts to different occupants contrary to the Managing Officer's initial indivisible allotment.
  3. The interpretation and application of rule 30 regarding the partition and allotment of evacuee property occupied by multiple persons holding verified claims.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner’s Arguments

  • The Government of India could not reject the revision application under section 33 without giving the petitioner an opportunity of being heard, relying on the Full Bench decision in Hira Lal Kher v. The Chief Settlement Commissioner.
  • The petitioner contended that rule 30 mandates either allotment of the entire property to the petitioner or division into three parts corresponding to the three occupants, including Rattan Singh, who had ceased to participate.

Respondent’s Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondent’s legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Hira Lal Kher v. The Chief Settlement Commissioner, New Delhi (1961) 63 P.L.R 560, I.L.R (1962) 1 Punjab 165 Requirement of hearing before dismissal of revision petitions under section 24 of the Act, applying Order XLI Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Distinguished from section 33 petitions; the court held that the procedural safeguards applicable under section 24 do not automatically apply to section 33 petitions.
Dewan Jhangi Ram v. Union of India and others (1961) 63 P.L.R 610 Principle that a person should be heard before the Central Government reverses a previous order under section 33. Agreed that the Central Government should give an opportunity to be heard before reversing decisions prejudicially affecting a person, but not necessarily before rejecting a request for interference.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the distinction between section 24 and section 33 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954. Section 24 pertains to the power of revision of the Chief Settlement Commissioner and mandates procedural safeguards, including hearing the petitioner before dismissal, as per Order XLI Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 33, however, confers residuary powers on the Central Government and does not explicitly require such procedural formalities. While the court recognized the principle that a person should be heard before a prejudicial reversal under section 33, it clarified that this does not extend to an absolute right to a personal hearing before the Government decides not to interfere.

Regarding the merits, the court found no reason to interfere with the order allowing the separation of shop No. 16 for the respondent, Kundan Lal, while leaving the petitioner in possession of the remaining shops and upper floor access. The court interpreted rule 30 flexibly, holding that the property need not be partitioned into three parts if it is not convenient, and that satisfying the claims of two occupants where subdivision into three is impractical is acceptable. The court noted the practical difficulty that the petitioner’s access to the upper portion depends on the portion formerly occupied by Rattan Singh, making a tripartite division inconvenient.

Holding and Implications

The petition filed by Ranjit Singh is dismissed.

The direct effect of this decision is that the respondent, Kundan Lal, retains possession of shop No. 16, while the petitioner retains possession of shops No. 17 and 18 and the upper floor with access. The court ordered the petitioner to pay the costs of the respondent. No new legal precedent was established beyond clarifying the procedural distinction between sections 24 and 33 of the Act and the flexible application of rule 30 in property partition. The authorities made respondents were not represented, and no further implications were discussed.

    Ranjit Singh, v. The Union Of India And Others,

    Falshaw, J.— This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution filed by Ranjit Singh in the following circumstances.

    The property in dispute consists of a small building comprising three shops, Nos. 16, 17 and 18 on the ground floor, and a Chaubara and open space on the upper floor. The building is an evacuee property.

    The petitioner was in occupation of shop No. 18 and the chaubara situated above it, while Kundan Lal respondent was in occupation of shop No. 16 and one Rattan Singh was in occupation of shop No. 17 and the roof above. When the question of permanent allotment came to be considered the Managing Officer held that the property was indivisible and gave it to Ranjit Singh petitioner, whose compensation was nearest to the value of the property. Both the other allottees, the present respondent Kundan Lal and Rattan Singh, filed appeals against the order of the Managing Officer which were dismissed by an Assistant Settlement Commissioner on the 14th of December, 1959. Thereafter apparently Rattan Singh, ceased to take any interest in the matter, but Kundan Lal, carried the matter further in revision and obtained on order from a Settlement Commissioner with delegated powers of the Chief Settlement Commissioner on the 19th of May, 1960, to the effect that shop No. 16 was separable and should be transferred to him though the staircase giving access to the upper portion of the building should be left with Ranjit Singh. Thereafter Ranjit Singh sent a representation to the Government of India under section 33 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954, regarding which he received a letter from an Under-Secretary dated the 5th of November, 1960, to the effect that Central Government saw no reason to interfere with the order of the 19th of May, 1960.

    On behalf of the petitioner the point has been raised that the Government of India could not reject the application or revision under section 33 of the Act without giving the petitioner an opportunity of being heard in person or through counsel. This contention was based on the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in Hira Lal Kher v. The Chief Settlement Commissioner, New Delhi, and others, () (1961) 63 P.L.R 560 , I.L.R (1962) 1 Punjab 165. This decision related to the similar dismissal of a petition submitted to the Chief Settlement Commissioner under section 24 of the Act. It is prescribed by rule 105 of the Rules framed in connection with the Act that except as otherwise expressly provided in the Act or in these rules the procedure laid down in Order XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure shall so far as may be applicable apply to the hearing and disposal of appeals and revisions under the Act, and it was held by the Full Bench that such being the case a revision petition filed under section 24 of the Act could only be dismissed after hearing the petitioner or his Pleader as required by Order XLI rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

    It is, however, quite clear that the provisions of section 33 are very different from those of section 24 which is headed “Power of revision of the Chief Settlement Commissioner”. This clearly means that any petition filed under that section must be treated as a regular revision petition. On the other hand section 33 is headed “Certain residuary powers of Central Government”. Some of the words of the two sections are undoubtedly similar but I do not regard any representation made to the Central Government with a view to causing it to exercise its residuary powers under section 33 as a revision petition or governed by rule 105. Our attention was drawn to a decision of D.K Mahajan, J., in Dewan Jhangi Ram v. Union of India and others, () (1961) 63 P.L.R 610, in which the view has been expressed that the petitioner should be heard before a decision is made by the Central Government under section 33, but in that case it appears that the person who moved this Court under Article 226 was one against whom some previous order in his favour had been reversed by the Central Government purporting to act under section 33 without giving him any opportunity to be heard. I would certainly agree that although the words which occur in sub-section (3) of Section 24 of the Act—“No order which prejudicially affects any person shall be passed under this section without giving him a reasonable opportunity of being heard”—do not occur in section 33, they embody a principle which should be applied by the Central Government when acting under section 33, and that before any previous decision is reversed under this section the person likely to be prejudicially affected by it should be given an opportunity to be heard. This, however, does not mean that any person, who chooses to make a request to the Central Government for the purpose of reversing some earlier decision must necessarily be given a personal hearing before the decision of the Government not to interfere is communicated to him.

    As regards the merits I see no reason to interfere. Prima facie it would appear that the shop occupied by Kundan Lal, respondent can be conveniently separated from the rest of the property and given to him leaving the petitioner in possession of the remaining two shops on the ground floor and the whole of the accommodation on the roof to which access is available by staircase specifically allotted to him by the impugned order. The learned counsel for the petitioner sought to rely on the words of rule 30 which reads as follows:—

    “If more persons than one holding verified claims are in occupation of any acquired evacuee property which is an allotable property, the property shall be offered to the person whose net compensation is nearest to the value of the property and the other persons may be allotted such other acquired evacuee property which is allotable as may be available:

    provided that where any such property can suitably be partitioned, the Settlement Commissioner shall partition the property and allot to each such person a portion of the property so partitioned having regard to the amount of net compensation payable to him.”

    The argument is that these words mean that either the whole property should be allotted to the petitioner, as was ordered by the Managing Officer, or else that it must be divided into three and even Rattan Singh, the original allottee, who has taken no part in the controversy since his appeal was dismissed by the Assistant Settlement Commissioner, should have been given the shop occupied by him. I do not consider that the words of rule 30 are meant to be applied as rigidly as this, and I cannot see any objection, in a case where there are three occupants of portions of a property which can only be conveniently subdivided into two portions, why the claims of two occupants cannot be met. In this case as I have said it appears to be quite feasible to separate ground floor shop occupied by Kundan Lal from rest of the property whereas a sub-division into three portions would not be convenient since as was pointed out by the Assistant Settlement Commissioner the present petitioner can only have access to the upper portion of the property occupied by him through the portion formerly occupied by Rattan Singh. I would accordingly dismiss the petition and order the petitioner to pay the costs of Kundan Lal. (Counsel's fee Rs. 50.) The authorities who were made respondents have not been represented.

    Tek Chand, J.—I agree.

    B.R.T

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    Comments

    Ranjit Singh, v. The Union Of India And Others,
    (Aug 28, 1961)