This case raises the question of the construction of a section of the Court Fees Act, VII of 1870, and the way that the matter arises in this. A suit was brought for the recovery of land which was a definite plot forming part of Survey No. 304 and was in fact 3 acres 59 cents in extent. That Survey Number as a whole consists of 4 acres 42 cents, out of which 83 cents had been sold away before, leaving a residue of 3 acres 59 cents which was what the plaintiff was suing for. The point is this, that according to the construction of the Court Fees Act will the question be determined as to what Court has jurisdiction, because it is not contested that on the method of valuation of the land, the jurisdiction of the Court, to try will depend. According to the plaintiff the proper Sub-section to apply is Sub-Sect. 5 (b) of Sect. 7 of the Act which would be to apply a system of multiplying the revenue payable in order to arrive at the calculation provided by the Act for fixing the value of the suit. According to the defendant it is Sub-Sect. 5 (d) of the section which really governs the matter, in which case the market value of the land has to be ascertained. According to the plaintiff as I say 5 (b) applies and the words then are these:—“Where the land forms an entire estate,”—that is not this case—“or a definite share of an estate, paying an annual revenue to Government, or forms part of such estate, and is recorded as aforesaid,” which by reference to sub-cl. (0) means “is recorded in the Collector's Register as separately assessed with such revenue.” It is not disputed that what appears in the Collector's book is this, a description of the whole area covered by a particular patta an enumeration of its extent and a figure representing the total revenue payable in respect of that patta. Then there follow particulars which show the rate charged per acre. I am asked to say by the plaintiff that the true construction of this Act is that because you can by a mathematical culculation arrive at what fraction of the whole patta any piece of land is, therefore any and every bit of land that you take within the whole patta must be considered to be separately assessed to revenue. That seems to me to be a proposition which is utterly incapable of being supported if for no other reason because it gives no meaning whatever to the words “separately assessed.” It is all assessed; the only thing is whether it is separately assessed as distinct from something which is assessed as part of a whole, and that is what I find to be the meaning of the words. Within the meaning of these words therefore the land in question in this suit cannot fall.
Then it is said that even if this is not a part of an estate separately assessed to revenue, nevertheless it may be regarded as “a definite share of an estate.” Once more I make the same criticism on that construction as upon the other. It entirely ignores the word “definite” because every share in an estate is in some sense a definite share, and I have no doubt that what is meant by the words “definite share “is an undivided tangible fraction of an estate as distinct from a defined demarcated part which has been taken out of an estate. Supposing for instance I sell Brownsfield plot out of Whiteacre estates, that would be in my opinion not a definite share of an estate within the meaning of this enactment. But if I sell a fraction of my Blackacre estate and it has got to be divided up among different kinds of land, that I think is a definite share of an estate within the meaning of the section. I observe, the same view was taken by a learned. Judge of the Allahabad High Court in Reference under the Court Fees Act(1), 1870, Sect. 5 (1). I am conscious of the extreme inconvenience of this decision but I see no possible escape from that construction of the Act. It leads no doubt to this absurdity in some cases. For instance you, might have a case where it you sue for the recovery of a whole plot, if it falls under Sub-Sect. 5 (b), taking live times the revenue would result in a lower value than if you sue for a portion of the land which according to this view has to be taken at the market-value. Probably in the present case it may be that a suit for recovery of the whole Survey Number will have to go to the District Munsif, whereas the suit for a portion of it may have go to the Subordinate Judge's Court. The result is doubtless reasonable and I tried very hard to avoid it: it seems to me that the view of the person who drafted the section in fact was that wherever you can caculate with reasonable certainty the amount of revenue payable on a plot you should take five or ten times the revenue, and in default of any possibility of measuring the revenue then you must in the last resort have recourse to the inconvenient and cumbersome method of valuation by the market-value. That is logical and intelligible method and must have been the intention of the framer of the statute, but if so, he has fallen very short of his object; because though, as I say, the coustruction that I have adopted is probably not what was intended, it is the only possible construction on the wording of the statute.
The result is that this petition is allowed and I declare that the subject-matter of this suit must be valued according to its market-value and the case must be remanded to the Lower Court to ascertain the market-value and determine the question of jurisdiction in accordance with the value found. The petitioner's costs in this Court will be paid by the respondent.
[The above Letters Patent Appeal against the said judgment of Coutts Trotter, J., came on for disposal before their Lordships Ayling and Seshagiri Aiyar. JJ., on 15th November 1916.]
Mr. P. Narayranamurthi for the Appellant.
Mr. A. Krishnaswami Aiyar for the Respondent.
JUDGMENT
The report of the District Munsif now received places it beyond doubt that the portion of Suney No. 304. which is part of the subject-matter of the suit, has not been sub-divided and Separately assessed to land revenue.
It cannot therefore be valued under cl. (b) of Sect. 7 (v) of the Court Fees Act. The order of the learned Judge, clearly right.
The appeal must be dismissed with costs.
S. S.Appeal dismissed.