1. Section 64 of the CPC, says that
“where an attachment has been made, any private transfer or delivery of the property attached or of any interest therein and any payment to the judgment-debtor of any debt, dividend or other moneys contrary to such attachment shall be void as against all the claims enforceable under the attachment.”
2. The only question for decision in this case is whether on the date of plaintiff's lease the attachment had been made.
3. No doubt an order had been passed a few days before the lease ordering attachment, but O. 21, R. 54 of the CPC, lays down the manner in which an attachment of an immovable property has to be made, and those provisions were not complied with until long after the lease was executed. It is contended that the mere writing of an order to attach is sufficient to constitute attachment, but the rule says that the order must be one “prohibiting” the judgment-debtor and we think that in order to make an order prohibiting, the person prohibited must have the opportunity, afforded by the publication mentioned in Cl. 2, R. 54, of knowing that he is so prohibited and the mere writing of such an order behind the judgment-debtor's back and keeping it in the Court records would not amount to an order prohibiting within the meaning of R. 54. A perusal of Rr. 43, 44, 46, 47, 48 and 51 to 53, O. 21, shows that the principle unlerlying the procedure in each case is to make the attachment known to the person affected by the order. In this view no attachment of the property had been made in this case and the lower Court's decree is right. Under Section 64 of the CPC no question of the bona fides of the alienee arises so this aspect of the case need not be considered. The second appeal is dismissed with costs.
S.N/R.K
4. Appeal dismissed.