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Case Number

A.S No. 43 of 1955 (T)

Attorney(S)

For the Appellant: N. Sankara Iyer

Judges

Kumara Pillai
T.K Joseph, JJ.

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Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — Kumara Pillai, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The suit concerned recovery of money due under four simple mortgages (hypothecation bonds) affecting ten scheduled items of property. The trial court decreed the suit as to all ten items. The appeal before this Court related only to plaint schedule item 1. Defendant 19 (the appellant) claimed title paramount to item 1 and contended it was not liable for the plaintiff's mortgage claim.

The plaint alleged that the ten scheduled properties were ancestral property of two brothers, Subramonia Pillai and Ponnuswami Pillai. Two mortgages (Exts. D and A) were executed by Subramonia Pillai (dates shown in the plaint) and two subsequent mortgages (Exts. B and C) were executed by his legal representatives (defendants 1 and 2) after his death. Earlier suits concerning partition or possession (including O.S. 81 of 1110 and O.S. 1468/1498 of 1093) and a land acquisition proceeding were part of the factual matrix and produced several documents and decrees (identified as Exts. E, F, 1, G, etc.) relied upon by the parties.

The lower court made findings on whether defendant 19 and her predecessors held the property under a lease, whether her possession was permissive (and therefore not adverse), and whether prior judgments or the land acquisition award affected the mortgagors' and plaintiff's rights. Defendant 19 appealed from adverse findings about her contentions and her party status.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether plaint schedule item 1 was liable to the plaintiff's suit for mortgage money (i.e., whether defendant 19's claimed title paramount or adverse possession defeated the plaintiff's charge on that item).
Whether defendant 19 was a necessary party to the mortgage suit and, relatedly, whether it was appropriate for the trial court to adjudicate her claim in the mortgage suit.
Whether prior proceedings and documents (including the judgment in O.S. 1468/1498 of 1093, the decree in O.S. 81 of 1110, and the land acquisition judgment and obstruction order) bound defendant 19 or otherwise precluded the mortgagors and plaintiff from contesting defendant 19's title or possession.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Defendant 19)'s Arguments

Defendant 19 contended that she (and her predecessors Ama Parvathi and Parvathi Lakshmi) had been in possession of plaint schedule item 1 for over 60 years and thus had acquired title by adverse possession, so the mortgages were not binding on the property.
She denied that she was a Vellala (as described in the plaint) and asserted she was a Nair; she denied that Muniswami Mudaliar was her father or husband of her mother and disputed the factual basis of earlier proceedings (contending some were fraudulent and not binding on her).
She relied upon the land acquisition judgment (Ext. 1) awarding compensation to her and an obstruction petition order (Ext. G/Ext C) that had found she was in possession in her own right, as supporting her claim of long adverse possession.
On appeal, her counsel argued documentary evidence established her caste status as Nair, cast doubt on the asserted parentage, and submitted there was no evidence of the lease alleged by the plaintiff; further, she argued prior decrees and the land acquisition proceedings precluded the mortgagors and plaintiff from denying her right.

Plaintiff's Arguments

The plaintiff's case (as taken in replication and at trial) was that defendant 19 was in possession as successor to lessees who held under a lease granted by Ponnuswami Pillai to Ama Parvathi and subsequently renewed or re-taken by Muniswami Mudaliar and Parvathi Lakshmi; Ext. F (judgment in O.S. 1468 of 1093) was relied on to prove this lease-based possession.
On this case, the plaintiff maintained that defendant 19's possession was permissive (i.e., as lessee or successor of lessees) and therefore did not give rise to adverse possession, so Subramonia Pillai and defendants 1 and 2 had subsisting title to one-half of item 1 on the date of the mortgages and the mortgages were valid and binding on that half share.
The plaintiff asserted that any rights created by an earlier lease or renewal would be binding on the mortgagors and that the plaintiff's charge was therefore subject only to such prior leasehold rights; the plaintiff sought a decree for sale of the mortgagor's right, title and interest as it stood after those antecedent rights.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Ext. F — Judgment in O.S. 1468 of 1093 (Trivandrum District Munsiff's Court)	Found that Ponnuswami Pillai had leased the building to Ama Parvathi in 1079; found Muniswami Mudaliar and Parvathi Lakshmi were in possession under a lease; used as evidence of permissive/lessee possession of defendant 19's predecessors.	The lower court relied on Ext. F to hold defendant 19's predecessors were lessees and that defendant 19's possession was permissive. The appellate court noted the lower court's reliance on Ext. F but reversed the lower court's findings on issues arising from defendant 19's contentions and left those questions open for a separate suit.
Ext. E — Decree in O.S. 81 of 1110 (Trivandrum District Court)	Partition decree that dismissed plaintiff's claim as to items 2–10 and awarded one-half of plaint schedule item 1 to defendants 1 and 2 as Subramonia Pillai's share.	Recited as part of the factual background. The appellate court observed that defendant 19 was not a party to that decree and that such decrees would not bind her, although the decree was part of the overall factual matrix.
Ext. 1 — Judgment in the Land Acquisition Case (district court award of compensation)	Record of award and compensation to defendant 19 for a small portion of item 1; used by defendant 19 to support claim of possession in her own right.	The lower court and the parties cited this judgment; the appellate court held the land acquisition judgment (Ext. 1) and the obstruction order (Ext. G) would not affect the rights of defendants 1 and 2 and the plaintiff as regards the mortgagee's charge, and left the substantive questions as to defendant 19's rights for separate adjudication.
Ext. G / Ext. C — Order on obstruction petition (relating to delivery of land under Ext. E)	Order allowed an obstruction petition filed by defendant 19 while defendants 1 and 2 sought delivery under Ext. E, on findings that defendant 19 was in possession in her own right.	Defendant 19 relied on this order to support a claim of possession in her own right. The appellate court held that such orders would not affect the rights of the mortgagors and the plaintiff in the mortgage suit and declined to adjudicate these matters in the mortgage suit.
Mulla, The Code of Civil Procedure (1953 ed.), p. 1080	Textbook principle that a person asserting title paramount or claiming adversely to the mortgagor/mortgagee should not be joined in a mortgage suit unless alleged to be a benamidar or necessary for an effective decree.	The court applied this principle to hold that defendant 19 was an unnecessary party to the mortgage suit and should not have been adjudicated against in that suit unless she was shown to be a benamidar or necessary for an effective decree.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analysed the dispute in light of the nature of a simple mortgage and what a mortgagee can obtain by way of execution sale. Key analytical steps were:

The court accepted the settled legal principle that a mortgagee under a simple mortgage is entitled in execution only to the right, title and interest which the mortgagor had at the time of the execution of the mortgage — not any superior or previously extinguished rights of the mortgagor.
If the plaintiff's own case (and the lower court's reliance on Ext. F) were accepted, defendant 19's predecessors held under a lease granted by the head of the undivided family prior to the mortgages. Such a prior lease would be binding on the mortgagors and thus would remain as a burden on the mortgagor's remaining interest at the time of the mortgages.
The plaintiff's charge therefore, according to the plaintiff's pleaded case, extended only to the mortgagor's residual interest subject to the prior lease. Consequently, adjudicating the title claimed by a prior lessee (or a person asserting title paramount) was unnecessary in a simple mortgage suit where the mortgagee sought only money and sale of the mortgagor's interest. The mortgagee would have no cause of action against such a lessee until, and unless, he purchased the property in execution.
The court reasoned by analogy to prior mortgagees: a prior lessee's rights are analogous to those of a prior mortgagee insofar as the subsequent mortgagee's charge is concerned. Both prior rights reduce the mortgagor's interest and bind the subsequent mortgagee, but neither requires the prior-holders to be parties to an ordinary mortgage-money suit.
The court found that on both the plaintiff's case (possession as lessee) and defendant 19's own case (title paramount or adverse possession), defendant 19 was not a necessary party to the mortgage suit. The presence of a person claiming title paramount or adverse title is unnecessary unless he is alleged to be a benamidar or necessary to pass an effective decree.
Because the lower court had decided issues between the parties touching on defendant 19's claim (including accepting Ext. F as evidence and finding permissive possession), the appellate court concluded that those findings should not have been made in the mortgage suit and therefore set them aside, leaving the substantive questions to be litigated in a properly framed suit by interested persons.
The appellate court further directed that the sale of plaint schedule item 1 in execution of the decree in the mortgage suit shall not affect whatever right, title and interest defendant 19 may have in the property.

Holding and Implications

CORE HOLDING: The Court held that defendant 19 was an unnecessary party to the simple mortgage suit and that the lower court's findings on issues arising from defendant 19's contentions should be set aside. The appeal was allowed to that extent and dismissed in other respects.

Implications and immediate consequences:

The appellate court set aside all findings in the lower court's judgment relating to defendant 19's contentions (including findings based on Ext. F regarding lease and possession) and left those questions open for adjudication in a properly framed separate suit by any person interested.
The sale of plaint schedule item 1 in execution of the decree in the mortgage suit is directed not to affect whatever right, title and interest defendant 19 may have in that item.
The lower court's decree was otherwise confirmed except as to costs. Specific costs directions were given:
- Defendant 19 will not be liable for the plaintiff's costs in the lower court.
- The plaintiff will recover his lower-court costs from defendants 1 and 2 and by sale of the mortgagor's right, title and interest in the mortgaged properties.
- Defendant 19 will bear her own costs in the lower court.
- In this appellate court, parties will bear their respective costs.
The decision does not purport to resolve the substantive contest between the mortgagors, defendant 19, and others about title, leasehold rights or adverse possession — those questions remain open for a separate suit. The judgment therefore does not establish a new substantive precedent on adverse possession or title beyond the application of established principles concerning necessary parties in a mortgage suit and the nature of a mortgagee's rights on execution.

Order accordingly. (Appeal allowed in part and dismissed in other respects.)

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Janaki Amma v. Venkitasubba Iyer .

Kumara Pillai, J.:— This appeal arises out of a suit for money due under four simple mortgages or hypothecation bonds. There were ten items of properties in the plaint schedule, and the suit has been decreed as regard all of them. The appeal relates only to plaint schedule item 1, and the question raised by the appellant, defendant 19, who claims the said item by tide paramount, is whether it is liable at all for the plaint claim. Defendants 4 to 27 were impleaded in the suit on the allegation that they were living in the plaint properties and it was therefore necessary to have them on the party array in order to enable the plaintiff to get an effective decree.

2. According to the plaint allegations, plaint schedule items 1 to 10 were the ancestral properties of two brothers, Subramonia Pillai and Ponnuswami Pillai, both of whom are now dead. Ponnuswami Pillai was the elder of the two brothers and defendant 3 is his son. Defendants 1 and 2 are the widow and son of Subramonia Pillai. Two of the plaint mortgages, Exts. D and A, were executed by Subramonia Pillai, Ext. D on 10-4-1109 and Ext. A on 23-4-1110, and the remaining two, Exts. B and C, were executed after his death by defendants 1 and 2, Ext. B on 2-11-1113 and Ext. C on 16-8-1118. After the execution of Ext. A Subramonia Pillai filed a suit, O.S 81 of 1110 of the Trivandrum District Court, for partition and recovery of possession of his one-half share in plaint schedule items 1 to 10. While that suit was pending trial Subramonia Pillai died, and defendants 1 and 2 were impleaded therein as his legal representatives. By the decree Ext. E dated 21-6-1116, O.S 81 of 1110 was dismissed so far as plaint schedule items 2 to 10 were concerned and one-half of plaint schedule item I was given to defendants 1 and 2 (additional plaintiffs therein) on account of Subramonia Pillai's share in the ancestral properties.

3. It was while an appeal against Ext. E decree filed by defendants land 2 was pending in the High Court that the plaintiff brought the present suit, & he had mentioned in the plaint that the appeal of defendants 1 and 2 was pending in the High Court.

4. Defendant 19 disputed the plaintiff's right to get a decree charged on plaint schedule item 1. She contended that the said item belonged to her and that defendants 1, 2 and 3 and Subramonia Pillai and Ponnuswami Pillai had no right to it, and so the mortgages executed by Subramonia Pillai and defendants 1 and 2 were not binding and could not create any charge on it. According to her, her grand mother Ama Parvathi, mother Parvati Lakshmi and herself had successively been in possession of the property for over 60 years and even if Subramonia Pillai and others had any right to it their rights have been extinguished by the long adverse possession of herself and her predecessors-in-interest.

5. She also contended that the decree in O.S 81 of 1110 was a collusive one and that it was not binding on her as she was not a party thereto. In the plaint defendant 19 was described as a Vellala lady. She denied she was a Vellala and contended that she was a Nair. In a suit, O.S 1498 of 1093 of the Trivandrum District Munsiff's Court, filed by defendant 3's sister against defendant 3 and one Muniswami Mudaliar for recovery of possession of Ponnuswami Pillai's share in plaint schedule item 1 on the allegation that he had sold his share to defendant 3's sister and that Muniswami Mudaliar was in possession of the property under a lease from Ponnuswami Pillai, it had been found that Ponnuswami Pillai had leased the property to Muniswami Pillai and his wife Parvathi Lakshmi.

6. Ext. F is the copy of the judgment in that suit. The suit itself was dismissed by Ext. F on the finding that the sale deed executed by Ponnuswami Pillai in favour of defendant 3's sister who was his daughter, was a sham document brought into existence for defeating his creditors and had not taken effect; and although in view of this finding and the dismissal of the suit it was unnecessary to consider in that suit the case that Muniswami Mudaliar was in possession of plaint item 1 under a lease, that question too was considered in that suit and a finding that he was in possession under a lease was recorded.

7. The case of the plaintiff in the present suit was that defendant 19 was in possession of plaint item 1 having obtained possession of it from the above lessees after their death. Defendant 19 admitted she was Parvathi Lakshmi's daughter. But she denied that Muniswami Mudaliar was her father or even the husband of her mother. According to her, it was to bolster up the case that she was Muniswami Mudaliar's daughter that the plaintiff had falsely described her in the plaint as a Vellala, and all the proceedings in O.S 1498 of 1093 were fraudulent and not binding on her.

8. About 1 cent and 60 sq. links of land from, plaint schedule item 1 was acquired by the State in 1118 or 1119 and the compensation amount for the same was awarded by the District Court to defendant 19. Likewise, an obstruction petition filed by defendant 19 when as decree-holders in O.S 81 of 1110 defendants 1 and 2 applied to get delivery of the land allotted to them under Ext. E, was allowed, by the District Court on the findings that she was in possession of item 1 in her own right.

9. The judgment in the Land Acquisition Case, Ext. 1, and the order on the obstruction petition, Ext. C or III, were also relied upon by defendant 19 in support of her contention that her grand-mother, mother and herself had been in possession of plaint schedule item 1 for over 60 years and Subramonia. Pillai and his brother and defendants 1 to 3 had no subsisting title to it and it belonged absolutely to her. On the other hand plaintiff relied upon the finding in Ext. F about the lease and contended that defendant 19's grand-mother and mother as well as her father were in possession as lessees of Ponnuswami Pillai who was the head of the joint family consisting of himself, Subramonia Pillai and defendants 1 to 3, that defendant 19 had only obtained possession of the property from the above lessees, and that her possession being therefore only permissive possession Subramonia Pillai and defendants 1 and 2 had a subsisting title on the date of the mortgages and there was no scope for a plea of adverse possession.

10. The findings of the lower court in regard to defendant 19's contentions are:

(i) that she is the daughter of Muniswami Mudaliar and Parvathi Lakshmi;

(ii) that Ponnuswami Pillai had leased the building in plaint schedule item 1 to defendant 19's grand-mother Ama Parvathi in 1079 and she was in possession of it till 1089. After Ama Parvathi defendant 19's mother Parvathi Lakshmi was in possession of the property from 1089 to 1092 and following this lease Muniswami Mudalia and his wife Parvathi Lekshmi took it under a written least from Ponnuswami Pillai in 1092 and defendant 19 is in possession under the said lease;

(iii) that defendant 19's possession being thus permissive possession she has not obtained any right to plaint schedule item 1 by adverse possession and defendants 1 and 2 and Subramonia Pillai had a subsisting title to one-half of plaint schedule item 1 and the mortgages executed by them were valid and binding on their half share;

(iv) that the judgment, Ext. 1, in the Land Acquisition case, and the order, Ext. G, on the obstruction petition, will not affect the rights of defendants 1 and 2 and the plaintiff; and

(v) that the decrees in O.S 81 of 1110 and O.S 1468 of 1093 will not bind defendant 19 as she was not a party to those suits but the judgment in O.S 1468 of 1093, Ext. F, can be relied upon as evidence proving that defendant 19's predecessors were enjoying the property only as lessees.

11. The question whether defendant 19 was a Vellala or a Nair was left open although the lower court made it clear in its judgment that on that question also it was inclined to believe the plaintiff's case and reject defendant 19's contention.

12. In the appeal before us it is contended by the appellant's (defendant 19's) learned counsel that there is good documentary evidence to prove that defendant 19 was a Nair and not a Vellala, that Muniswami Mudaliar was not defendant 19's father and there is no evidence at all to prove that he was her father, that the lower court has erred in accepting Ext. F as legal evidence against defendant 19 and acting on the finding therein about the alleged lease to Ama Parvathi and Parvathi Lekshmi and Muniswami Mudaliar, that there is no evidence at all to prove the lease set up by the plaintiff, that defendant 19 and her predecessors had been in possession of the property over 60 years and whatever title defendants 1 to 3 and Subramonia Pillai and Ponnuswami Pillai had in plaint schedule item 1 was lost by their adverse possession and Subramonia Pillai and defendants 1 and 2 had no subsisting title on the date of the mortgages and so the mortgages were not valid and binding on plaint schedule item 1 and could create no charge thereon, that by the judgment in the Land Acquisition case and by their failure to institute a suit for setting aside Ext. G order, within one year of the date of that order defendants 1 and 2 and the plaintiff are precluded from denying defendant 19's right to and possession of plaint schedule item 1 and from contending that Subramonia Pillai and defendants 1 and 2 had a subsisting title to that item on the date of the mortgages.

13. After hearing both sides we are of the opinion that defendant 19 was not a necessary party to the plaintiff's suit and that the questions arising on her contentions should not have been considered and decided in this suit but left open for adjudication in a fresh suit which may be brought by persons interested at the appropriate time. Although plaintiff had not specified either in the plaint or replication the date from which the possession of defendant 19 and her predecessors-in-interest had commenced the definite case set up by him in the replication was that defendant 19 was the daughter of Muniswami Mudaliar who was defendant 2 in O.S 1468 of 1093 and that he had taken the building in plaint schedule item 1 on lease from Ponnuswami Pillai, and defendant 19 had obtained possession of the item through Muniswami Mudaliar and the case put forward by him during the evidence stage lower court and at the time of the hearing of this appeal is what has been found in O.S 1468 of 1093 and adopted by the lower Court from the judgment in O.S 1468 of 1093 and stated as follows in paragraph 7 of the judgment in that suit:

“The first defendant (i.e defendant 3 in this suit) swears that his father leased the buildings to one Ama Parvathi in 1079, that Parvathi enjoyed the buildings till 1089, that from 1089 to 1092 Parvathi's daughter enjoyed it and that in 1092 he took Ext. IX rent note from the 2nd defendant and his wife. The plaintiff too admits that his father rented the building to Parvathi and that the 2nd defendant is the son-in-law of Parvathi. The evidence of the first defendant is borne out by Ext. IX. I therefore hold that the 2nd defendant enjoys the buildings in pursuance of Ext. IX.”

14. In paragraph 17 of its judgment the lower court says, “I have relied on Ext. F (judgment in O.S 1468 of 1093) for the purpose of showing that defendant 19's predecessors were enjoying the property as lessees only.” Thus the plaintiff's case and the lower court's finding are to the effect that defendant 19 is in possession of plaint schedule item 1 under a lease which Ponnuswami granted to her grand-mother in 1079 and a renewal of which was taken by Muniswami Mudaliar & Parvathi Lekshmi in 1092.

15. The alleged lease and renewal were both long, before the execution of the plaint mortgages, the earliest of which was executed only in 1109, and both the lease and the renewal would be binding on the mortgagors, Subramonia Pillai and defendants 1 and 2 since the lease and the renewal are said to have been granted by the head of their joint family at the time when the family was undivided. So the charge which the plaintiff has obtained by the plaint mortgage is only a charge on the right, title and interest of Subramonia Pillai and defendants 1 and 2 subsisting after the grant of the lease and renewal, in favour of defendant 19's predecessors-in-interest — that is to say, if the plaintiff's case is accepted, the plaint mortgages and the charge which the plaintiff got under these mortgages were subject to the rights created by the lease and its renewal in favour of defendant 19's predecessors.

16. Since in execution of a mortgage decree what the mortgagee is entitled to sell and what the auction-purchaser will get is only the right, title and interest which the mortgagor had in the mortgaged property at the time of the execution of the mortgage and not any superior right which the mortgagor might have had earlier, all that the plaintiff is entitled to ask for and obtain in this suit is, according, to his own case, only a decree for the sale of the right, title and interest which Subramonia Pillai and defendants 1 and 2 had after the grant of the lease and the renewal in favour of defendants 19's predecessors. For enabling the plaintiff to obtain such a decree, which cannot and will not affect the rights of the lessee, it is unnecessary to implead her and adjudicate upon her rights in this suit.

17. The position of a lessee holding under a lease granted by the mortgagor, or his predecessor-in-interest, before the mortgage was executed is analogous to that of a prior mortgagee, for the right, title and interest of the mortgagor at the time of the subsequent mortgage is only his balance right ml the property remaining after the creation of the prior lease or prior mortgage. As the mortgagee gets a charge only on the right, title and interest which the mortgagor had at the time of the mortgage, the rights of the prior lessee, binding on the mortgagor at the time of the mortgage, are as much binding on the subsequent mortgagee as the rights of a prior mortgagee.’

18. Like the prior mortgagee, the prior lessee also is an unnecessary party to a suit for mortgage money due under a simple mortgage. The mortgagee under a simple mortgage can and will have no right to evict the lessee until he purchases the right, title and interest of the lessor-mortgagor in execution of his decree for mortgage money. Before he purchases the property in execution he has no cause of action at all against the lessee. Therefore, on the case now put forward by the plaintiff, he has at present no cause of action against defendant 19 and so it is not necessary to adjudicate upon her rights, in this suit.

19. Likewise, on the case set up by defendant 19 also she is an unnecessary party and it is not necessary to adjudicate upon her rights in this suit. She is claiming plaint schedule item 1 by title paramount and adversely to both the mortgagors and the mortgagee, and it is settled law that a person who sets up a title paramount or is claiming the property adversely to the mortgagor and mortgagee should not be joined as a party in the mortgage suit unless it is alleged that he is a benamidar for the mortgagor or his presence on the party array is necessary for passing an effective decree (See Mulla's Civil Procedure Code, 1953 Edition, page 1080).

20. In the present suit neither the plaintiff nor defendant 19 has a case that defendant 19 is a benamidar for the mortgagor. Her presence on the party array is also not necessary for passing an effective decree in the suit. This is not a suit for recovery of possession of the mortgaged property in which case it can, perhaps, be contended that a person in possession is a necessary or desirable party in order to enable the plaintiff to get an effective decree in execution of which he can recover possession of the property. As this is only a suit by a simple mortgagee for mortgage money and the decree to be passed in it can direct only the sale of the mortgagor's right, title and interest, it is unnecessary to have on the party array a person claiming the mortgaged property by title paramount to the mortgagor or adversely to him.

21. The simple mortgagee will get a cause of action against the person claiming the property by title paramount or adversely to the mortgagor only after he purchases the property in execution of his decree for the mortgage money. If the mortgagor pays the mortgage money at any time before the execution sale the mortgagee will have no right at all to the property, and so the question of possession becomes material only after he purchases the property and gets the right to ask for actual possession. Therefore in either case on the plaintiff's case as well as on the case set up by defendant 19 — defendant 19 is an unnecessary party and her contentions are quite foreign to the simple mortgagee's suit for his mortgage money in which a decree can be passed for the sale of only the right, title and interest of his mortgagor.

22. For the reasons stated above, so far as defendant 19 and her rights in plaint schedule item 1 are concerned we set aside all the findings in the lower court's judgment on the issues arising on defendant 19's contentions and leave open the questions arising on her contentions for adjudication in a properly framed suit to be filed by any person interested at the appropriate time and also direct that the sale of plaint schedule item 1 in execution of the decree in this suit, shall not affect the right, title and interest which defendant 19 may have in the said item, and, subject to the above reversal of findings and the above direction, we confirm the lower court's decree except as regards costs. Defendant 19 will not be liable for the plaintiff's costs in the lower court and plaintiff will get his costs in that court from defendants 1 and 2 and by the sale of his mortgagor's right, title and interest in the mortgaged properties. Defendant 19 will bear her costs in that court. The appeal is allowed to the above extent and dismissed in other respects. Parties will bear their respective costs is this court.

M.K.S

23. Order accordingly.

Janaki Amma v. Venkitasubba Iyer .

Judgment Summary — Kumara Pillai, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Defendant 19)'s Arguments

Plaintiff's Arguments

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Janaki Amma v. Venkitasubba Iyer .

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