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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The defendants Nos. 1 to 6 traded in Ceylon under the name and style of "S.M.P.M.K." While so trading the firm obtained 25 negotiable promissory notes from different persons and indorsed them to Meyyappa Chetty, who indorsed them to the Bank of Madras at Colombo. On presentation the notes were dishonoured. Meyyappa Chetty paid the bank and obtained return of the notes. The defendants' firm gave Meyyappa three other promissory notes payable to him or his order; those were indorsed by Meyyappa to the bank and subsequently returned to him after similar dishonour and payment by him.

Subsequently, in consideration of Rs. 1,500 paid by the plaintiff to Meyyappa Chetty, Meyyappa assigned in Ceylon his right to the notes by an instrument dated 9 April 1901. The defendants failed to pay the amounts due on demand. The present suit sought recovery in respect of five promissory notes made payable to the firm and one made by the firm itself.

At first instance the District Munsif gave a decree to the plaintiff. On appeal the District Judge reversed that decree and dismissed the suit on the technical ground that the notes had not been indorsed over to the plaintiff.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an assignment of negotiable promissory notes without indorsement enables the assignee to sue in his own name (i.e., whether transfer other than by indorsement is valid and actionable).
  2. Whether the Negotiable Instruments Act restricts transfer of negotiable instruments exclusively to transfer by indorsement, thereby precluding other forms of assignment.
  3. Whether, when a prior indorser 'takes up' a note by paying his immediate indorsee and regaining possession, title is revested in him without an indorsement back from the indorsee.
  4. Whether the members of the trading firm (named with the prefix "S.M.P.M.") are liable on notes where the payee, indorser, or maker is not in strict form the firm but the name is preceded by such prefix—i.e., the evidential question of firm liability and the admissibility of extrinsic evidence to show firm transactions.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Case / Arguments

  • The plaintiff alleged that Meyyappa Chetty assigned to him the rights in the notes by an instrument dated 9 April 1901, in consideration of Rs. 1,500, and that the defendants had failed to pay the amounts due on the notes on demand.
  • The plaint sought recovery in respect of five notes payable to the firm and one note made by the firm.

Respondents' (Defendants') Arguments — as advanced by Mr. Krishnaswami Ayyar

  • That the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act do not permit any kind of transfer other than by indorsement, and therefore a transferee who has not been indorsed to cannot sue on the notes.
  • That because the notes had been indorsed to the Bank of Madras, the property in the notes remained in the last indorsee (the Bank), so the instrument of 9 April 1901 conferred no right on the plaintiff.
  • That in five of the notes the payee and first indorser and in the sixth the maker was not the firm (i.e., individuals rather than the firm name), and therefore firm members not parties to such notes are not liable.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Pattat Ambadi Marar v. Krishnan and Abboy Chetti v. Ramachandra Rau Earlier ratio decidendi holding relevant to transfer by indorsement (the District Judge followed these authorities). The court observed that the ratio decidendi in these cases, which the District Judge followed, has not been accepted as sound in subsequent cases and thus is not a reliable authority for the technical ground on which the District Judge dismissed the suit.
Ramachandra Rao v. Abeeb Rowihan Held that the Negotiable Instruments Act does not restrict transfer of negotiable instruments to indorsement only; choses in action may be assigned otherwise; an assignee may sue in his own name. Relied upon by the court as authoritative support for the proposition that an assignment without indorsement can vest rights enabling the assignee to sue in his own name.
Mahomed Khumar Ali v. Runya Rao Followed the view that a transfer otherwise than by indorsement gives the assignee the transferor's rights, and contrasted rights of assignee by indorsement vs. other assignment (reference to Bhashyam Ayyangar, J.'s discussion). Used to reinforce the distinction between transfer by indorsement (conveying holder-in-due-course rights) and transfer otherwise (conveying only transferor's rights), supporting the court's acceptance of assignment without indorsement as effective to transfer the assignor's right.
Kanhaiya Lal v. Domingo Held that a non-negotiable promissory note may be assigned so as to enable the assignee to sue in his own name. Cited to show that promissory notes as choses in action have been regarded as assignable and that assignment can enable suit by the assignee.
Ellsworth v. Brewer Authority for the technical law-merchant phrase "takes up a note" and related principles concerning payment by a prior indorser and reacquisition of possession. Referred to in discussing the legal effect of a prior indorser paying his immediate indorsee and regaining possession, i.e., the manner in which such 'taking up' is established.
Dugan v. The United States Held that where an indorser comes into possession of a bill again after indorsing it away, he is prima facie to be regarded as the bona fide holder and proprietor unless the contrary appears; possession is prima facie evidence of title. Quoted and relied on as leading authority to support the proposition that possession by the prior indorser (after payment) is prima facie evidence of ownership and may revest title without production of an indorsement back.
Subha Narayana Vathiar v. Ramasami Ayyar Considered points relating to admissibility of extrinsic/parol evidence with reference to a negotiable promissory note, especially in questions of firm identity and transaction. Invoked in discussing the factual question whether the notes were firm transactions (given the prefix "S.M.P.M.") and in explaining the admissibility of parol evidence to establish such a fact.
Castrique v. Buttigiey (Judicial Committee) Explained that the liability of an indorser arises from the written endorsement, delivery, and the intention with which delivery/acceptance was made; demonstrated that parol evidence and usage can show limited or modified liability of an indorser. Used to illustrate that an unqualified indorsement may be accompanied by extrinsic facts (usage, course of dealing, words of parties) limiting liability, and to support reception of extrinsic evidence about the parties' intention and dealings.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court undertook a legal analysis in several linked steps, applying precedents and general principles to the facts as pleaded:

  1. The court first identified the core legal error in the District Judge's decision: dismissal of the suit on the technical ground that the notes had not been indorsed to the plaintiff. The District Judge had followed earlier cases (Pattat Ambadi Marar v. Krishnan and Abboy Chetti v. Ramachandra Rau), but the court observed that those ratios had not been accepted as sound in later authorities.
  2. The court relied on the decision in Ramachandra Rao v. Abeeb Rowihan (Shephard and Moore, JJ.) which held that nothing in the Negotiable Instruments Act restricted transfer of negotiable instruments to indorsement only, and that a chose in action (such as a promissory note) may be assigned otherwise and an assignee under such an assignment can sue in his own name. This authority was applied to reject the premise that the Act forbids assignment other than by indorsement.
  3. The court explained the general nature of a promissory note: whether negotiable or not it remains a chose in action and is subject to the incidents of choses in action, unless the Negotiable Instruments Act expressly or impliedly displaces those rules. The court found nothing in the Act to displace them. The court noted that the Act's definition of "holder" indicates ownership at law according to the law merchant but does not extinguish applicable general-law rules of assignment not inconsistent with the Act.
  4. The opinion distinguished between transfer by indorsement (which confers the rights of a holder in due course) and transfer otherwise (which gives the assignee the transferor's rights only). The court cited Mahomed Khumar Ali v. Runya Rao and Story on Promissory Notes to explain that difference, and concluded that this distinction does not render assignments without indorsement ineffectual.
  5. Addressing the contention that title remained in the Bank of Madras because no indorsement back to Meyyappa Chetty was alleged, the court rejected the necessity of an express indorsement-back as a precondition to revesting title. The court reasoned that when a prior indorser "takes up a note" by payment to his immediate indorsee and retakes possession, there is no prescribed mode by which this must be proved, and possession by the maker, payee, or a subsequent indorser is prima facie evidence of lawful ownership (citing Story and the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Dugan v. The United States).
  6. On the point of firm liability where names were preceded by the letters "S.M.P.M.", the court framed the issue as one of fact to be determined on evidence: whether the usage of such prefixes and the practice of native merchants showed the notes to be firm transactions. The court observed that reception of parol evidence to establish such a fact is governed by the general rules applicable to written contracts and referenced Subha Narayana Vathiar v. Ramasami Ayyar and the Judicial Committee's reasoning in Castrique v. Buttigiey to support admissibility of extrinsic evidence and the principle that intention, delivery, usage, and course of dealing may influence the contractual liabilities of indorsers.

The court therefore concluded that (a) absence of an indorsement to the plaintiff did not bar suit by the plaintiff under the pleaded assignment; (b) the assumption that title necessarily remained with the Bank of Madras absent an indorsement back was legally unsound; and (c) the question of whether the notes bound the firm required factual inquiry into usage and evidence.

Holding and Implications

The decree of the District Judge is set aside and the appeal is remanded for disposal according to law.

Consequences and immediate effects:

  • The technical ground relied upon by the District Judge (that the notes had not been indorsed to the plaintiff and thus he could not sue) was rejected by the court as unsustainable in light of subsequent authorities and established principles concerning assignment of choses in action.
  • The matter is remitted for further proceedings consistent with the court's legal conclusions (including examination of factual issues such as whether the notes were firm transactions and whether possession or other facts establish revesting of title), and costs are to abide and follow the result.

The opinion does not purport to lay down a broad new precedent beyond applying and following the authorities cited; its direct effect is to reverse the District Judge's dismissal and return the matter for further disposition in accordance with the legal principles and factual inquiries identified above.


Additional notes from the opinion: Boddam, J. gave an agreeing concurrence: "I agree entirely."

    Muthar Sahib Maraikar v. Kadir Sahib Maraikar

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    Sir S. Subrahmania Ayyar, Offg. C.J:— The plaintiff's case in short is as follows. The defendants Nos. 1 to 6 traded in Ceylon under the name and style of S.M.P.M.K, and, while so trading, the firm obtained 25 negotiable promissory notes from different persons and indorsed the same to one Meyyappa Chetty, who again indorsed them to the Bank of Madras at Colombo. On the presentation of the notes on behalf of tho, bank to the makers the notes were dishonoured. The said Meyyappa Chetty paid the bank and obtained a return of them the defendants' firm gave to the said Meyyappa Chetty three other promissory notes payable to him or to his order which were indorsed by Meyyappa Chetty in favour of the bank and similarly returned to him on his payment to the hank after they also had been dishonored. Subsequently, in consideration of Rs. 1,500 paid by the plaintiff to him, Meyyappa Chetty assigned in Ceylon his right to the notes by an instrument, dated the 9th April 1901. The defendants on demand failed to pay the amount due by them upon the notes. The present suit is for the recovery of the amount due in respect of five out of the promissory notes made payable to the firm and one out of those made by the firm itself.

    Various defeuces were raised which it is not necessary now to state. The District Munsif gave a decree to the plaintiff. On appeal, the District Judge reversed the decree and dismissed the suit on the technical ground that the notes not having been indorsed over to the plaintiff he could not sue on them.

    The ratio decidendi involved in the actual decision in Pattat Ambadi Marar v. Krishnan(1) and Abboy Chetti v. Ramachandra Rau(2), which the District Judge followed, has not been accepted as sound in subsequent cases. In Ramachandra Rao v. Abeeb Rowihan(3) Shephard and Moore, JJ., held that there was nothing in the Negotiable Instruments Act to restrict the transfer of negotiable instruments to transfer by indorsement only, that such choses in action may be otherwise assigned, and that an assignee under an assignment of the latter class may sue in his own name. This was followed in Mahomed Khumar Ali v. Runya Rao(4) and the authorities in support of this view of the law will be found referred to and considered in the judgment of Bhashyam Ayyangar, J., in that case, where it is pointed out that the important difference between transfer by indorsement and transfer otherwise than by indorsement of a negotiable instrument is that in the latter case the assignee will acquire in the hill or note, as a chattel, nothing more than the right title and interest of his assignor, whereas in the former case the assignee by indgrsement will have all the rights and advantages of a bolder in due course of a negotiable instrument” (at page 656). Story also states the law on the point thus:—“If a promissory note is originally payable to a person or his order, then it is properly transferable by indorsement. We say ‘properly transferable’ because in no other way will the transfer convey the legal title to the bolder so that he can at law hold the other parties liable to him ex directo, whatever may be his remedy in equity. If there be an assignment thereof without indorsement, the holder will thereby acquire the same rights only as be would acquire upon an assignment of a note not negotiable” (Story on ‘Promissory Notes,’ 7th edition, section 120, page 153).

    Mr. Krishnasvami Ayyar on behalf of the respondents, in effect, contended not only that the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act do not permit of any kind of transfer other than by indorsement, but went the length of urging that in cases like the present we are precluded from travelling beyond the four corners of the Act. Before proceeding to examine the provisions of the Act, it is best to point out the fallacy underlying such an extreme contention—a contention possible only when the true nature of the instrument is overlooked. Now, a promissory note, whether negotiable or not, is nevertheless a chose in action and is subject to the incidents attaching to it in that aspect, so long as the rules of the law merchant are not departed from. Choses in action have been held assignable in this country, and it has been held that a non-negotiable promissory note may be assigned so as to enable the assignee to sue upon the note in his own name. See Kanhaiya Lal v. Domingo. The fact that the note is negotiable does not make any difference except that it carries with it certain peculiar incidents attached to it by the law merchant. The rules in regard to these choses in action prior to the Act do not cease to be any the less applicable to them by the passing of the Act unless its provisions expressly or impliedly affect those rules. If we now turn to the Act, so far as one can see, no provisions there constrain one to come to any other conclusion. The only provision of the Act which could, with any plausibility, be relied on in support of the contention under consideration is the definition therein of the term ‘bolder’: and Mr. Krishnasvami Aiyar did lay stress on it. But the real import of this definition is that, to come within it, the party should be the owner at law of the negotiable instrument, i.e, according to the law merchant, whatever such party's position and liability in equity may be. But this in no way interferes with the due application of rules which are unaffected by that law and which are not to be ignored simply because the Negotiable Instruments Act does not refer to them. The observations of Mr. Chalmers with reference to the English Bills of Exchange Act, 1882, may very well be applied to the Negotiable Instruments Act. He says at page 128 of his book on ‘Bills of Exchange’ that “the Act deals only with transfer by negotiation, that is, transfer according to the law merchant. It leaves untouched the rules of general law which regulate the transmission of bills by act of law and their transfer as choses in action or chattels according to the general law” (6th edition, page 128). No doubt, section 97, clause 2, in the English Act expressly says that “the rules of common law including the law merchant, save in so far as they are inconsistent with the express provisions of this Act, shall continue to apply to bills of exchange, promissory notes, and cheques”; and section 31, clause 4, enacts that “where the bolder of a bill payable to his order transfers it for value without indorsing it, the transfer gives the transferee such title as the transferor had in the bill, and the transferee in addition acquires the right to have the indorsement of the transferor.” These, of course, are provisions inserted by way of caution only and do not mean that, but for them, the rules of law referred to in those sections would have been unenforceable though there was nothing in the other provisions of the Act itself to forbid their application. And surely the absence of similar provisions in the Indian Act does not warrant that view that the Act abolished rules previously established, even though they are in no way inconsistent with any of its provisions. This was undoubtedly the reason for Shephard and Moore, JJ., upholding the assignment in question in the case already cited. It is thus clear that the absence of an endorsement to the plaintiff is no bar to the suit and the ground on which the decision of the District Judge rests is unsustainable.

    It was next urged by Mr. Krishnaswami Ayyar, if his argument in this respect was correctly understood, that upon the plaint allegations themselves the property in the notes should be taken as still residing in the last indorsee, the Bank of Madras, and, therefore, that the instrument of the 9th April 1901, relied on by the plaintiff, conferred on him no right whatever to the notes. The fallacy of this argument is in the assumption that, notwithstanding the payment to the Bank of Madras of all that was due to it by Meyyappa Chetty as indorser, an indorsement bock to Meyyappa Chetty from the Bank was, in point of law, necessary to revest the title in the notes in him. This contention is but a repetition in different words of the argument that transfer of a negotiable promissory note can be effected by indorsement only and in no other way, which has already been sufficiently refuted. It is true that there is no averment in the plaint of an express re transfer by the Bank to Meyyappa Chetty. But it may be pointed out that, when a prior indorser, in the technical language of the law, ‘takes up a note’ (see Ellsworth v. Brewer), on payment to his immediate indorsee and discharges his liability under the contract arising by the indorsement, there is no provision either in the Negotiable Instruments Act or elsewhere prescribing the mode in which such ‘taking up’ of the note is to be established. As laid down in section 452 of Story on ‘Promissory Notes,’ “the possession of a note by the maker or by the payee or by any subsequent indorser is primâ facie evidence that he is the true and lawful owner thereof and that he has acquired the full title thereto.” The proposition thus laid down is, it scarcely needs to be added, supported by numerous authorities of which the leading one is the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Dugan v. The United States, where Livingstone, J., delivering the opinion of the Court, said that ‘if any person who indorses a bill of exchange to another whether for value or for purposes of collection, shall come to the possession thereof again, he shall he regarded, unless the contrary appear in evidence, as the bonâ fide holder and proprietor of such bill and shall he entitled to recover, notwithstanding there may he on it one or more indorsements in full subsequent to the one to him, without producing any receipt or indorsement back from either of such indorsees whose names he may strike from the hill or not as he may think proper” (3 Wheaton, 172 at p. 183, reprinted in Book IV, Lawyers' edition, p. 362—see also ibid., p. 672 for Rose's notes of other, cases on the same point).

    A further point taken by Mr. Krishnaswami Ayyar was that the payee and first indorser in five of the notes as well as the maker of the sixth was not the firm, and, consequently, that the members of the firm, not parties to the notes, are not liable. As already stated, the plaintiff's case was that it was the firm that was liable on all the notes. Assuming that such an objection was distinctly raised before the lower Courts, the question is having regard to the fact that the name of the payee or the indorser or the maker is preceded by the letters S.M.P.M, and to the practice of native merchants to indicate firm transactions by such prefixes, one of fact to be decided with reference to the evidence in the case. Of course the reception of parol evidence in regard to such a matter is subject to much the same rules as govern written contracts generally. In Subha Narayana Vathiar v. Ramasami Ayyar, some of the points relating to the admissibility of such extrinsic evidence with reference to a negotiable promissory note were considered; and it may not be superfluous to call attention to what the Judicial Committee said in Castrique v. Buttigiey, in dealing with a case of indorsement which was on its face unqualified. There, a person acted as agent in Malta for another person residing in England for the purpose of buying and remitting to him in England bills on England on account of money received by him in Malta. In the course of the agency he purchased bills in Malta and indorsed them to his principal. It was held with reference to what the Committee referred to as “the law merchant common to all civilized countries” that the agent was not liable on the bills being dishonoured, though the indorsement was without any restriction of his liability and the principle of the decision was explained thus:—“The liability of an indorser to his immediate indorsee arises out of a contract between them, and this contract in no case consists exclusively in the writing popularly called an indorsement and which is indeed necessary to the existence of the contract in question but that contract arises out of the written endorsement itself, the delivery of the hill to the indorsee, and the intention with which that delivery was made and accepted, as evinced by the words, spoken or written, of the parties and the circumstances (such as the usage at the place, the course of the dealing between the parties and their relative situations) under which the delivery takes place; thus a bill with an unqualified written indorsement may be delivered and received for the purpose of enabling the indorsee to receive the money for account of the indorser or to enable the indorsee to raise money for his own use or on the credit of the signature of the indorser or with an express stipulation that the indorsee, though for value, is to claim against the drawer and acceptor only and not against the indorser who agrees to sell his claim against the prior parties but stipulates not to warrant their solvency. In all these cases the indorser is not liable to the indorsee and they are all in conformity with the general law of contracts which enables parties to them to limit and modify theft liabilities as they think fit provided they do not infringe any prohibitory law” (at pages 108 and 109).

    The decree of the District Judge is set aside and the appeal remanded for disposal according to law. The costs will abide and follow the result.

    Boddam, J.:— I agree entirely.

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    Muthar Sahib Maraikar v. Kadir Sahib Maraikar
    (Aug 16, 1905)