Mookerjee, A.C.J:— This is an appeal by the plaintiff in a suit for recovery of possession of land upon declaration of title. The disputed property belonged to one Dinanath Nag who left four sons, Kandarapa Nag (the plaintiff), Banwarilal Nag (the first defendant), Pasupati Nag (the second defendant), and Saslbhusan Nag since deceased. The third and fourth defendants held a decree for money against the Nag Brothers and in execution thereof purchased the property at an auction sale held in 1911. The case for the plaintiff is that as the ancestral homestead of the Nags was situated on the property sold, the execution purchaser agreed, on their request to reconvey the property to them upon payment of Rs. 250 and costs incidental to the sale, but that the first two defendants, his brothers, fraudulently took a conveyance on the 9th September, 1913, in their names alone. The plaintiff accordingly prayed that his brothers might be directed to transfer to him his one-fourth share upon receipt of a proportionate amount of the purchase money. The Nag defendants repudiated the claim as unfounded. During the pendency of the trial in the Court of first instance, the plaintiff and his brothers arrived at a settlement on the 22nd March, 1916. The terms of the compromise were that the plaintiff would get a decree declaring his title to the one-fourth share, that the plaintiff would pay to his brothers in two instalments Rs. 195 as the value of the share as also the amount of costs of the suit, that the first instalment of Rs. 100 would be paid on the 21st April 1916, that the second instalment of Rs. 95 would be paid on the 21st May, 1916, and that if payment was not made on the due dates, the defendants would become-owners of the entire property. The petition of compromise was filed in Court on the same date and a preliminary decree was made thereon by consent of parties. No money, however, was paid by the plaintiff on either of the dates mentioned; but on the 22nd May, 1916, be applied be the Court for extension of time, explaining that what had prevented performance of his part of the bargain, was, not his laches but the conduct of the defendants. The Court extended the time for payment bill the 21st June, 1916. On that date Rs. 145 was paid and an application made for a further extension of time. On the 5th July, 1916, the balance due was deposited and accepted. The defendants contended that the plaintiff had forfeited his rights under the compromise and the consent decree, and that the Court had no authority to extend the time under Section 148 of the CPC. The objection was overruled on the 4th August 1916 and the preliminary decree was made absolute on the 5th September, 1916. Upon appeal the District Judge has reversed that decision and has dismissed the suit on the ground that Section 143 of the CPC had no application and that where the time for performance has been fixed by a consent order, the time cannot be enlarged except by consent. The plaintiff has now appealed to this Court and has argued that although Section 148 of the CPC might not in terms apply, the trial Court was competent on principles of equity, to afford relief against forfeiture, even though the time for performance had been fixed originally by consent of parties and a consent decree made on the basis thereof. The question raised is by no means free from difficulty and requires careful examination.
2. Two principles are well-settled with regard to the nature and operation of constant decrees.
3. In the first place, there is high authority for the proposition that a consent decree is just as binding on the parties thereto as a decree after a contentions trial; In re-South American and Meziean Co. (1); The Belleairn (2); Jenkins v. Robertson (3); Thomas v. Moore, (4); Irish Land Com. v. Ryan (5); This rule has been repeatedly recognised and applied in Indian Courts; Nickolas v. Asphar (6); Rajlakshmi v. Ratyayani (7); Fate Chand v. Naraing Das (8); Amrita Sundari v. Serajuddin (9); Venkata Perumal v. Thatha (10); Tiruvamabla v. Chinna (11). In the second place, it is equally well-settled that consent decree cannot have greater validity than the compromise itself. As was observed by the Court of appeal in Hudderfield Banking Co. v. Lister (12), the real truth of the matter is that a conisent order is a mere creature of the agreement, and if greater sanctity were attributed to it than to the original agreement itself, it would be to give the branch an existence which is independent of the tree. To use the language of Kay, L. J. the consent order is only the order of the Court carrying out the agreement between the parties. The same idea was expressed in different terms when Parka, J. said in Wentworth v. Button (13), that “the contract of the parties is not the less a contract and subject to the ??? of a contract, because there is superadded the command of the Judge.” This statement was quoted with approval by Erle, C.J in Lievesley v. Gilmore (14); and by Chitty, J. in Conolan v. Leyland (15); The doctrine has been recognised and applied in a long series of cases in this court; Rajlakshmi v. Katyayani , Kshetramoni v. Amodini (16); Keshab Panda v. Bhobani Panda (17); Umeshananda v. Mohendra (18); Lal Bihari v. Nogendra Nath (19); Amrita Sundari v. Serajuddin ; Galttaun v. Umesh Chandra (20).
4. From the second of the two principles enunciated above Jenkins, C.J in Krishnabai v. Harigovind (21) drew the conclusion that where the consant decree gives effect to an agreement which embodies a right be forfeiture, the Court, in the exercise of its equitable jurisdiction, is competent be grant such relief against forfeiture as it might have granted it there had been no consent decree and a suit had been instituted to enforce the ???. It was pointed out that as ??? the Order 23, rule 3 of the CPC the decree is to be in accordance with the agreement, it cannot be deemed to have altered the relations of the parties as they existed under the agreement; and as it was an incident of those relations that the right of forfeiture was subject be relief, that incident must still apply when those relations are established by a decree passed in accordance with the agreement. This coincides with the view previously expressed by the Madras High Court in Nagappa…(Counter-Petitioner No. 1) v. Venkat Rao…(Petitioner) .* (22) & (23); and Lakshman v. Rangamma (24) followed in Venkata Perumal v. Thatha ; Beaman, J. amplified the same point of view when he stated, referring to the decision G.N.W Railway Co. v. Charlebois (25), that by private agreement converted into a decree, parties could not empower themselves to do what they could have done by private agreement alone. This logically leads to the conclusion that the Court could not be compelled to anforaa the agreement unquestioningly and literally; the decree is to be deemed, so long as it stands, as only the indisputable correct presentment of the contract, subject necessarily to the incidents of such a contract which include equitable relief against a tort elbure as not the least important and well established. A party to a conbtacb embodied in a consent dearas cannot be held to have renounced any incidental advantages or equitable reliefs, of which, upon the ??? of the contract itself as presenbed in the decree, he might ordinarily have claimed the benefit: Venkata Pemmal v. Thatha .
5. In Krishnabai v. Hari Govind , the right to forfeiture was contained in a consent decree whereby the status of landlord and tenant was established between the plaintiff and defendant; and the principle ennnicaied therein has been applied in subsequent cases bebween landlords and tenants, as in Balambhat v. Vinayah (26), Surendranath Banerjee v. Secretary of State (27), Thayyammalaehi v. Bajali (28) It is plain, however, from the judgments of ???, C.J and Beaman, J. in Kirshna ??? v. Hari Govind , that the principle enunciated therein was not intended to be restricted to cases where the relationship of landlord and tenant is created or recognised by the decree. An examination of the cases in the reports shews that the doctrine of the applicability of the principle of relief against forfeiture to consent decrees is of very extensive application and has been at least twice recognised by the Judicial Committee. The principle was invoked as early as 1857 by the Sudder Dewani Adalot in the case of Ramgopal Mookerjee v. Masseyk (29), where an agreement had been made for the settlement of 3rd between A. and C. This agreement recited that C was indebted to A in a certain sum which C agreed to pay, upon a remission by A of part of his claim, by two instalments as specified dates. The agreement then provided that if default was made by C in payment of the instalments, the remitted money was to be held due to A by C and secured upon certain property in addition to the personal liability of C. The agreement was made the foundation of the decree in the suit. Default was made on the payment of the instalments, whereupon A brought an action against C to recover the sum remitted. C resisted the claim on the ground that the default, it any, was not attributable to laches on his part but was due to accident and that in the circumstances he was entitled to relief against forfeiture. A Full Bench of the Sudder Dewani Adalat upheld this contention. The case was then taken on appeal to the Judicial Committe; Ramgopal Mookerjea v. Masseyk (30). Lord Kingsdown, in an elaborate judgment, reviewed the circumstances of the case and held that the conduct of the parties justified the great of relief against forfeiture to the defendant. A similar view was adopted by the Judicial Committee in the case of Balkrishen Das v. Run Bahadur Singh (31). the remarks made therein show that consent decrees were assumed to be subject to the application of the principle of relief against forfeiture, although it was ultimately held that in the events which had happened, relief should not be granted against the forfeiture incurred under the clause contained in the consent decree for the payment of sums of money in instalments. The same view was adopted by this Court in the case of Jamir Fakir v. Ramlal (32), where money was payable on a specified date under a consent decree and forfeiture was to ensue in default of punctual payment. Illustrations of the application of this principle will be found in some recent decisions of the Madras High Court. Thus, in Anna Sheikh v. Vadi (33), relief was granted against forfeiture under a consent decree which provided that the defendant should give up possession of the land decreed to him on his failure to pay the plain-biff a sum certain on a date fixed. This was followed in the case of Bheema v. Bommini (34), where also the compromise decree provided that the plaintiff should recover the property in suit unless the defendant paid into Court a certain sum of money within a certain date. To the same effect is the decision in Ramayanam v. Enamandra (35), where the consent decree in a suit by a Hindu widow for recovery of land from the reversioners of her husband provided that she should obtain possession, unless the defendants punctually paid into Court a prescribed amount as maintenance within a specified period. It was ruled that time was not of the essence of the contract and that relief should to granted against forfeiture on the ground that the power of the Court to grant relief against the enforcement of a penal clause is not confined to contracts between landlords and tenants incorporated in a compromise decree but extends to compromise decrees generally. The substance of the matter then is that the circumstance that a consent decree has been passed on the basis of a compromise, does not cost the jurisdiction of the Court to grant relief against forfeiture; the Court must determine, whether, on equitable grounds, relief would have been granted against forfeiture, if it had been called upon to enforce the agreement itself. An exhaustive enumeration of all the classes of cases where Courts of equity have granted relief against forfeiture, need not be attempted here. It is sufficient to point out that the general principle just enunciated explains and justifies the decisions in Uttam v. Khetra Nath (36); Harakh Singh v. Saheb Singh (37); Chandrabala v. Probodh Chandra (38), and Shashibhushan v. Charusila (39), which uniformly recognise the principle that time is of the essence of the agreement, when, in the course of proceedings by the judgment-debtor to set aside an execution sale, a compromise is made among the decree-holder, judgment-debtor and execution-purchaser that on payment of the judgment debt within a prescribed period, the sale shall stand cancelled, while upon failure to make such payment the sale shall stand confirmed. In such cases, as the parties intended in the first conception of the agreement to make time the essence of the contract, the Court would not be competent to extend the time, except by consent of all the parties concerned. On the other hand, as we have seen, time has not been deemed to be of the essence of the contract, when the agreement is for the payment of money on a prescribed date, whether upon default of payment on that data money or land is forfeited. We are not unmindful that in Raju v. Vithal (40) and Lachiram v. Jana (41) Scott, C.J who had been a party to the decision in Balambhat v. Vinayak , strictly applied the dictum of North, J. in Australian Machine Co. v. Walter (42), that a consent decree can only be varied by consent, expressed himself in favour of restriction of the rule to cases of landlords and tenants and declined to treat it as applicable to cases of vendors and purchasers. In this connection, it must be remembered that the judgment of Scctt, C.J in Burjorjee v. Jamshed (43), where he had held that time was of the essence of the contract in agreements for the sale of land had not yet been reversed by the Judicial Committee: Jamset v. Burjorji (44). It is, however, well-settled now by the decision of ??? Judicial Committee that in cases of ??? performance of contracts to sail real estate equity which governs the rights of the parties looks, not at the letter but at the substance of the agreement, in order to ascertain whether the parties, notwithstanding that they named a specific time within which completion was to take place, really and in substance intended more than that it should take place within a reasonable time. This accords with the doctrine formulated by Lord Cairns in Tilley v. Thomas (45) and by Lord Atkinson and Lord Parker in Stickny v. Keeble (46). See also In re Dagenham Dcck Co. (47); Mahadeo Pro ad v. Narain Chandra (48). We may add that we are not concerned here with the question of the right of a Court to grant relief against forfeiture under a decree which is not by consent, as in Sajiadi Begam v. Dilawar Husain (49) or under a decree made in accordance with statutory provisions which reserve power to the Court to grant an extension of time: Bodh Narain v. Mahomed Moofa (50), Akkach v. Aminuddi (51). We hold accordingly, first, that in the case before us, the jurisdiction of the trial Court to grant relief against forfeiture was not ousted by the circumstance that the agreement had been followed by a consent decree and, secondly, that the nature of the agreement was such as entitled the Court to grant relief against forficture on equitable grounds. The view taken by the District Judge that as the agreement had orystsllized into a decree, the trial Court was deprived of its power to grant relief cannot be supported. It has not been argued here that if the authority of the trial Court to grant relief against forfeiture were deemed established, its decision could be successfully challenged on the ground that the exercise of its discretion had been so manifestly erroneous as to justify the interference of a Court of appeal; and, plainly, the question could not be usefully discussed from that point ??? in a Court of second appeal which ??? Act investigate the facts.
6. The result is that this appeal is allowed; the decree of the District Judge set aside and that of the Court of first instance restored. There will be no order for costs either here or before the District Judge.
Fletcher, J.:— I agree.
7. Appeal allowed.