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Judgment Summary: Mukherjea, J. (with M.C. Ghose, J. concurring)

Factual and Procedural Background

Three brothers (Nabeen Krishna, Raj Krishna and Gopee Krishna) installed two deities (Radha Ballav Jiu and Radha Ranee Jiu) in a thâkurbâti adjacent to their house. On 15 April 1852 they executed an ekrârnamâ reciting contributions (Rs. 1,500 each) and certain ornaments/utensils for the shebâ and an intention to purchase immovable property with that money; until such purchase the interest on the money would be used for shebâ and, if insufficient, the brothers would supplement from private funds. The ekrârnamâ made the three brothers joint shebâits with rights of survivorship and provided that after the death of the last survivor the shebâiti right would devolve per stirpes on the heirs of the three founders.

The plaintiff, Ganendra Krishna Ghosh (great-grandson of Nabeen Krishna), alleged post-founder mismanagement and misappropriation of debattar funds by a manager (Bata Krishna) and brought a suit seeking that a proper scheme be settled for management of the debattar estate and performance of the shebâ. Initially there were six defendants (descendants of three sons of Nabeen); later other heirs were added on both sides and some changed categories (some defendants became added plaintiffs).

The trial Court overruled defendants' preliminary contentions and passed a preliminary decree ordering framing of a management/shebâ scheme and inviting shebâits to submit schemes. The lower appellate Court modified the trial Court's decree to the extent of holding that properties Nos. 2 and 3 were to be managed exclusively by Nabeen's descendants (excluding certain heirs). Two Second Appeals to this Court followed: Second Appeal No. 1730 of 1935 (by defendants Nos. 1–5) and Second Appeal No. 125 of 1936 (by some defendants who sided with the plaintiff). Mukherjea, J. delivered the principal judgment; M.C. Ghose, J. concurred.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a civil Court can entertain a suit seeking the framing of a management scheme for a private debattar (i.e., whether such a scheme is within the Court's power in respect of a private religious endowment).
  2. Whether the deity is a necessary party to a suit for settling a scheme or determining rights of management of a private debattar, and if so whether the deity must be represented by a disinterested person.
  3. Whether, on construction of the ekrârnamâ, properties subsequently dedicated by a particular shebâit (specifically properties Nos. 1, 2 and 3) should remain under the exclusive control and management of that shebâit's descendants (i.e., whether the lower appellate Court correctly confined management of properties Nos. 2 and 3 to Nabeen's branch and whether property No. 1 should likewise have been so confined).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants (Defendants Nos. 1–5) — represented by Mr. C.C. Biswas

  • Preliminary contention: Because the debattar is a private endowment, a suit to frame a scheme is not entertainable by a civil Court (s. 92, C.P.C., allegedly inapplicable); reliance placed on Lord Buckmaster's observation in Gopal Lal Sett v. Purna Chandra Basak.
  • Alternative preliminary contention: Even if cognizable, the deity is a necessary party to such proceedings and the deity should be represented by a disinterested person.
  • Substantive contention: The lower appellate Court was right to confine management of certain properties (Nos. 2 and 3) exclusively to Nabeen's branch and that, in particular, property No. 1 should also be held to be Nabeen's self-acquisition and so kept in exclusive management of his descendants (i.e., the lower appellate Court's contrary finding on property No. 1 was vitiated by an error of law).
  • Earlier pleadings and contentions (in trial): that properties 1–3 were subsequent gifts by Nabeen from self-acquisition and hence managed by Nabeen's branch; certain heirs (heirs of Gosain Das and Radha Nath) should be excluded; some descendants (including the plaintiff and defendant No.6) had forfeited shebâiti rights due to conduct.

Other Appellants / Respondents — represented by Mr. Gupta and supported by Mr. Abinash Chandra Ghosh (original plaintiff)

  • Contested the three points raised by Mr. Biswas (i.e., court competence, necessity of making the deity a party, and exclusivity of management for properties dedicated by a particular shebâit).
  • Advanced the specific point that the ekrârnamâ does not support the lower appellate Court's conclusion that properties subsequently dedicated by one shebâit should remain under exclusive control of his branch.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Gopal Lal Sett v. Purna Chandra Basak Observation (Lord Buckmaster) that where a gift creates effectively a private trust (trustee holding property legally), the establishment of a court-framed administration scheme is inappropriate and certain CPC provisions (referred to) would not apply. The Court treated the observation as entitled to respect, examined its facts, and distinguished it on the ground that there the property vested in a trustee legally; the Court concluded that the observation did not bar framing of a scheme where deity is legal owner and shebâits are managers.
Monohar Mookerjee v. Peary Mohan Mookerjee Held that in respect of a debattar the founder or his heirs may invoke judicial assistance for proper administration where trusts are not properly performed. Adopted as authority that courts can assist in administration of debattar estates and frame schemes where necessary to prevent mismanagement; used to distinguish private-trust situations from religious endowments where deity is legal owner.
Rabindra Nath Mandal v. Chandi Charan Mandal Reiterated the principle that judicial assistance can be invoked for administration of debattar where mismanagement is alleged. Relied on as further support for the proposition that courts may frame schemes for religious endowments (debattar) to protect the deity's estate.
Pramatha Nath Mullick v. Pradyumna Kumar Mullick Privy Council directed framing of a scheme in a private debattar case and indicated that where deity is vitally interested the deity should be represented by a disinterested person. Used to show that even private debattar cases may require a court-formulated scheme and to clarify when the deity must be made a party and represented by an independent person; distinguished on facts where necessary.
Prasaddas Pal v. Jagannath Pal Similar directions as to framing of a scheme in private debattar context. Cited to support the proposition that civil courts can direct framing of a scheme in private debattar cases.
Attorney-General v. Brown English rule analogy: in case of charitable corporations, visitatorial powers devolve on the Crown (public authority) where private visitors are extinct or incompetent. Invoked analogically to explain why in India the Court (as protector of infants) and the shebâits can seek judicial assistance for protection of a deity's interests.
Kanhaiya Lal v. Hamid Ali Privy Council held it could not deal with an appeal in the absence of the deity whose interest arose under the wakf; case remitted so matter could be decided in presence of appropriate parties. Relied on to show that in some instances the absence of the deity is material and requires representation or joinder; used to explain when the deity must be made a party.
Upendra Nath Ghose v. Baikuntha Nath Ghose Held that the deity was not a necessary party to a suit concerning construction of instruments about management among shebâits. Applied by this Court to justify that, for the present preliminary question (construction of ekrârnamâ and allocation among shebâits), the deity was not a necessary party.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court structured its analysis into the two preliminary points and the substantive point regarding construction of the ekrârnamâ and exclusive control of dedicated properties.

1. Competence of Civil Court to Frame a Scheme for a Private Debattar

Mr. Biswas urged that a private debattar is outside the scope of court-formulated schemes (citing Lord Buckmaster in Gopal Lal Sett). The Court examined the factual distinction: in Gopal Lal Sett the property had been given to a named trustee who held legal title and bore duties; that created a private trust not purely religious, where court framing of a scheme was inappropriate. By contrast, where a religious endowment exists and the deity is in law the perpetual infant and legal owner, the shebâits are managers/guardians. In such a case founders or heirs may invoke judicial assistance for proper administration (Monohar Mookerjee). The Court emphasized the analogy to English law on charitable corporations (Attorney-General v. Brown) and relied on Privy Council and Indian precedents (Pramatha Nath Mullick, Prasaddas Pal, Rabindra Nath Mandal) which directed framing of schemes even in private debattar cases. On this basis the Court rejected the extreme contention that civil Courts are incompetent to entertain suits whose object is establishment of a scheme for administration of a private debattar.

2. Whether the Deity Is a Necessary Party

The Court accepted the principle that where the deity is vitally interested it should be made a party and represented by a disinterested person (as indicated in Pramatha Nath Mullick). However, the necessity of joinder depends on facts: where the dispute concerns allocation of managerial/control rights among shebâits inter se and does not affect the deity's substantive interest, the deity need not be present. In the present case the preliminary decree only raised the question of construction of the ekrârnamâ (whether properties dedicated by a particular shebâit remain exclusively under his branch), and the Court held the deity's presence was not necessary for that question — a position supported by Upendra Nath Ghose v. Baikuntha Nath Ghose. The Court also noted that the plea of nonjoinder of the deity was not taken in written statement nor framed as an issue in the trial Court. The Court left open that at a later stage, when the final scheme is to be approved, the trial Court may direct that the deity be represented by a disinterested person if necessary.

3. Construction of the Ekrârnamâ — Exclusive Management of Dedicated Properties

The lower appellate Court had held that where a shebâit dedicated property, management of that property was to remain exclusively with his descendants (the "exclusive control" rule). The Court examined the terms of the ekrârnamâ: it recites contributions (total Rs. 4,500), the intention to purchase land so that income would defray shebâ expenses, direction to use interest until lands were purchased, rights of survivorship among the three brothers during their lives, and devolution of shebâiti per stirpes to heirs after the last survivor. The Court translated and analyzed the clause concerning purchase of lands with the given money, and concluded that the document read as a whole did not support the lower appellate Court's finding of permanent exclusive control by the branch of the donor.

Key textual points in the Court's analysis:

  • The word "angsha" (share) cannot be construed to indicate division of the shebâiti right as the lower appellate Court held.
  • The ekrârnamâ contemplates joint shebâits with rights of survivorship and envisages devolution per stirpes; it does not contemplate a severable, permanently exclusive management of specific properties gifted by individual shebâits.
  • A clause requiring surplus funds to be kept as a deposit and spent only with consent of all co-sharers indicates the fund/property of the deities is intended to be integral and not severed by individual gifts.

On this textual construction the Court concluded that the lower appellate Court's decision to confine properties Nos. 2 and 3 to Nabeen's descendants (excluding certain heirs) was not justified by the ekrârnamâ. The Court therefore restored the trial Court's approach and held that even if property No.1 were Nabeen's self-acquisition and dedicated, it would be debattar property and all shebâits would have rights of control and management.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

  • Second Appeal No. 1730 of 1935 — DISMISSED.
  • Second Appeal No. 125 of 1936 — ALLOWED IN PART.
  • The decree of the lower appellate Court is set aside; the decree of the trial Court is restored.

Consequences and Costs:

  • The appellants in Appeal No. 125 of 1936 are entitled to their costs against defendants Nos. 1 to 5 (respondents).
  • No order as to costs is made in Appeal No. 1730 of 1935.

Implications: The direct effect is to restore the trial Court's preliminary decree and to reject the lower appellate Court's rule that properties dedicated by an individual shebâit must remain under exclusive control of his branch. The Court affirmed that civil tribunals can, in appropriate cases involving religious endowments where the deity is the legal owner, entertain suits to frame management schemes; whether the deity must be joined depends on whether the deity's interests are directly and vitally affected. The opinion does not purport to establish any broader novel legal precedent beyond the applications of the cited authorities and the construction of the specific ekrârnamâ in this case.

Judgment concurred by M.C. Ghose, J. (short concurrence noted).

    Bimal Krishna Ghosh v. Jnanendra Krishna Ghosh

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    Mukherjea, J.:— These two appeals are by different parties against the decision in the same suit, which was commenced by the plaintiff, for settling a scheme in relation to a private debattar. The facts which are material for our present purposes may be briefly stated as follows:—

    Three brothers, namely, Nabeen Krishna, Raj Krishna and Gopee Krishna, installed two deities, to wit Radha Ballav Jiu and Radha Ranee Jiu, in a thâkurbâti which they erected close to their residential house. There was an ekrârnâmâ executed by and between the brothers on April 15, 1852, which recited inter alia that the brothers had contributed a sum of Rs. 1,500 each and certain ornaments and utensils for the shebâ of the images and that with this money certain immoveable properties would be purchased, the income of which would be sufficient to meet the expenses of worship. So long as such property was not purchased, the shebâ would be carried on with the interest of this money and, in case it was found insufficient, the brothers would supplement the income from their own private funds. Under this ekrârnâmâ the three brothers were made joint shebâits with rights of survivorship amongst them and, after the death of the last survivor, the shebâiti right would devolve per stirpes upon the heirs of the three founders. It may be mentioned here that there were two other brothers and all the five had effected a partition amongst them sometime in the year 1846 and since then each one of the brothers had separate funds of his own. The plaintiff in the suit is one Ganendra Krishna Ghosh, who is a great-grand-son of Nabeen Krishna, and what he alleges in substance is that, after the death of the original shebâits, there was an arrangement come to by the heirs according to which a sum of Rs. 821 was to be spent yearly for the pujâ and ceremonies of the deities. Apoorba Krishna, a son of Nabeen Krishna, became the managing shebâit with the consent of all the co-sharers and after him Bata Krishna, another son of Nabeen, became the manager. This Bata Krishna is alleged to have wasted and misappropriated a good amount of debattar money in collusion with one Manik Chandra, a gomastâ of the debattar estate. He died in 1910 and since then a quarrel is going on amongst the shebâits regarding the mode of management and performance of the shebâ of the deities. Hence the plaintiff brought this suit for having a proper scheme settled by the Courts as to how the debattar property should be managed and the shebâ performed. Originally there were six defendants, who are all the descendants of three sons of Nabeen, namely, Shiba Krishna, Pran Krishna and Bata Krishna. Later on, the heirs of Gosain Das, another son of Nabeen and the descendants of Raj Krishna and Gopee Krishna were added as parties defendants and some of them subsequently got themselves transferred to the category of plaintiffs and figure as added plaintiffs in the suit. The defendants Nos. 1 to 5 are in reality the contesting defendants and they raised certain points, some of which have come up for decision in this appeal. The other defendants practically supported the plaintiffs in their written statements.

    The defendants Nos. 1 to 5 contended inter alia that the debattar being a private debattar, no scheme could be settled by the civil Court and the deity would be a necessary party to such a proceeding. It was further alleged that, with regard to properties 1, 2 and 3 of the debattar estate, the management should be confined to Nabeen's branch alone according to the provision of the ekrârnâmâ, inasmuch as they were subsequent gifts made by Nabeen out of his own self-acquisition. Among Nabeen's descendants, it is said, that the heirs of Gosain Das and Radha Nath, two of the five sons of Nabeen, should.: be excluded and amongst the heirs of the other three sons again the defendants Nos. 1 to 5 want to exclude the plaintiff and defendant No. 6, all of whom according to them had forfeited their shebâiti right by reason of their conduct.

    The trial Court overruled all these contentions and passed a preliminary decree in favour of the plaintiffs. It was ordered that a scheme should be framed for the better management of the debattar estate and shebâ of the deities and all the shebâits on record were invited to submit a scheme for approval of the Court. The defendants Nos. 1 to 5 preferred an appeal against this decision to the lower appellate Court, which modified the trial Court's decree to some extent. The contention of defendants Nos. 1 to 5 was so far allowed that, with regard to properties Nos. 2 and 3, the management was left exclusively to the plaintiff and defendants Nos. 1 to 6,—in other words it was held to be confined to Nabeen's descendants, excluding the heirs of Gosain Das and Radha Nath. Against this decree, two Second Appeals have been taken to this Court, being Second Appeals Nos. 1730 of 1935 and 125 of 1936. Appeal No. 1730 is by defendants Nos. 1 to 5. Some of the other defendants who sided with the plaintiff are the appellants in Appeal No. 125.

    Mr. C.C Biswas who appears in Second Appeal No. 1730 has pressed three points for our consideration. He has put forward the two preliminary points raised in the Court below, namely, that a suit for a scheme in respect of a private debattar was not entertainable by civil Court, and that, in any event, no relief could be given unless the deities were made parties to the suit. In the third place, he has argued that the direction given by the Court of appeal below as regards properties Nos. 2 and 3 that they should remain in exclusive management of plaintiffs and defendants Nos. 1 to 6 should have been extended to property No. 1 as well, inasmuch as the said property was also Nabeen's self-acquisition and the finding to the contrary which was arrived at by the Court of appeal below was vitiated by an error of law. Mr. Gupta, who has appeared in support of the other appeal, has contested all these three points and has pressed one point in support of his appeal, namely, that the ekrârnâmâ does not support the conclusion of the lower appellate Court that the properties subsequently dedicated by one particular shebâit should remain under the exclusive control and management of his branch. Mr. Abinash Chandra Ghosh, who appears for the original plaintiff, who was made a respondent in both these appeals, has supported Mr. Gupta in his contention. It is better that we should take these points in their proper order.

    We will first of all deal with the two preliminary points raised by Mr. Biswas, and then take up the point raised by Mr. Gupta in support of his appeal and consider along with that the third point raised by Mr. Biswas as indicated above.

    On the first point Mr. Biswas argues that as the debattar is a private one, s. 92, C.P.C, obviously has no application. The shebâits of a private religious endowment, according to him, can have an adjudication of their rights if there is a dispute regarding the same and it is possible also to have a declaration of their rights on construction of an arpannâmâ or any other document. The Court, however, cannot frame any scheme as it can do in the case of a public trust. Reliance has been placed for this view upon the observation of Lord Buckmaster in Gopal Lal Sett v. Purna Chandra Basak. The relevant passage runs as follows:—

    Their Lordships see no reason to doubt that the Court executing the duty of appointing trustees would pay due regard to the claims of that branch of the family with whom the worship was established and by whom the services were performed, but they regard the gift as in effect a private trust to which the provisions of s. 539 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882, would not apply, and consequently the establishment of a scheme for its administration as provided by the decree of the High Court, is inappropriate.

    This observation is entitled to the highest respect and it is necessary, therefore, to look into the facts of the case closely. From the facts set out in that judgment it appears that in this case there was no gift to the deities but the property was given to one Uday, who was made a trustee in the legal sense of the word and upon whom were cast certain duties both religious and secular in their nature. He was to perform the worship of a certain deity with the income of a particular property and the remainder of the income was given to three people whose names were given in the will. In a case like this, where a private trust was created not of a purely religious character and the ownership of the property was vested in the trustee in the legal sense of the word, the Court could not possibly frame a scheme for the administration of the trust estate. In a religious endowment, however, where the deity who is a perpetual infant is the legal owner of the property and the shebâits occupy the position of managers or guardians, the position is different. In the case of Monohar Mookerjee v. Peary Mohan Mookerjee, it was held by Asutosh Mookerjee, J. sitting with Panton J. that—

    In respect of a debattar in this country, the founder or his heirs may invoke the assistance of a judicial tribunal for the proper administration thereof on the allegation that the trusts are not properly performed.

    Mookerjee, J. invoked the analogy of the rule of English law, according to which, in case of a charitable corporation, where the founder was a private person, he and his heirs became visitors in law and, in case such heirs were extinct or were incompetent, the visitatorial powers devolved on the Crown. It is true that in England such trusts are regarded as matters of public concern and the Attorney-General who represents the Crown takes proceedings on his behalf for protection of these charities. Vide Attorney-General v. Brown. In India, the Crown is the constitutional protector of all infants and as the deity occupies in law the position of an infant, the shebâits, who represent the deity, are entitled to seek the assistance of the Court in case of mismanagement or mal-administration of the deity's estate and to have a proper scheme for management framed which would end the disputes amongst the guardians and prevent the debattar estate from being wasted or ruined. This principle was reiterated in Rabindra Nath Mandal v. Chandi Charan Mandal. The Privy Council itself directed the framing of a scheme in case of a private debattar in the case of Pramatha Nath Mullick v. Pradyumna Kumar Mullick and the case was remanded to the trial Court expressly for that purpose. The same directions were given by this Court in the case of Prasaddas Pal v. Jagannath Pal, which was also a case of private debattar, and we are unable to uphold the extreme contention raised by Mr. Biswas that a civil Court is incompetent to entertain a suit, the object of which is to have a scheme established for the administration of a private debattar.

    Mr. Biswas's second argument, which he put forward in the alternative, is that, even if such a suit was cognisable by a Court of law, the deity is a necessary party to such a proceeding and it should be represented by a disinterested person as was done in the case of Pramatha Nath Mullick v. Pradyumna Kumar Mullick, referred to above. It is perfectly true that in a matter in which the deity is vitally interested, the deity should be made a party and if the shebâits have got any interest adverse to that of the deity, it is necessary that the deity should be represented by a perfectly disinterested person as was indicated by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in the case mentioned above. Necessity, however, has got to be judged on the facts of each particular case and the controversies to which it gives rise. In Pramatha Nath Mullick v. Pradyumna Kumar Mullick, the appellant claimed, the right to remove the image during his term of worship and their Lordships held that the will of the deity as regards location must be respected and the suit was remitted in order that the image might appear by a disinterested person to be appointed by the Court in Kanhaiya Lal v. Hamid Ali, there was a suit for possession of a property upon which a thâkurdâlân was raised by the defendants and an image called Sree Thakurji Maharaj was installed. The Privy Council held that they could not deal with the appeal in the absence of the deity whose interest arose under the wâkf and the case was sent back in order that the question might be decided in the presence of appropriate parties. In the present case it is admitted that none else except the parties to the suit are interested in the deity and it is not suggested that the deity's interest would in any way be affected by adjustment of the rights of management among the shebâits inter se. Up to now, the preliminary decree had dealt only with one substantial question, namely, as to whether upon the construction of the ekrârnâmâ properties added to the debattar by a particular shebâit should remain under the exclusive management and control of his branch only. For this purpose, the presence of the deity is not necessary. The facts are somewhat similar to those in the case of Upendra Nath Ghose v. Baikuntha Nath Ghose, where it was held by the learned Judges that the deity was not a necessary party to such a suit. At any further stage of the proceedings when the scheme would have to be finally approved of by the Court it might feel the necessity of having the deity before it. In such circumstances it would be open to the trial Court to direct that the deity should appear by a proper and disinterested person. We do not see, however, that up to this time any necessity for this has arisen. It will be relevant to point out that the plea of nonjoinder of the deity as a party was not taken in the written statement and there was no such issue expressly framed upon it. We overrule, therefore, this second contention of Mr. Biswas.

    The third point raised by Mr. Biswas should be considered along with the question raised by Mr. Gupta in support of his appeal. The lower appellate Court has held that, according to the ekrârnâmâ, in case of a dedication, of any property by any of the shebâits, the management is to be confined entirely to his descendants. We will have to see whether this decision is correct and this conclusion can be arrived at upon a proper construction of the ekrârnâmâ. The ekrârnâmâ, as we have indicated above, recites first of all the dedication of certain ornaments and utensils and a sum of Rs. 4,500 by the three brothers in equal shares. It is stated next that with this money landed properties would be purchased with the income of which the expenses of the shebâ and worship of the deities might be defrayed and so long as the landed properties were not purchased the interest on this money should be utilised for shebâ and worship and when that fell insufficient the deficiency would be made up by the shebâits themselves in proportion to their resources. Then comes the passage, which literally translated, would stand as follows:—

    Whoever amongst us will purchase suitable lands with the money already given or in excess of it for carrying on the shebâ with the income or profits of that thing his share, of the shebâ should be carried on.

    After that the ekrârnâmâ, provides that the three brothers would remain shebâits with rights of survivorship and, after the death of the last survivor, the shebâiti would devolve on the heirs of all the three brothers who should step into the shoes of their respective ancestors and exercise the powers of a mâlik and mukhteâr in the matter of exercising control and carrying on the worship of the deities. There is one other passage which has to be mentioned and which says that, in case a surplus is left after meeting the expenses of the shebâ, that will be kept as a deposit in the khâtâ of Iswar Jiu and with the consent of all co-sharers it would be spent for repairs of the temple or for the decoration or ornaments of the deities, etc. The document read as a whole does not, in our opinion, support the conclusion which is arrived at by the lower appellate Court. The word “angsha” cannot suggest a division of the shebâiti right as found by the lower appellate Court. The deed expressly contemplates that the three brothers would remain joint shebâits during their lives with rights of survivorship among them.

    We are unable to say that the document contemplates any division of the shebâiti even after the death of the last surviving brother. All that is contemplated is that the shebâiti right should after the death of the last shebâit vest in the heirs of all the co-sharers whose shares or interests in the right would be the same as in other properties of their ancestor and they will get it per stirpes and not per capita. If there is any doubt on this point, it is removed by the last clause mentioned above which definitely indicates that the property or the fund of the deities is an integral thing with regard to which no separation on the basis of gifts made by individual shebâits is recognised and whatever is to be done is to be done with the concurrence of all the co-sharers. Of course, for purposes of convenience there may be something like the division of the term of worship but with regard to that it is not necessary to express any opinion at the present stage. It is enough for our purposes that the ekrârnâmâ does not justify the decision of the lower appellate Court that any property given by a particular shebâit should remain for ever under the exclusive control and management of his heirs.

    In the above view of the case, it is not necessary for us to go into the other questions raised by Mr. Biswas as to whether property No. 1 was Nabeen's self-acquisition or not. Even if it was and was dedicated by Nabeen to the deities it would be a debattar property to all intents and purposes and all the shebâits would have a right of control and management of the same.

    The result, therefore, is that Second Appeal No. 1730 of 1935 is dismissed and Second Appeal No. 125 of 1936 is allowed in part. The decree of the lower appellate Court is set aside and that of the trial Court restored. The appellants in Appeal No. 125 of 1936 will be entitled to their costs against defendants Nos. 1 to 5 respondents. We make no order as to costs in Appeal No. 1730 of 1935.

    M.C Ghose, J.:— I agree.

    Appeal No. 1730 of 1935 dismissed;
    125 of 1936 allowed in part.
    A.A

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    Bimal Krishna Ghosh v. Jnanendra Krishna Ghosh
    (Jan 11, 1937)