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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • Panchanon Ghose and Shyama Charan Mitter for the Petitioners.
  • Radha Benode Pal, Panchanon Pal for Shyamapada Majumdar for the Opposite Party.
  • Rama Prosad Mukherjee for the Crown.
Judges
  • Nasim Ali
  • Rau, JJ.
Acts
  • secs. 7, 9 and 10 of the Public Demands Recovery Act
  • SCHEDULE 2 COURT FEES ACT
  • Schedule 2, Art. 17, cl. 1 of the Court Fees Act.
  • section of the Public Demands Recovery Act
  • sec. 6 of the Public Demands Recovery Act
  • sec. 9 of the Public Demands Recovery Act.
  • Art. 17(i) of Sch. 2 of the Court Fees Act.
  • Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act
  • Bengal Tenancy Amendment Act, 1938,
  • 13(a) of the Bengal Tenancy Act
  • Public Demands Recovery Act
  • section 5, Sub-section (2);
  • COURT FEES ACT 1870
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • Panchanon Ghose and Shyama Charan Mitter for the Petitioners.
  • Radha Benode Pal, Panchanon Pal for Shyamapada Majumdar for the Opposite Party.
  • Rama Prosad Mukherjee for the Crown.
Judges
  • Nasim Ali
  • Rau, JJ.
Acts
  • secs. 7, 9 and 10 of the Public Demands Recovery Act
  • SCHEDULE 2 COURT FEES ACT
  • Schedule 2, Art. 17, cl. 1 of the Court Fees Act.
  • section of the Public Demands Recovery Act
  • sec. 6 of the Public Demands Recovery Act
  • sec. 9 of the Public Demands Recovery Act.
  • Art. 17(i) of Sch. 2 of the Court Fees Act.
  • Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act
  • Bengal Tenancy Amendment Act, 1938,
  • 13(a) of the Bengal Tenancy Act
  • Public Demands Recovery Act
  • section 5, Sub-section (2);
  • COURT FEES ACT 1870
See more information ...
Smart Summary

Summary of the Judgment

Factual and Procedural Background

On 15 April 1936 the Certificate-Officer of Nadia signed a certificate under section 6 of the Public Demands Recovery Act stating that Rs. 2,03,403-12-3 was due from the Petitioners, on the basis of a written requisition by the Opposite Party. The Petitioners filed objections under section 9 of the Act; those objections were rejected by the Certificate Officer on 9 March 1938 with remarks to the effect that (i) the certificate could not be executed while section 99 of the Cess Act remained in force; (ii) considerations about saleability of the patni would be deferred until execution; and (iii) adjustment of dues would be deferred till termination of attachment under section 99 of the Cess Act.

The Petitioners appealed the rejection of their objections but were unsuccessful. On 26 November 1938 the Petitioners instituted the suit that led to this Rule. The plaint sought (1) a decree declaring the certificate not duly filed and null and void, and (2) alternatively, if the certificate were held duly filed, a decree cancelling or modifying it. The Opposite Party (sole defendant) filed a written statement on 23 January 1939 asserting, inter alia, improper valuation of the suit and insufficiency of court-fees.

The learned Subordinate Judge, on 7 July 1939, concluded that valuation for jurisdictional purposes should be the amount specified in the certificate and that ad valorem court-fees were payable on that amount; he directed the Plaintiffs to pay the deficient court-fees within 21 days. The Plaintiffs obtained the present Rule challenging that direction.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. What is the correct valuation of the suit for the purposes of jurisdiction — should it be the amount stated in the certificate (Rs. 2,03,403-12-3)?
  2. What class of court-fee is payable for the suit — is it a fixed fee under Schedule 2, Article 17, Clause 1 of the Court Fees Act (applicable to suits to set aside summary decisions/orders of a Revenue Court), or are ad valorem court-fees payable on the amount mentioned in the certificate?

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs' Arguments

  • The Plaintiffs contended that the suit is a suit to set aside a summary decision or order of a Revenue Court and therefore only a fixed court-fee is payable under Schedule 2, Article 17, Clause 1 of the Court Fees Act.
  • The Plaintiffs (through their Advocate) also indicated that the suit seeks cancellation of the certificate signed under section 6 on 15 April 1936.

Defendant/Opposite Party's Arguments

  • The Opposite Party (in its written statement) contended that the suit was not properly valued and that the court-fee paid was insufficient.
  • Mr. Mukherji, Assistant Government Pleader, argued that the suit sought cancellation not only of the certificate as signed under section 6 but also of any modification made by the Certificate Officer after hearing objections under section 9 of the Public Demands Recovery Act.
  • Rau, J. records the Crown's principal contention that because sections 7, 9 and 10 permit the original certificate to be modified by the Certificate Officer after hearing the certificate-debtor before execution under section 13, the certificate in its effective form cannot be said to represent a summary decision of a Revenue Court.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Maharajadhiraj Mahatab Chand Roy Bahadur v. Bacharam Hazra Interpretation of the word “summary” — a decision of a court which determines the matter for the present but does not finally conclude the parties. The court accepted the observation of Sir Richard Couch, C.J., and applied it to hold that the certificate signed under section 6 is a summary decision within the meaning of Article 17(1) of Schedule 2 of the Court Fees Act because it determines liability for the present without finally concluding the parties and is susceptible to challenge in a regular suit.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in ordered steps based on the statutory scheme and the facts before it:

  1. The court accepted that, for the purposes of jurisdiction, the amount stated in the certificate must be treated as the value of the subject-matter of the suit — hence the Subordinate Judge's order directing valuation at Rs. 2,03,403-12-3 was correct and affirmed.
  2. The court examined whether the suit is one to set aside a "summary decision or order of a Revenue Court" within the meaning of Article 17(1) of Schedule 2 of the Court Fees Act. It analysed the relevant provisions of the Public Demands Recovery Act (notably sections 5(1), 5(2), 6 and section 34) to determine the character of the Certificate Officer's action under section 6.
  3. The court noted that under section 6 the Certificate Officer may sign a certificate declaring a demand recoverable based on the statements in the written requisition and in the absence of the certificate-debtor; subsequently the Act provides for notice, hearing of objections, and power to modify or set aside the certificate. Section 34 gives a statutory right to bring a suit in the Civil Court for cancelling or modifying the certificate.
  4. Relying on the cited precedent for the meaning of "summary," the court concluded that the Certificate Officer's ex parte determination under section 6 is of a summary character: it determines liability for the present without finally concluding the parties because the certificate-debtor can later challenge the certificate in Civil Court or by objection/appeal in the Revenue forum.
  5. Because the certificate is a summary decision or order of a Revenue Court within the meaning of Article 17(1) of Schedule 2 of the Court Fees Act, the court held that only a fixed court-fee is payable for the Plaintiffs' suit to cancel the certificate; consequently, the Subordinate Judge's direction that ad valorem court-fees be paid was incorrect and was set aside.
  6. Rau, J. concurred, emphasising that section 34's provision for cancellation or modification by the Civil Court indicates that the certificate, even in its eventual form, embodies no more than a summary decision liable to be set aside on a regular suit. He also noted the description of the recovery procedure as "summary" in the heading to Chapter 13A of the Bengal Tenancy Act (as referred to in the opinion).

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The Rule is made absolute in part.

The court's specific directives were:

  • Affirmed: The Subordinate Judge's order that the Plaintiffs must amend the valuation for the purposes of jurisdiction to Rs. 2,03,403-12-3 (the amount mentioned in the certificate) is affirmed.
  • Set Aside: The Subordinate Judge's order directing the Plaintiffs to pay ad valorem court-fees on the said amount is set aside; the court held that only a fixed court-fee (under Schedule 2, Article 17, Clause 1 of the Court Fees Act) is payable because the suit is to set aside a summary decision/order of a Revenue Court.
  • No order as to costs was made.

Implications: The decision directly affects the parties by (i) fixing the valuation for jurisdiction at the certificate amount and (ii) determining that only a fixed court-fee is payable for a suit to cancel the certificate. The opinion does not purport to establish any broader binding precedent beyond the applied statutory interpretation and the cited authority.

Show full summary ...

    Joy Durga Dasi And Ors. , v. Maharaj Kumar Sourish Chandra Roy Bahadur, Minor Opposite Party

    The Judgment of the Court was as follows:—

    Nasim Ali, J.:— On April 15th, 1936, the Certificate-Officer of Nadia signed a certificate under sec. 6 of the Public Demands Recovery Act in the prescribed form stating that a sum of Rs. 2,03,403-12-3 was due from the Petitioners on a written requisition to him by the Opposite Party in the prescribed form. The Petitioners thereupon filed objections to the certificate under sec. 9 of the Act. These objections were rejected by a Certificate Officer on March 9th, 1938, with remarks to the following effect:—

    (i) that considering the principles laid down in sec. 99 of the Cess Act, the certificate cannot be put to execution as long as sec. 99 is in force;

    (ii) that the consideration about the saleability of the patni according to the terms of the patni patta would be deferred till the execution stage;

    (iii) that the question of adjustment of the dues in the certificate would be deferred till the termination of the attachment under sec. 99 of the Cess Act.

    The Petitioners filed an appeal against this order of the Certificate Officer rejecting their objections to the certificate, but they were unsuccessful. On the 26th November, 1938, the Petitioners raised the suit out of which this Rule arises. In the plaint of this suit the Petitioners prayed for two reliefs:—

    (1) That a decree might be passed in favour of the Plaintiffs declaring that the certificate was not duly filed and was null and void; and

    (2) That, in case it be held that the aforesaid certificate was duly filed, a decree might be passed in favour of the Plaintiffs for cancelling or modifying the said certificate.

    The Opposite Party is the sole Defendant in the suit. He filed his written statement on the 23rd January, 1939, stating inter alia that the suit was not properly valued and that the court-fee paid was not sufficient.

    This issue was taken up for hearing by the learned Subordinate Judge on the 7th July, 1939. He has come to the conclusion that the valuation for the purposes of jurisdiction should be the amount mentioned in the certificate and that the Plaintiffs are bound to pay ad valorem court-fees on that amount. He accordingly directed the Plaintiffs Petitioners to file the deficit court-fees within 21 days. The Plaintiffs thereupon obtained the present Rule.

    As regards the question as to what should be the valuation of this suit for the purposes of jurisdiction, the learned Subordinate Judge appears to me to have come to a correct conclusion. On the materials before him the amount or value of the subject-matter of the suit must be taken to be the amount mentioned in the certificate. The order of the Subordinate Judge directing the Plaintiffs to value the suit at the amount mentioned in the certificate must therefore stand.

    As regards the amount of court-fees, the Plaintiffs' case is that the suit is a suit to set aside the summary decision or order of a Revenue Court and consequently a fixed court-fee is payable under Schedule 2, Art. 17, cl. 1 of the Court Fees Act. This contention appears to me to be well-founded. There cannot be any doubt that the decision or order in question is the decision or order of a Revenue Court. The controversy at the Bar was on the question as to whether the certificate which the Plaintiffs want to be cancelled in the present suit could be called a summary decision or order of the Revenue Court Mr. Mukherji, Assistant Government Pleader, contended that the present suit was not only a suit for the cancellation of the certificate which was signed by the Certificate Officer under sec. 6 but also a suit for cancelling the certificate as amended by the Certificate Officer after hearing the objections of the certificate-debtor under sec. 9 of the Public Demands Recovery Act. There is no material before me to indicate that the certificate which was signed by the Certificate Officer under sec. 6 has been, in any way, modified by the Certificate Officer after hearing the objections of the certificate-debtor. I have already pointed out that he rejected the objections of the certificate-debtors with certain remarks. These remarks do not in any way affect or modify the original certificate signed by him under sec. 6. The learned Advocate for the Plaintiffs also stated before us that the suit was a suit for cancellation of the certificate signed by the Certificate Officer Under sec. 6 on the 15th April, 1936. The plaint also goes to indicate that the Plaintiffs in the present suit want the certificate signed by the Certificate Officer under sec. 6 to be cancelled.

    The next question for consideration therefore is whether this certificate can be called the summary decision or order of a Revenue Court within the meaning of Art. 17(i) of Sch. 2 of the Court Fees Act. The relevant section of the Public Demands Recovery Act are these:—

    “5.(1)— When any public demand payable to any person other than the Collector is due, each person may send to the Certificate Officer a written requisition in the prescribed form.

    (2) Every such requisition shall be signed and Verified in the prescribed manner, and, except in such cases as may be prescribed, shall be obargeabla with the fee of the amount which would be payable under the Court-fees Act, 1870, in respect of a plaint for the recovery of a sum of money equal to that stated in the requisition as being due.

    6. On receipt of any such requisition, the Certificate Officer, if he is satisfied that the demand is recoverable and that recovery by suit is not barred by law, may sign a certificate, in the prescribed form, stating that the demand is due; and shall include in the certificate the fee (if any) paid under section 5, Sub-section (2); and shall cause the certificate to be filed in his office.”

    These provisions clearly indicate that the Certificate Officer declares that a certain amount is due from a certificate-debtor and signs the certificate under sec. 6 if he is satisfied from the statements which are made in the written requisition in the absence of the certificate-debtor. The Act then provides for a notice to the certificate-debtor and for the hearing of his objections within a certain time. The Act also gives power to the Certificate Officer to set aside, modify or vary the certificate after hearing the objections of the certificate-debtor. There is a further provision in the Act, viz. sec. 34, under which the certificate-debtor has been given the right to bring a suit in the Civil Court for cancelling or modifying the certificate. From this provision it is clear that the legislature contemplated that the decision of the Certificate Officer is not final but is liable to be questioned in the Civil Court.

    The point for consideration therefore is whether an ex parte decision which is liable to be questioned by a regular suit in the Civil Court can be called a summary decision or order within the meaning of Art. 17(i) of Sch. 2 of the Court Fees Act. The word “summary” has not been defined in the Court Fees Act. In the case of Maharajadhiraj Mahatab Chand Roy Bahadur v. Bacharam Hazra (1), Sir Richard Couch, C.J, observed as follows:—

    “It is the decision of a Court which hears and determines the matter, but does not finally conclude the parties, a proceeding in which the Court makes an order and determines the matter in issue, if I may so describe it, for the present occasion.”

    I respectfully agree with the observations of the learned Chief Justice in that case as regards the meaning of the word “summary.” Evidently powers under the Public Demands Recovery Act have been conferred upon certain zemindars for speedy realization of rent from; their tenants. Chapter 13(a) of the Bengal Tenancy Act (now repealed) points to the conclusion that the procedure for recovery of rent under the Public Demands Recovery Act is a summary procedure. The Act gives power to the Certificate Officer to decide for the present the question of the liability of rent. His decision does not conclude the parties as his decision can be questioned in a regular suit. The Certificate Officer before signing the certificate does not hear the certificate-debtor at all. The certificate-debtor is saddled with liability before he is heard. The mere fact that subsequently the certificate-debtor has been given a fight to file his objections to the certificate or that he has got a right of appeal before a superior Revenue Officer does not take away the summary character of the decision arrived at by him under sec. 6 of the Act as the certificate-debtor has got a statutory right to have the question of his liability decided in the Civil Court. I am therefore clearly of the opinion that the present suit, so far as it relates to the Plaintiffs' prayer for cancellation of the certificate, is a suit which comes within Art. 17, cl. 1 of Schedule 2 of the Court Fees Act and only a fixed court-fee is payable. I therefore set aside the order of the learned Subordinate Judge directing the Plaintiffs to pay ad valorem court-fees on the amount mentioned in the certificate.

    The result therefore is that this Rule, is made absolute in part. The order of the Subordinate Judge directing the Plaintiffs to amend the valuation for the purposes of jurisdiction on Rs. 2,03,403-12-3 is affirmed. The order of the Subordinate Judge directing the Plaintiffs to pay ad valorem court-fees on the said amount is set aside.

    There will be no order as to costs.

    Rau, J.:— I agree in the order proposed. The main argument on behalf of the Crown is that since secs. 7, 9 and 10 of the Public Demands Recovery Act provide for the original certificate being modified by a Certificate Officer after hearing the certificate-debtor before the certificate can be executed under sec. 13, it cannot be said that the certificate in its effective form or at its effective stage represents a summary decision of a Revenue Court. To my mind, the very fact that sec. 34 of the Act provides for the cancellation or modification of the certificate by the Civil Court, Subject doubtless to certain limitations, is an indication that the certificate even in the form in which it ultimately emerges from the Revenue Court, is regarded as embodying no more than a summary decision liable to be set aside or modified upon a regular suit. As already mentioned by my learned brother, in the heading to Chapter 13A of the Bengal Tenancy Act, a chapter which was only recently repealed by the Bengal Tenancy Amendment Act, 1938, the procedure for recovery of rent under the Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act was described as a summary procedure, so that there is legislative sanction for this description.

    P.C

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    Comments

    Joy Durga Dasi And Ors. , v. Maharaj Kumar Sourish Chandra Roy Bahadur, Minor Opposite Party
    (Dec 1, 1939)