Mukherjea, J.:— The facts giving rise to this appeal may be shortly stated as follows: Certain persons who may be called the Sahas and who are represented in this appeal by the Appellants and pro forma Respondent obtained a final mortgage decree against one Akhoy Kumar Kar in the Court of the 2nd Subordinate Judge of 24-Parganas for a sum of Rs. 1,19,000 and odd on the 13th of June, 1930. The decree was put into execution on the 8th of August, 1930, the execution case being registered as Title Execution Case No. 187 of 1930, and it is admitted that no portion of the decretal dues has been realised up till now. On the 2.3rd of December, 1941, the judgment-debtor Akhoy died. The death was reported to the Court on the 10th of January, 1942, and on the 5th of March, 1942, the decree-holders made an application for continuing the execution proceedings against the widow and sons of the judgment-debtor on substitution of their names as legal heirs in place of the deceased. The widow whose name is Radha-rani and who figures as Respondent No. 1 in this appeal objected to the application for substitution made by the decree-holders on the ground that the judgment-debtor having died leaving behind him a Will by which she was appointed the sole executrix, she alone was the legal representative of the deceased and that there could be no substitution of the intestate heirs of the judgment-debtor in the execution proceeding. It was stated by her in the petition of objection that she had already applied for probate of the Will though no grant was actually made in her favour at that time. The Court by its order dated the 25th April, 1942, dismissed her objection and allowed substitution of all the intestate heirs of the judgment-debtor including Radharani, the widow. It is rather curious to notice that on the very same day orders for substitution were made in two Miscellaneous Cases (Miscellaneous Cases Nos. 39 of 1940 and 8 of 1941) which arose out of objections filed by the judgment-debtor in the same execution case, and in both of them Radharani was allowed to be substituted in her capacity as executrix as the sole legal representative of the deceased of the judgment-debtor. On the 8th of June, 1942, the probate Court made an order granting probate of the Will to Radharani and on the 16th of September, 1942, she brought this fact to the notice of the executing Court. On the 29th of September, 1942, the decree-holders applied for amendment of the execution petition by describing Radharani as the sole executrix and legal representative of the judgment-debtor and striking out the names of the other heirs from the execution record. On the 1st of October, 1942, this application was allowed, and the execution petition was amended. On the 3rd of October, 1942, Radharani filed a petition objecting to the execution of the decree contending inter alia that as the application for substituting her as the sole legal representative of the deceased judgment-debtor was made more than 12 years after the date of the decree, it was in substance a fresh application, for execution and consequently the execution case was barred under sec. 48 of the Civil Procedure Code. The Subordinate Judge by his order dated the 5th of April, 1943, overruled this contention and held that see. 48 of the Civil Procedure Code could not be attracted to the facts of this case, as the application of, the decree-holders made on the 29th of September, 1942, was merely ancillary to the original petition for execution and could not be treated as a fresh application within the meaning of sec 48 of the Civil Procedure Code. Later on, however, there was an application made by Radharani for review of the order made on the 5th of April, 1943, and the learned Judge by a fresh order made on the 13th of May, 1943, vacated the earlier order and dismissed the execution case being of opinion that the application for bringing Radharani on the record as the sole legal representative of the judgment-debtor was a fresh application for execution as contemplated by sec. 48 of the Civil Procedure Code and as that application was presented more than 12 years after the date of the decree, the execution of the decree was barred. It is against this order that the decree-holder have come up on appeal to this Court Having heard the learned Advocates on both sides we are of the opinion that the order made by the Subordinate Judge on the 13th of May, 1943, is a wrong order and cannot be sustained. We agree with the learned Advocate for the Appellants that there were none of the grounds contemplated by Or. 47, r. 1 of the Civil Procedure Code upon which the Court could set aside, by way of review, the previous order made by it on the 5th of April, 1943. There was no error apparent on the face of the record nor discovery of any new and important piece of evidence subsequent to the passing of the order. If the decision was erroneous, it was open to the judgment-debtor to challenge it by way of appeal. But it is not necessary for us to base our decision on this somewhat technical point, for we are definitely of opinion that the view of law taken by the Subordinate Judge in the subsequent order made on the 13th of May, 1943, is not sound and cannot be accepted. The whole controversy really centres round the point as to whether the application made by the decree-holders on the 29th September, 1942, was in substance a fresh application for execution within the meaning of sec. 48 of the Civil Procedure Code. It is well settled by authorities that the expression “fresh application” as used in sec. 48 of the Civil Procedure Code means a fresh substantive application and not merely an ancillary one made with the object of moving the Court to proceed in the matter of a substantive application already on the file, vide Rahim All v. Phul Chand . I.L.R 18 All. 482 1896. and Ram Sarup v. Dasrath . I.L.R 33 All. 517 1911.. Sec. 48 of the Civil Procedure Code does not lay down that as soon as the period of twelve years elapses from the date of the decree the executing Court becomes functus officio and cannot proceed with the execution of the decree any further. Provided no fresh application for execution is presented after the lapse of 12 years from the date of the decree the executing Court can certainly continue a proceeding in execution commenced but not completed before the expiry of 12 years and if an application has got to be made by the decree-holders in furtherance of and ancillary to the petition for execution already filed, sec. 48 of the Civil Procedure Code would have no application. Mr. Bose argues that if a judgment-debtor dies pending an execution proceeding and the decree-holder applies for continuation of the proceeding against his heirs under sec. 50 of the Civil Procedure Code, it amounts to a fresh application for execution and if it is made when 12 years have already passed from the date of the decree, it would come within the mischief of sec. 48 of the Civil Procedure Code. We cannot accept this contention as sound. When the judgment-debtor dies pending an execution proceeding, it is not necessary for the decree-holder to file a fresh application under Or. 21, r. 11 of the Civil Procedure Code. He can continue the same execution proceeding against the heirs of the deceased by bringing them on record in place of the original judgment-debtor, vide Purushottam v. Rajabai . I.L.R 34 Bom. 142 1909.. It has been held further by the Bombay High Court that even if any separate” application is made in such circumstances, it would not be a fresh application within the meaning of sec. 48 of the Civil Procedure Code, vide Shankar v. Hiralal . 33 Bom. L.R 858 1931.. The Subordinate Judge has relied strongly on a decision of the Patna High Court which is to be found reported in Maharaja Ram Ram Bijaya v. Kesho Prasad . A.I.R [1940] Pat. 571.. The facts of that case, however, are quite different. We are quite prepared to hold that if the decree-holder after he has presented his petition for execution wants to proceed against any new party whose name was not mentioned in the petition or wants to attach and sell any new property not included in it, the application might be regarded as a fresh application for execution. But this principle cannot possibly apply where the decree-holder does not want to proceed against any new party but prays for continuation of the proceeding against an heir or legal representative of the judgment debtor originally on the record. In our opinion, therefore, if the application made by the decree-holders on the 29th of September, 1942, be regarded as a fresh application for execution against the legal representative of the deceased judgment-debtor under sec. 5O of the Civil Procedure Code, it would be merely ancillary to the substantive petition against the original judgment-debtor and could not rank as a fresh application within the meaning of sec. 48 of the Civil Procedure Code. As under Or. 22, r. 12 of the Civil Procedure Code the provisions of rr. 3 and 4 of that order do not apply to execution proceedings, no other question of limitation regarding the time within which substitution has to be made can possibly arise.
2. Furthermore, it appears, as stated above, that in the two miscellaneous cases arising out of the same execution proceeding Radharani got herself substituted as the sole executrix and legal representative of her husband and the orders were made by the Court in the same execution record on the 25th April, 1942, when 12 years had not run out from the date of the decree. She thus introduced herself as a party to the execution case in her capacity as representative of her husband's estate. In these circumstances the application of the decree-holders presented on the 29th of September, 1942, can be treated a; a formal application for correcting the description of Radharani in the cause title of the execution case and nothing more, she being already made a party to the execution case on her own application and within 12 years from the date of the decree.
3. In the result therefore the appeal is allowed. The order of the learned Subordinate Judge dated the 13th May, 1943, is set aside and that made on the 5th April, 1943, restored. The Appellants will be entitled to the costs of this appeal, Hearing-fee, three gold mohurs.
Ellis, J.:— I agree.
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