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Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Acts
  • provisions of Section 73, T.P. Act,
  • Section 73, T.P. Act,
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal concerns a suit by the plaintiff to enforce a simple mortgage-bond executed by defendant 1 in favour of the plaintiff's father (now deceased) for Rs. 100 on 25 Kartic 1385 B.S.

Relevant chronological facts (as stated in the opinion):

  • July 1909: Defendant 1 (the mortgagor) executed a first mortgage in favour of defendant 3's father.
  • 11 November 1911: Defendant 1 executed a second mortgage in favour of the plaintiff's father (the mortgage-bond now in suit).
  • 7 August 1915: The property was sold in execution of a rent-decree and purchased by defendant 2.
  • 1917: The plaintiff instituted a suit to set aside the rent sale alleging fraud and that defendant 2 was a benamidar for defendant 1; that suit was dismissed on 3 September 1919.
  • 7 July 1920: Defendant 1 sold the property to defendant 3 in satisfaction of the first mortgage for Rs. 290; defendant 3 and defendant 1 then dispossessed defendant 2.
  • Defendant 2 then brought a suit for recovery of possession against defendant 3 and defendant 1; that suit was decreed on 8 May 1923.
  • The plaintiff's suit for enforcement of the mortgage-bond was contested by defendant 2, who argued (among other points) that because defendant 2 purchased the land in execution for arrears of rent, the plaintiff could not follow the property to satisfy his mortgage-debt.

The Court of first instance awarded a decree to the plaintiff and directed that any balance of sale proceeds, if any, should be paid to defendant 2. The lower appellate Court affirmed the decree and additionally found that defendant 2 was only a benamidar for defendant 1. Defendant 2 appealed to the present Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the lower appellate Court's finding that defendant 2 was a benamidar of defendant 1 was unnecessary or inconsistent with its decree.
  2. Whether, under Section 73 of the T.P. Act, a mortgagee whose mortgaged property has been sold for arrears of rent is confined to the surplus sale-proceeds (and cannot follow the mortgaged property itself).
  3. Whether the plaintiff was estopped from enforcing his mortgage claim against the property because he had earlier instituted a suit (in 1917) to set aside the rent sale.
  4. Whether the incumbrance on the property was annulled under Section 167 of the Benami Tenure Act because an application to the Collector had been made (despite alleged improper service of notice).
  5. Whether the plaintiff's claim against the property should be reduced by the amount of the first mortgage (on the theory that defendant 2 had eliminated that first mortgage by subsequent litigation).
  6. Whether the mortgagee could proceed against the mortgaged property to realize interest where the covenant for interest was pleaded as personal (and interest was to be added to principal at year end).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (as presented in the opinion)

  • The lower appellate Court's finding on benami was unnecessary and inconsistent with the decree, because the decree of the first Court (which was affirmed) was based on defendant 2 being the real owner, not a benamidar of defendant 1.
  • Under Section 73 of the T.P. Act, the mortgagee is precluded from proceeding against the mortgaged property once it is sold for rent; the mortgagee's remedy is confined to the surplus sale proceeds. Reliance was placed on observations in Hem Chandra v. Tafazzel Hossein Khan [1904] 8 C.W.N. 332.
  • The plaintiff was estopped from enforcing his mortgage because he had previously instituted a suit (in 1917) to have the sale set aside.
  • The incumbrance on the property was annulled under Section 167 of the Benami Tenure Act because the purchaser (defendant 2) had applied to the Collector for service of notice; the purchaser's duty ended on making that application and some form of notice of the purchase was conveyed to the mortgagee.
  • Because defendant 2 had, by subsequent litigation, removed the first mortgage (in favour of defendant 3's father), the plaintiff's claim should be reduced by the amount of that first mortgage.
  • The mortgaged property could not be proceeded against to realize interest because the covenant for interest was only a personal one (and therefore not a charge on the property).

Respondent / Plaintiff's Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed, separately enumerated account of the plaintiff's legal arguments in party-comparison form. The Court's text does, however, reject the appellant's points and explains the legal bases for those rejections.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Hem Chandra v. Tafazzel Hossein Khan [1904] 8 C.W.N. 332 Observation relied on by appellant that Section 73 effects that the mortgagee has no charge upon property sold for rent; such charge is "transferred" to surplus sale proceeds. The Court distinguished this case on its facts (there only one mortgaged property was sold and the purchaser was the mortgagee himself, leaving nothing for the mortgagee to follow). The Court held Hem Chandra inapplicable to the present facts.
Beni Prosad Sinha v. Rewat Lal [1897] 24 Cal. 746 Authority that Section 73 is intended to give the mortgagee a right over the residue of sale proceeds but does not enlarge the interests of purchasers at sales for arrears of revenue or rent; it does not nullify a mortgage in every case. The Court treated this decision as clear authority against the appellant's contention and used it to support the conclusion that Section 73 did not bar the plaintiff from following the mortgaged property.
Prem Chand Pal v. Purnimadas [1888] 15 Cal. 546 Decision with similar effect regarding the scope of Section 73 and the rights of mortgagees versus purchasers at sales for arrears. The Court cited it as supportive authority (alongside Beni Prosad Sinha) that Section 73 does not prevent the mortgagee from following the mortgaged property in the present circumstances.
Radhay Koer v. Ajodhya Das [1908] 7 C.L.J. 262 Holds that until notice under Section 167, Benami Tenure Act, has been properly served on the incumbrancer, the incumbrance subsists; it is obligatory on the purchaser to show service as prescribed. The Court applied this principle to conclude that the purchaser's application to the Collector, without proper service of notice as prescribed, did not annul the incumbrance; the finding in the present case was that no such proper service had occurred.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court addressed the appellant's contentions in sequence and gave reasoned responses to each, basing conclusions on evidence, statutory interpretation, and precedent cited in the opinion:

  1. On the lower appellate Court's benami finding: The Court acknowledged that the decree, as worded, affirmed the first instance decree in its entirety and therefore was not "strictly in accordance" with every nuance of the appellate finding. However, the Court held that the lower appellate Court was entitled to consider and determine the benami question; the appellate Court had relied on prior litigation (where a benami finding was made) and the subordinate judge had independently reached the same conclusion on the evidence. The appellants could not show an absence of evidence supporting the benami finding.
  2. On Section 73, T.P. Act: The Court examined the wording of Section 73 and found nothing to indicate that a mortgagee whose mortgaged property is sold for arrears of rent must be confined to the surplus sale-proceeds and cannot follow the property. The Court distinguished Hem Chandra by emphasizing its particular facts (mortgagee purchased at the sale). The Court relied on Beni Prosad Sinha and Prem Chand Pal to conclude Section 73 did not bar the plaintiff from following the mortgaged property in the present case, where the purchaser's title remained subject to the plaintiff's mortgage-incumbrance.
  3. On estoppel arising from the plaintiff having sued in 1917 to set aside the sale: The Court rejected the estoppel argument, holding that bringing a suit to have the sale set aside did not estop the plaintiff from subsequently instituting a suit to enforce his mortgage claim against the mortgaged property.
  4. On annulment under Section 167, Benami Tenure Act: The Court noted that although defendant 2 had applied to the Collector for service of notice under Section 167, the notice was not properly served. Radhay Koer v. Ajodhya Das established that until notice is properly served as prescribed, the incumbrance subsists and the purchaser must prove proper service. Applying that principle, the Court found no proper service had occurred and so the incumbrance was not annulled.
  5. On reduction of the plaintiff's claim because of the first mortgage: The Court observed that although defendant 2 had brought a suit for recovery of possession in 1920, there was nothing to show that the result of that suit was to satisfy the first mortgage-debt in favour of defendant 3's father; therefore the plaintiff's claim was not liable to be reduced on that basis.
  6. On realization of interest: The Court found the contention without force. The mortgage-bond stipulated that interest was to be added to the principal at the end of the year; the Court did not accept the argument that interest was merely a personal covenant that could not be realized against the property.

After rejecting each contention raised by the appellant, the Court concluded that the appeal must be dismissed with costs, subject to a modification that any balance of sale proceeds directed to be paid to defendant 2 would not be paid to him because he was only a benamidar.

Note: The opinion record indicates that Garlick, J. concurred ("I agree").

Holding and Implications

Holding: APPEAL DISMISSED WITH COSTS.

Immediate consequences for the parties (direct effect):

  • The decree of the lower Court in favour of the plaintiff enforcing the mortgage-bond is confirmed.
  • The appellant (defendant 2) fails in all the principal contentions raised on appeal.
  • Any balance of sale proceeds that had been directed to be paid to defendant 2 will not be paid to him because the Court found him to be only a benamidar for defendant 1.

Broader implications:

The opinion does not purport to lay down a new legal principle; it applies existing principles and precedents (as cited) to the facts before the Court. No novel precedent is announced in the text of this opinion.

    Rasik Chandra Chakravarti v. Jagabandhu Chakravarti And Ors.

    1. This appeal arises out of a suit brought by the plaintiff to enforce a simple mortgage-bond executed by defendant 1 in favour of plaintiff's father since deceased for a sum of Rs. 100 on the 25th Kartic 1385 B. S. To understand the case properly as also the arguments that were advanced before us it would be necessary to state the facts of the case in some detail. Defendant 1 the mortgagor, executed a first mortgage in favour of defendant 3's father in July 1909. On 11th November 1911 he executed in favour of the plaintiff's father a second mortgage, the suit for enforcement of which has given rise to the present appeal. On 7th August 1915, the property was sold in execution of a rent-decree and purchased by defendant 2. In 1917 the plaintiff brought a suit to have this rent sale set aside on the ground of fraud as also on the allegation that defendant 2 was a benamidar for defendant 1

    2. This suit, however, was dismissed on 3rd September 1919. Thereafter on 7th July 1920 defendant 1, the mortgagor, sold the property to defendant 3 in satisfaction of the first mortgage for Rs. 290 and after the sale by defendant 1 to defendant 3 they dispossessed defendant 2 from the property in suit. Thereafter defendant 2 brought a suit for recovery of possession from defendant 3 and defendant 1 and this suit was decreed on 8th May 1923. Plaintiff's suit for enforcement of the mortgage-bond was contested by defendant 2, on, amongst others, the allegation that as defendant 2 had purchased the lands in execution of a decree for arrears of rent the plaintiff could not follow the property in suit for the satisfaction of his mortgage-debt. The Court of first instance gave a decree to the plaintiff and in the decree it was directed that the balance of the sale proceeds after the sale, if any, should be paid to defendant 2. On appeal the lower appellate Court found among other things that defendant 2 was only a benamidar for defendant 1, the mortgagor, and the Court of appeal below dismissed the appeal and confirmed the decree that had been made by the Court of first instance. Defendant 2 has appealed to this Court.

    3. A number of points were taken on behalf of the appellate before us and I will take them up seriatim. It was first of all contended that the finding of the lower appellate Court on the question of benami was unnecessary inasmuch as the decree of the first Court which was confirmed by the lower appellate Court was based on the fact that defendant 2 is the real owner of the property and not a benamidar of defendant 1. The decree of the lower appellate Court as it stands whereby the decree of the Court of first instance was affirmed in its entirety is not strictly in accordance with the finding arrived at by the lower appellate Court on the question of benami. But the decree which the lower appellate Court made was made after the lower appellate Court had arrived at its finding on the question of benami and at the time when the lower appellate Court arrived at that finding there was nothing to prevent it from taking up and determining the question whether defendant 2 was the real owner or benamidar of defendant 1.

    4. The lower appellate Court has found the question of benami in favour of the plaintiff on two grounds, first, because in a previous litigation between the parties the question that defendant 2 was a benamidar of defendant 1 was raised and in that litigation it was found that defendant 2 was a benamidar of defendant 1 It was said that the Court of appeal below in the previous litigation had not come to any clear finding on the point But the judgment of the appellate Court in that litigation clearly shows that the appellate Court there upheld the finding of the first Court in that litigation to the effect that defendant 2 was a benamidar of defendant 1. The learned Subordinate Judge in the present litigation has also arrived at the same conclusion on the question of benami independent of the determination of the question in the previous litigation. It was contended before us that this finding of the lower appellate Court on the question of benami is wrong in law inasmuch as the learned Subordinate Judge does not fully set out in his judgment the evidence and circumstances to lead to the conclusion that he came to on the point. There is in the judgment of the lower appellate Court, however, a statement that the learned Subordinate Judge had come to his finding on that point on a consideration of the circumstances disclosed in the evidence. The learned advocate for the appellants could not say that there was absolutely no evidence in the ease in support of the finding.

    5. The next point taken before us was that the plaintiff was under the provisions of Section 73, T.P. Act, precluded from proceeding against the property and that his only remedy was to proceed against the surplus sale-proceeds under Section 73. There is nothing in the wording of Section 73, T.P. Act, which would, in my opinion, indicate that a mortgagee in a case where the mortgaged property is sold for arrears of rent must be confined to the surplus sale-proceeds and cannot follow the mortgaged-property. In support of his contention the learned advocate for the appellant placed reliance on the observations of their Lordships in the case of Hem Chandra v. Tafazzel Hossein Khan [1904] 8 C.W.N. 332. The observation that is to be found at p. 336 runs thus:

    The effect of this section is, as we understand it, that the mortgagee has no charge upon the property sold for rent, such charge being taken to be extinguished, and transferred, as it were, to the surplus sale proceeds.

    6. But the case of Hem Chandra v. Tafazzel Hossein Khan [1904] 8 C.W.N. 332 can in my opinion be distinguished from the facts of the present case. In Hem Chandra v Tafazzel Hossein Khan [1904] 8 C.W.N. 332 only one of the properties mortgaged was sold and the purchaser at the sale was no other than the mortgagee himself. That being so, there remained nothing in the property sold which could be followed by the mortgagee, the mortgagee himself having purchased the property. On the other hand, the case of Beni Prosad Sinha v. Rewat Lall [1897] 24 Cal. 746 is in my opinion, a, clear authority against the contention of the learned advocate for the appellant. In this case Beni Prosad Sinha v. Rewat Lal [1897] 24 Cal. 746, (at p. 749) their Lordships observed:

    The object of Section 73 in our opinion is to relieve the mortgagee of the effect of the injury which he would suffer by the property which, was a security for his money being sold, and to give him a right over the residue of the sale proceeds. It is not intended in any way to enlarge the interests of persons purchasing at a sale for arrears of revenue or rent. If that had been the intention any subsequent provision of law providing that a sale for arrears of revenue or rent could get rid of an incumbrance would be unnecessary. It is, in our opinion, intended to refer to cases where the law has otherwise provided that the effect of a sale for arrears of revenue or rent should nullify a mortgage.

    7. Somewhat to the same effect is the decision in Prem Chand Pal v. Purnimadas [1888] 15 Cal. 546. In the present case the purchase which defendant 2 made at the sale for arrears of rent was subject to the mortgage of the plaintiff which was an incumbrance and which was never annulled. I am therefore of opinion that Section 73, T.P. Act was no bar to the plaintiff's following the mortgaged property to satisfy his. mortgage debt.

    8. The learned advocate for the appellant next contended that even if Section 73 does not prevent the plaintiff from proceeding against the property, the plaintiff was by his conduct estopped from enforcing his mortgage claimed against the property which was in the hand of defendant 2 and the conduct of the plaintiff which according to the learned advocate for the appellant estopped the plaintiff enforcing the mortgage claim against the property was the fact that the plaintiff had instituted a suit in 1917 to have the sale set aside at which defendant 2 had purchased the property. I am unable to appreciate the force of this contention of the learned advocate. The plaintiff might have brought a suit to have the sale set aside but I do not understand how it can be contended that he was thereby estopped from instituting a suit to enforce his mortgage claim against the property in suit.

    9. Another point that was taken by the learned advocate was that the in cumbrance that was on the property at the time when defendant 2 purchased it was annulled under the provisions of section 167, ben. ten. act. It appears that defendant 2 after his purchase made an application to the Collector for service of notice under Section 167 but it appears also that that notice was not properly served. The contention on behalf of the appellant was that defendant 2's (the purchaser's) duty ended when he made the application to the Collector and that although there might not have been a proper service of the notice notice of the purchase was in some other way conveyed to the mortgagee. It was urged that in these circumstances it ought to have been held that the incumbrance had been annulled. I do not think this contention is well founded. It has been held in the case of Radhay Koer v. Ajodhya Das [1908] 7 C.L.J. 262 that until the notice has been properly served under Section 167, Ben. Ten. Act upon the incumbrancer, the incumbrance subsists and it is obligatory on the purchaser to show that the notice has been served in the manner prescribed. The finding in the present ease is that no notice under Section 167 had been served in the prescribed way.

    10. The next point that was taken before us was that as the plaintiff's mortgage was subject to the first mortgage in favour of defendant 3's father and as defendant 2 got rid of that first mortgage by the suit which he (defendant 2) brought in the year 1920, the plaintiff's claim against the property should be diminished by the amount of the first mortgage. I do not think that there is much substance in this contention. Defendant 2, it is true, brought a suit against defendants 1 and 3 in the year 1920, but that was a suit for recovery of possession and there is nothing to show that the result of that suit was a satisfaction of the mortgage-debt due to defendant 3's father.

    11. The last contention advanced before us was in connexion with the question of interest. It was said that the mortgaged property cannot he proceeded against for realization of interest inasmuch as so far is the interest was concerned the covenant was only a personal one. We fail to appreciate the force of this contention. The mortgage-bond would show that the stipulation was that the interest was to be added to the principal at the end of the year. All the contentions that were raised before us therefore fail and the appeal must be dismissed with costs with this little modification only that the balance of the proceeds, if any, which has been directed to be paid to defendant 2 will not be paid to defendant 2 who is only a benamidar.

    Garlick, J.

    12. I agree.

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    Comments

    Rasik Chandra Chakravarti v. Jagabandhu Chakravarti And Ors.
    (Jun 7, 1928)