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  • Sec. 185 states that (1) sees. 7, 8 and 9 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1877,
  • Bengal Tenancy Act and that sec. 184 of the Bengal Tenancy Act
  • INDIAN LIMITATION ACT
  • section, sec. 4, secs. 9 to 18 and sec. 22
  • sec. 184 of the Bengal Tenancy Act
  • sec. 14 of the Limitation Act
  • sec. 29 of the Limitation Act.
  • sec. 14 of Limitation Act
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
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  • Sec. 185 states that (1) sees. 7, 8 and 9 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1877,
  • Bengal Tenancy Act and that sec. 184 of the Bengal Tenancy Act
  • INDIAN LIMITATION ACT
  • section, sec. 4, secs. 9 to 18 and sec. 22
  • sec. 184 of the Bengal Tenancy Act
  • sec. 14 of the Limitation Act
  • sec. 29 of the Limitation Act.
  • sec. 14 of Limitation Act
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The Plaintiff sued for possession of approximately eight bighas of land, identified as settlement dags Nos. 823, 918, 919 and 700, and sought a perpetual injunction restraining the Defendants from interfering with the Plaintiff's possession after a declaration that an entry in the record-of-rights was erroneous, ultra vires and not binding on the Plaintiff.

The Plaintiff's primary factual contentions were:

  • For dags Nos. 823, 918 and 919: these lands were taken in settlement by five persons in July 1830; one of them was Gaya Narayan Shee (the Plaintiff's grandfather); the Plaintiff inherited the land as heir and and his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession continuously.
  • For dag No. 700: the Plaintiff purchased it from Madhab Kamdar in 1316, had been in possession since that date, and executed a kabuliyat in favour of the Government Khas Mehal Department because dag No. 700 was found to be included in the Government khas mehal as bund surplus land.

The Defendants resisted, asserting that dags Nos. 823, 918 and 919 were recorded in their names in the settlement record-of-rights; they disputed the genuineness of the amalnama and denied that those dags were included in it. Regarding dag No. 700, the Defendants contended the Government had no title to any portion of it. The Defendants also pleaded that the suit was barred by limitation, invoking the special limitation scheme in the Bengal Tenancy Act (Art. 3, Sch. III).

The trial Court and the lower Appellate Court found for the Plaintiff and decreed the suit. The Defendants appealed to the Court that produced the present opinion.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the suit was barred by limitation and, relatedly, whether section 14 of the Limitation Act applied to allow exclusion of time during which the Plaintiff prosecuted the suit in good faith in the Munsif's Court, notwithstanding the special limitation provisions of the Bengal Tenancy Act (notably sec. 184 and sec. 185).
  2. Whether the Plaintiff had prosecuted the suit in "good faith" for the purpose of excluding the period of prosecution under the Limitation Act.
  3. Whether the learned trial Judge improperly placed the burden of proof on the Defendants rather than on the Plaintiff with respect to whether the disputed lands lay within the Plaintiff's jote.
  4. Whether the learned Judge considered whether the disputed lands were covered by the amalnama (i.e., whether the amalnama included dags Nos. 823, 918 and 919) and whether that omission vitiated the judgment.
  5. Whether dag No. 700 was sufficiently dealt with by the learned Judge, given the brief treatment in the judgment.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (as advanced by Mr. Bose)

  • The suit is barred by limitation under the special law (Bengal Tenancy Act). In particular, sec. 184 of the Bengal Tenancy Act excludes the application of sec. 14 of the Limitation Act, so the Plaintiff cannot exclude the period during which he prosecuted the suit in the Munsif's Court.
  • The Plaintiff was not shown to have prosecuted the suit in the Munsif's Court in "good faith" as required to exclude that period under sec. 14 of the Limitation Act.
  • The learned Judge wrongly placed the burden of proof on the Defendants (citing Rajendra Kumar v. Mohim Chandra) by saying the Defendants must prove the land lay outside the Plaintiff's jote.
  • The learned Judge failed to consider whether the disputed lands were covered by the amalnama; therefore his finding might be vitiated.
  • The learned Judge dealt with dag No. 700 only briefly (two lines), and that was inadequate given the contention about Government title and the Plaintiff's earlier purchase.

Plaintiff's Contentions (as set out in the opinion)

  • Dags Nos. 823, 918 and 919 formed part of the settlement of five persons dating back to July 1830; one of them was the Plaintiff's grandfather, and the Plaintiff inherited and continuously possessed the land.
  • Dag No. 700 was purchased from Madhab Kamdar in 1316; the Plaintiff had been in possession since and executed a kabuliyat to the Government Khas Mehal Department when it was found to be included as Government khas mehal (bund surplus).
  • The Plaintiff relied on section 14 of the Limitation Act to exclude the period during which he was prosecuting his claim in the Munsif's Court in good faith, thereby keeping the suit within time.
  • The Plaintiff contested the correctness and binding effect of the entry in the record-of-rights and sought declaration and perpetual injunction accordingly.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Rajendra Kumar v. Mohim Chandra Referenced for the proposition that the Defendants must prove that the land is outside the Plaintiff's jote (i.e., issues relating to whom the burden of proof lies on in such land disputes). The opinion records that the learned District Judge cited this authority in indicating that the Defendants must prove the land lay outside the Plaintiff's jote. The appellate judge (Cuming, J.) observed that stating the burden lay on the Defendants was erroneous, but treated this error as immaterial because the learned Judge proceeded on the correct footing (requiring the Plaintiff to rebut the presumption from the record-of-rights) and ultimately found the presumption rebutted.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis focused first on the question of limitation and the interplay between the Bengal Tenancy Act and the Limitation Act.

  1. The factual chronology relevant to limitation was set out: the suit was instituted on 8 December 1922 in a Munsif's Court and, after valuation was raised, the plaint was returned on 22 December 1923 to be presented to the proper Court; it was presented to the Subordinate Judge at Midnapore on 2 January (the Civil Courts having been closed from 23 December to 2 January). The court noted that, as presented to the Subordinate Judge on 2 January, the suit would appear to be out of time because the period of limitation had expired on 22 November 1923.
  2. The Plaintiff relied on section 14 of the Limitation Act to exclude from computation the period during which he was prosecuting the suit in good faith in the Munsif's Court. Both lower courts had allowed exclusion of this period and found the suit to be within time. The Appellants challenged the applicability of sec. 14, invoking sec. 184 of the Bengal Tenancy Act.
  3. Cuming, J. framed the statutory issue as one of distinction between a provision that prescribes the period of limitation (sec. 184 of the Bengal Tenancy Act) and a provision that prescribes the manner of computing such period (sec. 14 of the Limitation Act). He concluded that sec. 184 prescribes the period while sec. 14 provides a rule for computing that period and is therefore conceptually different.
  4. The judgment examined sec. 185 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, which expressly excludes secs. 7, 8 and 9 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1877, but otherwise provides that the provisions of the Limitation Act shall apply to suits mentioned in sec. 184. From this, the court inferred that the legislature knew how to exclude particular sections and that sec. 14 was not excluded.
  5. The court further relied on the amended sec. 29 of the Limitation Act (amendment in 1922), which provides that when a special or local law prescribes a different period of limitation, certain provisions of the Limitation Act (sec. 4, secs. 9–18, and sec. 22) apply unless expressly excluded. The judge interpreted "expressly" to mean that a specific section must be named for it to be excluded. From this textual reading the court concluded that sec. 14 was not expressly excluded and therefore applied.
  6. On the "good faith" contention, the court noted that the trial Judge had made an express factual finding that the Plaintiff prosecuted the suit in good faith (and specifically referenced a passage indicating the Plaintiff acted in good faith). The Limitation Act defines "good faith" as conduct done with due care and attention; the appellate judge assumed the trial Judge applied that statutory meaning and accepted the finding as implying due care and attention.
  7. Concerning the burden of proof, the court accepted that the trial Judge had incorrectly stated that the burden lay on the Defendants, as indicated by his citation of Rajendra Kumar v. Mohim Chandra. However, the appellate court found the mistake immaterial because the trial Judge in substance proceeded on the correct legal footing: he was aware that the record-of-rights favored the Defendants and that the Plaintiff had to rebut the presumption arising from that entry; having considered the evidence on that basis, the Judge found the presumption rebutted.
  8. Regarding the amalnama, the appellate court observed that, in the lower Appellate Court, it was not disputed that the lands in question were covered by the terms of the amalnama. Thus the sole question before the trial Judge concerning the amalnama was its genuineness; there was no dispute before him that the specific dags were covered, and therefore the trial Judge's finding that dags Nos. 823, 918 and 919 belong to the Plaintiff was not vitiated by failure to address coverage of the amalnama.
  9. On dag No. 700, the court noted the trial Judge had dealt with it briefly. The appellate judge accepted the explanation that dag No. 700 was very small (about a cottah) compared to the other three dags (about eight bighas) and that few arguments were addressed to it. Nevertheless, the trial Judge held that the Plaintiff had proved purchase from Madhab Kamdar and possession; since that purchase occurred in 1316 (more than 12 years before institution of the suit), the appellate judge considered nothing further necessary.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED — The appeal is dismissed with costs.

Direct effect on the parties:

  • The trial and lower Appellate Courts' findings in favour of the Plaintiff are affirmed by the Court producing this opinion.
  • The Plaintiff's decree for possession of the lands (dags Nos. 823, 918, 919 and 700) and the ancillary reliefs as decreed below stand upheld.

The opinion does not discuss broader doctrinal or policy implications beyond the resolution of the statutory construction question between the Bengal Tenancy Act and the Limitation Act. Accordingly, no new precedent beyond the case disposition is identified in the text of the opinion.


Judges: Cuming, J. delivered the main opinion; Mallik, J. agreed. (Final notation in the opinion: "P.C.")

    Rajah Sati Prosad Garg, Bahadur v. Gobinda Chandra Shee

    The Judgment of the Court was as follows:—

    Cuming, J.:— In the suit out of which this appeal arises the Plaintiff sued for possession of some 8 bighas of land which were specified as settlement dags Nos. 823, 918, 919 and 700 and further for a perpetual injunction restraining the Defendants from interfering with the Plaintiff's possession after a declaration that the entry in the record-of-rights is erroneous, ultra vires and not binding on the Plaintiff.

    The Plaintiff's case is briefly this—That the lands in dispute so far as dags Nos. 823, 918 and 919 are concerned were taken settlement of by some five persons so long ago as July 1830. One of these five persons was one Gaya Narayan Shee, the grand-father of the Plaintiff, that the Plaintiff inherited the land, in suit which formed part of the demised land as heir of his grandfather, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession all along. With regard to the dag No. 700 he states that he purchased it from Madhab Kamdar in 1316 and had been in possession of the same since that date and that he had executed a kabuliyat in favour of the Government Khas Mehal Department as this dag No. 700 was found to be included in the Government khas mehal being described as bund surplus land of the Government. The Defendants resisted his claim and contended that the lands in suit so far as dags Nos. 823, 918 and 919 were concerned were recorded in their names in the settlement record-of-rights. They contended that the amalnama was not genuine and further that the dags Nos. 823, 918 and 919 had not been included in the amalnama. With regard to dag No. 700 the Defendants seemed to contend that the Government had no title to any portion of dag No. 700. They further argued that the suit was barred by limitation the period of limitation applicable to the case being the special law of limitation provided by Art. 3, Sch. III of the Bengal Tenancy Act.

    The trial Court and also the lower Appellate Court found all the issues in favour of the Plaintiff and decreed the suit. The Defendants have appealed to this Court.

    The first point which has been urged by Mr. Bose who appears on behalf of the Appellants is that the suit is barred by limitation. He would maintain that the period of limitation provided for the suit is that provided by the Bengal Tenancy Act and that sec. 184 of the Bengal Tenancy Act would exclude this suit from the operation of sec. 14 of the Limitation Act. In order to understand Mr. Bose's point clearly it would be necessary to state a few more facts. The suit was instituted on the 8th of December 1922 in a Munsif's Court. The period of limitation would normally expire on the 22nd November 1923. Therefore apparently at the time when the suit was instituted in the Munsif's Court at Tamluk it was within time. A question, however, was raised by the Defendants as to the valuation of the suit. After an enquiry made by the Munsif it was found by him that the value of the suit was beyond his pecuniary jurisdiction and on the 22nd December 1923 he returned the plaint to the Plaintiff to be presented before the proper Court, on the 2nd January next it was presented in the Court of the Subordinate Judge at Midnapore. I may here note that the Civil Courts were closed on the 23rd December and remained closed up to the 2nd January. The 2nd January was the re-opening day of the Civil Courts. It will be seen therefore that on the day when it was presented in the Court of the Subordinate Judge at Midnapore that suit was out of time—time having expired on the 22nd November 1923. The Plaintiff, however, called to his aid sec. 14 of Limitation Act and contended that he was entitled to exclude the period during which he had been prosecuting in good faith his suit in the Court of the Munsif at Tamluk. Both the lower Courts have found that he was entitled to exclude this period and hence his suit was within time. Mr. Bose admits that if the Plaintiff is entitled to exclude this period the suit is within time. But Mr. Bose contends that sec. 14 of the Limitation Act does not apply and he is not entitled to exclude the period. Mr. Bose relies on sec. 184 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. Sec. 184 states that “the suits, appeals and applications specified in Sch. III annexed to this Act shall be instituted and made within the time prescribed in that schedule for them respectively, and every such suit or appeal instituted and application made after the period of limitation so prescribed, shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been pleaded.” Mr. Bose would argue from this that sec. 14 of the Limitation Act has no application. sec. 184 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, however, to my mind provides the period of limitation. sec. 14 of the Limitation Act provides not the period of limitation but means to compute that period which to my mind is an entirely different thing. A reference to sec. 185 of the Tenancy Act will, I think, make it quite clear that sec. 14 of the Limitation Act does apply. Sec. 185 states that (1) “sees. 7, 8 and 9 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1877, shall not apply to the suits and applications mentioned in the last foregoing section, (2) subject to the provisions of this chapter, the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 1877, shall apply to all suits, appeals and applications mentioned in the last foregoing section.” Now, it seems to me that if it were the intention of the legislature that sec. 14 would not apply to suits, etc., mentioned in sec. 184 of the Bengal Tenancy Act the legislature would have stated so because it specifically excludes secs. 7, 8 and 9 and if it desired to exclude sec. 14 nothing would have been easier than to add this section to the list of sections which were excluded and I cannot see how sec. 184 of the Bengal Tenancy Act excludes the application of sec. 14 of the Limitation Act. The point is made still clearer by a reference to sec. 29 of the Limitation Act. This section has been amended recently in 1922. It provides that where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefor by the first schedule, the provisions of sec. 3 shall apply, as if such period were prescribed therefor in that schedule, and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, (a) the provisions contained in sec. 4, secs. 9 to 18 and sec. 22 shall apply only in so far as and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.” As I read this section, sec. 4, secs. 9 to 18 and sec. 22 would apply unless they are expressly excluded, by any special or local law. By the expression “expressly” I think it is meant that express reference is made to the specific section in the Act, and that unless such reference is made to the sections and by that reference they are expressly excluded then they would apply. I have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that sec. 14 of the Limitation Act does apply to the present suit and in view of the facts the Plaintiff is clearly within time.

    Mr. Bose has further contended with regard to the question of limitation that it has not been found that the Plaintiff was in good faith prosecuting the suit in the Munsif's Court. Whether a person is acting in good faith or bad faith is clearly a question of fact and there is on this point a specific finding by the learned Judge, see page 14 of the paper-book, lines 5 and 6, where the learned Judge states: “In such circumstances it cannot be said that the Plaintiff in bad faith gave a lower price.” Reading this portion of the judgment I think it is quite clear that the learned Judge means to say that the Plaintiff gave the price that he did in good faith. Mr. Bose then proceeds to contend further that the learned Judge in deciding this point had not got in his mind, the meaning of the expression “good faith.” “Good faith” is specifically defined in the Limitation Act as follows: “Nothing shall be deemed to be done in good faith which is not done with due care and attention.” Now the learned Judge was dealing with a section of the Limitation Act and there is no doubt that the expression “good faith” is used with a particular meaning in this Act. But we must presume that the learned Judge in dealing with the expression “good faith” as used in the Limitation Act was perfectly well aware of the particular definition of the expression “good faith” which will be found in the Limitation Act and therefore when he found that the Plaintiff prosecuted his suit in good faith, he found that he prosecuted it with due care and attention.

    Mr. Bose has then argued that the learned Judge has wrongly placed the burden of proof on the Defendant. At page 14, line 45 of the paper-book the following statement of the learned District Judge appears “The lands in suit are claimed by Plaintiff as part of his holding. Defendants must prove according to the ruling in Rajendra Kumar v. Mohim Chandra(1) that it is outside the Plaintiff's jote.” Mr. Bose contends that in so doing the learned Judge has placed the burden of proof on the wrong party. He contends, I think rightly, that it was for the Plaintiff to prove that the land lay within his jote and not for the Defendants to prove that it lay outside. I do not, however, think that this is really material. No doubt the learned Judge was wrong in stating that the burden of proof lay on the Defendants. But as has been pointed out by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, the question on whom the burden of proof should fall is of very little importance when evidence have been gone into by both sides. When one reads the judgment it will be seen that the learned Judge really put the burden of proof on the Plaintiff. He was aware as would be quite clear from line 36 at page 15 of the paper-book that the record-of-rights was in favour of the Defendants and it was for the Plaintiff to rebut the presumption arising from the entry in the record-of-rights. He deals with the evidence on that footing and finally finds that the presumption of the record-of-rights has been rebutted.

    Mr. Bose next argues that the learned Judge has not considered whether the lands in question are covered by the amalnama. As far as I can see reading the judgment of the learned District Judge, it was not disputed in the lower Appellate Court that the lands in dispute were covered by the terms of the amalnama. So far as the amalnama was concerned the only question raised before the learned District Judge was whether the amalnama itself was or was not genuine and it was not disputed before him whether the lands in dispute were or were not covered by it. I do not think therefore that the finding of the learned Judge that the three plots Nos. 823, 918 and 919 belong to the Plaintiff has been vitiated by any erroneous proposition of law that he put before himself and apparently adopted with regard to the burden of proof.

    Mr. Bose lastly argued that dag No. 700 has not been properly dealt with and that the learned Judge disposed of dag No. 700 in two lines. No doubt the learned Judge has not dealt with dag No. 700 at any length as he has done with regard to the other three dags. The explanation is, I think, that dag No. 700 is about a cottah in area while the area of the remaining three dags amounts to some eight bighas; it is quite possible that the parties did not attach very much importance to what amounts to 1/160 of the whole and very few arguments were addressed to the learned Judge. However he has held that the Plaintiff has proved his possession and his purchase from Madhab Kamdar. This purchase was in 1316 more than 12 years before the institution of the suit. I do not think that it is necessary to find anything further.

    The result is this appeal must fail and is dismissed with costs.

    Mallik, J.:— I agree.

    P.C

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    Rajah Sati Prosad Garg, Bahadur v. Gobinda Chandra Shee
    (Nov 28, 1928)