1. Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 are the appellants. The plaintiff's suit was for a declaration of his title to the suit properties and also for an injunction restraining the defendants from executing a decree in Original Suit No. 845 of 1910 which they had obtained with reference to these properties. These properties belong to the fifth defendant. He had effected some mortgages on these properties of which only two need be noticed so far as the present case is concerned. The mortgagee under the first mortgage (Exhibit D) instituted a suit and obtained a decree for the sale of the properties. Money was borrowed from the plaintiff by the fifth defendant to discharge that decree and a site-deed (Exhibit A) was executed in favour of the plaintiff on 29th November 1910. This was registered on 1st December 1910. Later on, a suit was instituted by the third mortgagee, namely, the appellants. Original Suit No. 845 of 1910, against the suit properties to which the plaintiff was not made a party and they obtained a decree. It is the execution of this decree that is now sought to be restrained by the plaintiff in this suit.
2. Only one question was really argued before me, and that is the question raised in the second point noted by the Subordinate Judge at page 3 of his judgment, namely, “whether the sale-deed executed in favour of the plaintiff is invalid as having been pendents lite.” In this connection I must point out that Original Suit No. 845 of 1910 was instituted on 29th November 1910.
3. It is argued that, since Exhibit A. was registered only after the institution of the suit, the document does not take effect at all; and in support of this position a decision in Tilakdhari Singh…Defendant 5 v. Gour Narain…Plaintiff .(1), has been referred to. This decision has been considered by our High Court in Venkataramana Reddi v. Rangiah Chetti(2), and a Bench of this Court has declined to follow the principle of this decision. I am asked to refer this point to a Bench, but I think that I am bound by the decision of the Bench, and, therefore, following the decision of this Court, I hold that, though the registration was after the institution of the suit, the document which was executed on 29th November 1910 takes effect and that the plaintiffs title under it is not invalid as having been pendente lite. The argument with reference to this question of pendente lite which has been now put forward in this case was not put forward in the lower Court. In the lower Court the attempt was made to show that the suit was institute before the execution of the document. In a concurring judgment, the Subordinate Judge has held that it cannot be held that the execution of the document was subsequent to the institution of the suit. He refers to the reasons given by the District Munsif which he accepts. I agree with the reasoning of the lower Court and hold that it has not been proved that the document was executed after the institution of the suit. This disposes of the two aspects of the argument in connection with the “plea of pendente lite” raised in this case.
4. The learned Vakil for the appellants wanted to argue also that a suit, of this nature asking for an injunction restraining execution of a decree will not really lie and that, therefore, the plaintiffs suit must be dismissed. He was prepared to support his position by means of authorities; but I am not prepared to allow him to raise that point now, because there is not the slightest trace or suggestion of each an argument anywhere in the records of the case, not even in the grounds of the second appeal. No other points were argued in this case.
5. The learned Subordinate Judge has made certain remarks about the rights of the appellants. Nothing has been argued about those rights in this Court and I do not express any opinion about them. I, therefore, dismiss the second appeal with costs.
6. Appeal dismissed.