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citation codes
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  • Sections 249, and 338(b) of the Madras District Municipalities Act V of 1920.
  • Section 249 of the New District Municipalities Act, Madras Act V of 1920.
  • Section 365, Act V of 1920,
  • Section 249, Section 312
  • Section 303(1) rules
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Judges
Acts
  • Sections 249, and 338(b) of the Madras District Municipalities Act V of 1920.
  • Section 249 of the New District Municipalities Act, Madras Act V of 1920.
  • Section 365, Act V of 1920,
  • Section 249, Section 312
  • Section 303(1) rules
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The opinion concerns a revision petition by a person convicted and sentenced for storing and selling grain wholesale within the Cannanore Municipal limits without a license, an offence prosecuted under Sections 249 and 338(b) of the Madras District Municipalities Act V of 1920. The prosecution relied on a municipal notification (marked Ex. D) said to have been published under Section 249, which required licences for wholesale storage and sale. The notification relied upon was published on 15 July 1920. The new Act (Act V of 1920) was notified in the Fort Saint George Gazette by the Governor in Council by Notification No. 595 dated 10 August 1920 and came into force on 1 October 1920. The petitioner was convicted by a subordinate court for wholesale selling and storing without a licence; the conviction was challenged on the grounds that (1) there was no evidence of wholesale selling or storage as contemplated by the Schedule, and (2) in any event the notification Ex. D was invalid because it had been issued before the new Act and the powers under it had legally come into force.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the evidence established that the petitioner carried on a "wholesale" trade in grain (such that a licence under Schedule V and Section 249 could be required).
  2. Whether storage and sale without a licence was punishable under Section 338(b) in the absence of a valid notification under Section 249.
  3. Whether the municipal notification Ex. D (dated 15 July 1920) could be validated despite being issued before the new Act came into force, by reference to:
    1. Section 366(a) of the Act (which preserves certain powers of the old council until the new council assumes office), or
    2. The proviso to Section 365 allowing "rules, bye-laws and regulations" to be made after assent of the Governor-General (i.e., whether Ex. D could be treated as a rule, bye-law, or regulation made under that proviso).
  4. Whether Section 338 applies to create criminal liability in the absence of a proper notification under Section 249.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's / Accused's Arguments

  • The petitioner argued there was no evidence of the sale of grain "wholesale" or of storage for wholesale trade as contemplated by Schedule V(c) and Section 249; in the absence of a statutory definition, the common meaning of "wholesale" must be applied and the evidence did not establish wholesale activity.
  • The petitioner contended that the notification Ex. D was invalid because it was published on 15 July 1920, before the new Act had been brought into force (the Act was brought into force on 1 October 1920 by the Governor in Council's notification dated 10 August 1920). Because Ex. D was issued prior to the existence of power under the new Act, it could not create a legal obligation, and therefore storage without a licence could not be penalized under Section 338(b).
  • The petitioner further argued that the trade carried on was retail rather than wholesale.

Prosecution / Municipal Council's Arguments

  • The prosecution relied on the subordinate magistrate's findings that the petitioner had six shops and stored thousands of bags of grain, selling one to six bags at a time to petty merchants and others — facts the prosecution considered sufficient to show "wholesale" in ordinary parlance.
  • The prosecution argued that Section 366(a) of the Act enabled the pre-existing (old) Chairman and Councillors to exercise the powers under the new Act until the newly appointed/elected council assumed office, and thus the old council could have validly issued Ex. D.
  • In the alternative the prosecution (and the appellate court, as noted in the opinion) relied on the proviso to Section 365, which permitted rules, bye-laws and regulations to be made after the assent of the Governor-General, attempting to characterize Ex. D as within one of those categories.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in two main strands of analysis: (A) the question whether the trade was wholesale for the purposes of Schedule V and Section 249, and (B) the validity of the notification Ex. D and whether a conviction under Section 338 could stand if the notification was invalid.

A. Meaning of "Wholesale" and factual application

- The Act did not define "wholesale." The court therefore adopted the ordinary public meaning, referencing dictionary definitions (Century and Webster's) as "sale in large quantities" or "selling to retailers or jobbers." The subordinate magistrate's factual finding — that the petitioner had six shops, stored thousands of bags of grain, and sold them in units of one to six bags to petty merchants and others without breaking the bags — was taken as sufficient to establish wholesale dealing in the ordinary sense. Both judges whose reasoning appears agreed that, on the evidence, the trade qualified as wholesale.

B. Validity of Ex. D (notification under Section 249) and application of statutory provisions

- Central legal principle: the licensing requirement for the purposes specified in Schedule V is made operative only where a notification under Section 249 is properly published and 60 days have lapsed thereafter. Without a valid notification, the liability to take out licences does not arise in that municipal area.

- Timing facts: Ex. D (the council's notification under Section 249) was published on 15 July 1920. The Governor in Council's Notification No. 595 bringing the Act into force was dated 10 August 1920 and took effect on 1 October 1920. Thus Ex. D preceded the formal commencement of the new Act and the date appointed for powers under it to come into force.

- Section 366(a) argument: The prosecution relied on Section 366(a), which provides that until the newly appointed/elected Chairman and Councillors come into office they (the old Chairman and Councillors) "shall have all the powers of the Chairman and councillors under the new Act." The court analyzed the text and purpose of Section 366(a) and concluded that it was a transitional provision intended to preserve the functioning of municipal administration during the interregnum after the new Act comes into force but before the newly constituted council assumes office. It did not, however, operate to bring the commencement of the Act (or powers conferred by the Act) into existence before the date to be notified under Section 365. In short, Section 366(a) does not authorize the old council to exercise powers under the new Act at a date prior to the Act's commencement.

- Section 365 proviso argument: As an alternative, reliance was placed on the proviso to Section 365, which permits "rules, bye-laws and regulations authorised under the new Act" to be made after publication of the Governor-General's assent (here, after 15 June 1920). The court examined whether Ex. D could properly be categorized as a "rule," a "bye-law," or a "regulation."

- Analysis of the statutory scheme for rules/byelaws/regulations:

  • Rules (Sections 303–305): the court noted rules are those made by the Governor-in-Council (Section 303), so Ex. D (a municipal council notification) could not be a "rule."
  • Bye-laws (Section 306 and related provisions): bye-laws are to be made by the council but only for specified purposes identified in the Act; further, Sections 309–310 prescribe that a bye-law must be approved/confirmed/published in a specified manner before taking effect. Ex. D's subject matter did not clearly fall within the enumerated purposes for bye-laws, nor was the required process for bye-laws followed, so Ex. D could not be sustained as a bye-law.
  • Regulations (Section 312): regulations are made by municipal authorities in connection with certain specified provisions of the Act; Section 312 prescribes how such regulations may be published. The court observed that Section 249(1) is not among the provisions for which Section 312 confers regulatory making power on municipal authorities. The form and method of publication required by Section 249 were distinct and could not be satisfied by treating Ex. D as a regulation.

- Conclusion on Ex. D: Because Ex. D was issued before the Act and before the powers under the Act came into force, and because neither Section 366(a) nor the proviso to Section 365 could be read to validate Ex. D (Ex. D could not properly be classified as a rule, bye-law or regulation under the relevant provisions), the court held Ex. D to be invalid. The notification could not create the obligation that was the foundation for the conviction.

- Application to Section 338: The court explained that Section 338 applies where the Act imposes the liability and the condition about the notification (Section 249) has been fulfilled. Where that condition is not properly fulfilled — as the court found here — Section 338 does not apply and a conviction under it cannot stand. One judge specifically noted that even if Section 338 speaks of the Act generally, the Act itself makes the liability conditional on a proper notification under Section 249.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court allowed the petition, held the municipal notification Ex. D to be invalid, set aside/quashed the petitioner's conviction, and ordered that the petitioner be acquitted. Any fine paid, including the amount levied as a licence fee, will be refunded upon application by the petitioner.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the petitioner's conviction for selling and storing grain wholesale without a licence is quashed and the petitioner is acquitted; fines and licence fees paid are to be refunded on application.
  • The opinion emphasizes a strict approach to penal provisions and transitional statutory power: licensing obligations under the Act arise only after a valid notification under Section 249 has been published and the prescribed lapse of time (60 days) has passed; premature municipal action taken before the Act or the requisite powers have lawfully come into force cannot create criminal liability.
  • The court did not rely upon or establish any new judicial precedent in the sense of cited case law (no precedents were cited in the provided opinion). The ruling is rooted in statutory interpretation and application of the Act's transitional and procedural provisions to the particular facts of Ex. D's timing and form.

This summary is strictly limited to the matters and language presented in the supplied opinion and does not add information beyond that text.

    In Re: v. Sesha Prabhu

    1. We are asked to revise petitioner's conviction and sentence for the offence of storing and selling grain wholesale within the Cannanore Municipal limits without a license from the Municipal Chairman punishable under Sections 249, and 338(b) of the Madras District Municipalities Act V of 1920.

    2. The first objection taken to the conviction is that there is no evidence of the sale of grain wholesale or of the storage for wholsale trade, contemplated by Sch, V. (c) for which a license can be required under Section 249. In the absence of a definition of "Wholesale" in the Act, the meaning of that expression in common parlance must be decisive and, whether the definition in the Century or Webster's Dictionaries as "sale in large quantities" or the secondary definition in the latter as "Selling to retailers or jobbers" is accepted, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate's finding of fact is sufficient, that petitioner" has six shops, in which he stores thousands of bags of grain selling them from one to six bags at a time to petty merchants and others and not, so far as was shown, selling them by measures after breaking up the bags."

    3. This failing, we have to deal with the more substantial contention that such storage without a license was not punishable under Section 338(b) because there had not been any valid notification under Section 249, making it obligatory on petitioner to obtain one. The facts are that under Section 365, Act V of 1920, the Notification of the Governor in Council No. 595, dated 10th August 1920, came into force on 1st October, 1920; but Ex.D the notification under S.249 relied on by the prosecution had been published on 15th July 1920; and it is argued that, the new Act in the had been made to the Municipal Council having at the latter date no powers under the Act, its notification could have no legal effect and could create no obligation, for breach of which petitioner could be punished. The lower Court's answer that petitioner was in no way prejudiced by such premature publication is clearly inconclusive, when the question arises in connection with the application of a penal provision and a strict construction of the law is required. Here reliance is placed firstly on Section 366(a) of the Act of 1920 which provides that until the Chairman and Councillors to be newly appointed or elected under that act come into office the Chairman and councillors under the previous Act of 1884 shall have all the powers of the Chairman and councillors under the former. Section 366(a) however, as its wording and the substantive part of the section show, merely provides for modification in the provisions of the new Act in their application to the term of the office and election and appointment of the councillors and Chairman for the first time after its commencement and does not advance the commencement of the Act or of powers under it before the date to be notified under Section 355. In the alternative reference had been made to the proviso to the last mentioned section under which rules, bye-laws and regulations authorised under the new Act could be made at any time after the publication of the assent to it of the Governor-General on 15th June 1920. But this did not justify the issue of Ex, D on 29th June 1920, For Ex, D is not a rule, because under Section 303(1) rules can be made only by the Governor in Council; it is not a bye-law, because, if its subject matter can be identified with any of those enumerated in Section 3 06, it was not published or confirmed in the manner prescribed in Sections 309, 310; and it is not a regulation, because Section 312 providing only for the manner in which regulations may be published, power to make them is conferred on the Municipal Council, not generally, but only in connection with certain specified provisions, see for instance, Sections 25 and 130 in which Section 249(1) is not included.

    4. In these circumstances it is not possible to uphold as valid the council's Notification, Ex. D. which petitioner is charged with infringing. The foundation for this conviction thus failing, his petition must be allowed and he must be acquitted. The fine, if paid, including the amount levied as license fee will be refunded on his application.

    Krishnan, J.

    5. This case raises the question of the validity of a notification issued by the Municipal Council of Cannanore in July 1920 under Section 249 of the New District Municipalities Act, Madras Act V of 1920. The notification is marked Ex. D and was issued in accordance with a resolution passed by the Council constituted under the new Repealed Act of 1884 bringing into application the licensing powers given by the new Act with effect from 1st of October 1920 the date on which the Act was brought into force by the Governor in Council by notification in the Fort Saint George Gazette of the 10th August 1920, as provided in Section 365 of the Act. The accused has been prosecuted and convicted under Section 338 for selling grain wholesale and for storing it for such sale without taking out licenses as required by the notification. It is contended for the accused that the notification had no legal effect as it was issued by a Council which was not constituted under the new Act but by one constituted under the repealed Act, and which had no power to pass the resolution to levy licensing fees or to publish a notification to that effect.

    6. Without a valid and proper notification under Section 249 the liability to take out licenses for any of the purposes specified in Sch- V of the New Act will not of course arise in any Municipal area for the Act makes the publication of the notification in the manner provided for in the section and the lapse of 60 days thereafter, necessary pre-requisities for bringing into force the licensing provisions. It is therefore important to consider whether Ex-D was a valid notification.

    7. Reading Section 249 by itself it is manifest that the Council referred to in it is the Council constituted under the new Act according to the provision of Chapter II thereof. That council is the body given authority by S- 249 of the Act to decide how far it would bring into force the licensing powers given by the Act. The Council constituted under the old Act, was a different body altogether, a different legal entity and could not exercise the power under Section 249 unless indeed there is any other provision of law giving the council the power to so act. It is contended by the learned Public Prosecutor that Section 366 of the Act is such a provision and in fact he relied chiefly on the last part of clause (a) in it as giving power to the old Council to issue the notification in question. That clause gives power to the Governor in council to determine after the new Act had been brought into force, the date on which the Chairman and councillors of the old Council should go out of office and the newly elected Chairman and councillors should come into office; and then it says that until they so come into office, the Chairman and the Councilors of the old Council should have all the powers and be subject to all the duties respectively of the Chairman and councillors under the new Act. It is contended that this last provision validated the notification Ex-D. But unfortunately in this case the council had acted before the New Act was brought into force, their resolution and notification being in July as already stated, that is, some l\ months before the Act was put in force. No doubt the power to issue a notification under Section 249 is a power given to the new council under the new Act but the power itself came into existence only when the Act was brought into force and not before. It is impossible to see, how then, the old council could have properly exercised that power which did not exist on the date on which it purported to exercise it. It is evident from the language of clause (a) that by it the legislature was making provision for carrying on the Municipal administration during the interregnum between the coming into force of the New Act and the assumption of office by the New Chairman and Councillors. The clause, as I understand it, has nothing to do with any anterior period, for before the New Act came into force there was the old act in full force under which the old council was free to act.

    8. The only provision of the New Act that gave power to the old council to act in anticipation of the Act being brought into force is the proviso to Section 365 which enabled "rules, bye-laws and regulations" to be made under the New Act as soon as it had received the assent of the Governor General. The notification Ex-D was no doubt issued after the assent of the Governor General had been given and if Section 365 could be held to apply to it, it would be a valid proceeding. Apparently the council acted under that section and in fact the appellate Court has upheld its validity under that section. But I am unable to support that view as the notification in question cannot apparently be brought under any one of the terms, "rule, bye-law or regulation" used in the section. These words are not defined in the Act but Chapter XIV dealing with the making of them shows what is meant by each Section 303 to 305 show that rules are those made by the Governor-in-Council. Section 306 shows bye-laws are made by the council but that section specified the purposes for whichbye-laws. can be made, of which the purpose of the notification in question here does not seem to be one. The matter is made clear by referring to Section 309 which prevents a bye-law from having effect till it is approved of and confirmed by the Governor-in-Council, and Section 310 which shows the method of making it and publishing it. These conditions do not apply to the action of the Council under Section 249, Section 312 shows regulations are those made by Municipal authorities and not by the Council and they can be published in such manner as the Council determines. The method of their publication shows clearly that the word regulation cannot refer to the notification under Section 249 which the section itself directs to be published in a particular manner. I am therefore of opinion that Section 365 cannot be used to validate the action of the council in the issuing of the notification Ex-D,

    9. It was suggested that if the liability to take out license is not treated as one imposed by any rule, bye-law or regulation there may be a difficulty in applying Section 338 even to cases where proper notification had been issued under Section 249 and that there will be no provision for punishment for- disobedience. This argument is, I think, not sound for I consider that the necessity to take out license when a proper notification is issued arises under the Act itself and Section 338 which speaks of the Act as well will apply. In my view the Act imposes the liability subject to the condition about the notification prescribed in Section 249. But when that condition is not properly fulfilled, as I hold is the case here, Section 338 does not apply and the conviction of the accused must be set aside.

    10. It was also argued for the petitioner that the trade carried on by him in grain was not a wholesale trade but a retail one. On this point, I agree with the lower court that the trade was a wholesale one as the petitioner is found to have sold grain by the bulk without breaking the bags, in quantities of 1 to 6 bags at a time to retail dealers. The term wholeasle as used in Schedule V of the Act is not defined in the Act and we have therefore to apply to the word the meaning that is ordinarily given to it by the public and by the traders in general. That is the view taken by the lower court and I agree with it and taking that view the petitioner's trade was well within the scope of the term "wholesale" trade. Though the petitioner fails on this point he has succeeded on his first point and his conviction is therefore quashed and the fine and license fees if they have been paid by him will be refunded to him.

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    Comments

    In Re: v. Sesha Prabhu
    (Dec 15, 1921)