Ayling, J. — This is a Letters Patent Appeal against an order of Napier, J. passed under Sect. 195 pf the Code of Criminal Procedure, sanctioning the prosecution of the appellant for making false statements in an affidavit filed by faun in connection with C.M.P No. 1403 of 1915 on this Court's file.
Such difficulty as its disposal presents is owing mainly to the divergent views which have been held regarding the principles which should be observed by a Court in granting or refusing sanctions under this section.
The section itself undoubtedly neither lays down nor even suggests any principles for the Court's guidance. As Jenkins, C.J, put it in In re Attorney, “The section is expressed in the widest terms, and vests in the Court an absolute and unfettered discretion. On the other hand, as the learned Judge proceeds to say at page 456) “There are, however, certain rules of prudence to which any Court exercising its discretion would have regard and pre-eminent among them, possibly a compendious statement of them all, would be the rule that the Court will be astute to see that there shall be no abuse of the administration of criminal justice. No one therefore would be permitted to use the penal law merely to satisfy his own private ends or personal spite; that would be to misuse it.” With all this I entirely and respectfully agree.
In the present case, we must be 10th to interfere with an order of a learned Judge of this Court which is primarily of a discretionary nature. On the other hand the law casts on us the duty of deciding in appeal whether the order is correct and as the learned Judge has, I think, purposely refrained from discussing the merits of the case or recording any reasons, we are necessarily forced to consider whether the order is one which we should ourselves have passed in the circumstances. Our peculiar difficulty is that we are not even in a position to say that the learned Judge has himself considered points which may appear to us essential to a determination of the case. We must therefore apply for ourselves the rules of prudence referred to by Jenkins, C.J, and quoted above.
They have been variously stated at great length by different Judges with the facts of different cases in their minds. But speaking for myself and with all deference I would put it thus: To ensure that there shall be no abuse of criminal justice, a Court before granting sanction should consider whether the case is one in which a prosecution could be instituted with a fair chance of success. See Pampapati Sastri v. Subba Sastri. This is necessary to avoid the risk of frivolous or vexatious prosecutions designed not to vindicate justice, but to harass and annoy the person against whom they are directed. Without some such a safeguard, the Criminal Courts in this country would be flooded with useless prosecutions. I take in that Sect. 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was enacted not because a perjurer, for example, was entitled to more protection or consideration than any offender; but because in the case of offences of the class specified there exists a responsible officer who is in a position to form an opinion before the prosecution is instituted whether it is one, into which, from the public point of view, a Criminal Court may profitably enquire. The consideration of this question need not involve (to quote Stephen, J., in the abovementioned case In re An Attorney) . That the Court to whom the application for sanction is made should perform any of the acts that will fall within the scope of the Magistrate's duty, if sanction is granted.’ The Court whose sanction is applied for need not confine its attention to evidence already legally on record. It may fairly and reasonably take other circumstances into consideration, and in particular the probability of other evidence being adduced at the trial. In effect, by according sanction, it does not say to the Court which tries the case “this is a case in which I think you will have to convict” but “this is a case which I think it is worth your while to enquire into.”
Apart from the prospects of success, 1 think a Court may properly refuse sanction where it considers that a prosecution is not desirable in the public interests. This is a question, which will only present difficulty in infrequent cases. As a rule, if the Court is of opinion that a man has committed the offence in respect of which sanction is applied for and can be prosecuted with a fair chance of success, it will be desirable that justice should be vindicated. But exceptional cases will occur, in which prosecution may possess every chance of success and yet be undesirable (e.g) where the moral turpitude is very slight, the offender may have already suffered sufficiently, or other considerations may intervene. In such cases, a Court might prudently and properly refuse sanction.
I am far from putting the above remarks forward as exhaustive; but they represent principles which have been generally followed by the Courts of this Presidency and from which I do not think we ought to depart, and from which we cannot depart if we are to be “astute to see that there is no abuse of the administration of criminal justice.” I do not think the judgment in the Calcutta case enunciates anything really contrary to them, though the learned Judges have felt it necessary to protest against the tendency to unduly fetter the discretion of the sanctioning Court by quoting judicial pronouncements, It may be that in the case before them, they accepted the fact that the application was made by the Public Prosecutor after due deliberation and scrutiny of the papers placed in his hands by a Bench of the Court, as sufficient guarantee that it was a fit and proper case for sanction. I am far from saying that they would not have been justified in doing so. But similar cases are rare and where, as in the case before us, sanction is applied for by a private party, it will be for the Court to test its desirability by the rules of prudence referred to by the Chief Justice.
Viewed from this stand point, I do not think the present case is a suitable one for sanctioning prosecution. The circumstances have been placed before us, fairly fully and are set forth in the judgment of my learned brother. I agree with him that there is no chance of securing the conviction in the case of either of the specified statements. The sanction is applied for by the appellants adversary in the Civil Appeal (A. S. No. 163 of 1915) now pending and the latter appears to me to be taking advantage of the existence of certain inconclusive recitals in Exhibit E and of Exhibits H and HI to harass appellant by a vexatious prosecution. No satisfactory grounds have in fact been indicated to us for coming to the conclusion that the statements are false.
I would set aside the sanction.
Seshagiri Aiyar, J.—I entirely agree. This is an appeal against the order of Mr. Justice Napier granting sanction to prosecute the appellant for having made a false affidavit in the High Court. The Appellant Palahiyappa Chetti is the respondent in a first pending in this Court. He obtained a decree for Rs. 23,000 and odd in the Court of First Instance. After the First Appeal was filed an application for stay of execution was that Palaniappa Chetti was not a man of means. In answer to this affidavit, Palaniyappa Chetti filed a connteraffidavit in which he stated that he owned “Thousand Acres of Nanja and Punja Lands in Perumpallipatti attached to the Village of Koduk-kanpatti, Melur Taluk, Madura District, worth more than one lakh of rupees,” and that he also owned a house in Palani with about Rs. 6,000 Mr. Justice Napier considered these two statements to be false and sanctioned the prosecution.
I am constrained to differ from the learned Judge. It was argued by Mr. Sadagopachariar that on the face of the records filed in this case, there are prima facie grounds for enquiry, and that we would not be justified in interfering with the discretion of the learned Judge. Although sitting in Appeal, we are bound to be guided very largely in matters of discretion, by what influenced the learned Judge, I cannot accede to the contention that our hands are practically tied in such cases.
I do not think it necessary to examine at any length the authorities regarding the quantum of proof that is necessary before sanction is accorded; but I should like to indicate as briefly as possible my views on the subject. The paramount principle is to see that the person to be charged before a Magistrate is not subjected to unnecessary expense and humiliation. The liberty of a subject should not be subjected to restrictions which are not absolutely called for. The second principle is that it is not what on the face of a document or of a statement appears be untrue that should guide a Court in granting sanction. If further materials are placed before it which would enable it to conclude that the prima facie impression is unfounded, it is the duty of the Court to examine the materials fully and to satisfy itself whether, in the interests of justice, the prosecution is desirable. The third principle upon which Mr. Sadagopachariar laid some stress and which should undoubtedly guide the Courts in such matters is that the order granting sanction should express no definite pronouncements on the matter to be enquired into. I do not understand by this reservation that the Court granting sanction is not to apply its mind fully to the materials placed before it. On the other hand, every circumstance telling in favour of the person against whom sanction is asked for, should be weighed before the Court makes up its mind, although in the order granting the sanction, care should be taken to see that conclusions are not stated which may prejudice the accused. There have been a series of cases in this Presidency which have enunciated the above principles in some from or other. In Chakrapani Aiyangar v. The King Emperor a Full Bench of this Court said “there is no probability of the appellant's conviction, even if sanction is granted, and set aside the sanction accorded by the Sessions Judge.” In In re Pares Kuuhammed, Mr. Justice Bhashyam Iyengar discussed this question at some length and came to the conclusion that it is the duty of the authority giving sanction or upholding it to go into the merits of the application for sanction with reference to the evidence before it and that, unless there is sufficient prima facie evidence and a reasonable probability of conviction, the Court will not be exercising its discretion properly in granting or upholding the same.” t entirely adopt the language of the learned Judge, at page 117, where he says: “The object of Sect. 195 is to protect parties resorting to Courts and witnesses against vexatious or frivolous prosecutions for their resorting to Courts and giving evidence therein and such protection is afforded by prescribing the necessity of a preliminary sanction by the Court before which the offence is alleged to have been committed before a prosecution is launched and by giving a right of appeal to the Court to which the Court giving sanction is subordinate.” In Veeraraghava Swami Naidu v. Bhagavatula Visvanadhan, Ayling and Spencer, JJ., held that it is the duty of the Court to see if there are good grounds for thinking that a prosecution is necessary in the interests of justice. On the other hand Mr. Justice Napier in Kristnamma v. Chitturi Chinna Perraju, has taken a view which is opposed to the current of authorities in this Presidency. He has dissented from the dictum of Justice Bhashyam Iyengar in In re Paree Kunhammed and has preferred to follow the ruling of the learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court in In re An Attorney. With all respect, I am unable to agree with the view enunciated by the learned Judge. With some of the observations of the learned Judge, I am in entire accord. As the learned Judge points out, the Appellate Court should see that by the granting of sanction there has been no absence of the administration of criminal justice. But when he says that the discretion is absolute and unqualified, I beg leave to differ from him. It is a discretion given in the interests of justice and in the interests of persons to whom protection is intended to be given under Sect. 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; and therefore unless the discretion is exercised to advance justice and to extend the protection, the Court will not be exercising its discretion properly. As regards the decision in In re An Attorney, I desire to speak with the greatest respect With a great deal of what is said in the case, I agree. In one place the learned Chief Justice says at page 456: “We are not trying the guilt or innocence of his client We are merely considering whether the statutory bar imposed by Sect 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be removed and the law allowed to take its ordinary course.” In my opinion, this view of Sect 195 requires some modification. The learned Chief Justice seems to be of opinion that Sect. 195 imposes a bar to an otherwise uncontrolled prosecution. I would substitute the words “protection given” for the words “the statutory bar imposed. Sect 195 is intended to safeguard the rights of persons who go to a Court of Law. Courts throw their shield of protection over persons who resort to them. That is the reason why proceedings in a Court of Law are regarded as privileged; if that privilege is abused or exceeded, a person may be prosecuted for anything said or done by him. Before withdrawing the protection, the presiding officer should be satisfied that the privilege has been forfeited and that the man should be prosecuted to vindicate justice. If the presiding functionary is satisfied that there has been such a conduct on the part of the person as renders the person liable to conviction and that on the materials a conviction is probable, then he should withdraw the protection and sanction the prosecution. Sect. 195 should be examined only from this standpoint. In this view unless there is a probability of conviction and unless the interests of justice demand it, there should be no sanction. I do not propose to go into the case-law any further because the cases are numerous and are not easily reconcilable; but so far as Madras is concerned, excepting the discordant note sounded by Mr. Justice Napier, there has been practical uniformity and consistency in enunciating the principles I have stated, I shall now proceed to examine the facts of this case.
As regards the first of the two statements for which sanction is given to prosecute, the facts are these The lands claimed by Palaniappa Chetty originally belonged to one Sivarama Aiyar. Sivarama Aiyar sold them by Exhibits F and G to the father of Palaniappa Chetty in 1903. Prior to the sale, Sivarama Aiyar had executed a lease to one Venkatakrishna Aiyangar and a Chetti. Venkatakrishna Aiyangar mortgaged his lease right to one Ramasami Chetti. After this, Palaniappa Chetti sold the properties to Nagappa Chetty in the year 1911 by Exhibits H and H1. In 1914 in O. S. No. 145 of 1914, Ramasami Chetty, the mortgagee from Venkatakrishna Aiyangar, sued to enforce his mortgage on the lease right of Venkatakrishna Aiyangar. To this suit, Palaniappa Chetti was a party; Venkatakrishna Aiyangar, the mortgagor, Nagappa, the purchaser from Palaniappa Chetti, were also parties. Palaniappa Chetti filed a written statement in that suit on the 3rd July 1915 in which he stated that although he sold the property to Nagappa in 1911, that was a dominal transaction, and that he was still the real owner. Nagappa did not contest this statement. He remained ex parte and it is common ground that the litigation was defended really by Palaniappa Chetty. Venkatakrishna Aiyangar, as I said before, was a defendant in the suit and must have been aware of the written statement filed by Palaniappa Chetty on the 3rd July. It was after this written statement in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Madura, that an application was made to this Court for stay of execution in the first appeal referred to by me. The order on the said petition was that the appellant should deposit the money into Court and that Palaniappa Chetty who was the respondent in the appeal should draw it only on giving security therefor. After the order was passed, Venkatakrishna Aiyangar filed an affidavit on the 5th October 1915 before the learned Judge, Mr. Justice Napier, in which he alleged that the statement of Palaniappa Chetty in his counter-affidavit in the execution application that he was entitled to 1000 acres of land and was the owner of a house in Palani were false, and that sanction should be accorded to prosecute him. In answer to that affidavit, Palaniappa Chetty filed an affidavit before the learned Judge in which he drew attention to the fact that he had stated as early as July 1915 that the property belonged to him, and that he had no intention of swearing falsely to its ownership. Now the question is as to whether, when a person has been consistently claiming the property as his own, notwithstanding the passing of a sale-deed in favour of another person, he can be said to have made a wilfully false affidavit in that behalf. Nagappa Chetty, the alleged nominal vendee, did not dispute this claim. Venkatakrishna Aiyangar, the person most interested in the litigation, with the knowledge that Palaniappa Chetty has asserted his claim to the lands, charged Palaniappa Chetty with having made false statements. This man who apparently wants to invoke the authority of the Court to vindicate justice was not honest enough to state that in the litigation in the Madura Sub-Court, Palaniappa Chetty had made the same statement which he had subsequently reiterated in the affidavit filed in this Court. It is impossible under these circumstances to have taken Venkatakrishna Aiyangar seriously and to have acted upon his affidavit as against a consistent assertion of right made by Palaniappa Chetty first in the Madura Sub-Court and subsequently in this Court. Is it possible under these circumstances that the prosecution of Palaniappa Chetty on such a statement can be successfully maintained in a Criminal Court, and is it right with these facts staring us in the face, to compel this man to submit himself to all the indignities of a criminal prosecution? In my opinion, on the materials placed before us there are no sufficient grounds for holding that Palaniappa Chetty made a wilfully false statement in respect of the ownership of the 1000 acres. Mr. Sadagopachariar referred to the extent and value having been exaggerated. These are not matters which appealed to the learned Judge in grating the sanction.
The second item of Charge is even less substantial than the first one. Exhibit E is the sale-deed in respect of the Palani house. The conveyance is absolutely to Palaniappa Chetty. The document states that he is to enjoy the house from generation to generation with the power of alienation by way of sale, gift, etc. It was said that certain recitals in the deed point to the property being held in trust and not absolutely by Palnniappa Chetty. There is no justification for such an inference on the materials available to us. I am satisfied from the statements made by palaniappa Chetty in his affidavit that the property was absolutely at his disposal although he intended to dedicate that property for a charity at some time or other. I am therefore of opinion that as there is no chance of a conviction being had in respect of these two statements made by Palaniappa Chetty in the affidavit filed in this Court, the sanction granted by the learned judge should be revoked.
S. S.Sanction revoked.