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  • section 2 of the Indian Contract Act.
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  • section 2 of the Indian Contract Act.
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Bucknill, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The central dispute concerned whether the plaintiffs (mortgagees) could obtain a personal money decree against purchasers of the equities of redemption. In the deeds by which those purchasers acquired the equities of redemption they had stipulated to pay off the debts secured by the mortgages, but the purchasers did not in fact pay those debts. It was common ground before the Court that the plaintiffs had no notice of the arrangements between the mortgagors and the purchasers and were not parties (not privy) to that contract. The matter came on appeal; various authorities were considered by the Court and a cross-objection was also before the Court but not pressed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiffs (mortgagees) could obtain a personal money decree against purchasers of the equities of redemption who had, by their contract with the mortgagors, undertaken to pay the mortgage debts, when the plaintiffs had no notice of and were not parties to that contract.
  2. Whether there had been an arithmetical or other mistake in the quantum of costs awarded to defendants nos. 8 to 13 (referred to in the appellant's ground no. 7) and, if so, whether this Court should decide that point.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (Plaintiffs') Arguments

  • The plaintiffs argued they should be able to enforce the purchasers' stipulation to pay off the mortgage debts, even though the plaintiffs were not parties to the contract between purchasers and mortgagors and had no notice of that contract.
  • The plaintiffs' counsel relied upon case law that, in his submission, supported the entitlement of a non-party third person to enforce beneficial stipulations — notably Dwarika Nath Ash v. Priya Nath Malki, Khajwa Muhammad Khan v. Husaini Begum, and Deb Narain Dutt v. Chuni Lal Ghose.

Respondents' (Defendants') Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondents' separate legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Dwarika Nath Ash v. Priya Nath Malki Authority where facts similar to the present case led the Calcutta High Court (Mookerjee and Cuming, JJ.) to hold that the plaintiff could enforce his claim against the purchaser of the borrower's property despite not being party to the purchaser's agreement. The Court acknowledged this case as supportive of the appellants' argument but treated it as only some authority in their favour, not dispositive.
Khajwa Muhammad Khan v. Husaini Begum Privy Council decision (Ameer Ali) holding that a third party (a minor female in a marriage settlement) could enforce an agreement made for her benefit in equity, distinguishing the English rule in Tweddle v. Atkinson. The Court regarded this case as distinguishable on its facts because the benefit flowed as consideration for marriage; it was cited as an example of equitable enforcement of a third-party benefit rather than as authority directly controlling the present case.
Deb Narain Dutt v. Chuni Lal Ghose Decision (Jenkins, C.J. and Mookerjee, J.) that where a transferee of a debtor's liability acknowledged the liability in the registered instrument conveying the debtor's properties, and that acknowledgment was communicated to and accepted by the creditor, the creditor could sue the transferee on the instrument. The Court treated this case as applicable where the creditor was privy or otherwise had been brought into the transaction (there being communication and acceptance); it contrasted that situation with the present case where the plaintiff had no notice and did not accept any proposal.
Jamna Das v. Ram Autar Pande Privy Council (Lord Macnaghten) holding that a mortgagee cannot avail himself of an undertaking entered into between the vendor (mortgagor) and purchaser; the purchaser entered into no contract with the mortgagee and is not personally bound to pay the mortgage debt. The Court regarded this Privy Council decision as directly in point and conclusive against the appellants' contention; it held that this authority bound the Court.
Nanku Prasad Singh v. Kamta Prasad Singh Privy Council decision upholding a High Court holding that purchasers of an equity of redemption did not incur personal liability under a recital in the sale deed promising to pay the mortgage; purchasers did not personally incur a liability to the mortgagee. The Court treated this later Privy Council decision as similarly conclusive and stated that it bound the Court to refuse to grant a personal decree against the purchasers.
Tweddle v. Atkinson English common law authority cited to show the rule that a person who is not a party to a contract cannot sue to enforce it. The Privy Council's reasoning in Khajwa Muhammad Khan was said to distinguish Tweddle; the Court here noted Tweddle but relied upon how the Privy Council applied or distinguished it in the other authorities.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court framed the dispositive point narrowly: whether the plaintiffs could obtain a money decree against purchasers of the equities of redemption who had stipulated in their purchase instruments to pay off the mortgage debts. The Court noted three uncontested factual predicates: (1) the purchasers had so stipulated in their instruments, (2) the purchasers did not in fact pay off the debts, and (3) the plaintiffs had no notice of, and were not parties to, the contract between the mortgagors and the purchasers.

The Court reviewed authorities presented by the appellants which appeared, at first blush, to support their contention (notably Dwarika Nath Ash, Khajwa Muhammad Khan, and Deb Narain Dutt). It examined the precise factual and legal bases of those cases and identified important distinctions:

  • Dwarika Nath Ash was acknowledged as similar and supportive but not binding on the Court as dispositive.
  • Khajwa Muhammad Khan was treated as an equitable case in which a third party (a minor marriage beneficiary) could enforce an agreement made for her benefit; the Court found this case distinguishable because the benefit was tied to marriage and the principles applied were equitable rather than an application of ordinary contract law.
  • Deb Narain Dutt was distinguished because in that case the creditor was privy to the arrangement (there had been an acknowledgment communicated to and accepted by the creditor), placing that creditor within the position described by section 2 of the Indian Contract Act as a promisee of a contract for consideration.

The Court contrasted those authorities with two Privy Council decisions (Jamna Das v. Ram Autar Pande and Nanku Prasad Singh v. Kamta Prasad Singh) which it described as directly in point. Those Privy Council decisions held that a mortgagee could not personally enforce an undertaking entered into between purchaser and vendor where the mortgagee was not a party to and had no notice of the purchaser's undertaking. The Court stated that these Privy Council decisions were conclusive and binding on it.

The separate concurring judgment of Foster, J. emphasized the important legal distinction: where the creditor has been made a party to or has accepted a proposal (as in Deb Narain Dutt), section 2 of the Indian Contract Act brings the creditor into the position of promisee and permits enforcement. In the present appeal, Foster, J. observed, the plaintiff had neither notice nor acceptance of any proposal from the purchasers; accordingly section 2 did not apply. He further noted that cases like Khajwa Muhammad Khan form a distinct class (e.g., minors asserting family or marriage settlement benefits) typically decided on equitable principles rather than ordinary contract doctrine.

For procedural/computational matters, the Court observed that an asserted arithmetic or other mistake in the award of costs to certain defendants was raised as a ground of appeal. The Court stated it had no materials before it to adjudicate that issue and directed that any such question of quantum should be referred to and dealt with by the lower appellate court.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED WITH COSTS. The Court dismissed the appeal and also dismissed the unpressed cross-objection with costs.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the plaintiffs (mortgagees) are not entitled to a personal money decree against the purchasers of the equities of redemption under the circumstances of this case where the plaintiffs had no notice of and were not privy to the agreement between mortgagors and purchasers.
  • The Court expressly relied upon and followed Privy Council authority (Jamna Das and Nanku Prasad Singh) and therefore treated those decisions as binding; the decision does not purport to create a new legal principle but applies existing binding authority to the facts.
  • Questions relating to an alleged arithmetic or other mistake in the award of costs to certain defendants were not decided on the merits by this Court for lack of materials and were referred back to the lower appellate court for determination.

Appeal dismissed. Cross-objection dismissed. No new precedent was announced; the Court treated the matter as governed by existing Privy Council decisions.

    Achuta Ram v. Jainandan Tewary

    Bucknill, J.:— (after stating the facts set, out above, proceeded as follow): The simple point for consideration is whether the plaintiffs could obtain a money decree against the purchasers of the equities of redemption. It must first be pointed out that in the instruments under which the purchasers of the equities of redemption so purchased, they (the purchasers), stipulated that they would pay off the debts due under the mortgages. It is common ground that they did not do so. It is also common ground that the plaintiffs had no notice of what had taken place between the mortgagors and the purchasers of the equities of redemption and were not privy to the contract. It is important to observe that some support was lent to the argument which was put forward before us by the learned Advocate who has appeared for the plaintiffs by the ruling in the case of Dwarika Nath Ash v. Priya Nath Malki. In that case the facts were certainly very similar to those which obtain in this appeal now before us. The defendants had borrowed a sum of money from the plaintiff for which they had given a promissory note; they subsequently transferred their property to another party who executed an agreement, in their favour expressly undertaking to pay to the lender of the money under the promissory note his dues thereunder. The lender of the money under the promissory note was no party to this contract and had no notice thereof; but, having ascertained the circumstances, he proceeded to sue the borrowers as well as the individual who had purchased the borrower's property: he claimed that, in view of the agreement, entered into between the borrowers and the purchasers of the borrowers' property, he (the lender) was entitled to take advantage of that agreement. Mookerjee and Cuming, J.J, of the Calcutta High Court held that the plaintiff was entitled to enforce his claim against the purchaser of the borrowers' property.

    Had the matter rested there one might have thought that this case would constitute an authority in favour of the proposition argued in the present instance. There are also other cases which have been quoted by the learned Advocate for the appellant which certainly as first sight appear to support to some extent the learned Advocate's argument. In the case of Khajwa Muhammad Khan v. Husaini Begum their Lordships of the Privy Council held that under certain circumstances (to which I shall refer presently) it, was possible for a person who was no party to an agreement to take advantage of the provisions of such an agreement which were in fact beneficial to herself. Their Lordships' decision (which was given by the Right Hon'ble Mr. Ameer Ali) relates the facts at some length. Put very shortly, they were as follows. A minor Muhammadan lady, prior to and in consideration of her marriage with the son of the defendant in the suit, was promised by the defendant under an agreement executed between the defendant and the lady's father to be paid by the defendant the sum of Rs. 500 per mensem from the date of her reception in marriage; the defendant also charged certain specified properties for the purpose of producing the requisite funds. The lady, as I have stated, was a minor; but eventually, after the marriage, lived with her husband for sometime; owing, however, to disagreement she, at the end of some 12 or 13 years, ceased so to do. The defendant then refused to continue to pay the allowance and the lady accordingly brought the suit against him basing her claim upon the document of agreement which had been entered into between the defendant and her (the plaintiff's) father. It was maintained on behalf of the defence on the line of reasoning adopted in the well-known English case, Tweddle v. Atkinson, that as the plaintiff was in no way an actual party to the agreement made between her father and the defendant, she had no locus standi and was unable to sue thereunder. Mr. Ameer Ali, however, pointed out that the case of Tweddle v. Atkinson was one decided under the common law of England and was not in their Lordships' opinion applicable to the facts which were disclosed in the case before their Lordships. Their Lordships were of opinion that although no party to the agreement (and it must be remembered that the lady was then a minor and the document was executed by her father) she was clearly in equity entitled to enforce her claim against the defendant. The case, however, appears to me to be distinguishable from the present case in view of the fact that the benefit which was to accrue to the plaintiff was one for which the consideration was the marriage to take place between herself and the defendant's son. Then there is another case which was cited on behalf of the plaintiffs, Deb Narain Dutt v. Chuni Lal Ghose. In that case Jenkins, C.J and Mookerjee, J., held that where the transferee of a debtor's liability acknowledged in the provisions of the registered instrument which conveyed to him all the original debtor's properties, his obligation to the creditor for the debt, to be paid by him and where the acknowledgment was communicated to the creditor and accepted by him, the creditor could sue the transferee on the registered instrument. Here again their Lordships based their decision upon the equitable principle which had operated upon the minds of their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case which I have just quoted. Here in this case of Deb Narain Dutt v. Chimi Lal Ghose it may indeed be said that the facts disclosed that the creditor was actually privy to and concerned in the transaction which took place between the transferee and the debtor. In fact in the judgment of Jenkins, C.J, it is expressly stated that there was an arrangement between the plaintiff and defendant no. 5 by which the liability of defendant no. 5 under the transfer was acknowledged and accepted and it, may also be observed that (although under a mistaken idea of their true legal, effect) certain title-deeds were actually handed over at that time by the purchaser to the plaintiff. Although, therefore, the last two cases quoted seem to be based upon considerations somewhat different from those which have to be regarded in the present appeal, there is no doubt, as I have said before, that Dwarika Nath Ash v. Priya Nath Malki does constitute some authority to support the argument which has been addressed to us by the learned Advocate who has appeared for the appellants. There are however, on the other hand, two cases which appear to be conclusive authority upon the point which has been argued in this appeal. The first of these is Jamna Das v. Ram Autar Pande. It is a decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council and although the facts are not set out at any great length in the report they can be found fully reported in I.L.R 81 Allahabad 352 (1909). It will be seen, from a perusal of the facts as given in that report, that, the circumstances were almost the same as those which obtain in the present appeal. The judgment of their Lordships of the Privy Council delivered by Lord Macnaghten is very short and very much in point here. His Lordship observes—“This is a perfectly plain case. The action is brought by a mortgagee to enforce against a purchaser of the mortgaged property an undertaking that he entered into with his vendor.”

    I may pause here to observe that the undertaking referred to was to the effect that the purchaser would pay off the debt due to the mortgagee by the person from whom the purchaser had purchased the property. His Lordship continues—“The mortgagee has no right to avail himself of that. He was no party to the sale. The purchaser entered into no contract with him, and the purchaser is not personally bound to pay his mortgage debt.”

    There is still a later case in which the same proposition has been similarly set forth in another decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council. In that case, Nanku Prasad Singh v. Kamta Prasad Singh, the facts again are in that report but very shortly set out. We have had the advantage, however, of seeing what the facts were from the record of this court, the case having been tried on appeal on the 7th June, 1918 before Roe and Coutts, JJ. The facts were substantially identical with those which exist in the present appeal. A mortgagor having executed a mortgage in favour of the plaintiff sold the property to a third party who, in the recitals of this sale-deed, agreed to pay off the mortgage with a portion of the purchase money which was for that purpose left in his hands. The mortgagee sued upon his mortgage not only the mortgagor but also the purchaser; but this court refused to grant any personal decree against the purchaser, holding that he (the mortgagee) could not avail himself of the stipulation made in the contract between the purchaser and the mortgagor. Their Lordships of the Privy Council upheld the decision of this court, Lord Atkinson, in a very short judgment, stating: “Their Lordships have considered this case and they think it is clear that no personal liability was incurred by the purchasers of the equity of redemption. Their Lordships therefore think that the decree of the High Court was right and that the point made by the appellant failed.” It may be observed that in the judgment given by this court on the 7th June, 1918, the cases to which I have referred above were mentioned and quoted. It seems therefore that we are clearly bound by the authority of these two decisions of the Privy Council which are so directly in point.

    The appeal therefore must be dismissed with costs. I should mention that there was a cross-objection which, however, is not pressed and has not been argued and that cross-objection also must be dismissed with costs.

    It is said by the learned Advocate who has appeared for the appellants (and it may be mentioned that the question is referred to in ground no. 7 of the appellant's grounds of appeal to this court) that there has been some arithmetical or other mistake with regard to the amount of costs which have been awarded to the defendants nos. 8 to 13. It was suggested that, as this question had been made a ground of appeal, it might be dealt with in this court. We have, however, no materials whatever before us which would enable us to discuss or consider this point. If there has been any mistake in regard to the quantum of costs, that matter should be referred to and dealt with by the lower appellate court.

    Foster, J.:— I agree. The difference between Dev. Narain Dutt v. Chuni Lal Ghose and the last cases quoted by my learned brother, Jamana Das v. Ram Autar and Nanku Prasad v. Kamta Prasad, appears to me to be very important in connection with the facts of the present case. It is to be borne in mind that in the present case there was no notice to the plaintiff at the time of the contract. In the judgment of Dev Narain Dutt v. Chuni Lal Ghose we see that the promisee, that is to say the plaintiff, had a proposal made to him by the promisoee that is to say defendant no. 5, and he accepted it. So in that case the promisee was in the position indicated in section 2 of the Indian Contract Act. He held the benefit of a contract for consideration. In the present case the plaintiff, who claims to be the promisee, has never had a proposal made to him by the defendants against whom he is seeking a money decree: and he certainly never accepted any such proposal. Therefore section 2 does not bring him into the position of a person who can sue a promiser upon a contract for consideration. That is the distinction between the two classes of cases, and I think the present case falls within the class indicated in the Privy Council cases which have been quoted. There may be a third class of cases in the judgments which we have been studying, namely, the class in which minors or other third parties sue under family or marriage settlements. In such cases as those the plaintiff can hardly be regarded as a promisee who has accepted any proposal or promise and such cases are probably decided on the traditional principles governing the English Courts of Equity rather by any application of the terms of section 2 of the Indian Contract Act. If I am correct, this third class would I think be exemplified by the case of Khajwa Muhammad Khan v. Husaini Begum.

    Appeal dismissed.

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    Comments

    Achuta Ram v. Jainandan Tewary
    (Apr 19, 1926)