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  • (Art. 145 of Act IX of 1871 and Art. 144 of Act XV of 1877 and Act IX of 1908).
  • Art. 143 (Arc. 142 of Act XV of 1877 and Act IX of 1908);
  • Art. 143 of Act IX of 1871 (Art; 142 of the present Act)
  • Art. 144 of Act XV of 1877 and Act IX of 1908,
  • Art. 144 of the Limitation Act XV of 1877
  • Madras Forest Act (Madras Act V of 1882).
  • Art. 144 (Art. 145 of Act IX of 1871).
  • Art. 143 or 145 of Act IX of 1871),
  • Art. 142 of the Limitation Act,
  • Art. 145 of Act IX of 1871,
  • Limitation Act IX of 1871.
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  • (Art. 145 of Act IX of 1871 and Art. 144 of Act XV of 1877 and Act IX of 1908).
  • Art. 143 (Arc. 142 of Act XV of 1877 and Act IX of 1908);
  • Art. 143 of Act IX of 1871 (Art; 142 of the present Act)
  • Art. 144 of Act XV of 1877 and Act IX of 1908,
  • Art. 144 of the Limitation Act XV of 1877
  • Madras Forest Act (Madras Act V of 1882).
  • Art. 144 (Art. 145 of Act IX of 1871).
  • Art. 143 or 145 of Act IX of 1871),
  • Art. 142 of the Limitation Act,
  • Art. 145 of Act IX of 1871,
  • Limitation Act IX of 1871.
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a suit for recovery of possession and a declaration of title to disputed land. The Plaintiffs and Defendants were putnidars under owners of Touzis No. 92 and 14 respectively, both Touzis being in the same village. Plaintiffs claimed the land as part of Touzi No. 92; Defendants claimed it as part of Touzi No. 14.

At first instance the trial Court held that the Plaintiff had failed to prove both title and possession and dismissed the suit. On appeal the District Judge found that the Plaintiff's title was proved but that the Plaintiff failed to establish possession within twelve years and therefore dismissed the appeal. The Plaintiff (Appellant) appealed to the present Court.

Relevant factual allegations include the Plaintiffs' claim that they were in possession of the land (khas patit) and that the Defendant excavated a tank on the land 4 or 5 years before the suit, thereby dispossessing them; the trial Court found the tank had been excavated more than 12 years before the suit and also found evidence that before the excavation the land was under cultivation by named persons and exchanged by the Defendant. The courts below found the evidence of possession on both sides to be unsatisfactory or not satisfactorily proved in parts.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, once the Plaintiff's title is proved, the onus shifts to the Defendant to show that the Plaintiff's claim is barred by limitation (i.e., that the Defendant or those through whom he claims had adverse possession for 12 years).
  2. Whether, having regard to the nature of the land (e.g., waste, jungle, or diluviated land), the burden of proof should be placed on the Defendant.
  3. Whether, where evidence on both sides is found to be unsatisfactory, there is a presumption that possession follows title (i.e., presumption in favour of Plaintiff when title proved but possession evidence conflicted).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • Once the Plaintiff's title has been established, the onus should be on the Defendant to prove that the Plaintiff's claim is barred by limitation due to the Defendant's adverse possession for 12 years.
  • Given the nature of the land, the onus should in any case have been placed on the Defendant.
  • Because the evidence on both sides was found to be unsatisfactory, a presumption should have been applied that possession follows title (i.e., possession should follow the proven title).

Respondent/Defendant's Position (as reflected in the opinion)

  • The Defendant claimed the disputed land as part of Touzi No. 14 and admitted excavating a tank on the land (asserting it as part of his patni mahal), an act said by Plaintiffs to have dispossessed them.
  • The defence (as accepted by the trial Court) included a finding that the tank was excavated more than twelve years prior to the suit and that before excavation the land had been under cultivation by certain named persons and exchanged by the Defendant.
  • The Defendant therefore relied on possession and acts of occupation (including cultivation and exchange) to defeat the Plaintiffs' claim, with contention that the suit was barred by limitation.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Moharaja Koowar Nitrasur Singh v. Nund Lal Singh Where plaintiff is out of possession (having been dispossessed), the onus is on the plaintiff to prove possession and dispossession within twelve years (Reg. III of 1793, sec.16 discussed). Cited as an early authority establishing that possession issue is independent of title and that a plaintiff seeking to disturb long possession must prove dispossession within 12 years.
Rajah Saheb Perlilad Sein v. Moharaja Rajendra Kishore Affirmed principle that plaintiff alleging dispossession must prove possession up to the date of dispossession or that cause of action accrued within the statutory time; plaintiff bound to show right of action not barred by lapse of time. Used to support the view that the plaintiff must satisfy the court that the right of action is not time-barred; reaffirmation of the burden on plaintiff in dispossession cases.
Beer Chunder Joobraj v. The Deputy Collector of Bhooloah Essential for plaintiff (appellant) in ejectment to prove possession within twelve years before suit and title to possession; burden rests with the appellant/plaintiff. Reinforces the general principle that the onus of proof lies on the plaintiff in ejectment suits where defendants are in possession.
Mohima Ghander Mozumdar v. Mohesh Chander Neogi Where plaintiffs were dispossessed earlier and defendants in long possession, the onus is on the plaintiffs to prove possession within 12 years prior to suit; plaintiffs must recover by strength of own title. Relied on as a key decision affirming that plaintiffs in ejectment suits must prove possession within 12 years even when title is proved.
Mohammad Amanullah Khan v. Kadan Singh If a claim comes within Art. 142, adverse possession by defendant is not required to be proved in order to maintain a defence (i.e., burden on plaintiff to prove dispossession within 12 years). Accepted as another instance where the Judicial Committee held the burden rests on the plaintiff under Art. 142.
Rani Hemanta Kumaree v. Moharaja Jogadindra Nath Roy Under Act XV of 1877, reaffirmed that it is for the plaintiff in an ejectment suit to prove possession prior to alleged dispossession. Cited as a later affirmation (1906) of the same principle set out in earlier Privy Council decisions; used to show continuity of the rule.
Karan Singh v. Pakar Ali Khan Explained distinction under Limitation Act IX of 1871: some cases limitation runs from cause of action, others from when possession of defendant became adverse; decision dealt with Art. 145 (corresponding to Art. 144/145 family). Distinguished as a case falling under Art. 145 (Art. 144 family), not Art. 142; Court used it to clarify that it does not alter the rule applicable to Art. 142 cases.
Radha Gobinda Roy v. Inglis In the particular facts (land forming part of beel/bed-of-lake), constructive possession of rightful owner continued while submerged; on such facts the onus was on defendant to prove adverse possession for 12 years, but observations were to be taken in context. Used to show this case fell under Art. 144 family and that its observations are fact-specific (diluviated/beel lands); Court stressed contextual reading and did not treat it as changing Art. 142 rule.
Secretary of State for India v. Chelikani Rama Rao Claimants seeking title by adverse possession (in afforestation/reserved forest context) bear onus to prove adverse possession for statutory period (extended to 60 years by Art.149); claimant in position of plaintiff must prove possession for requisite period. Cited and analysed; Court treated it as consistent with prior authorities and applicable to claimants seeking title by adverse possession rather than altering the rule for dispossession cases under Art. 142.
Kumar Basant Roy v. Secretary of State for India Held that annual cultivation of parts of diluviated land that emerge seasonally does not amount to dispossession of true owner under Art. 142; constructive possession of true owner while diluviated continues; examined what constitutes dispossession for such lands. Used to show that this authority concerns what constitutes dispossession for diluviated lands and does not support shifting burden onto defendant in Art. 142 cases.
Mahomed Ali Khan v. Khaja Abdul Guny Full Bench decision: under former and present Limitation Acts, where cause of action is dispossession, plaintiff must prove possession and dispossession within the prescribed period; burden on plaintiff in suits for possession where cause is dispossession. Cited as a Full Bench decision consistent with Privy Council decisions, corroborating the view that plaintiffs must prove possession within 12 years.
Mirza Shamsher Bahadur v. Munshi Kunj Behary Lal Stated as settled law that a plaintiff in an action for ejectment must prove both title and possession within 12 years of the suit. Relied upon to show that the principle is accepted in this Court's jurisprudence and treated as settled law.
Raja Shiva Prosad Singh v. Hira Singh Full Bench held presumption that possession follows title can be raised only where evidence is equally strong on both sides; such presumption cannot be used to bolster evidence unworthy of credit. Used to support the Court's conclusion on the limited circumstances in which a presumption that possession follows title may be invoked.
Kali Charan Sahoo v. Secretary of State for India (Illustrative case) Where rightful owner proves possession until land becomes incapable of enjoyment (e.g., submerged), constructive possession continues until land emerges; constructive possession not available to a wrongdoer. Included among authorities illustrating constructive possession for diluviated/submerged land and limitations of presumption for wrongdoers.
Monomohan Roy v. Mathura Mohan Roy One of the cases illustrating the constructive possession principle for lands not capable of enjoyment in the usual mode (e.g., submerged lands). Referenced as an illustrative authority for the constructive possession principle in special factual situations.
Raj Kumar Roy v. Gobind Chandra Roy Illustrative decision where possession of the plaintiff was held to be proved in context of lands not readily susceptible to usual enjoyment. Used as an example where possession was satisfactorily shown in the character of the land.
Secretary of State v. Krishnamoni Gupta Considered constructive possession in the context of submerged or diluviated land; discussed continuity and revival of constructive possession. Cited for the principle that constructive possession may continue while land is not capable of use and enjoyment; relevant to distinguishing types of land.
Runjeet Ram Pandey v. Goburdhan Ram Pandey Where evidence is strong on both sides, the ordinary presumption that possession follows title may be considered and can aid in assessing probabilities. Relied upon to explain the limited use of the presumption that possession follows title when evidence is contestable but not wholly unworthy of credit.
Dharam Singh v. Har Prosad; Babu Kasturi Singh v. Raj Kumar Bala Bissen Pragash Narain Referenced in connection with application/limits of the presumption that possession follows title. Used to illustrate the jurisprudence on when presumptions may be considered; cited in support of Court's approach to conflicting evidence.
Thakur Singh v. Bhogeraj Singh; Lala Singh v. Mir Latif Hossain; Fakira Lal Singh v. Munshi Ram Charan Authorities cited for the proposition that the presumption does not apply where evidence is equally unworthy of reliance on both sides. Invoked to show limits of presumption and when it cannot be applied.
Watson v. The Government of Bengal Illustrated acts (cutting or preserving wood, gathering wax or wild honey, collecting stick lac) as evidence of possession in jungle lands. Used to support the description of what acts may constitute possession for jungle or waste lands.
Leigh v. Jack (per Cotton, L.J.) Quoted for the proposition that a man may cease to use land because it cannot be used (e.g., submerged) and that constructive possession continues until dispossession. Quoted to support the principle of constructive possession when land is incapable of use/enjoyment.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by first identifying the relevant Limitation Act provision: the facts placed the case under Article 142 of the Limitation Act (suits where the plaintiff while in possession has been dispossessed or has discontinued possession). The Court emphasised the established line of authorities from the Privy Council and domestic benches which hold that where a plaintiff was in possession and has been dispossessed, the plaintiff must prove that he was in possession and was dispossessed within twelve years of the suit. The Court treated this as the governing principle.

The Court examined authorities relied upon by the Appellant that appeared to suggest a different rule. It carefully distinguished those decisions: several of them (e.g., Karan Singh, Radha Gobinda Roy, Chelikani Rama Rao, Kumar Basant Roy) were held to fall under other articles of the Limitation Act (the Art. 144/145 family) or to be fact-specific (for example, involving diluviated or newly-formed land such as beels or islands). The Court concluded those authorities do not displace the longstanding rule applicable to Art. 142 cases.

The Court then considered whether the nature of the land in the present case (claimed as waste/khas patit) alters the onus. It set out the established principle that the nature of the land affects the character of acts of ownership to be expected: where land is incapable of ordinary enjoyment (e.g., submerged/diluviated lands), constructive possession of a rightful owner may be presumed to continue until the land re-emerges or there is actual dispossession; for jungle or waste lands, acts such as grazing, marking boundaries, cutting wood or gathering produce may constitute possession. Nevertheless, the Court reiterated that these are not exceptions to the rule that a dispossessed plaintiff must normally prove possession within twelve years.

Turning to the facts, the Court noted that the Plaintiff admitted in the plaint that a tank was excavated by the Defendant 4 or 5 years before the suit (alleged dispossession). The trial Court, however, found the excavation to have occurred more than 12 years before the suit; if so, limitation would bar the claim. The District Judge agreed the suit was barred but commented that the best evidence about the excavation had not been produced, suggesting some factual uncertainty. Evidence on both sides as to possession prior to excavation was found unsatisfactory by the courts below.

The Appellant's contention that a presumption that "possession follows title" should be applied because evidence was unsatisfactory was considered. The Court explained that such a presumption can arise only where evidence on both sides is equally strong; it cannot be invoked to bolster evidence found to be unworthy of credit. Moreover, if the Plaintiff asserts acts of ownership (as here, grazing) and those acts are disbelieved, he cannot then rely on the presumption because his own case negates the factual circumstances that would support the presumption.

Applying these principles to the present record—where both parties adduced evidence of acts of possession and the courts below disbelieved the Plaintiff's witnesses (noting lack of independence and interest)—the Court concluded that there was no basis for a presumption in favour of the Plaintiff and that the Plaintiff had not discharged the burden of proving possession within twelve years.

Holding and Implications

Appeal dismissed.

Immediate effect on the parties: the Appellant's appeal fails and the dismissal of the suit for recovery of possession is affirmed (with costs). The Court applied established law that in suits falling under Article 142 (dispossession cases) the plaintiff, even where title is established, must prove possession within twelve years of the suit; the onus does not shift to the defendant merely because title has been proved.

The opinion treats the rule as settled by a long line of authorities and distinguishes cases said to suggest otherwise as falling under different articles or as fact-specific; it does not purport to create a novel precedent but reaffirms the existing legal position on burden of proof and the limited circumstances in which a presumption that possession follows title may be invoked.

Source: Summary prepared exclusively from the provided opinion text. No information has been added beyond that text.

    Rakhal Chandra Ghose v. Durgadas Samanta

    The Judgment of the Court was as follows:—

    This appeal arises out of a suit for recovery of possession of the land in dispute on declaration of the Plaintiffs' title thereto. The Plaintiffs and the Defendants are putnidars under the owners of Touzis 92 and 14 respectively, both the Touzis being situate in the same village. The Plaintiffs claimed the land as appertaining to Touzi No. 92 while the Defendants claimed it as part of Touzi No. 14.

    The Court of first instance held that the Plaintiff had failed to prove both title and possession and dismissed the suit. The learned District Judge on appeal found that Plaintiff's title was proved, but that he failed to prove possession within 12 years and accordingly dismissed the suit. The Plaintiff has appealed to this Court.

    It is contended on behalf of the Appellant first that the title having been found to be with the Plaintiffs the onus was upon the Defendant to prove that the claim was barred by limitation by reason of adverse possession on his part. Secondly that in any case having regard to the nature of the land the onus should have been placed on the Defendant. Thirdly that the evidence on both sides having been found to be unsatisfactory, there was a presumption that possession follows title.

    With regard to the first contention it is to be observed that Plaintiffs alleged that they were in possession of the land which was khas patit, and that the Defendant excavated a tank on the land in spite of the object ions of the Plaintiff, 4 or 5 years before the suit, claiming the same as part of his patni mahal, and they were accordingly dispossessed from the land. The case therefore clearly was one under Art. 142 of the Limitation Act. It is well-settled that where the Plaintiff while in possession has been dispossessed and is out of possession at the date of suit …. the onus is upon him to prove that he was in possession and was dispossessed within 12 years of the suit.

    It is contended, however on behalf of the Appellants that some of the authorities show that where Plaintiffs' title is proved, the onus is upon the Defendant to show that the Plaintiff lost that title by adverse possession for 12 years on the part of the Defendant. It is necessary therefore to examine the authorities on the point.

    One of the earliest cases is that of Moharaja Koowar Nitrasur Singh v. Nund Lal Singh . In that case, it appears that decrees were made in the year 1816 in suits respecting disputed boundaries of certain mouzahs in two Zemindaries, and the boundary line was determined. In 1845 a suit was brought by the representatives of one of the parties in the above suits to recover land alleged to be part of one of these mouzas, which land, it was admitted by the Plaintiff that the Defendants had been in possession of since the year 1834. It was pleaded in defence first that the land claimed was within the boundary declared by the decrees of 1816 to belong to the Defendants; and secondly that the Plaintiff or those under whom he claimed had been out of possession for upwards of twelve years and that the cause of action was consequently barred by Reg. III of 1793, sec. 16. Lord Justice Turner in delivering the judgment of the Judicial Committee observed that the issue of possession is the first to be considered in this case and that it is wholly independent of the boundary question. The Appellant is seeking to disturb the possession, “admitted to have existed for about eleven years, of Defendants, who insist on a possession of much longer duration as a statutory bar to the suit. It clearly lies on him to remove that bar by satisfactory proof that the cause of action accrued to him (for that is the way in which the regulation puts it) on a dispossession within twelve years next before the commencement of the suit; and, therefore, that he, or some person through whom he claims, was in possession during that period. No proof of anterior title such as would he involved in the decision of the boundary question in his favour, can relieve him from the burden, or shift it upon his adversaries by compelling them to prove the time and manner of dispossession. The lands in question may have been part of Mouzah Gopaulpore, and as such may have been enjoyed by his ancestor and yet he may have lost, by lapse of time, his right to recover them. Their Lordships, therefore, propose to consider in the first place, what evidence there is that the Appellant, or any person through whom he claims, was in possession of the lands in question at any time within twelve years next before the commencement of the suit.”

    In 1869 in the case of Rajah Saheb Perlilad Sein v. Moharaja Rajendra Kishore , the Judicial Committee affirmed the same principle. Their Lordships' observed: “The Appellant comes into Court admitting upon the face of the plaint that he is out of possession and haa been so for more than ten years; and the date which he assigns to his dispossession is the 20th of March 1881. Upon the issue as settled by the Court it lay upon him to establish that he was in possession up to that date; or, failing in that, that the date at which he or some former proprietors of Ramnuggur was last in possession is consistent with a right to institute this suit. Act VIII of 1859, sec. 32 shows that the Plaintiff is bound to satisfy the Court, that his right of action is not barred by lapse of time.

    In 1870 again in the case of Beer Chunder Joobraj v. The Deputy Collector of Bhooloah where the Plaintiff brought a suit to recover immoveable property which was in the possession of the Defendant since 1845 and at the time of the institution of the suit it was held by their Lordships that “it was essential for the Appellant (the Plaintiff in that case) to have proved two things—first, possession within twelve years before his suit, and secondly, title to possession … the onus of proof rests with the Appellant.”

    The question again came up before the Judicial Committee in 1888 in the case of Mohima Ghander Mozumdar v. Mohesh Chander Neogi (4). There the Plaintiffs had shown that they formerly were proprietors of the lands to which they alleged title and from which they claimed to oust the Defendants, but they had been dispossessed or their possession had been discontinued some years before the suit was brought by them, and the lands were occupied by the Defendants who denied their title. The Plaintiffs were found to be the rightful owners, but their Lordships observed that the question for decision was not “whether or not the title of the Defendants was created just after the disturbance or otherwise but when were the Plaintiffs dispossessed or when did they discontinue possession” …. “This in reality is what in England would be called an action for ejectment, and in all actions for ejectment where the Defendants are admittedly in possession, and a fortiori where, as in this particular case, they had been in possession for a great number of years, and under a claim of title, it lies upon the Plaintiff to prove his own title. The Plaintiff must recover by the strength of his own title, and it is the opinion of their Lordships, that in this case, the onus is thrown upon the Plaintiffs to prove their possession prior to the time when they were admittedly dispossessed, and at some time within 12 years before the commencement of the suit, namely, for the two or three years prior to the year 1875 or 1874, and that it does not lie upon the Defendants to show that in fact the Plaintiffs were so dispossessed.”

    In the next year (1889), in the case of Mohammad, Amanullah Khan v. Kadan Singh (5), the Judicial Committee again held that if a claim comes within the terms of Art. 142, adverse possession is not required to be proved in order to maintain a defence.

    Lastly in 1906 under Act XV of 1877 in the case of Rani Hemanta Kumaree v. Moharaja Jogadindra Nath Roy (6) the Judicial Committee affirmed the same principle. Their Lordships observed:—“The difference between the admitted possession and the period of limitation being so narrow (one year) the question of onus is important: and their Lordships adhere to the principle stated in the Privy Council case cited by the learned Judge in the High Court [Mohima Chander Mozundar v. Mohesh Chander Neogi ], and hold that it is for the Appellant as Plaintiff in a suit for ejectment to prove possession prior to the dispossession which he alleges.”

    In all these cases it was clearly held that where the Plaintiff has been dispossessed and the suit is one for recovery of possession the onus is upon the Plaintiff to prove that he was in possession within 12 years of the suit.

    It is contended however that a different principle has been laid down in some other cases, viz., Karan Singh v. Pakar Ali Khan , Radha Gobinda Roy v. Inglis , Secretary of State for India v. Chelikani Rama Rao (9) and Kumar Basant Roy v. Secretary of State for India (10).

    In Karan Singh v. Pakar Ali Khan their Lordships in dealing with the contention that the Plaintiff must prove that he was in possession within 12 years held that it wars not correct under the Limitation Act IX of 1871. Their Lordships observed:—“It would have been correct under the old law, under which the suit must have been brought within 12 years from the time of the cause of action but under the present law it may be brought within 12 years from the time when the possession of the Defendant or of some person through whom he claims became adverse to the Plaintiff.”

    It was a case under Art. 145 of Act IX of 1371 (see p. 1 of the report) corresponding to Art. 144 of Act XV of 1877 and Act IX of 1908, and there can be no doubt that the suit was dealt with by the Judicial Committee as coming under Art. 145 of Act IX of 1871 because that article deals with cases where the limitation runs from the date when possession of the Defendant became adverse to the Plaintiff. Under Act XIV of 1859, the period of limitation for suits for the recovery of moveable property or of any interest in immoveable property to which no other provisions of the Act applied (there were no other provisions in the Act similar to those of Art. 143 or 145 of Act IX of 1871), is 12 years from the time when the cause of action arose; so that all suits whether they came under Art. 143 or 145 of Act IX of 1871 had to be brought under sec. 15 of Act XIV of 1859 within 12 years of the time when the cause of action arose. Under Act IX of 1871 for the first time a distinction was drawn between (1) suits for possession when the Plaintiff while in possession has been dispossessed or has discontinued the possession and (2) suits for possession of immoveable property or any interest therein not otherwise provided for. In the first class of cases, the starting point was the date of the possession or discontinuance and came under Art. 143 (Arc. 142 of Act XV of 1877 and Act IX of 1908); in the second class of cases the starting point was the date when the possession of the Defendant became adverse to the Plaintiff (Art. 145 of Act IX of 1871 and Art. 144 of Act XV of 1877 and Act IX of 1908). Karan Singh's case fell ‘under Art. 145 of Act IX of 1871, and the. Judicial Committee was merely referring to the change in the law stated above. Their Lordships did not or could not have laid down that the law of limitation had been in any way changed so far as suits coming under Art. 143 of Act IX of 1871 (Art; 142 of the present Act) were concerned, as the reference “12 years from the time when the possession of the Defendant came adverse to the Plaintiff” unmistakably shows that their Lordships are dealing with cases under Art. 144 (Art. 145 of Act IX of 1871). It is unnecessary to further discuss this matter which is clear enough, but we may refer to the Full Bench decision in Mahomad Ali Khan v. Khaja Abdul Guny Which was a case under Act IX of 1871, and where it was settled: “There is no doubt as to the general rule that under the former Limitation Act, the cause of action, and under the present law, the event from which limitation is declared to run, must have occurred within the prescribed period, and that it lies on the Plaintiff to show this. Accordingly, where the suit is for possession, and the cause of action is dispossession, it has more than once been held by the Privy Council that the Plaintiff is bound to prove possession and dispossession within 12 years.”

    The case of Radha Gobinda Ray v. Inglis was also considered by the Full Bench in Mahomed Ali Khan's case . Wilson, J., observed “We do not understand that case as establishing the broad proposition contained in the head-note, which would be in conflict with the earlier decisions of the same tribunal.”

    In that case, their Lordships having disposed of the other questions which were raised say: “The question remains whether the disputed land had or had not been occupied by the Defendant for 12 years before the suit was instituted, so as to give him a title against the Plaintiff by the operation of Statute of Limitation. On this question undoubtedly, the onus is on the Defendant. The Plaintiff has proved his title, the Defendant must prove that the Plaintiff has lost it by reason of his, the Defendant's, adverse possession.” But the land in dispute in that case had formed part of the bed of a beel or lake; the title to the beel and its bed was found to be in the Plaintiff, and he had been in possession so long as the land was covered with water. The beel gradually dried up, and the Defendant occupied the land so formed. There was a controversy as to when the land dried up and the Defendant occupied the land. It was found by the High Court that the land had been formed quite recently within six or seven years or at all events within less than 12 years before the suit and their Lordships held that “if the High Court are right in that finding, of course the statute cannot apply.” The constructive possession of the rightful owner continued till within 12 years of the suit and the Defendant relied upon adverse possession for more than 12 years. The observations with regard to the onus of proof quoted above must be taken with the facts of the case.

    Much reliance is placed upon the case of The Secretary of State for India v. Chelikani Rama Rao . The disputed lands in that case formed part of islands which had formed in the bed of the sea within the territorial limits, and which therefore belonged to the Crown, and the lands were constituted a reserved forest under the Madras Forest Act (Madras Act V of 1882). The Respondents claimed proprietary rights in the said lands, which were disallowed by the District Judge in a proceeding under the Act, holding that the title being originally in the Crown, the onus was upon the claimants to prove adverse possession for sixty years, and that they had failed to do so. The High Court was of opinion that it rested upon the Crown to show that the possession became adverse to the Crown within sixty years prior to the notification under which the land was constituted a reserved forest. The Judicial Committee held that it was for the claimants to prove that they or their predecessors in title had been in adverse possession for sixty years.

    The principle laid down is consistent with that laid down by the Judicial Committee in previous cases. The claimants in that case were in the position of Plaintiffs, and they claimed a title to the properly by adverse possession. Their Lordships observed: “In their Lordships' opinion objectors to afforestation thus preferring claims are in law in the same position as persons bringing a suit in an ordinary Court of Justice for a declaration of right. To such a situation in the one case, as in the other, their Lordships think that Art. 144 of the Limitation Act XV of 1877 (Sell. II) applies, the period of twelve years thereunder being, however, extended to a period of sixty years by Art. 149. In an ordinary suit for a declaration it cannot be doubted that the onus of establishing possession for the requisite period would rest upon the Plaintiff. In their Lordships' opinion the situation of a claimant under afforestation proceedings is the same upon this point. Reference may be made to Radha Gobinda Roy v. Inglis , decided by this Board.” Referring to the view taken by the High Court that the Crown had to prove that it has a subsisting title by showing that the possession of the claimants commenced or became adverse within the period of limitation their Lordships observed: “Nothing is better settled than that the onus of establishing property by reason of possession for a certain requisite period lies upon the person asserting possession. It is too late in the day to suggest the contrary of this proposition. If it were not’ correct it would be open to the possessor for a year or a day to say: I am here; be your title to the property ever so good, you cannot turn me out until you have demonstrated that the possession of myself and my predecessors was not long enough to fulfil all the legal conditions. Such a singular doctrine can be well illustrated by the case of India, in which the right of the Crown to vast tracts of territory, including not only islands arising from the sea, but great spaces of jungle lands, necessarily not under the close supervision of Government officers, would disappear because there would be no evidence, available to establish the state of possession for sixty years past. It would be contrary to all legal principles thus to permit the squatter to put the owner of the fundamental right to a negative proof upon the point of possession.… In so far as this negatives the duty resting upon the claimants to establish affirmatively their and their predecessors' possession for sixty years, their Lordships' opinion is, as stated, that this is erroneous. But secondly with reference to the ‘subsisting title,’ it appears to their Lordships that nothing further is needed than the acknowledgment of the undisputed fact that these islands formed in the sea belonged to the Crown. That fact is fundamental: until adverse possession against, the Crown is complete, that is to say, is for the period of sixty years, that fundamental fact remains, and that fact forms ‘subsisting title.’ And thirdly it is no part of the obligation of the Crown to fortify its own fundamental right by any inquiry into possession or the acceptance of any onus on that subject.”

    The title of the Crown to the land could not be disputed; the claimants set up a title by adverse possession, and there can be no question that it was upon the Plaintiff who wanted a declaration of his title by adverse possession to prove that he acquired such a title by adverse possession for the statutory period. That is all that was laid down in that case, and the general observations made at p. 204 must be taken with the facts of that case in which the claimants stood in the position of a Plaintiff seeking a declaration of his title to the property. Such a person on the strength of possession for a short period cannot throw upon the Opposite Party the burden of proving that he, the claimant had not been in possession for the statutory-period. We do not think therefore that decision laid down any principle different from that laid down previously in a series of cases by the Judicial Committee.

    It is to be observed that their Lordships while dealing with the case coming under Art. 144, referred to Radha Gobinda Roy v. Inglis which clearly shows that the latter case also was treated as one falling under Art. 144.

    The case of Kumar Basant Roy v. Secretary of State for India , also does not help the contention of the Appellants. There the land was diluviated, and parts of the diluviated land emerged during part of the year. It was held that the annual cultivation of such parts of diluviated lands as emerge during part of the year is not a dispossession of the owner of the lands within Art. 142 of the Limitation Act, and that the constructive possession of lands while diluviated being in the true owner cannot be continuous adverse possession within Art. 144 while it is diluviated during part of every year, and that no rational distinction could be drawn between that case where the re-flooding was seasonal, and Krishnamoni Gupta's case (12), where the lands were sub-merged for several years.

    Their Lordships observed:—“If as their Lordships think, no dispossession occurred, except possibly within twelve years before the commencement of this suit, Art. 144 is the article applicable and not Art. 142. It is not easy to see in the circumstances of a case such as this how conduct insufficient to evidence dispossession of the Plaintiffs can be used to evidence adverse possession available to the Defendants; but be that as it may, in their Lordships' opinion the Defendants' contention resting on Art. 144 fails on another ground.”

    This case therefore is no authority for the proposition that in a case coming under Art. 142, the onus is upon the Defendant. Their Lordships were dealing with the question what constitutes dispossession in cases of diluviated lands coming out of water during part of the year, and the question of adverse possession having regard to the nature of the land and the nature of possession exercised upon the land.

    None of the four cases relied upon by the Appellant, therefore, is any authority for the proposition contended for on behalf of the Appellant.

    It is to be observed that Radha Gobinda Roy v. Inglis was decided in 1880, and that of Karan Singh v. Pakar Ali in 1882. Had those cases intended to lay down any different principle, the Judicial Committee in 1888 in Mohima Chander's case , without even referring to those cases, could not have laid down the principle that the Plaintiff in a suit for ejectment cannot succeed without proving possession within 12 years although his title is proved. They were not referred to evidently because they were cases falling under Art. 144. Mohima Chander's case was expressly followed 18 years afterwards (in 1906) by their Lordships in Rani Hemanta Kumaree's case .

    We do not think it reasonable to hold that the Judicial Committee in Secretary of State v. Chelikani Rama Rao laid down any principle at variance with that enunciated so far back as 1860 in Maharaja Koowar Nitrasur Singh's case , and which was followed in all cases (where the Plaintiff while in possession was dispossessed) up to 1906 in Rani Hemanta Kumaree's case , i.e, for nearly half a century. Even leaving aside the earlier cases, which were decided under the Regulations or Act XIV of 1859 (though as stated above there was no difference in, the law so far as cases coming under Art. 142 are concerned) their Lordships laid down the same principle in Mohima Chander's case , Mohammad Amanullah Khan's case and Rani Hemanta Kumaree's case .

    There is in fact no inconsistency in the decisions of the Privy Council because the decisions relied upon by the Appellant as stated above, show that they were cases not falling under Art. 142 of the Limitation Act, and the contention of the Appellant is based merely upon some general observations in some of the judgments wrenched from the context and the facts of the cases. So far as this Court is concerned, the principle laid down by the earlier Privy Council decisions, and in Mohima Chander Moztmdar's case and Rani Hcmanta Kumaree's case , and the Full Bench decision in Mahomed All Khan v. Khaja Abdul Gunny has always been taken as settled law on the point, and we need only refer to the case of Mirza Shamsher Bahadur v. Munshi Kunj Behary Lal (13), where Mookerjee and Caspersz. JJ., observed:—“It is now firmly settled beyond an probability of controversy. That the Plaintiff in an action for ejectment must not only prove his title but also his possession within 12 years of the suit.” A recent Full Bench of the Patna High Court also, upon a review of the decisions on the point has taken the same view. [See Raja Shiva Prosad Singh v. Hira Singh (14)].

    We are accordingly of opinion that in cases coming under Art. 142, although the Plaintiffs' title is proved the onus is not upon the Defendant to show that the Plaintiff' lost his title by adverse possession on the part of the Defendant.

    The next question is whether the onus of proof is upon the Defendant having regard to the nature of the land, and this brings us to the question as to what the Plaintiff has to prove in order to show that he was in possession within 12 years of the suit. As pointed out by Wilson. J., in the judgment of the Full Bench in Mahomed All Khan's case , possession is not necessarily the same thing as actual user. The nature of the possession to be looked for and the evidence of its continuance must depend upon the character and condition of the land in dispute. Where the land is incapable of actual enjoyment, as in the case of diluvion by a river, if the Plaintiff shows his possession down to the time of the diluvion, his possession is presumed to continue so long as the lands continue to be submerged. The cases of Kali Charan Sahoo v. Secretary of State for India (15) [overruled by Secretary of State v. Krishnamoni in so far as it held that there was constructive possession in favour of a wrong-doer]; Monomohan Roy v. Mathura Mohan Roy , Radha Gobinda Roy v. Inglis and Raj Kumar Roy v. Gobind Chandra Roy , (where however possession of the Plaintiff was held to be proved); Secretary of State v. Krishnamoni Gupta and Kumar Basant Roy v. Secretary of State for India , illustrate the principle that where the rightful owner proves possession until the land goes under water of otherwise becomes wholly incapable of enjoyment in the usual modes, he is deemed to be in constructive possession until the land emerges out of water and becomes capable of enjoyment in the usual modes and he is actually dispossessed by the Defendant. No such presumption, however, arises in the case of a wrong-doer. In Kumar Batsant Roy v. Secretary of State for India , the Judicial Committee observed:—“The Limitation. Act of 1877 does not define the term ‘dispossession,” but its meaning is well-settled. A man may cease to use his land because he cannot use it, since it is under water. He does not thereby discontinue his possession: constructively it continues, until he is dispossessed; and upon the cessation of the dispossession before the lapse of the statutory period, constructively it revives. ‘There can be no discontinuance by absence of use and enjoyment, where the land is not capable of use and enjoyment.’ [Per Cotton, L.J, in Leigh v. Jack (18)]. It seems to follow that there can be no continuance of adverse possession, when the land is not capable of use and enjoyment, so long as such adverse possession must rest on de facto use and occupation. When sufficient time has elapsed to extinguish the old title and start a new one, the new owner's possession of course continues until there is fresh dispossession, and revives as it ceases.”

    In cases where the land is not incapable of enjoyment, but may produce some profit, though trifling in amount and only of occasional occurrence as is often the case with jungle land, it would be unreasonable to look for the same evidence of possession as in the case of a house or a cultivated field. All that can be required is that the Plaintiff should show such acts of ownership as are natural under the existing condition of the land, and in such cases, when he has done this his possession is presumed to continue so long as the state of the land remains unchanged unless he is shown to have been dispossessed. [See Mahomed Ali Khan v. Khaja Abdul Guuy ]. In Watson v. The Government of Bengal (19), Sir Barnes Peacock, C.J, referred to the “cutting or preserving the wood, gathering wax or wild honey, collecting stick lac, etc.” as evidence of possession of jungle lands. In waste lands (and jungle lands also) possession may be exercised by grazing of cattle, putting up boundary marks or fences and the like.

    The cases of diluviated lands or jungle or waste lands, however, are no exception to the general rule that a Plaintiff who is dispossessed and brings a suit for recovery of possession must show that he was in possession within 12 years of the suit. The rule of law as pointed out by the Judicial Committee in Rani Hemanta Kumarec Devi v. Maharajah Jagadindra Nath Rag is that it if for the Plaintiff in a suit for ejectment to prove possession prior to the alleged dispossession. At the same time in this question of possession the initial fact of Plaintiff's title comes, to his aid with greater or less force according to the circumstances established in evidence.

    Bearing the above principles in mind we have to see what the Plaintiff has proved in the present case. The land was asserted by the Plaintiff to be khas patit formerly but it was admitted in the plaint that the Defendant had excavated a tank on the land 1 or 5 years before the suit. The Court of first instance found that the tank was excavated more than 12 years before the suit. Upon that finding there can of course be no question of any presumption in favour of the Plaintiff because, he was ousted from possession 12 years before the suit by the excavation of the tank. The Court of first instance further found that before the excavation of the tank the land was under cultivation of certain persons (Harina and Jala Maihis) with whom the land was exchanged by the Defendant. Had these findings been affirmed by the Court of Appeal below, no question of onus of proof or any presumption could arise. The learned District Judge, however, while agreeing with the Munsif that the suit was barred by limitation observes that the best evidence regarding excavation of the tank had not been produced by the Defendant. It is not clear what he meant, because the excavation of the tank 4 or 5 years before the suit was admitted by the Plaintiff in his plaint, and spoken to by his own witnesses. Probably he meant that the excavation of the tank earlier, and the exchange of land, as set up by the Defendant was not satisfactorily proved, and that the evidence of possession on both sides prior to the excavation of the tank was unsatisfactory. It is contended on behalf of the Appellant that in this conflict of evidence the Court ought to have presumed that possession went with the title. That presumption, however, can arise only where the evidence is equally strong on both sides. In Runjeet Ram Pandey v. Goburdhan Ram Pandey , the Judicial Committee observed:—“Now the ordinary presumption would be that possession went with the title. The presumption cannot of course be of any avail in the presence of clear evidence to the contrary, but where there is strong evidence of possession as there is here on the part of the Respondents opposed by evidence apparently strong also on the part of the Appellant, their Lordships think that in estimating the weight due to the evidence on both sides the presumption may, under the peculiar circumstances of the case be regarded, and that with the aid of it there is stronger probability that the Respondents' case is truer than that of the Appellant.” See also Dharam Singh v. Har Prosad , Babu Kasturi Singh v. Raj Kumar Bala Bissen Pragash Narain (22) and Mirza Shamsher Bahadur v. Munshi Kunj Bchary Lal (the word “unsatisfactory” at p. 280 is evidently a slip). The principle does not apply to a case where the evidence is equally unworthy of reliance on both sides, see Thakur Singh v. Bhogeraj Singh (23), Lala Singh v. Mir Latif Hossain (24) and Fakira Lal Singh v. Munshi Ram Charan (25) (the observations with regard to waste or jungle lands are obiter).

    The question was discussed by a Full Bench of the Patna High Court in the recent case of Raja Shiva Prosad Singh v. Hira Singh , where it was held (overruling two decisions of the Court) that the presumption can be raised only where the evidence is equally strong on both sides and cannot be called in aid to give weight to evidence unworthy of credit any more than if no evidence at all had been given. The subject-matter of dispute in that case was cultivated land. In the order of reference the learned Judge expressed the opinion that in cases of submerged or jungle or waste land, the continuance of possession may be presumed if antecedent title and possession are proved. The observation has reference to land of such a nature that possession cannot be expected to be proved by acts of actual user and enjoyment and the learned Chief Justice referred with approval to the observations of Wilson, J., in the judgment of the Full Bench in Mahomed Ali Khan's case (with regard to jungle lands) that the Plaintiff should show such acts of ownership as are natural under existing conditions, and that where this has been clone prior possession may be presumed to have continued until the Plaintiff is shown to have been dispossessed.

    In the present case, the Plaintiff alleged that the land was waste, but it was not the case of the Plaintiff that no act of ownership could be or were exercised upon the land. The Plaintiff adduced some evidence of possession, viz., grazing of cattle upon the land prior to the excavation of the tank by the Defendants. The Defendants adduced evidence to show that the land was under cultivation before he excavated the tank. According to both parties therefore, acts of possession were exercised upon the land. Now, where definite evidence of acts of possession is forthcoming there is no difference between the proof of possession in the case of jungle, waste or uncultivated lands and in that of cultivated lands. But whereas in the case of cultivated lands the Plaintiff will fail if he does not prove his possession within 12 years, in the case of jungle or waste lands, if he proves his title, there is a presumption in his favour where having regard to the nature of the land possession cannot be expected to be proved by acts of actual user and enjoyment. If, however, the Plaintiff asserts that he exercised acts of ownership upon the land and adduces evidence in support of such assertion, he cannot, where such evidence is disbelieved by the Court, turn round and rely upon any presumption, because the case set up by him negatives the existence of circumstances which would give rise in the presumption, and is inconsistent with it.

    In the present case if the Plaintiff had been able to show that neither party had exercised any act of possession, or that he had exercised such acts of ownership as were natural under the existing conditions, a presumption could have been raised in his favour on the question of possession of the land prior to hie dispossession by the Defendant's excavation of the tank. He attempted to prove such acts of possession, but the evidence was not accepted by the Courts below.

    It is contended, however, on behalf of the Appellant that the learned District Judge should not have held that “Plaintiff witness No. 1's statement that cattle of all villagers grazed on the disputed land, was consistent with the Plaintiff's case as much as with the Defendant's,” and ought to have held that Plaintiff's possession prior to the excavation of the tank by the Defendant was thereby proved. But in that passage the learned Judge was merely commenting upon the statements of the Plaintiff's witness No. 1, and what he ‘meant was that the “villagers” who are said to have grazed their cattle on the land were tenants under the patni taluks of both the Plaintiff and the Defendant, both the taluks being in the same village. He did not find that the Plaintiff's tenant grazed cattle on the land, because further on referring to the Plaintiff's witnesses who all deposed to the same effect, he says: “The lower Court rightly disbelieved them as they were clearly not independent and disinterested witnesses.” In these circumstances, we do not think that there was any presumption in favour of the Plaintiff.

    The appeal accordingly fails, and must be dismissed with costs.

    J.N.R
    Appeal dismissed.

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