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  • s. 27, Evi. Act, 1872, controls ss. 24, 25
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  • s. 27, Evi. Act, 1872, controls ss. 24, 25
Smart Summary

Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion (as provided)

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion arises from a reference under s. 374, Criminal Procedure Code made by the learned Judicial Commissioner of Chota Nagpur seeking confirmation of a sentence of death imposed on Remis Christian, who was convicted under s. 302, Indian Penal Code, for the murder of his wife Leoni. The condemned man's appeal was heard together with the reference.

Material facts (as presented in the opinion):

  • On 13 April 1945 the dead body of a young woman was found on a village path between the jungles of Katkahi and Karaku in the Chainpur Police Station area. The head was almost severed and much blood was at the scene.
  • The prosecution alleged the body was that of the appellant's wife, Leoni. The couple had been seen together on 12 April 1945 near the area and the appellant was carrying a balua (axe-like implement).
  • The body was sent for post-mortem; the post-mortem record indicated the heart was empty and the doctor found no disease to explain sudden death (the doctor had earlier been examined before the committing Magistrate but was not examined at the Sessions trial).
  • The police, acting on inquiries, went to the appellant's village, took possession of one balua and a gamchha; later, after arresting the appellant, the Sub-Inspector and several witnesses accompanied him to the jungle where the appellant pointed out and produced from a ditch a second balua (Ex. 2). Chemical examination found human blood and hair on that balua.
  • The deceased's parents attended Gumla and identified the body as their daughter by appearance and clothing; they gave evidence at the trial.
  • The case at trial was circumstantial: last seen together, appellant carrying a balua, appellant produced (pointed out and uncovered) the balua later found bloodstained, and the appellant gave no satisfactory explanation or steps taken to trace his wife after she did not return.
  • The trial court convicted under s. 302 IPC and sentenced the appellant to death; this Court considered the reference and the appeal together and reviewed conviction and sentence.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the dead body found was proved to be that of Leoni, the appellant's wife.
  2. Whether the injuries and circumstances established that the woman was murdered (i.e., whether death was ante-mortem and the head injury was not post-mortem).
  3. Whether the appellant was proved to be the murderer on the circumstantial evidence presented.
  4. Whether statements of the appellant leading to the discovery of the weapon were admissible in evidence, specifically the interplay between s. 27 of the Evidence Act and ss. 24–26 (in particular s. 24) of the Evidence Act.
  5. Whether the death sentence was appropriate, or whether a lesser sentence should be substituted in light of mitigating circumstances.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant denied knowledge of or participation in the killing.
  • He alleged false implication at the instance of Silvanus Prachar and others because he had renounced Christianity; that is, he claimed a motive on the part of those witnesses to fabricate the charge.
  • It was suggested (through cross-examination evidence) that the appellant had been beaten by police prior to pointing out the weapon, and counsel (Mr. Rai Parasnath) argued that the appellant's statements about producing the axe were therefore not admissible under s. 27 of the Evidence Act (because ss. 24/25/26 may exclude such statements if made under compulsion or inducement).

Prosecution's Arguments

  • The prosecution relied on the circumstantial chain: appellant last seen with the deceased, appellant seen carrying a balua, the deceased's body later found mortally injured, the appellant produced a balua which was bloodstained and carried human hair, and the appellant gave no satisfactory explanation or attempt to locate his missing wife.
  • The prosecution maintained that the discovery of the second balua (the bloodstained weapon) was made in consequence of the appellant's statement and production and so was admissible under s. 27 of the Evidence Act.
  • The prosecution rejected alternate theories (post-mortem decapitation, robbery, human sacrifice) as inconsistent with the medical and local evidence (empty heart, large quantity of blood at scene, presence of earrings on the deceased).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Singampilli Yerranna, In re Distinction between a discovery made "in consequence of" information given by an accused and a discovery made by an accused merely accompanying an officer when the item is produced; if production is essentially contemporaneous accompaniment, s.27 may not apply. The Court applied the principle to hold that a second recorded statement (made after removing the balua) ought not to have been admitted under s.27 (the ruling applied to the second statement). However, the error was deemed immaterial because the first statement was considered admissible and sufficient.
Mathura v. Emperor Holds that s. 27 of the Evidence Act controls ss. 24 and 25 (as well as s. 26); i.e., s. 27 acts as a proviso to those sections, making certain discovery statements admissible notwithstanding the general exclusionary rules. The Court treated this authority (and related citations) as establishing that s.27 ought to be read as a proviso to s.24; it relied on this to conclude admissibility of the appellant's initial statement leading to the discovery.
Queen-Empress v. Babu Lal Full Bench decision holding that s.27 is a proviso not only to s.26 but also to s.25 (and, by implication, to s.24); supports broad reading of s.27 as limiting the exclusions in preceding sections. Cited as part of the chain of authority showing s.27 qualifies the operation of ss.24–26; used to support the view that s.27 applies despite claims of improper compulsion.
Emperor v. Misri Held s.27 is a qualifying section to the three immediately preceding sections (ss.24–26); emphasises that s.27 is not to be limited to s.26 alone. Relied upon to reinforce the conclusion that s.27 controls s.24 and hence that discovery statements can be admissible even where ss.24/25 would otherwise exclude confessions/statements made under certain pressures.
Amiruddin Ahmed v. Emperor Expressed the view that s.27 qualifies ss.24 and 25 as well as s.26; reasoned that the exception in s.27 was intended to apply to the three preceding general rules. Used to support the Court's reading that s.27 is applicable as a proviso to s.24 and thus governs admissibility of the discovery in this case.
Durlav Namasudra v. Emperor Rankin C.J. observed that s.27 is not a mere proviso to s.26 but cuts down the operation of ss.24 and 25 as well. Quoted as persuasive authority (from an esteemed Judge) reinforcing the Court's conclusion that s.27 curtails the exclusionary effect of s.24 and so validates admission of the discovery statement.
Pakala Narayana Swami v. Emperor (Privy Council) The Privy Council made observations suggesting s.27 appears to be intended as a proviso to s.26, but the Court here notes that the Privy Council was not really deciding the narrower point whether s.27 also qualified s.24/25, so it is not a direct authority on that question. The Court distinguished this authority on the ground that the Privy Council was not directly deciding the s.24–s.27 interaction; thus it did not displace the line of local decisions holding that s.27 qualifies ss.24–26.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

(Structured account of the court's step-by-step analysis, faithfully reflecting reasoning in the opinion.)

  1. Identification of the body:

    The Court accepted without doubt that the corpse was Leoni. Both parents (P.W.7 and P.W.8) gave positive identification by appearance and clothing; although the clothing itself was not produced in court or chemically examined, the Court found no reason to reject the parents' in-court identifications and observed that the wife had indeed disappeared after being seen with the appellant.

  2. Whether death was homicidal:

    The Court rejected theories that the neck injury was post-mortem. It relied on the post-mortem finding that the heart was empty and on the testimony that a large quantity of blood was present at the scene. The Court held these facts inconsistent with post-mortem decapitation. Alternative explanations (disease, sacrifice, robbery) were also rejected as unsupported or inconsistent with the evidence (for example, earrings were still on the deceased, making robbery unlikely).

  3. Assessment of defence accusations of fabrication and police ill-treatment:

    The defence suggested Silvanus and others fabricated the charge because of religious animus and alleged the police beat the accused. The Court examined cross-examination and other evidence and found no credible basis for the fabrication claim: (a) Silvanus had admitted the accused was beaten, which the Court considered inconsistent with a manufactured falsehood by him; (b) another witness (P.W.14) stated Remis still attended Christian worship, undermining the asserted motive; (c) the Magistrates' notes shortly after arrest recorded no complaint of ill-treatment and the accused made no complaint when produced for possible confession recording; the Court therefore concluded any beating was minimal, if it occurred at all.

  4. Admissibility of statements under s.27 Evidence Act (interaction with ss.24–26):

    The Court addressed a key legal point: whether the appellant's statements leading to production of the balua were admissible under s.27 even though the accused was alleged to have been beaten (which could invoke s.24). Citing a line of authorities (including Mathura v. Emperor, Queen-Empress v. Babu Lal, Emperor v. Misri, Amiruddin Ahmed, Durlav Namasudra), the Court concluded that s.27 must be read as a proviso not only to s.26 but also to ss.24 and 25 — i.e., s.27 controls and can render discovery statements admissible despite the general exclusionary rules in those sections. The Court distinguished the Privy Council's observation in Pakala Narayana Swami as not deciding the narrower question.

    Applying that principle to the facts, the Court found that the discovery of the second balua was made in consequence of the appellant's initial statement "I shall give you the balua with which the woman has been killed. Come with me" and his accompanying action pointing out and removing the balua. Therefore the first statement fell within s.27 and was admissible. The Court regarded the subsequent recorded statement (made after the balua was removed) as akin to the situation in Singampilli Yerranna and should not have been admitted under s.27, but this error was immaterial because the first admissible statement and other evidence sufficed.

  5. Evaluation of evidence that the appellant produced the weapon:

    The Court accepted the Sub-Inspector's evidence that the appellant had produced the second balua from the ditch. It disbelieved a prosecution-tendered witness (Kamil Minz, P.W.15) who later said he did not go to the spot, observing the witness had signed the production list and his signature matched his deposition; the Court regarded the contradictory statement as false. Independent witnesses Hazari Sahu (P.W.3) and Silvanus (P.W.5) corroborated that the accused brought out the balua and that it had blood marks and hairs. The chemical report was consistent (blood and human hair found on Ex.2).

  6. Overall circumstantial case:

    Considering: (a) identification of the deceased as the appellant's wife, (b) the appellant last seen with the deceased carrying a balua, (c) the appellant's production of the bloodstained balua, (d) his failure to take steps to trace the missing wife, and (e) lack of credible alternative explanation — the Court found the circumstantial evidence collectively established guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

  7. Sentencing analysis:

    Although conviction was affirmed, both Judges (Meredith, J. and Bennett, J.) analyzed mitigation. The appellant was young (about 21) and an aboriginal, and the Court recognized possible sudden rage or provocation and a "hiatus" in the case (no proven motive). For these reasons the Court concluded that the death sentence was not appropriate and that the ends of justice would be met by a lesser punishment.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court confirmed the appellant's conviction under s.302, I.P.C., but it refused to confirm the death sentence. The reference for confirmation of the death sentence was discharged, the appeal was dismissed, and the sentence was altered from death to transportation for life. (Both Meredith, J. and Bennett, J. concurred with this result.)

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: the appellant Remis Christian remains convicted of murder but the capital sentence was substituted with a sentence of transportation for life.
  • On admissibility law: the Court followed and applied a line of authorities holding that s.27 of the Evidence Act ought to be read as a proviso to ss.24–26, and therefore a discovery made in consequence of a statement by an accused can be admissible even where there are allegations of pressure or inducement that might otherwise invoke s.24. The Court applied this principle to admit the appellant's initial statement leading to the recovery of the weapon, while excluding a subsequent, ancillary statement as unnecessary and inadmissible under the Singampilli analysis.
  • No new broad precedent purporting to overturn existing authorities was announced; the opinion explains and applies existing authorities and treats the view that s.27 controls s.24 as "settled" by the cited line of cases (subject to any future Privy Council decision to the contrary).

End of summary. This summary is strictly confined to the information and reasoning contained in the provided opinion and does not add facts or inferences beyond that text.

    Emperor Prosecutor v. Remis Christian Opposite Party.

    Meredith, J.:— This is a reference under s. 374, Criminal P.C, made by the learned Judicial Commissioner of Chota Nagpur for confirmation of the sentence of death passed upon Remis Christian whom he has convicted under s. 302, I.P.C, for the murder of his wife Leoni. There is also an appeal by the condemned man which has been heard together with the reference.

    2. On April 13, 1945, the dead body of a young woman was found by some villagers lying on a village path running between the jungles of Katkahi and Karaku villages within the Chainpur Police Station of the Gumla sub-division of Ranchi. The head of the woman had been almost severed from the body by some sharp weapon, and was connected only by a piece of skin. There was much blood upon the ground at the spot. It is the prosecution case that the body was that of the appellant's wife. The appellant is a resident of village Hesag, which is situated about four miles to the northwest of the spot where the body was found. The woman came from village Tilwari, which is situated about six miles to the east of that spot, and the path was the path which would be taken by a person going from one village to the other. According to the prosecution, Leoni had given birth to an infant a few months before the occurrence. The infant died and the woman became unwell, and she, therefore, went to the house of her parents at Tilwari. On April 12, the appellant went to fetch her, and he started back in the afternoon of that day to take her to his home. Evidence has been led to show that they went off together and were seen together not more than a mile from the place of occurrence. When within the jungle the appellant, for some reason which the prosecution has not attempted to establish, killed his wife with a balua (Ex. 2), which he was carrying with him. Afterwards he hit the axe in a ditch under some leaves, and went on home, where he said nothing to any one. On the evening of 13th, the dead body was discovered by the villagers. The chaukidar (P.W No. 1) was informed, and after inspecting the body for himself he went to the Police Station, and lodged information at 3 P.M on 14th. The Sub-Inspector (P.W No. 16) reached the spot at 5 P.M the same day. He made inquiries, and as a result of certain information received, he suspected that the appellant might be concerned in the murder. He, therefore, visited Hesag, and searched his house. That was on 15th. He took possession of a balua and a gamchha (wrapper) which he found there. This wrapper was subsequently sent for chemical examination, but no blood was found thereon. The balua was not sent as the Sub-Inspector saw no traces of blood. After this, the Sub-Inspector arrested Remis, and Remis, according to the prosecution, then stated to him that he would produce the balua with which the woman had been killed. He then went with the Sub-Inspector to the jungle, and in the presence of several witnesses taken by the Sub-Inspector, he showed a spot 120 yards from where the dead body had been found, and he took out from under dead leaves in a ditch another balua (Ex. 2). This was subsequently sent for chemical examination, and human blood, besides some human hair, was found thereon. On the night of 14th, the Sub-Inspector had sent the dead body to Gumla for post mortem examination. On 15th he met the parents of Leoni, who told him that they suspected that the woman might be their daughter. He, therefore, sent them off to Gumla, where they arrived on 16th morning before the post mortem had begun, and they identified the woman as their daughter both by her appearance and her clothing. They have given evidence to that effect at the trial.

    3. It will be seen that the case against the appellant is purely circumstantial, and rests on the evidence that he was the last person seen with the deceased during her life, was seen going with her and carrying a balua near the spot, that he never did anything to take any steps to trace his wife who certainly did not reach home with him, and finally that he confessed that he could point out where the weapon was with which the woman had been killed, and subsequently did point out that weapon.

    4. The appellant's defence was that he knew nothing about the matter. He had been falsely implicated at the instance of Silvanus Prachar (P.W No. 5), because he had resiled from the Christian faith. There is a Christian mission at village Chechali not far from where the dead body was found, and to this Silvanus was attached. Beyond this the appellant put forward no positive case. He did not definitely assert that his wife was alive, or that the dead body could not be hers. What he did say when questioned by the learned Judge was:

    “I did not kill. Having renounced Christianity I became separate. Hence Silvanus and others implicated me in the case. They brought balua and kept it. They did not give it to me.”

    5. I suspect that the last sentence is a mistake for “I did not give it to them,” as otherwise it appears meaningless.

    6. The first question for examination is whether it was established beyond doubt that the dead body was that of Leoni, wife of the appellant. In my opinion, there can be no doubt upon that point. Both the parents in evidence definitely stated that they recognized the body. The father is Pinas Uraon (P.W No. 7), and he says he identified his daughter. The cloth was about the same, the manner of wearing was also the same when he saw the corpse as when the girl left. His wife is P.W No. 8 and she says:

    “We saw the corpse and identified it as that of the daughter. She was dressed just as she left. She were a jhula, a chadar and Sari.”

    7. Unfortunately, the clothing found upon the body has not been preserved, nor was it sent for chemical examination to ascertain whether it was blood-stained. Despite the fact, however, that the clothing was not produced for identification by the witnesses in Court, I consider there can be no reason at all for not accepting the evidence of the parents. Certainly, the appellant's wife seems to have disappeared, and there is ample evidence that she had been near the spot where the body was found, not long before the finding of the body. I consider there is no doubt upon the point of identification.

    8. The next question is whether the woman was murdered. A suggestion has been made that the injury to the neck might have been post mortem. This is based upon a statement of the doctor who was examined before the committing Magistrate but unfortunately was not examined before the Sessions Court, to the effect that owing to decomposition, he could not be sure of the cause of death, and whether the injury on the neck was ante-mortem or post mortem injury can be confidently rejected. The post mortem report discloses that the heart was empty. The evidence of the Suh-Inspector and other witnesses is that there was a large quantity of blood upon the ground at the spot. Both these circumstances are quite inconsistent with the theory of post mortem injury. It does not need a medical expert to say that if the woman had died before her head was cut off, the heart would not have emptied itself. Moreover, the doctor did say that no other injury was found upon the person nor did he find any indication of any disease. It is true that the girl's mother said she was suffering from a swelling of the body and limbs, but that is not a thing likely to have caused sudden death. Apart from that, the whole theory is fantastic to my mind. Had the girl died from some other cause, there could have been no possible reason why any one would have wanted to cut her head off, and leave the body lying where it was found. It has been suggested that it might be a case of human sacrifice, a thing which, though it is very rare, does sometimes still occur in the aboriginal tracts of Chota Nagpur. There is, however, nothing to support this theory, and it is inconsistent with the theory that the injuries ware post mortem, because sacrifice would not be made by cutting off the head of a dead body. In my opinion, despite the failure to examine the doctor at the trial, there can be no doubt that the woman was murdered.

    9. The remaining question is whether it has been established that it was the appellant who murdered her. The theory that some one might have murdered the woman for the sake of robbery must be rejected, because the evidence is that silver ear-rings were found in the ears; nor is the woman likely to have had much in her possession worth stealing. I consider that the theory of murder for the sake of robbery must certainly be rejected.

    10. Before I proceed to deal with the evidence, I should like to say a word about the appellant's defence. It seems to be quite without substance. There is nothing in the evidence of Silvanus Prachar to suggest that he has any animus against Remis. On the contrary, this witness stated in cross-examination:

    “It is a fact that when he was arrested Remis was beaten….. The Sub-Inspector Saklu Bhagat and Juel Christian beat the accused. Even a lathi was used.”

    11. If Silvanus had been instrumental in getting a false charge brought against Remis on concocted evidence he would have been the last person to make a statement like this. On the other hand, there is no evidence on the record to suggest that Remis has ceased to be a Christian. On the contrary, the only witness questioned on the point, Dasain Uraon (P.W No. 14) said in cross-examination:

    “It is not a fact that Remis has given up Christianity, and does not attend our church. He does.”

    12. A point of law has been raised by Mr. Rai Parasnath, who has argued the appellant's case with great ability. He has urged that the statements of the appellant with regard to the production of the axe were not admissible under s. 27, Evi. Act. These statements were actually taken from the Sub-Inspector in the following form. He said:

    “I recovered from his house a gamchha and a balua. He said ‘I shall give you the balua with which the woman has been killed. Come with me’. He took us—myself, Silvanus Prachar, Hazari Sahu, Jamandar Singh of Kattibi, Dasain Mahto—to the jungle near the place where the corpse was found. He removed from a ditch, after removing the leaves, a balua. This is the balua with which the woman has been killed,” he said, “I found blood marks on the balua and some hairs sticking near the sharp edge”.

    13. Mr. Parasnath has cited, Singampilli Yerranna, In re (1), in which it was observed:

    “Under s. 27 cases where a discovery is made in consequence of information given and a disclosure by an accused accompanying a statement must be distinguished. Where an accused makes a statement to a Police Officer describing the murder and the part played by the other accused and almost simultaneously produces earrings identified as those worn by the deceased, the discovery of the ear-rings cannot be said to have been made in consequence of the information given by the accused, and therefore, the statement is inadmissible in evidence under s. 27.”

    14. The proposition of law here laid down is, if I may say so, quite obviously correct. The statement is only admissible under s. 27, if it can be shown that the discovery had been made in consequence of that statement. The ruling applies to the second statement which has been recorded as having been made after removing the balua from under the leaves. Quite clearly, for the reasons given, that statement ought not to have been admitted. The error, however, is immaterial if the first statement is admissible, because the second statement does not add anything to the first. The important question, therefore, is whether the first statement: “I shall give you the balua with which the woman has been killed. Come with me” was rightly admitted. Here the point that arises is whether by reason of the statement of Silvanus that the appellant was beaten this statement must be excluded under s. 21, Evi. Act; whether is fact, s. 27, is subject to s. 24, or, on the contrary, s. 24 is subject to s. 27.

    15. In the first place, I should say that there cannot have been any severe beating of the man, and I am inclined to think that Silvanus was trying to help him. The reason is that Remis was produced before the Magistrate on April 17, only two days after the Sub-Inspector had arrested him. The Magistrate has recorded in his order-sheet “The accused does not complain of any ill-treatment at the hands of the police”. On the following day, the 18th, the accused was produced before another Magistrate with a view to having his confession recorded. He did not confess, but there also he made no complaint of any ill-treatment. Certainly, on the 18th, he could not be under police influence. He was not prepared to do what it is alleged the police had been trying to make him do. Therefore, if he had really had any complaint on the score of ill-treatment, he would, I think, certainly have made it. If he had really received any severe beating, there must have been bruises on his body which he could and no doubt would have shown to the Magistrate. I am of opinion in such circumstances that if there was any beating, it must have been very little. We will assume, however, that there was some sort of compulsion which would bring in the operation of s. 24. It seems to be well-settled that s. 27 is to be regarded as a proviso not only to s. 26 but also to ss. 24 and 25. There has been recently a direct decision of a Bench of this Court upon this very point. I refer to Mathura v. Emperor (2). In this case, Manohar Lall and Das, JJ. held that s. 27, Evi. Act, 1872, controls ss. 24, 25 and 26 thereof. If, therefore, a confession comes within the purview of s. 27, it is admissible in evidence even if it is hit by s. 24 of the Act. Ordinarily, this decision would be binding upon us, but to some extent it must be regarded as obiter, since the confession in question was held inadmissible upon a different ground. Reference has, however, been made in that decision to a number of previous cases in which the same view has been taken. These include two Full Bench decisions of the Allahabad High Court and two Calcutta decisions. In Queen-Empress v. Babu Lal (3) the Full Bench, Mahmood, J. dissenting, held that s. 27, Evi. Act, is a proviso not only to s. 26 but also to s. 25. Oldfield, J. in the course of his judgment, said:

    “Had the proviso been intended to be a proviso to s. 26 only, it would not have been put in the form of a separate section, but as part of s. 26.”

    16. The other Allahabad case is Emperor v. Misri (4). That was a case bearing directly upon s. 24, as it was found as a fact that the police officer had made a promise to the accused prior to her pointing out the ornaments to the effect that if she produced the ornaments she would be let off. The learned Judges said:

    “Learned Counsel who appeared for the accused wished us to limit the force of s. 27 and to read it as qualifying only s. 26 and not ss. 24 and 29. We see no ground for such limitation, and we hold that section is a qualifying section to the three sections which immediately precede it.”

    17. In Amiruddin Ahmed v. Emperor (5) a similar observation was made. The learned Judge who delivered the judgment said:

    “If (sic, however,) the question does arise, in that case I am of opinion that s. 27 qualifies not only ss. 26 and 25, but also s. 24. All three stations lay down general rules excluding confessions……………………. In s. 27 follows an exception. The reason for making or providing this exception applies alike to each of the three preceding general rales. If the exception had been intended to apply only to s. 26 or only to ss. 26 and 25 we should have expected to find this intention expressly stated or to find the exception embodied in those two sections or in s. 23 alone.”

    18. In Durlav Namasudra v. Emperor (6), Rankin, C.J as he then was, a Judge to whose opinion the greatest weight must be attached, said:

    “As my learned brother has printed out, it has been decided by the highest authority that s. 27 is not a mere proviso to s. 26 but cuts down the operation of ss. 24 and 25 as well.”

    19. Mr. Parasnath relies upon the well-known Privy Council case in Pakala Narayana Swami v. Emperor (7). In that case, however, the point under consideration was quite a different one, and though Lord Atkin in the course of his judgment made the observation that s. 27 seems to be intended to be a proviso to s. 26, he was not really dealing with the point in question, and certainly there was no decision upon that point.

    20. I am of opinion that it must now be taken as settled, unless and until the Privy Council decides to the contrary, that s. 27 should be read as a proviso to s. 24, and controls it. Therefore, the fact that Remis may have been threatened or beaten does not prevent the application of s. 27.

    21. As the evidence stands, the discovery was most certainly made in consequence of the statement. Mr. Parasnath suggests that the evidence has been deliberately presented in that particular form so as to secure the admissibility of the statement and actually the axe was not recovered in consequence of the statement. I cannot accept that contention. There is one thing which, to my mind, apart from the absence of evidence to support it, must rule it out. The Sub-Inspector had already recovered one axe from the appellant's house, and he would naturally suppose, unless and until something appeared to the contrary, that this was the weapon used. It could only have been a statement made by the appellant that led him to look for a second axe which turned out to be the bloodstained weapon. I think, therefore, it is clear that this is a case where the statement has been properly admitted.

    22. This evidence as to the appellant's statement coupled with the evidence as to the recovery of the axe is a very strong circumstance pointing towards the appellant's guilt. Mr. Parasnath points out that one of the witnesses who were taken to the spot and whose signature appears on the production list, namely, Kamil Minz (P.W No. 15) said:

    “In my presence the accused did not bring any balua, I did not go with the accused or the Sub-Inspector. There is no other Kamil Minz in my village.”

    23. This witness was simply tendered by the prosecution. His signature appears clearly on the production list, and is similar to the signature which he affixed to his deposition. It is, therefore, impossible to believe his statement. The suggestion that the Sub-Inspector by some improper means secured his signature on the production list does not at all appeal to me, nor was this point put to the witness. I think, to suit his own purposes, this witness has made a false statement. Besides the evidence of the Sub-Inspector with regard to the production of the axe, there is also the direct evidence of Hazari Sahu (P.W No. 3) who says:

    “He (the appellant) brought out a balua from under dried leaves. This is the balua with which the Woman was killed. It had blood marks and some hairs sticking to it.”

    24. Silvanus (P.W No. 5) said: “The accused brought out a balua from a ditch by the side of the pathway, after removing the dried leaves.” I think the production of the weapon by the appellant has been established.

    25. Then with regard to the conduct of the appellant, the girl's father (P.W No. 7) said:

    “He (the appellant) came again on a Thursday. They had food. They went away some time after midday. May be about 3 p.m The accused had a balua and a gamchha with him. I sent the girl willingly. The girl was not keen on going. We asked her to go…………… I thought that as my aughter had passed that way recently it might be she herself. So I and my wife went to Hesag to the house of Remis. Not finding the girl in his house, I asked him why. The son-in-law replied ‘I walked ahead. She did not come with me.’ Then my fears were confirmed.”

    26. The girl's mother (P.W No. 8) said:

    “The girl's name was Leoni. The accused is my son-in-law. The girl went away with him on Thursday about 4 or 5 months ago to his house. It was some time in the afternoon when they left. The son-in-law had a balua with. On Sunday morning we heard that a girl had been found murdered in the Karaku jungle. We went to Remis's house at Hesag to see if the girl was not there. The girl was not in the husband's house. We asked him about it. He replied “I do not know, and she did not come with me.”

    27. She added in cross-examination that they had seen the pair up to the boundary of the village, and had gone with them up to a kos.

    28. Barku Uraon (P.W No. 11) testifies that he saw the accused and the daughter of Pinus going away by the road on a Thursday about four months ago. He was outside his village grazing cattle. It is true he did not see the father and the mother with them, but that might have been after the father and mother had returned.

    29. Din us Uraon (P.W No. 9) said:

    “I know Remis. He was married at Tilwari. I had seen his wife, I saw them walking away aoroas a jungle Kora-Sarua on Thursday about 4 months ago. It was some time before sunset. The woman was going ahead followed by the husband. He had a balua. This was about one mile to the south of Karaku jungle,”

    30. Taking all this evidence in conjunction with the appellant's production of the bloodstained balua and the fact which is evident from the record that after he must have missed his wife he did nothing to bring the matter to the notice of the authorities I consider that it has been established beyond any reasonable doubt that the appellant must have been the murderer, and he had been rightly convicted.

    31. There remains the question of sentence. The appellant is a young man, little more than a boy. The learned Judge gives his age as 21. He is an aboriginal, and such people cannot be judged entirely by the standards which are applicable to more civilized races. Such people are liable to sudden accessions of rage, when they are not perhaps entirely responsible for their actions. Apart from that, there is a hiatus in the case. We do not know what the reason was for the murder. We cannot be sure that there was not grave provocation. In these circumstances, I am of opinion that it would not be proper to impose a death sentence, and that the ends of justice can be sufficiently met by imposing the leaser penalty. In the result, therefore, I would discharge the reference, but would maintain the conviction and dismiss the appeal, merely altering the sentence to one of transportation for life.

    Bennett, J.:— I agree. A suggestion was made by and on behalf of the accused, Remis Christian that because of his renunciation of Christianity the witness Silvanus (P.W No. 5) and others had deliberately manufactured a false accusation against him in this case and that they had deliberately buried an axe and foisted it upon the accused as being the axe with which the crime had been committed. In my opinion, there is no such basis to that suggestion as would have enabled the learned Judicial Commissioner or as would enable this Court to reject or to doubt the evidence as to the manner in which this balua was, is fact, found. The suggestion rests upon no evidence, and as a possibility it appears to me to be nothing but a wild surmise. Once the evidence that the accused after his arrest in connection with the disappearance of his wife led the Sub-Inspector and at least two other prosecution witnesses, Hazari Sahu (P.W No. 3) and Silvanus (P.W No. 5), to the place where the balua was buried and there himself uncovered it and handed it over, is believed, there appears to me to remain no doubt on the three main issues involved in the case. It would be a matter of extraordinary coincidence if in those circumstances the accused bad ??? the Sub-Inspector to this axe, but the corpse had turned out to be the body of some person other than his wife. That consideration, coupled with the positive evidence of the parents of the girl as to her identity leaves, in my mind, no possible doubt that the deceased was, in fact, the wife of the accused.

    32. Similarly, it would be a matter of great coincidence if after the accused had led the Sub-Inspector to the balua as he did it had been found that the axe which he uncovered had not in fact caused the death of the wife of the accused. Similarly, having discovered this axe in the manner I have referred to, it would be an extra-ordinary coincidence again if it turned out that the murderer was not in fact the accused. The absence of any explanation whatever by the accused as to the discovery of the axe coupled with the evidence as to the movements of the accused and of his wife on the afternoon of the evening of April 12, 1915, and the evidence of the extraordinary unsatisfactory statements made by the accused to the deceased's parents when questioned by them on the morning of April 15, 1945, as to the whereabouts of his wife, point, in my opinion, conclusively and beyond any reasonable doubt to the guilt of the accused and this even if the evidence of the statement leading to the discovery of the balua is excluded. In my opinion, therefore, the appellant was rightly convicted. For the reasons given by my learned brother, I agree that the death sentence should not be imposed, and that the ends of justice will be met by a sentence of transportation for life. I am, therefore, of opinion that the conviction should be confirmed, but that the reference for confirmation of the sentence of death should be rejected, the appeal dismissed, and the sentence altered to one of transportation for life.

    P.

    33. Sentence reduced.

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    Emperor Prosecutor v. Remis Christian Opposite Party.
    (Jan 22, 1946)