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citation codes
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  • section 477A read with section 109 of the Indian Penal Code.
  • section 34 and not section 109 of the Indian Penal Code.
  • Sections 236 and 237 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • section 477A read with section 34 of the Indian Penal
  • section 4774 of the Indian Penal Code. Satyanarayana
  • section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
  • section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
  • Section 4774 of the Indian Penal Code
  • section 120B of the Indian Penal Code.
  • section 465 of the Indian Penal Code;
  • section 379 of the Indian Penal Code
  • section 411 of the Indian Penal Code.
  • section 34 of the Indian Penal Code.
  • section 114 of the Indian Evidence
  • section 477A, Indian Penal Code,
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • section 477A read with section 109 of the Indian Penal Code.
  • section 34 and not section 109 of the Indian Penal Code.
  • Sections 236 and 237 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • section 477A read with section 34 of the Indian Penal
  • section 4774 of the Indian Penal Code. Satyanarayana
  • section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
  • section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
  • Section 4774 of the Indian Penal Code
  • section 120B of the Indian Penal Code.
  • section 465 of the Indian Penal Code;
  • section 379 of the Indian Penal Code
  • section 411 of the Indian Penal Code.
  • section 34 of the Indian Penal Code.
  • section 114 of the Indian Evidence
  • section 477A, Indian Penal Code,
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (as provided)

Factual and Procedural Background

The opinion arises from a scheme to defraud the Bengal Nagpur Railway in connection with the sale of used sleepers. A tender for unserviceable sleepers was accepted in March 1939; deliveries occurred in August 1939. Suspicion led to a departmental enquiry and to police involvement in late September 1939. Several documents (including monthly returns and supply orders) and witnesses (notably Simpson) were central to the prosecution.

Criminal proceedings commenced: on 11 November 1940 Woodhouse, Ratnam, Satyanarayana, Ramlakhan and his son Sheodewan were tried on a joint charge of conspiracy and various separate charges (forgery, falsification of accounts, receiving stolen goods, etc.). On 13 June 1942 the trial Magistrate acquitted all on conspiracy but convicted Woodhouse, Satyanarayana and Ramlakhan on other charges; Ratnam and Sheodewan were acquitted. The conviction was affirmed on appeal on 29 August 1942. Satyanarayana applied in revision; the Criminal Bench (including the present bench) directed notices to be issued to the three convicted accused to show cause why sentences should not be enhanced.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the evidence of Simpson and other accomplices could be acted upon and, if so, to what extent corroboration was required (principles governing accomplice evidence).
  2. Whether statements made before a departmental enquiry, in the presence of a police sub-inspector, were admissible in criminal proceedings in view of section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
  3. Whether the accused's examination under section 342 CrPC and their filing of written statements affected the admissibility or the drawing of adverse inferences from admissions (i.e., the proper scope of the Magistrate's questioning when the accused file written statements).
  4. Whether the acts charged against the accused fit the specific offences charged (interpretation and application of sections 465, 477A, 411, 4774/477A [as cited], 34, 109 IPC and sections 236–237 CrPC), and whether convictions could properly be recorded under the provisions used by the courts below or should be altered to different provisions (notably recording convictions under section 34 read with section 477A rather than section 109 in one instance).
  5. Appropriate sentence for the convicted persons given the nature of the conspiracy and their respective roles.

Arguments of the Parties

Crown / Prosecution

  • Relied primarily on Simpson's evidence (an accomplice) corroborated in part by Asif Hussain and documentary evidence (returns, orders, muster rolls, envelopes, receipts) to establish the conspiracy and specific offences (forgery, falsification of accounts, receiving stolen property).
  • Argued that statements made before the departmental enquiry were admissible; the fact of making the statements was proved by railway officials (Baxter and Bell) and no improper means were used to obtain them, so section 162 CrPC did not exclude them.
  • Contended that documentary and circumstantial facts (weights, substituted returns, forged notes, muster rolls, recovered sleepers) corroborated Simpson's account and established guilty knowledge and participation of the accused.

Defence (representations made for the accused as recorded)

  • Challenged admissibility of departmental enquiry statements under section 162 CrPC (counsel for Woodhouse and Satyanarayana).
  • Argued that no inference should be drawn from certain statements/documents because they were not specifically put to the accused in their examination under section 342 CrPC (counsel for the two accused relied on authority such as Dwarkanath Varma).
  • Contended that Satyanarayana, charged with abetment under section 109 IPC, could not be convicted as a principal under section 34 without proper charging; raised technical/contention about mis-application of charges.
  • Woodhouse defended on the basis that he acted innocently and that his initials on muster rolls did not prove presence at loading; also alleged he had lost pension/benefits as a consequence.
  • Ramlakhan's counsel submitted that he was unaware of railway rules or sleeper classes and believed he had received slightly better unserviceable sleepers; denied guilty knowledge of theft.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Rattan Dhanuk v. King-Emperor (judgment of Sir Courtney Terrell, C.J.) Principles governing evidence of an accomplice/approver: (a) accomplice evidence is open to grave suspicion; (b) it should not be acted on unless corroborated in some material particular unless suspicion is removed; (c) if suspicion is removed, uncorroborated accomplice evidence may suffice. The court applied these guidelines to treat Simpson as an accomplice and to require corroboration in material particulars before convicting, while explaining when uncorroborated accomplice evidence may be sufficient.
Dwarkanath Varma (King-Emperor) Authority relied on concerning the consequences of failure to properly examine an accused under section 342 CrPC (potential for quashing convictions if the Court fails to put proper questions). The court considered this authority in addressing the contention that failure to put specific documents/questions to the accused under s.342 should prevent inferences; it distinguished that case on its facts (in that case no written statement had been filed).
Zalim Singh v. King-Emperor (unreported, this Court) Referred to in argument on s.342 practice (not relied upon as authority because facts differed). The court reviewed the unreported record and found it of no assistance for the point here (the presence of a written statement after the prosecution case).
Bhagwat Singh v. King-Emperor When an accused, after hearing the prosecution, indicates they will file and then files a written statement addressing the points, the Magistrate need not press further questions; written statement may be treated in lieu of oral examination under s.342. The court followed this decision and extended it: when accused, represented by competent counsel, file written statements after the close of prosecution and refuse oral answers, the Magistrate is neither bound nor entitled to question further; accepted the written statements and admitted pre-enquiry statements into evidence.
Saiyid Mohiuddin v. King-Emperor Held that if an accused states he will file a written statement, the writing can be accepted in lieu of oral statement; provided accused had a reasonable and substantial opportunity to exercise the privilege under s.342. Cited to support the conclusion that accepting a written statement in lieu of oral examination is lawful and does not vitiate trial where procedure afforded a reasonable opportunity to the accused.
Begu v. King-Emperor (Privy Council; Lord Haldane) Interpreted sections 236–237 CrPC: an accused may be convicted of an offence even if not expressly charged with it, provided the evidence establishes a charge that might have been made under those sections. The court relied on this interpretation to permit altering recorded conviction to the appropriate offence (for example, convicting under section 34 read with section 477A when evidence showed acts constituting that offence though the accused was charged with abetment under section 109).
Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. King-Emperor (Post Office case) Privy Council's well-known extended meaning of section 34 to include criminal acts done by one or more persons in furtherance of common intention. The court noted the Post Office case as authority for the extended meaning of section 34 and observed that the present case falls within the literal scope of section 34 even without relying on that extended interpretation.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded through a sequence of legal analyses grounded in the facts and the authorities cited in the record:

  1. Treatment of Simpson's Evidence and Accomplice Corroboration:

    The court accepted that Simpson was legally an accomplice and therefore his evidence is prima facie open to grave suspicion. The court applied the companionable rule from Rattan Dhanuk (Sir Courtney Terrell) that accomplice evidence requires corroboration in some material particular unless the suspicion attaching to it is removed. The court held Simpson's evidence to be foundational but sought independent corroboration for specific accusations against each accused.

  2. Admissibility of Departmental-Enquiry Statements (s.162 CrPC):

    Counsel for Woodhouse and Satyanarayana argued statements taken at the departmental enquiry were inadmissible under section 162 CrPC. The court rejected that submission because the making of the statements was proved by railway officials (Baxter and Bell), no improper means were used, and the mere presence of Sub-Inspector Kulli did not convert the statements into inadmissible statements under s.162 since the statements were made to a board of enquiry and not to the police. Accordingly, those statements were held admissible.

  3. Examination of Accused under s.342 CrPC and Written Statements:

    The court confronted the procedural question whether, when an accused answers "I will file a written statement" at the commencement of their s.342 examination and does file such a statement, the Magistrate must continue to put specific questions. Relying on Bhagwat Singh and Saiyid Mohiuddin, the court held that where the accused (represented by competent lawyers) files a written statement addressing the prosecution's points and indicates they will rely on counsel, the Magistrate is neither bound nor entitled to continue questioning. The court expressly followed Bhagwat Singh, and stated further that the Magistrate should not question further unless accused are unrepresented or the court thinks accused/counsel do not appreciate the case; any observations to defence counsel should be recorded.

  4. Construction and Charging Issues (Sections 34, 109, 236–237 CrPC):

    The court examined whether convictions should be recorded under the sections used by the trial court or altered. It held that where the evidence establishes acts constituting a principal offence done in furtherance of common intention, convictions under section 34 read with the substantive offence (e.g., section 477A) are proper even if the accused was charged only with abetment under section 109. The court relied on sections 236–237 CrPC and the Privy Council in Begu to justify altering convictions to the charges established by evidence.

  5. Evaluation of Factual and Documentary Corroboration:

    The court surveyed documentary and circumstantial evidence that corroborated Simpson's narrative: (a) the weight of delivered sleepers (1,945 maunds) inconsistent with unserviceable-sleeper measurements; (b) substitution of the August return (original present in P.W.I file, substituted carbon in D.E file while A.E's file retained original); (c) suspicious supply orders and notes (including exhibit 10 and exhibit 11) and the handwriting/notes on them; (d) an insured envelope addressed to Simpson from Ramlakhan; (e) a peculiar receipt for 1,200 sleepers attached to a report (exhibit 39) with no explanation; (f) muster rolls and initials indicating Woodhouse's presence at loading.

    The court analyzed the forgery allegation against Satyanarayana in the light of the definition of forgery (section 464 IPC), considered three avenues of proof (obtaining Bell's signature by deception, insertion of a date after signing, or making a document with dishonest intention to cause belief in an earlier date), and found the strongest corroboration to be the forged note on exhibit 10 which itself was judged to be a forgery. The court concluded there was corroboration for Simpson's evidence as to the forgery of exhibit 11 and upheld Satyanarayana's conviction for forgery.

    With respect to the substituted August return, timing evidence (dates of signatures, leave, Simpson's statement timeline) and other corroboration led the court to conclude the substitution occurred on or before 30 September 1939; the court found sufficient corroboration to uphold convictions for falsification of accounts under section 477A (to be recorded read with section 34).

  6. Assessment of Individual Liability and Mens Rea:

    The court assessed the roles and mental states: Simpson's evidence implicated all accused; the court regarded Simpson's evidence against Woodhouse with suspicion (possible self-serving blame-shifting) but saw no reason to doubt Simpson's evidence against Satyanarayana and Ramlakhan. The court found evidence establishing that Ramlakhan had guilty knowledge and participated (receiving/retaining stolen property) and did not rely on presumptions under section 114 Evidence Act but on direct and corroborative testimony and documents.

  7. Sentencing Considerations:

    On sentencing, the court found no reason to distinguish among the three convicted accused (Woodhouse, Satyanarayana, Ramlakhan). The court emphasized the conspiracy required complementary participation (buyer, executive officer, accounts clerk) and warranted a deterrent custodial sentence; the court fixed three years' rigorous imprisonment for each and remitted fines imposed by the trial court.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

  • The court upheld the conviction of Satyanarayana for forgery under section 465 IPC and for falsification of accounts under section 477A IPC, but ordered that the section 477A conviction be recorded as read with section 34 (and not under section 109).
  • The court upheld Woodhouse's conviction under section 477A IPC and ordered it recorded as read with section 34.
  • The court upheld Ramlakhan's conviction under section 411 IPC (receiving/retaining stolen property knowing or having reason to believe it to be stolen).
  • All three convicted accused were sentenced to three years' rigorous imprisonment under the respective sections of conviction; fines imposed by the trial court were remitted and any fines paid were ordered repaid.

Implications:

  • The court affirmed that accomplice evidence requires material corroboration (following Rattan Dhanuk) and applied that principle in assessing Simpson's testimony and the documentary corroboration.
  • The court clarified procedural practice under section 342 CrPC where an accused, after the close of the prosecution and being represented, elects to file a written statement: the Magistrate is not bound to continue oral questioning and may accept the written statement in lieu of further oral examination (following Bhagwat Singh and Saiyid Mohiuddin).
  • The court confirmed that departmental-enquiry statements proved to have been made voluntarily and shown to have been made to officials (even in the presence of police) are admissible despite section 162 CrPC objections when no improper means were used to obtain them.
  • The court exercised the power to alter the form of conviction where the evidence establishes offences that might have been charged under sections 236–237 CrPC and where the acts established correspond to principal liability under section 34 rather than mere abetment under section 109.
  • On sentencing, the decision imposed a uniform deterrent custodial term and remitted fines; the opinion does not purport to create a broader binding precedent beyond these legal applications but does explain the court's approach to corroboration, admissibility, and s.342 practice in the factual context presented.

Order by Brough, J.; Agarwala, J. concurred. "Order accordingly."

    Satyanarayana v. King-Emperor

    Brough, J.:— I confess that this case is to my mind apt to nip any building affection which one might have had for the Code of Criminal Procedure. It arose out of a scheme to defraud the Bengal Nagpur Railway in connection with the sale of used sleepers; the sale took place just four years ago and the fraud was discovered almost immediately after. The trial involved taking the evidence of some 50 witnesses and the consideration of a number of documents, but the volume of evidence, oral and documentary, was not more than would be usual for the sort of fraud which is unfortunately not uncommon in a well-developed commercial community. Nevertheless the trial took nearly two years and proceeded before three different Magistrates so that no Magistrate had the advantage of seeing all the witnesses and the Magistrate who actually delivered the judgment saw none of them.

    There is a division of the Bengal Nagpur Railway with its headquarters at Adra in charge of a District Engineer (D.E) Mr. Morrison. His staff consists of two Assistants, Mr. Bell, who acted as his Personal Assistant, and Mr. Baxter, the Assistant Engineer (A.E) Lines; his department also includes a considerable office which is in charge of N.V Ratnam, the Head Accountant, who was accused in this case but has been acquitted and to it belonged the accused Satyanarayana, the stores clerk, and an assistant stores clerk Muhammad Shariff. The division in charge of the D.E is divided into a number of sections each in charge of a Permanent Way Inspector (P.W.I). One such section is based on Adra and was in charge of the accused Mr. Woodhouse as P.W.I His duties were principally executive but he had an office in charge of a clerk who was called the ‘Time-keeper’, Asif Hussain. Under Mr. Woodhouse were two subordinates known as S.P.W.I or S.E.P, one of whom Mr. Simpson had charge of the Adra yard and sidings and is the principal witness in the case.

    The materials of the permanent way have to be constantly and regularly renewed and this is the principal duty of the P.W Is. and their subordinates. When a section of the line is re-sleepered with new sleepers all the old ones are replaced irrespective of their condition. They are classified according to their condition and taken back to some yard. The worst are classified as unserviceable and are either used as fuel or for rough purposes on the railway under the authority of the P.W.I or are sold to railway employees or the public on the authority of the D.E For the purposes of sale, an unserviceable sleeper is assumed to weigh one maund although in fact it weighs ten or fifteen seers more. The better sleepers described as secondhand are classified in three categories A, B and C according to their quality and are used for patch repairs on main lines or on sidings or branch lines or are converted into narrow gauge sleepers. The weight of a secondhand sleeper in reasonable condition is approximately twice that of an unserviceable one and the value, at any rate, to the Railway Company is very much more. Patch repairs are carried out on the authority of the P.W.I and it will be seen that every secondhand sleeper employed in patch repairs releases a sleeper which would be classified as unserviceable. It is the practice of the B.N Railway to mark secondhand sleepers with two letters, one of them indicating the section of the line from which they were taken and the other the category in which they were classified.

    On the 20th of every month each P.W.I has to prepare a return described as ‘the unserviceable released material account’ which shows in various forms all dealings with unserviceable or released materials during the preceding month. This return is prepared in triplicate by carbon process and the original, is kept by the P.W.I, one copy is sent to the D.E and the other copy to the A.E Lines.

    At the end of 1938 and beginning of 1939 a section of the line under the control of the P.W.I Adra was re-sleepered and the sleepers released were marked with the letter G.

    On the 8th of February, 1939, the accused Ramlakhan Singh in the name of his son Sheodewan Singh, who was accused but acquitted, submitted a tender to the D.E Adra for 5,000 maunds of unserviceable sleepers at 4 annas a maund. On the 29th of March that tender was accepted and on the 1st of April he deposited Rs. 600 being the price of 2,400 maunds of the sleepers applied for. It is said that the scheme to defraud the Railway Company was to supply to Ramlakhan secondhand instead of unserviceable sleepers and to conceal the fraud by showing in the monthly return fictitious patch repairs which would account for the number of secondhand sleepers supplied and produce on paper a corresponding number of unserviceable sleepers. There is no clear evidence on this second point but it is obvious that it is the essence of the scheme that the fraud should be concealed and it is not easy to see how otherwise that could be managed. The successful operation of the scheme would involve the co-operation of some persons dealing with the executive side of the work and others dealing with the monthly returns and other records.

    In pursuance of the accepted tender above referred to, on the 15th and the 16th of August, 1939, four wagons of sleepers were loaded in the Adra yard and delivered to Ramlakhan at Digha Ghat. For the purposes, of freight, and this is an important point, those wagons were found to contain 1,945 maunds of timber. It appears the wagons contained 800 secondhand sleepers made up of 300A Class 300B Class and 200C Class and this fact is not disputed. In September, 1939, in consequence of information received the Dinapur Police searched Ramlakhan's timber yard at Dinapur and being suspicious that some of the five or six thousand sleepers they found there had not been honestly acquired circularised the Railway Companies. One of those circulars addressed to the D.E Adra arrived in his absence and was opened by Ratnam and handed over to Satyanarayana for report. On the D.E's return on the 20th of September, Satyanarayana placed that letter before the D.E with his report which is an important document and is exhibit 39. The D.E was not, however, satisfied and on the 25th of September he sent his Personal Assistant Mr. Bell with Satyanarayana to Dinapur to inspect the sleepers and they returned on the 28th, on which day Satyanarayana took leave, and Mr. Bell mreported that about 500 of the sleepers were undoubtedly A, B and C Class sleepers belonging to the Company and released by the re-sleepering, to which I have referred, which was carried out on a section of the line under the control of Mr. Woodhouse. On the 29th of September, Sub-Inspector Kulli of the Dinapur Police Station arrived at Adra and the D.E instructed Mr. Bell and Mr. Baxter to conduct a formal departmental enquiry which they did, Sub-Inspector Kulli being present throughout the enquiry. They examined material records and a number of witnesses. Among other things; they discovered on the file two orders from the D.E for the supply of unserviceable sleepers to Ramlakhan in the name of his son Sheodewan, one dated the 10th of July for 700 maunds and the other, dated the 25th of July for 1,000 maunds. They also found that the carbon copy of the P.W.I Adra's monthly return for August on the D.E's file was materially different from the carbon copy of the same return on the A.E's file.

    Simpson who was the person actually in charge of the Adra yard from which the sleepers had been despatched was the first witness to be examined and on the 30th of September he made a statement which was wholly non-committal except that it referred only to the order of the 10th July for 700 maunds. Woodhouse was also examined and made a statement which threw the blame for any irregularity on Simpson. Simpson was told by someone what Woodhouse had said and on the night of the 1st of October he went to Mr. Bell and in consequence of that interview he made a written report and subsequently made a long oral statement before the departmental enquiry in which he purported to expose the whole scheme. In consequence of Simpson's statement, a first information report was lodged on the 30th of October, 1939, and on the 11th of November, 1940, Woodhouse, Ratnam, Satyanarayana, Ramlakhan and his son Sheodewan were put on trial on a joint charge of conspiracy and separate charge of falsifying documents and receiving stolen goods, and the trial commenced. On the 13th of June, 1942, judgment was delivered acquitting all the accused on the charge of conspiracy but convicting Woodhouse, Satyanarayana and Ramlakhan on the separate charges against them: Ratnam and Sheodewan were acquitted altogether. On the 29th of August, 1942, that judgment was affirmed on appeal and Satyanarayana applied to this Court in revision but when the case came up for hearing before the Criminal Bench consisting of the then Chief Justice and myself on the 19th of November, 1942, we directed notices to be issued on all the three convicted accused to show cause why the sentences passed on them should not be enhanced.

    The foundation of the prosecution case is the evidence of Simpson corroborated in part by that of Asif Hussain and it was first submitted that Simpson was an accomplice and his evidence should not be accepted unless corroborated. Much of the cross-examination of Simpson was directed to show that he was an accomplice: to what extent he was morally involved may be a matter of dispute but that he was legally an accomplice appears from every line of his statement and every word of his oral evidence. It is clear, therefore, that his evidence must be treated as the evidence of an accomplice. Asif Hussain is also an accomplice and, therefore, his evidence can have no corroborative value. The considerations affecting the evidence of an accomplice (or an approver) are conveniently and authoritatively stated in the judgment of Sir Courtney Terrell, C.J, in Rattan Dhanuk v. King-Emperor* as follows:—

    “(a) The evidence of an approver does not differ from the evidence of any other witness save in one particular respect, namely,

    (b) that the evidence of an accomplice is regarded as initio as open to grave suspicion. Accordingly,

    (c) if the suspicion which attaches to the evidence of an accomplice, be not removed, that evidence should not be acted upon unless corroborated in some material particular, and,

    (d) if the suspicion attaching to the accomplice's evidence be removed, then that evidence may be acted upon even though uncorroborated, and the guilt of the accused may be established upon that evidence alone.”

    It is of course not necessary in any case that every statement in such evidence should be corroborated; and in a case like the present if there is corroboration not only of the general fact of the existence of a conspiracy but also of the participation in it of any particular accused it would not be necessary that there should be corroboration of all the specific acts in the conspiracy said to have been done by that accused unless the evidence of the accomplice on the point was intrinsically open to suspicion.

    The Crown have sought to use as a corroboration of Simpson's evidence against Woodhouse and Satyanarayana the statements made by them before the departmental enquiry. But the counsel for these two accused have submitted that these statements are not admissible in evidence by virtue of section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In my view, however, that submission is not well-founded. The object of the section was to ensure that it should not be open to the police in a criminal prosecution to give evidence of admissions which were either not in fact made or obtained by improper means. In this case the fact of the making of the statements is proved not by a policeman but by two responsible Railway officials Mr. Baxter and Mr. Bell; it is also clear from their evidence that no improper means were used to obtain the statements. The mere fact that Sub-Inspector Kulli was present when the statements were made is in my judgment quite insufficient to bring in section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The statements were not made to him but in his presence to the board of enquiry consisting of Mr. Baxter and Mr. Bell. Accordingly I hold that these statements are admissible.

    It is next said on behalf of these two accused that no inference ought to be drawn against them from these statements and certain other documents relied on by the Crown because they were not specifically put to them in their examination under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This is a point of very considerable importance affecting the general administration of justice in this province. I am bound to say that it does illustrate the inconvenience of the rule existing in India that the accused cannot give evidence. That rule has been abrogated in England for 45 years and I understand the general view is that the abrogation has been favourable to the administration of justice. The English practice leaves it to the accused to give evidence or not as he likes and if he elects to give evidence it is for his legal advisers to elicit such facts as they consider material; his explanations are liable to be tested by cross-examination but this is no disadvantage to an innocent accused. The position of the Court under section 342 is very invidious; if it fails to ask proper questions, no inference may be drawn against a prisoner from his failure to give a satisfactory explanation, which may result in the quashing of a conviction [see the judgment of the Privy Council in Dwarkanath Varma v. King-Emperor, which was the case relied upon by counsel for Satyanarayana for his submission]; if, on the other hand, the Court presses the witnesses too hard it is charged with cross-examining the accused which is equally not permitted.

    The examination of the accused Woodhouse and Satyanarayana in this case was as follows. After the evidence for the prosecution was concluded, the Magistrate asked them:

    “You have heard the evidence against you; what is your statement?”

    Both of them replied

    “I have committed no offence. I am filing a written statement”

    and they both did file written statements which unfortunately did not deal in any way with their previous admissions, or in the case of Satyanarayana with any other specific point.

    I understand from my brother Agarwala, J., whose experience on this point is most extensive, that it is not the invariable practice in this province that if upon examination under section 342 the accused says he will file and does file a written statement the Magistrate puts no further question to him, and this practice is based on the general knowledge of the fact that many accused prefer to refrain from making unguarded answers which might contain some admission and to leave it to their legal advisers to draw up at leisure such a statement of their defence as they think proper. Nevertheless it was submitted to us that it was the duty of the Magistrate to go on, after the accused had intimated that they would file a written statement, by putting to them questions on the particular points in the evidence to which he attached importance. We were referred to an unreported case [Zalim Singh v. King-Emperor of this Court] decided last year by a Criminal Bench consisting of the then Chief Justice and myself. I have re-examined the record in that case and I can find no trace of any written statement being filed and the examination of the accused fully justifies the comment of the learned Chief Justice that it was a most perfunctory one. That, case, therefore, is of no assistance. We have also examined the record in Dwarkanath Verma v. King-Emperor, and it appears that in that case too no written statement was filed at any stage of the proceedings. Counsel for Satyanarayana also referred us to other cases in support of his contention but in none of them had any written statement been filed after the close of the prosecution case. They are, therefore, no authority on the point which arises in this case; that is to say, what is the proper course when having heard all the evidence the accused in answer to the first question put to them in their examination under section 342 intimate that they proposed to file a written statement.

    The question was considered by this Court in Bhagwat Singh v. King-Emperor in which the facts appear to be on all fours with this; that is to say, after the prosecution case was closed the accused were asked whether they would make a statement after hearing the case which had been brought against them by the prosecution and the answer of each of the accused was

    “No. 1 shall file a written statement”

    and thereupon a written statement on the same day was filed by the petitioners meeting the charges put forth by the prosecution. It was argued that nevertheless it was the duty of the Court to go on and ask specific questions, and the observations of Adami, J. on that point on page 243 are as follows:—

    “It is quite true that the filing of a written statement; cannot take the place of the examination of an accused as required by section 342; but in the present case the accused petitioners filed their written statement in answer to the Magistrate's question, and when asked to make a statement they said “here is my written statement.

    Now, experience shows that, when a written statement has been drawn up for an accused, he will commonly refuse to answer questions orally; he is very often instructed by his pleader not to answer questions; and where an accused has refused to answer questions and puts forward a written statement, it would be useless for the Magistrate to go on questioning him, knowing that the only reply he will get is a refusal to answer questions.

    The learned Government Advocate has shown that in the present case the written statement put forward by the petitioners covered all the points in the case. It is very difficult to lay down a rule as to the minimum number of questions which should be put to an accused. If numerous questions are put, there is generally an allegation that the Court has attempted to cross-examine the accused.

    While agreeing that it is the duty of the Magistrate to question the accused generally on the case, after the close of the prosecution, we are not prepared to hold that where the accused refuses to answer a question, the Magistrate is bound to go on asking questions especially where a written statement is put in at the time meeting the points of the prosecution.

    I can see no reason to hold that in the present case the trial has been vitiated by the fact that the Magistrate did not continue asking questions after the accused had refused to answer.”

    Some guidance on the question can also be obtained from another case Saiyid Mohiuddin v. King-Emperor in which Mullick, J. said (on page 494):—

    “If an accused states that he will file a written statement, the writing, in my opinion, is to be accepted in lieu of his oral statement.” Bucknill, J. concurred saying that:—

    “Provided the, accused has in fact had a reasonable and substantial opportunity of exercising the privilege accorded to him by the provisions of section 342, that is of either orally or in writing saying what he wishes to say in explanation of what has been alleged against him, a technical failure or omission in the procedure ought not to be regarded as rendering a trial wholly nugatory.” In my view the decision in Bhagwat Singh v. King-Emperor is perfectly correct and one which we ought to follow. But I would go further and say positively that when, as in this case, the accused having heard the evidence for the prosecution and on being questioned by the Court in compliance with the provisions of section 342 in general terms indicates his intention of leaving his defence to his legal adviser by filing a written statement, the Court is neither bound nor entitled to question him further. Different considerations would arise if the accused were not legally represented or the Court thought for any reason that the accused or his legal adviser did not properly appreciate the case that had to be met. If the Court addresses any observations to the defence lawyers on this point it would be highly desirable to record such observations and the replies.

    In this case it is quite clear that the accused were represented throughout by competent lawyers who were fully capable of appreciating all the points that had been, made and on whose advice the accused were relying. I hold therefore, that the statements of Woodhouse and Satyanarayana made before the departmental enquiry and the other documents referred to are admissible and that the Crown is entitled to make use of their contents against each accused.

    In order to determine what the Crown have to prove to justify a conviction of the accused now before the Court, it is necessary to examine the charges in detail. The general charge against all the accused was that between in the 1st of February and the 30th of September, 1939, at Adra and Dinapur they agreed to do and caused to be done several illegal acts to wit theft, dishonest retention of stolen articles, criminal breach of trust, forgery and falsification of account and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 120B of the Indian Penal Code. That charge was apparently; abandoned by the prosecution for some reason against Ramlakhan and in any case the trying Magistrate recorded an acquittal on that charge in favour of all the accused. His conduct in so doing was unfavourably commented upon by the dower appellate Court but I do not think that comment was justified; there is authority for the view that section 120 was only intended for cases in which no actual concrete offence had been committed. The existence of the charge is not, however, without importance; it is not necessary to go into the matter at length but it is quite clear that Simpson's evidence, if it be believed, fully establishes the charge of conspiracy against all the accused and it was convenient in the charges to draw attention to the existence of facts which formed a connecting link between what might otherwise have appeared to be a series of different individual offences. It was contended in the Courts below that a joint trial was improper, but the contention was obviously ill-founded and was not pressed in this Court.

    With regard to the individual charges, Woodhouse was charged firstly with criminal breach of trust under section 408 of which he was found not guilty, and secondly that he between the 20th and 30th of September at Adra being a servant in the employment of Bengal Nagpur Railway Company wilfully and with intent to defraud altered, mutilated and falsified the original return of unserviceable materials for the month of August, 1939, which belonged to Bengal Nagpur Railway Company by making exhibits 26, 27 and 28 and causing the same to be substituted in place of a portion of return (original) of August, 1939, and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 4774 of the Indian Penal Code. Satyanarayana was charged firstly that between the 20th and the 30th day of September, 1939, at Adra he forged a letter (the order, dated 25th July, 1939, for the supply of 1,000 maunds), exhibit 11, and a copy of the same letter, exhibit 17 with intent to cause damage or injury to the Bengal Nagpur Railway Company and with intent to commit fraud and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 465 of the Indian Penal Code; and secondly that between the 20th and the 30th of September, 1939, at Adra he aided and abetted Woodhouse in the commission of an offence of falsification of account under section 477A, Indian Penal Code, by substituting exhibits 26, 27 and 28 in the file of the District Engineer of Adra marked A and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 477A read with section 109 of the Indian Penal Code. The charge against Ramlakhan Singh was firstly a charge of theft of four wagons' load of sleepers under section 379 of the Indian Penal Code on which he was acquitted, and secondly of dishonestly retaining some of the sleepers which were the property of the Bengal Nagpur Railway Company knowing or having reason to believe the same to be stolen property thereby committing an offence under section 411 of the Indian Penal Code.

    On those charges certain submissions were made on behalf of Woodhouse and Satyanarayana. Section 4774 of the Indian Penal Code reads as follows:—

    “Whoever, being a clerk, officer, or servant, or employed or acting in the capacity of a clerk, officer or servant, wilfully, and with intent to defraud, destroys, alters, mutilates or falsifies any book, paper, writing, valuable security or account which belongs to or is in the possession of his employer, or has been received by him for or on behalf of his employer, or wilfully, and with intent to defraud, makes or abets the making of any false entry in, or omits or alters or abets the omission or alteration of any material particular from or in, any such book, paper, writing, valuable security or account, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both.”

    On behalf of Woodhouse it was submitted that it contains nothing about causing an act to be done by other persons. That is perfectly correct; the section relates only to the acts of the accused himself, but the facts put forward by the prosecution as the basis of the charge in this case are these:—a complete return for August 1939 had been properly submitted to the D.E on the due date; thereafter with intent to defraud the Company Simpson and Asif Hussain on Woodhouse's direction prepared a different and fraudulent return; Woodhouse signed it on the 25th or 26th of September 1939 and Satyanarayana took the return and substituted it for the original return in the D.E's file which he removed and tore up; all the persons concerned were servants of the Railway Company, in my judgment the offence under section 477A was only complete by virtue of the acts of all the persons involved, and both accused should, therefore, properly have been directly charged under that section and would have been liable by virtue of section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. If the prosecution case is true, this case is within the literal meaning of section 34 and it is not necessary to rely on the extended meaning given to it by the Privy Council in the well known Post Office case [Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. King-Emperor] to include a criminal act done by one or more of several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all. So far as Woodhouse is concerned, although he was charged alone with; having committed the whole offence it is quite clear that he can be convicted, even though section 34 is not specifically mentioned, with having done one of the acts which make up the offence committed in furtherance of the common intention of himself and his co-actors.

    However, as regards Satyanarayana it was contended that as he had been charged with abetment under section 109 he could not be convicted as a principal under section 34. The soundness of that contention depends, in my judgment, upon the particular facts of the case. Stated in broad terms it is too wide. Sections 236 and 237 of the Code of Criminal Procedure read as follows:—

    “236. If a single act or series of acts is, of such a nature that it is doubtful which of several offences the facts which can be proved will constitute the accused may be charged with having committed all or any of such offences, and any number of such charges may be tried at once; or he may be charged in the alternative with having committed some one of the said offences.”

    “237. If, in the case mentioned in section 236, the accused is charged with one offence, and it appears in evidence that he committed a different offence for which be might have been charged under the provisions of that section, he may be convicted of the offence which he is shown to have committed, although he was not charged with it.”

    The effect of these sections was considered by the Privy Council in Begu v. King-Emperor and Lord Haldane in delivering the judgment of the Board after quoting the sections proceeded as follows:—

    “The illustration makes the meaning of these words quite plain. A man may be convicted of an offence, although there has been no charge in respect of it, if the evidence, is such as to establish a charge that might have been made.”

    An examination of the charges against Woodhouse and Satyanarayana shows that the acts alleged against Satyanarayana as constituting an abetment in fact constitute the commission of the actual offence under section 34. If, therefore, the evidence before the Court was held to prove the acts alleged against Satyanarayana on the charge laid he might have been convicted of any other offence which those acts really constituted, that is of the principal offence under section 34. It is also clear that if the trial Court under circumstances such as these has found the facts proved but recorded a conviction under the wrong section it is open to an appellate Court to alter the conviction to one under the section under which the accused ought properly to have been convicted. If, therefore, the evidence establishes the facts alleged against Woodhouse and Satyanarayana they may both be properly convicted under section 477A read with section 34.

    It remains to consider the evidence in this case and to see how far the conviction of the accused was justified. As I have said, the foundation of the prosecution case is the evidence of Simpson. * * * * * * * * * *

    It appears, therefore, that Simpson's evidence clearly proves that the three accused are all guilty of the charges framed against them. There is nothing to be said against Simpson's evidence which appears to be as consistent as one would expect having regard to the lapse of time between his first statement and his giving evidence in Court. He had no motive to implicate Satyanarayana or Ramlakhan at all. It is apparent that he is trying to put his own case in as favourable a light as possible and this may well involve throwing the blame on his superior Woodhouse. I, would, therefore, regard his evidence against Woodhouse with suspicion whereas I would have no suspicion with regard to his evidence against the other two. It would, however, not be wise in this case to convict them without some corroboration directly implicating each accused.

    There are certain indisputable facts which, do corroborate, Simpson's evidence in general terms to which I will refer before considering the separate case of each accused. In the first place it is clearly established and cannot be disputed that although Ramlakhan purchased unserviceable sleepers which weighed about one and a quarter maunds each the sleepers which were delivered to him were secondhand sleepers 800 of which weighed 1,945 maunds and some 500 of these sleepers were recovered from his yard. Secondly there was a substitution of the August return from P.W.I Adra; this is clear because the substitution was not complete, the original was duly substituted in the P.W.I's file, one carbon copy was duly substituted in the D.E's file but there was no substitution in the A.E's file which continued to hold the original return. Simpson also produced before the departmental enquiry, and they are exhibits in this case, a carbon of the substituted return which he said was intended for the A.E's file, the torn pieces of the carbon of the original return which he said came from the D.E's file and the original of the original return. All the six documents referred to bore the signature of Woodhouse. The principal difference between the two returns, although there are others, is that the original return contains the following entry:—

    “Sold to Sheodevan Singh as per D.E's P.W 7/153 of 10/7/39—U.S.B.G Sal sleepers—U/S—700 Mds. Full 600, Pieces 200.”

    whereas the substituted return shows:

    “Sold to Sheodevan Singh as per D.E's nos. P.W/7 dated…………………u/s BG Sal sleepers—u/s full 1025 in pieces—325-1,800 Mds.”

    Thirdly the orders on P.W.I Adra for the supply of sleepers to Sheodewan Singh are highly suspicious. When the original Rs. 600 was deposited for the supply of 2,400 maunds, that order was distributed by the D.E between P.W.I Chandil and P.W.I Bhaga—two other P.W, Is. in his Division—who were ordered to supply 1,200 maunde each and in fact 100 maunds were supplied from Bhaga; and 330 from Chandil. On the 23rd June, 1939, a letter was written signed by Mr. Bell to the P.W.I Bhaga, which is; exhibit 87, which cancels the order on Bhaga except to the extent of 500 maunds, that is to say, it cancels the order for delivery of 700 maunds and on the 10th of July an order, the original of which is exhibit 10, was issued to P.W.I Adra to supply 700 maunds. That order was signed by Mr. Bell and in the ordinary way a copy was sent to the A.E Lines. The original, but not the carbon copies in the files of the P.W.I Adra and of the A.E Lines, also contained at the foot underneath the signature of Mr. Bell two lines to the following effect which appear to be in the same handwriting as the remainder of the form which is admittedly that of Satyanarayana:

    “Copy to P.W.I CNI and VAA. This cancels orders for supply of 700 mds.—400 mds. against no. PW/7 of 12th April, 1939.”

    (CNI and VAA are the respective railway code names for Chandil and. Bhaga). The respective P.W Is. Chandil and Bhaga stated that they did not receive these copies and it is not suggested that there was any other cancellation of the remaining part of the Chandil and Bhaga orders on that date. Another order dated the 25th of July was sent to the P.W.I Adra for the supply of 1,000 maunds and the copy received by the P.W.I Adra contains a note in the writing of Woodhouse bearing the date 26-7-39 in the same writing as the rest of the note “to S.E.P Yard for compliance”. This second order, which is exhibit 11, is the order which Satyanarayana is charged with having forged.

    Fourthly there is the registered and insured envelope (exhibit 120) addressed to Simpson at his private address which was handed by Simpson to Mr. Bell at the departmental enquiry. It bears post marks of the 30th of August and the name of the sender is Ramlakhan Singh, Timber Merchant, Sikanderpore, P.O Digha, and was insured for Rs. 75, the sum Simpson stated that it contained.

    Fifthly there is a receipt bearing the date 15th of August, 1939 which was attached by Satyanarayana to his report dated the 20th of September (exhibit 39). This is a most curious document. It purports to be a receipt for 1,200 sleepers equivalent to 1,800 maunds from Ramlakhan. No explanation for that document has been put forward by anyone. It does not correspond to any possible combination of facts except the statement made by Simpson. It is quite clear that unserviceable sleepers are always treated as weighing one maund and therefore it is incredible that on this occasion only they should have been treated as weighing a maund and a half. Further, no order had ever been issued to supply Ramlakhan from Adra with 1,800 maunds of sleepers; certainly there was an order for 700 maunds and possibly another order for 1,000 maunds but together this only made 1,700 maunds.

    The first charge against Satyanarayana was the charge of forging the order for 1,000 maunds. Forgery is defined in section 464 as follows:—

    “A person is said to make a false document—

    First.—Who dishonestly or fraudulently makes, signs, seals or executes a document or part of a document, or makes any mark, denoting the execution of a document, with the intention of causing it to be believed that such document or part of a document was made, signed, sealed or executed by or by the authority of a person by whom or by whose authority he knows that it was not made, signed, sealed or executed, or at a time at which he knows that it was not made, signed, sealed or executed; or

    Secondly.—Who, without lawful authority, dishonestly or fraudulently, by cancellation or otherwise, alters a document in any material part thereof, after it has been made or executed either by himself or by any other person, whether such person be living or dead at the time of such alteration; or

    Thirdly.—Who dishonestly or fraudulently causes any person to sign, seal, execute or alter a document, knowing that such person by reason of unsoundness of mind or intoxication cannot, or that by reason of deception practiced upon him, he does not know the contents of the document or the nature of the alteration.”

    The Crown first of all attempted to show that Satyanarayana had been guilty of an offence under the third proviso that is to say, obtaining Mr. Bell's signature by deception. That they wholly-failed to do as Mr. Bell in evidence merely stated that he had signed the documents and gave no explanation as to how he came to do so. Secondly they turned to the second proviso, that is to say, they tried to show that the date “25-7-39” had been inserted by Satyanaray and after the documents had been signed by showing that this date was in Satyanarayana's handwriting and they called a number of witnesses to prove this, but their evidence was not such that any Court would be justified in accepting. Finally they sought to show that he had committed an offence within the first proviso, that is to say the document was made dishonestly with the intention of causing it to be believed that it was made at a time at which he knew it was not made; in other words that it was made by Satyanarayana between the 20th and 30th of September with the intention that it should be put forward as a document dated prior to the 15th of August. The evidence called by the Crown did show that the body of the document was in the handwriting of Satyanarayana and the evidence of Simpson, to which I have already referred, is clear as to the time at which it was prepared. The main corroboration relied on by the lower Courts, and as far as I can see the only corroboration available of this fact, is the note at the bottom of exhibit 10, the original of the order for 700 maunds:

    “Copy to P.W I CNI and VAA. This cancels orders for supply of 700 mds.—400 mds.”

    If that can be shown to be a forgery, the conclusion is almost irresistible that the order for 1,000 maunds is also a forgery because the order for 1,000 maunds could only have been issued after the previous orders on Chandil and Bhaga had been cancelled to the necessary extent, and it is not suggested that there was any other cancellation of the Chandil and Bhaga orders except the note on exhibit 10. It is not for this purpose necessary to show (and it is impossible to show except on the slender evidence of handwriting) that Satyanarayana was the person who made the forgery.

    The note on exhibit 10 is in itself most suspicious. The order is initialled in two places by Mr. Bell, firstly at the bottom of the body of the order and secondly under the note

    “Copy forwarded to A.E Lines for information etc.”

    If copies were to be forwarded to P.W Is. Chandil and Bhaga one would have expected Mr. Bell to initial that fact too Secondly it is clear from the letter of P.W.I Bhaga (exhibit 87) that the normal way of cancelling an order for supply would be by a separate notification. Thirdly the note itself is a misstatement. The note says:

    “This cancels orders for supply of 700 mds.—400 mds.”

    “This” must refer to the order on Adra to supply 700 maunds. That order did not cancel the orders for the supply of 700 maunds and 400 maunds from Chandil and Bhaga respectively. The 700 maunds ordered from Adra were supplied in substitution for 700 maunds from Bhaga which had been cancelled a fortnight before by exhibit 87. If any order on Adra did cancel 700 maunds and 400 maunds of Chandil and Bhaga it was exhibit 11. One Avould, therefore, approach the note on exhibit 10 with the greatest suspicion. The Crown called the P.W Is of Ghandil and Bhaga. Bhaga stated that no order for the cancellation of the 1,200 maunds ordered from them had been received except exhibit 87 and Chandil stated that no order for cancellation had been received by him at all. It was urged on behalf of Satyanarayana, without attacking the honest intention of these two officers, that they could not be expected to state positively what documents had or had not been received in their office and that, therefore, their evidence on this point should not be accepted. I cannot agree with that contention; the discovery of this fraud must have been in October, 1939, a topic of keen interest and constant discussion amongst all the responsible employees of the B.N Railway in the Adra division and any personal connection with the scandal would be clearly remembered by the officers concerned. I, therefore, see no reason to doubt the evidence of these two officers when they say that they remember that they were ordered to supply 1,200 maunds to Ramlakhan and that those orders had not been cancelled at the date the fraud was discovered.

    There is further indication that the order for 1,000 maunds (exhibit 11) was not prepared in July.

    It was contended, however, on behalf of Satyanarayana that there were other indications which showed that the order for 1,000 maunds was given before August 15. This contention is based on what is described as a concession order. When a purchaser buys unserviceable goods from the Railway it is the practice to allow him concession rates for their carriage on the Railway and there is exhibited (exhibit 184) an order authorising the issue of four wagons for the carriage of unserviceable sleepers from Adra to Digba Ghat for the benefit of Shewdewan Singh. Mr. Bell in evidence said that the minimum number of wagons required were to be given to a purchaser who had been granted concession rates and that the number or quantity of materials were checked before orders for concession rates were passed. He admits having signed the concession order. There is no very clear evidence as to the capacity of any particular wagon or what wagons were used. But it has been clearly proved that the four wagons issued in pursuance of this order held 1,945 maunds. It is also known that the weight of 700 unserviceable sleepers would almost certainly not exceed half that amount. It was, therefore, argued by counsel on behalf of Satyanarayana that Mr. Bell would not have issued a concession order for four wagons to carry only 7:00 unserviceable sleepers for which two wagons would be enough and that it must, therefore, be assumed that on the date of that order Mr. Bell was aware of the second order for 1,000 maunds. If there were any clear evidence that before signing the concession order Mr. Bell, was actually in the habit of calling for the orders for supply, that argument would be a very cogent one, but there is no note on either the concession order or the orders for supply which shows that they were connected directly and Mr. Bell's evidence does not show that the checking done before the concession order was issued meant a check by him against documents. It may well be that Mr. Bell did nothing more than ask the clerk who brought him the concession order to sign—who would be Ratnam or Satyanarayana—whether he had checked it and whether it was all right and that thereupon signed it unless he had reason to feel suspicious. That is in fact what is likely to happen judging from the impression of the railway procedure that one gathers from, the evidence in this case. I am not, therefore, prepared to hold that the concession order is evidence that the order for the supply of 1,000 maunds was in existence before the 15th of August. In my judgment, therefore, it has been proved that the note on exhibit 10 is a forgery and there is, therefore, corroboration of Simpson's evidence as to the forgery of exhibit 11 and the conviction of Satyanarayana on this charge must be upheld.

    The second charge relates to the substitution of the new for the old August return. Simpson's evidence on the subject, I think, is not seriously shaken and it shows that it was Satyanarayana who carried out the substitution which was undoubtedly done by somebody. As to that the facts speak for themselves, but the serious question is the date. The charge lays the act as having been done between the 20th and the 30th of September. The documents were not signed by Woodhouse till the 26th and Satyanarayana did not return from, Dinapur till the 28th and he was on leave on that date. The substitution also cannot have been done after the 1st of October because on the 1st of October Simpson went to Mr. Bell and expressed his intention to confess and his written confession was written that night. The question, therefore, is whether it was done on the 29th or 30th or on the 1st. Simpson's evidence as to dates is extremely vague. He does say, however, that his first discussion with Satyanarayana on the subject, when something was done by Satyanarayana, was on the 29th. Simpson himself gave evidence before the departmental enquiry on the 30th. There is nothing in his evidence to suggest that after he had given evidence for the first time he spoke to anyone of the conspirators about the matter; in fact it strongly implies the contrary. I, therefore, conclude that Sampson's evidence does establish that the substitution took place on or before the 30th of September. There is some corroboration of Simpson's evidence in Satyanarayana's evidence before the departmental enquiry……………

    I would add that there is further corroboration that Satyanarayana was implicated in the conspiracy in his report (exhibit 39), made on the 20th of September…………………

    I, therefore, conclude that the second charge against Satyanarayana is also proved, but for the reasons already stated I would alter the conviction to one under section 477A read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code.

    The charge against Woodhouse is under section 477A in respect of the substituted August returns. Simpson's evidence on the subject is quite clear and prima facie Woodhouse is clearly guilty as his signature admittedly appears on both sets of returns. His explanation is that he intended the second return to be supplemental and not substitutionary and that he acted innocently. That explanation cannot for one moment be accepted. In the first place Simpson says that he was present and directed the loading of the sleepers and that is corroborated by the production of the muster rolls of the gangs which did the loading. Those muster rolls were signed at the end of the month by Woodhouse and no importance attaches to that signature which is merely a check of the rolls. But each day's work is initialed by the subordinate in charge and some days' work is also initialled by Woodhouse and it is in evidence by P.W.I Chandil that the purpose of those initials was to indicate the P.W.I's personal presence on the job. In fact it was submitted on behalf of Woodhouse that he was not present in, the yard at the time of the loading because he had initialled the rolls of gangs working 8 miles away on a section of the line under his personal control, but there is no reason why he should not have inspected more than one gang in different places on the same day and in fact the purpose of his initials on those rolls is to form a record of his own movements. It was then suggested that owing to pressure of work in the monsoon season he had put his initials without being present to create the impression that he was doing more work than in fact he was. I cannot accept that explanation and the presence of his initials on the muster rolls in those gangs is corroboration of Simpson's account that he was present at the loading. The evidence of the muster rolls is corroborated by the evidence of two of the gangers who said that Woodhouse was present. One of them was examined by the police at the time of the investigation and did not make any statement to this effect then but the other was not. In spite of the lower appellate Court's observation as to the unreliable character of witnesses of this type I see no reason why the two gangers should depose against their old chief or who would have endeavoured to corrupt them. This prosecution was being conducted by the Railway Company who were throughout advised by responsible legal advisers and they have no interest except to get the truth and discover who were the guilty parties. That is not, however, all as before the departmental enquiry he filed a written statement, in which he explained that he was asked to sign a supplemental return. This request was made after he had heard that suggestions were being made that sleepers had been improperly sold from the Adra yard and it is inconceivable that he would then have signed a supplemental return which was in itself untrue. Apart from the fact that there had never been an issue of 1,200 sleepers weighing 1,800 maunds to Ramlakhan, as he could have ascertained by check of the stocks and returns, the return made two other alterations:

    I, therefore, think that Woodhouse was rightly convicted.

    Ramlakhan is charged under section 411 of the Indian Penal Code, that is, of receiving or retaining stolen property knowing or having reason to believe it to be stolen. Although the facts were contested in the trial Court, it was not disputed before us that Ramlakhan was the man who went to Adra to purchase sleepers from the B.N Railway, that the sleepers he purchased were in fact stolen by the employees of the Railway and that they or a substantial number of them were subsequently found in the possession of Ramlakhan. There is abundant evidence to establish these three facts which is not open to any sort of suspicion. The question, however, is whether there is evidence that Ramlakhan knew or had reason to believe that the sleepers were stolen. This is not in my opinion a case in which it would be proper to rely on the presumption of knowledge which a Court is authorised to make under certain circumstances under section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act.

    The submission made by counsel for Ramlakhan was that being dissatisfied with the quality of sleepers supplied to him by Bhaga and Chandil, when he came to Adra he did take steps to persuade the officials there to let him have rather better stuff but he knew nothing about the railway rules or the classes of sleepers and that all he thought was that he was getting slightly better unserviceable sleepers than he otherwise would have had.

    This submission is completely disposed of by Simpson's evidence, if that evidence be accepted. With regard to the case against Satyanarayana and Woodhouse and generally I have shown that there is considerable corroboration of Simpson's evidence and there is no reason whatever why Simpson should depose falsely against Ramlakhan.

    It would, however, be more satisfactory if there were some corroboration of Simpson's evidence on this point and I think there is.

    In my judgment, therefore, the guilty knowledge of Ramlakhan is clearly established as also his complicity in the affair. I, therefore, hold that the conviction against him was properly recorded.

    There remains the question of sentence. I cannot see any reason to distinguish between the three accused. The lower appellate Court thought that Satyanarayana was the ringleader but I am not satisfied as to that. As I have already said, this conspiracy definitely required the co-operation of three people—a man in the timber trade to buy the sleepers and to provide money to the other conspirators, a man on the executive side to see about the supply of sleepers and a man on the accounts side to cook the books. I cannot see that any one member of the conspiracy carries with him less responsibility than any of the others. Of the three people involved and now before the Court, Satyanarayana was possibly in the lowest position but he was the confidential and trusted clerk of his D.E and his assistants. Woodhouse was an executive officer who had long been in the employ of the Railway Company and was in charge of substantial quantities of stores on their behalf. Ramlakhan was a timber merchant in a considerable way of business posing as a respectable citizen of Dinapur. It was urged before us on behalf of Woodhouse that he had lost his pension and other benefits through his crime. It was urged on behalf of Ramlakhan that his speculation in. B.N Railway sleepers had proved unprofitable; on this point I am not prepared to express any opinion one way or the other, and also that he had been put to great trouble and expense by these protracted proceedings. I do not, however, think those pleas ought to be allowed to avail of the accused. The sum involved in this case may not have been very large but this was an elaborate conspiracy for the purpose of defrauding a corporation carrying on an important public utility undertaking and in my view a deterrent sentence in a case of this kind is called for. I consider that a sentence of imprisonment is required, in the public interest in the case of each of the accused and I think the minimum period that would meet the ends of justice would be three years' rigorous imprisonment. In the circumstances, however, I consider that an additional sentence of fine is unnecessary and I would, therefore, remit the sentences of fine imposed by the trial Court.

    In the result, therefore, the conviction of Satyanarayana under section 465 of the Indian Penal Code is upheld as is his conviction under section 477A but it will be recorded as being read with section 34 and not section 109 of the Indian Penal Code. The conviction of Woodhouse under section 477A will be upheld but will be recorded as being read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and the conviction of Ramlakhan under section 411 of the Indian Penal Code will be upheld. All these accused will be sentenced under the respective sections of which they are convicted (the sentences on Satyanarayana under the two sections being ordered to run concurrently) to three years' rigorous imprisonment. The sentences of fine will be remitted and the fines if paid are ordered to be repaid.

    Agarwala, J.:— I agree.

    Order accordingly.
    K.D

    section 34 of the Indian Penal Code
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    Satyanarayana v. King-Emperor
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