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  • Article 182, cl. (5), of the Limitation Act,
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  • Article 182, cl. (5), of the Limitation Act,
Smart Summary

Summary of the Court Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal challenges the order of the District Judge, Salem, which set aside the order of the District Munsif, Dharmapuri. The District Munsif had held that Execution Application No. R.E.P. 642 of 1952 in O.S. No. 43 of 1945 was in time and not barred by the law of limitation. The procedural chronology relevant to the competency of an earlier appeal is as follows (dates taken from the opinion):

  • Order of the District Munsif passed on 20 March 1953 (the opinion describes this as the order against which an appeal by the judgment-debtors was preferred).
  • Application for certified copy of the decree made on 30 March 1953 — not proceeded with and struck off.
  • Another application for certified copy filed on 22 April 1953 — also struck off.
  • A third application for certified copy filed on 14 May 1953 — action taken and copies supplied.
  • Appeal presented on 12 June 1953 — the opinion finds this to be out of time (24 days after the period for appeal had expired, according to the court's calculation).

The office and the District Judge who heard the first appeal did not notice that the appeal was out of time, and that appeal was heard and disposed of. The present (second) appeal (a C.M.S. Appeal) was then preferred against the District Judge's decision setting aside the District Munsif's order.

The opinion also discusses earlier execution proceedings: an order dated 20 April 1948 in E.P. No. 318 of 1947 dismissing an execution application (with an endorsement that "delivery was not effected as the petitioner was absent"), a suit by the obstructor O.S. No. 104 of 1948 (filed 13 March 1948 under Order XXI, Rule 103 CPC to set aside an earlier order dated 26 January 1948), the dismissal of that suit on 24 November 1948, and an appeal A.S. No. 282 of 1950 which was dismissed on 25 June 1951.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the appeal preferred by the judgment-debtors against the District Munsif's order was competent or time-barred (i.e., whether the appeal filed on 12 June 1953 was barred by limitation).
  2. Whether the time taken in proceedings instituted by the obstructor (the claim proceedings, the suit O.S. No. 104 of 1948, and the subsequent appeal) should be treated as part of the execution proceedings and thus be available to the decree-holder for purposes of limitation.
  3. Whether the Full Bench decision in Sivaramachari v. Bayya Anjaneya Chetty (AIR 1951 Mad 962) applies to the present case, specifically in relation to the applicable clause(s) of Article 182 of the Limitation Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appeal preferred by the judgment-debtors against the District Munsif was not competent because it was filed after the time for appeal had expired (the appeal was presented on 12 June 1953 after certified copies were supplied on 14 May 1953, and thus was prima facie out of time).
  • Implicit in the appellant's conduct (and criticized by the court) is that the appellant failed to press the point that the first appeal was time-barred before the District Judge.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The respondent's counsel argued that setting aside the subsequent proceedings and dismissing the appeals would place the respondent in a prejudicial position, and suggested remanding the matter to the lower appellate court to investigate the competency of the appeal and give a finding; he could not fully explain the specific legal reliefs this would afford.
  • The respondent's counsel contended that the order dated 20 April 1948 was a final order and that the bar of limitation should apply if no further application for execution were filed within three years thereafter.
  • The respondent's counsel also suggested that the court could not be said to have been aware of the suit O.S. No. 104 of 1948 being on its file when the District Munsif passed the order.
  • Mr. Krishna Rao (appearing for the respondent) took the court through relevant portions of the Full Bench judgment in Sivaramachari v. Bayya Anjaneya Chetty, arguing for its applicability.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Krishnappa Chetti v. Abdul Khader Saheb, ILR 38 Mad 535; AIR 1915 Mad 495 Authority supporting that time taken by claim proceedings, a subsequent suit and an appeal should be treated as a continuation of execution proceedings and thus can be counted for the decree-holder's benefit for limitation purposes. The court relied on this authority as part of a line of decisions establishing that such proceedings keep the execution in suspense and the time so consumed is available to the decree-holder. It supported the conclusion that the application filed on 7 July 1952 was within time.
Venugopal Mudali v. Venkatasubbiah Chetti, ILR 39 Mad 1196; AIR 1916 Mad 883 Same principle: proceedings arising out of execution (claim, suit, appeal) are to be treated as continuation of execution proceedings for limitation. Used alongside other authorities to justify treating the obstructor's suit and appeal as part of the execution timeline, benefiting the decree-holder.
Ewaz Ali v. Mt. Firdous Jehan, ILR 19 Luck 565; AIR 1944 Oudh 212 Support for the proposition that claim proceedings, a suit and an appeal connected to execution should be treated as review/continuation of execution, keeping execution proceedings in suspense. Relied upon by the court to conclude that the time up to final disposal of the obstructor's appeal (25 June 1951) could be reckoned for the decree-holder; thus an application filed within one year after that final termination was not barred.
Sivaramachari v. Bayya Anjaneya Chetty, AIR 1951 Mad 962 (Full Bench) Full Bench decision concerning application of Article 182, clauses (1) to (4) of the Limitation Act. The court held this Full Bench decision not applicable to the present case because the present application falls under Article 182, clause (5), which the Full Bench did not consider. The District Judge's application of the Full Bench decision was therefore incorrect.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in several steps:

  1. Competency of the first appeal: On examining the record dates, the court concluded that the appeal presented on 12 June 1953 was out of time. The District Munsif's order was passed on 20 March 1953; the first two applications for certified copies (30 March and 22 April 1953) were struck off; certified copies were only supplied after a successful application filed on 14 May 1953; yet the appeal was presented on 12 June 1953, which made it late. The court noted that neither the office nor the District Judge who heard that appeal noticed the apparent delay.
  2. Procedural consequence of an incompetent appeal: If the first appeal was incompetent, the second appeal would also be incompetent and both ought to be dismissed, returning parties to the position as of 20 March 1953 (when the District Munsif passed the order). The court considered, but ultimately rejected, a remand to the lower appellate court suggested by the respondent's counsel as possibly affording some unclear legal relief to the respondent.
  3. Merits and limitation analysis: The court examined the order dated 20 April 1948 in E.P. No. 318 of 1947 (an order dismissing the execution application, with an endorsement that delivery was not effected). The court observed that before that dismissal an obstructor's suit, O.S. No. 104 of 1948, had been instituted (filed 13 March 1948) under Order XXI, Rule 103 CPC to set aside an earlier order. That suit was dismissed on 24 November 1948, and an appeal (A.S. No. 282 of 1950) was finally dismissed on 25 June 1951.
  4. Legal principle on accrual of time: Relying on a series of precedents, the court held that time consumed by proceedings instituted by the obstructor (the claim, suit and appeal) should be treated as part of the execution proceedings — effectively a suspension of execution — and therefore the period consumed counts for the benefit of the decree-holder. The court described those proceedings as, in substance, a continuation or review of the execution proceedings.
  5. Application of principle to the present facts: Given that the obstructor’s appeal was disposed of on 25 June 1951, the court treated that date as the final termination of those proceedings. The application filed on 7 July 1952 fell within one year after that final termination and therefore was within time and not barred by limitation (the court places the present application within the scope of Article 182, clause (5) of the Limitation Act).
  6. On precedential authority (Full Bench decision): The court considered the Full Bench decision in Sivaramachari and concluded it does not apply to the present facts because that decision dealt with Article 182 clauses (1)–(4), whereas the present case falls under Article 182 clause (5). The court found the District Judge erred in applying the Full Bench decision.
  7. Disposition on costs and conduct: Although the court upheld the District Munsif’s order on the merits, it observed that the appellant was responsible for allowing the District Judge to consider an appeal that was prima facie incompetent. Because the appellant failed to press the time-bar point earlier, causing waste of judicial time, the court held that it would not be justified in awarding costs to the appellant and deprived the appellant of costs.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court upheld the order of the learned District Munsif (that the execution petition was in time) and set aside the appellate order of the District Judge. The execution petition (R.E.P. 642 of 1952 in O.S. No. 43 of 1945) was held not to be barred by limitation and was to be proceeded with according to law. The appellant was deprived of costs. The court noted "No leave."

Implications:

  • The immediate legal consequence is that the execution petition is permitted to proceed; the appellate order that had set aside the District Munsif's order is vacated.
  • The court applied the principle that time taken by the obstructor's claim proceedings, related suit, and appeal is to be treated as part of the execution proceedings for limitation purposes — thereby benefiting the decree-holder in this case.
  • The court expressly declined to apply the Full Bench decision in Sivaramachari to the facts of this case because of the difference in the clause of Article 182 relied upon; this narrows the Full Bench decision's application insofar as it concerns Articles 182(1)–(4) rather than Article 182(5).
  • The opinion does not purport to create any broader binding precedent beyond applying established authorities that treat related suits and appeals as a continuation of execution proceedings; no new legal principle beyond the application of those authorities is announced.

Order accordingly.

Signed: H.G.P.

    Chennammal v. Chennappa Goundar And Others

    1. This appeal is against the order of the learned District Judge, Salem, setting aside the order of the District Munsif, Dharmapuri, holding that the execution application No. R.E.P 642 of 1952 in O.S No. 43 of 1945 was in time, and not barred by the law of limitation. Two points arise for consideration in this appeal. The first is that from a perusal of the records it is found that the appeal preferred by the judgment-debtors against the order of the learned District Munsif was not competent in that it was filed 24 days after the time for the appeal had expired. The order of the learned District Munsif was passed on the 20th March, 1953. An application for certified copy of the decree was made on the 30th March, 1953. But this application was not proceeded with, and it was dismissed and struck off. Another application was filed on the 22nd April, 1953, for the certified copy of the judgment and decree. Even this application was not proceeded with, and it was also struck off. A third application was filed on the 14th May, 1953, for a certified copy of the decree and judgment, and on this application action was taken and copies were duly supplied. It is after obtaining copies under this application dated 14th May, 1953, that the appeal itself was presented as late as 12th June, 1953. When these dates are kept in view, obviously the appeal preferred on the 12th June, 1953, was out of time. It is curious that neither the office nor the District Judge who dealt with the first appeal, ever noticed that the appeal was out of time. The appeal was, however, heard and disposed of, against which the present appellant has since preferred this C.M.S Appeal.

    2. If the appeal against which this second appeal has been preferred was thus incompetent, the second appeal also becomes incompetent, and both deserve to be dismissed, as not being of any legal validity. If the appeal before the learned District Judge and also the second appeal before this Court are dismissed, then the parties have to be relegated to the position in which they stood as on the 20th of March 1953, when the learned District Munsif passed the order holding that the execution petition in question was in time. I wanted to adopt this course, but the learned counsel for the respondent argues that the adoption of this course will place him in a very prejudicial position, and his suggestion is that the matter should be remanded to the lower appellate Court for investigating into the question of the competency of the appeal, and then give a finding. The learned counsel thinks that such a procedure would give him certain legal reliefs or remedies which he is not able to explain to me or convince me about.

    3. However that be, even on the merits I do not think that any relief could be given to the respondent in this appeal. The last order was passed on the 20th April, 1948, in E.P No. 318 of 1947. The order in that execution petition was to the effect that it was dismissed, but above the record showing this order, there is an endorsement. It is not known by whom the endorsement has been made, because it is in a different ink and in different handwriting from that in which the relevant order appears on the docket sheet. This is to the effect that ‘delivery was not effected as the petitioner was absent’. In all probability, this endorsement is the result of the return by the bailiff who had been issued the warrant (for delivery of the property) for execution. It will not be wrong to assume that on the basis of this return of the bailiff, endorsed by some person or other on the docket, the learned District Munsif dismissed the application. But what is material is only the order dismissing the application.

    4. It is sought to be construed by the learned counsel for the respondent that this order is a final order, and therefore, the bar of limitation should apply to it if any further application for execution is not filed within a period of three years thereafter. I cannot agree with the learned counsel for the respondent.

    5. Before this dismissal order was passed on the 20th April, 1948, the records disclosed that there was a suit instituted by the obstructor, even as early as the 13th of March 1948. That suit was O.S No. 104 of 1948. It was a suit under O. XXI, R. 103 of the CPC, to set aside the order made earlier by the District Munsif in the very same E.P No. 318 of 1947, on the 26th of January 1948. This suit by the obstructor was however dismissed on the 24th November, 1948. When the order was passed on the 20th April, 1948, it must be presumed that the learned District Munsif was aware that the obstructor had filed a suit, O.S No. 104 of 1948, in the same Court, and it will not be wrong to assume that one of the reasons that should have prevailed in the mind of the learned District Munsif to dismiss the E.P No. 318 of 1947 on the 20th April, 1948, was that it was futile to continue the E.P any further in view of the suit having been filed. The learned counsel for respondent would say that the Court cannot be said to have been in the know of the fact that there was a suit O.S No. 104 of 1948, filed in that very Court by the obstructor. I do not think that such a contention could be raised, much less accepted. It must, on the other hand, be presumed that the Court had full knowledge of the proceedings which were pending on its own file when it was passing the order in the application for execution. So there is nothing improper or strange in believing that the learned District Munsif, when he passed the order on the 20th April, 1948, in E.P No. 318 of 1947, was also influenced by the fact of the filing of the suit which was then pending before it.

    6. Not merely is this the situation, but there is also the further fact which has to be taken into consideration, in arriving at a decision as to whether the order made on 20th April, 1948 is a final order, or an order which had the effect of keeping the execution proceedings pending. This leads us to the consideration of the proceedings that were initiated by the obstructor prior to the order and which continued until 25th June, 1951. The suit was dismissed as already stated on the 24th November, 1948, and an appeal was preferred namely, A.S No. 282 of 1950, and that was dismissed on the 25th of June 1951. The question is whether the time taken in the institution of the suit and the final disposal of the appeal could be availed of by the decree-holders, or whether that would operate against the decree-holders. In my view, for an application to execute the decree, the time that lapsed in the proceedings by the obstructor in the shape of a suit as also the appeal would be available to the decree-holder, for, as has been held in more than one decision, the suit and the appeal which has been filed by the obstructor should be construed and considered only as a continuation of the execution proceedings, the claim the suit, and the appeal having arisen all out of the same execution proceedings.

    7. Krishnappa Chetti v. Abdul Khader Saheb, ILR 38 Mad 535 : (AIR 1915 Mad 495 (2)) (A); Venugopal Mudali v. Venkatasubbiah Chetti, ILR 39 Mad 1196 : (AIR 1916 Mad 883) (B); and Ewaz Ali v. Mt. Firdous Jehan, ILR 19 Luck 565 : (AIR 1944 Oudh 212) (C) seem to be authorities in support of this contention that the time taken by way of claim proceedings, a subsequent suit and an appeal should all ensure to the benefit of the decree-holder who is seeking to execute his decree, in view of the fact that all these proceedings are nothing other than a continuation of the same proceedings, though, for the purpose of convenience they are termed as a suit and an appeal. Further, it has been tightly held that this is in the nature of a review of the previous order which arose in execution, and as long as further progress in the execution proceedings is held up, further proceedings must only be considered to have the effect of keeping in suspense the execution petition, so that the decree-holder might renew the execution after the proceedings are finally terminated. In this view, I think the application filed on 7th July, 1952, which was ordered by the learned District Munsif, and which was also the subject-matter of the appeal before the District Judge, being within 1 year after the final termination of the proceedings, namely, the 26th of June 1951, when the appeal in the suit was finally disposed of, should be considered quite in time, and as not barred by limitation.

    8. The question now raised is as to the applicability of the Full Bench decision in Sivaramachari v. Bayya Anjaneya Chetty, AIR 1951 Mad 962 (D), to this case. Mr. Krishna Rao, appealing on behalf of the respondent has been good enough to take me through the relevant portions of the judgment, and after a careful consideration of the judgments, I am of the opinion that this Full Bench decision does not apply to the facts of the present case. That decision concerns the application of Article 182, cls. (1) to (4). But so far as I can see, the present application falls within the scope of Article 182, cl. (5), of the Limitation Act, and this clause has not been the subject-matter of any consideration in the said Full Bench decision. That being the case, I think the learned District Judge was wrong in having applied the decision of the Full Bench to the facts of this case.

    9. On a consideration of the entire facts and the circumstances of this case, and also taking, if I may, the question of equities, I think the order passed by the learned Distract Munsif is the correct one, and that order will be upheld. The appellate order will be set aside, and since the execution petition is in time, it will be proceeded with, according to law. I think I shall not be justified in ordering costs to the appellant while allowing this second appeal, the reason being that he was responsible for allowing the learned District Judge to consider and give a decision on an appeal which had prima facie become incompetent. If he had pressed the point of the appeal having become time barred, the rime of the learned District Judge would have been saved, and even the time of this Court would have been saved. Therefore, it is but just and meet that the appellant should be deprived of his costs. (No leave.)

    H.G.P

    10. Order accordingly.

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    Comments

    Chennammal v. Chennappa Goundar And Others
    (Mar 27, 1956)