Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

New Mahe is a panchayat formed in 1982 from portions of two earlier panchayats, Chokli and Kodiyeri. The accused operated a cool bar in New Mahe. On 14-1-1983 a food inspector (appointed in 1978 for the "Tellicherry Circle", a local area that included Chokli and Kodiyeri) purchased 750 grams of ice candy from the accused, issued Form VI notice, received a cash receipt, divided the sample into three parts and drew up mahazar (Ext. P4) signed by two witnesses.

Analysis of one part by the Public Analyst showed the sample did not meet standards and contained artificial sweeteners (saccharine and dulcin). A separate analysis by the Director of the Central Food Laboratory (Ext. P25), obtained at the accused's instance, identified saccharine.

At trial the accused was convicted under S.16(1)(a)(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for six months and a fine of Rs. 1,000/-. On appeal the Sessions Judge set aside the conviction and sentence on the ground that the food inspector (Pw.1) lacked jurisdiction to take the sample in New Mahe (because he had not been appointed specifically for New Mahe), and therefore the sampling was held unsupportable in law. The State/complainant appealed against that acquittal, leading to the present opinion.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the appeal was maintainable where the special leave petition was filed by the complainant (food inspector) but signed by the State Public Prosecutor on the complainant's behalf (vakalatnama), having regard to S.378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the authorities relied upon.
  2. Whether the food inspector (Pw.1), appointed for the "Tellicherry Circle" prior to formation of New Mahe panchayat, had jurisdiction to take a sample and initiate prosecution in respect of the accused's cool bar situated in New Mahe after that panchayat was formed.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent (Accused) / Counsel for Respondent

  • Preliminary objection: The appeal is not maintainable because it was presented by the State Public Prosecutor and not by the complainant/food inspector; reliance placed on State of Kerala v. Sunder Raj (1985 KLT 368) where an appeal was held improperly presented when the Public Prosecutor signed without a vakalatnama of the complainant.
  • Jurisdictional contention: When New Mahe Panchayat was formed, areas falling within its limits ceased to be within the territorial limits of the local area for which Pw.1 had been appointed; Pw.1 therefore ceased to have jurisdiction to take samples in New Mahe. The decision in Abdulla Haji v. Food Inspector (1967 KLT 577) was cited in support.

Appellant (State / Complainant / Food Inspector)

  • Procedural/maintainability response: Although the memorandum was signed by the State Public Prosecutor, the special leave petition was filed by the food inspector and a vakalatnama from the complainant authorised the Public Prosecutor to sign; under S.378(1) and (4) CrPC the appeal is maintainable when special leave is granted and the complainant may present the appeal or the Public Prosecutor may present it when directed by the State Government.
  • Substantive response on jurisdiction: Ext. P1 notification appointed Pw.1 for the "Tellicherry Circle" (a local area comprising named panchayats). The State's argument, accepted by the court, was that a local area declared under S.9 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act continues to exist until altered by a subsequent government notification; the mere formation of a new panchayat does not automatically exclude it from that local area. Alternatively, S.10 of the Act uses expansive language ("any") permitting a food inspector to take samples from places or persons outside the inspector's local area, so Pw.1's sampling would be lawful even if New Mahe were treated as outside his local area.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of Kerala v. Sunder Raj (1985 KLT 368) Held that an appeal memorandum signed by the Public Prosecutor was improperly presented where the complainant did not authorise the Public Prosecutor (no vakalatnama filed) — appeal found not properly presented. The court distinguished this case on facts: in the present matter the special leave petition was filed by the complainant and a vakalatnama authorised the Public Prosecutor to sign; accordingly the preliminary objection based on Sunder Raj was overruled.
Abdulla Haji v. Food Inspector (1967 KLT 577) Decision that a notification authorising "the food inspector appointed under the said Act" could not be read to apply to food inspectors appointed after the notification (i.e., the notification did not cover future appointees or panchayats not in existence when the notification was issued). The court noted the Sessions Judge relied on this decision to conclude lack of jurisdiction. The court held the facts here were different (no fresh appointment had been made for areas constituting New Mahe) and therefore the reliance on Abdulla Haji did not support the Sessions Judge's view.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in two parts: (A) maintainability of the appeal; and (B) competence/jurisdiction of the food inspector to take the sample.

A. Maintainability of the Appeal

  1. The court examined S.378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It observed that S.378(1) permits the State Government to direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the High Court from an order of acquittal, subject to the High Court's leave. S.378(4) provides that if an order of acquittal was passed in a case instituted on complaint and the High Court grants special leave on an application by the complainant, the complainant may present the appeal.
  2. The court reasoned that S.378(1) and S.378(4) are complementary: subsection (1) is not controlled or restricted by subsection (4). Thus an appeal can be filed by the Public Prosecutor where leave has been granted by the High Court irrespective of whether the case was instituted on complaint.
  3. Applying these provisions to the facts, the court noted that in the present case special leave was obtained by the food inspector (the complainant). Although the petition was signed by the State Public Prosecutor, that signature was authorised by the complainant through a vakalatnama filed by the complainant. Consequently, the appeal was not defective on the ground urged by the respondent and the preliminary objection was overruled.

B. Competence / Jurisdiction of the Food Inspector (Pw.1)

  1. The court accepted that Ext. P1 is a notification appointing Pw.1 as food inspector on 22-6-1978 for the local area designated "Tellicherry Circle", which comprised named panchayats including Chokli and Kodiyeri. The accused's cool bar was within the geographic territory defined in Ext. P1.
  2. The Sessions Judge had held that on formation of New Mahe panchayat (in 1982), areas falling within its limits ceased to be within the territorial limits of the local area for which Pw.1 had been appointed, thus depriving Pw.1 of jurisdiction. The Sessions Judge relied on Abdulla Haji.
  3. The court analysed S.9 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (power to appoint food inspectors for "local areas") together with the definition of "local area" in S.2(vii). It emphasized that a "local area" declared by notification continues to be the local area for purposes of the Act until the Government alters it by a subsequent notification under S.9.
  4. The court held that changes in local nomenclature or the formation of a new panchayat under the Kerala Panchayats Act do not automatically affect or impair a local area declared by the State Government under S.9 of the Act. The Government retains the power to exclude newly formed panchayats from the local area by a fresh notification; absent such exclusion, the local area continues to embrace the geographical territories of the newly formed panchayat.
  5. The court advanced an alternative reason: even if Pw.1 were not the food inspector appointed specifically for New Mahe, S.10 of the Act confers power on "any" food inspector to take samples from "any" person selling or conveying articles of food and to enter and inspect "any" place. The court read the repeated use of the word "any" in S.10 as indicating there is no statutory inhibition preventing a food inspector appointed for one local area from taking samples outside his assigned local area. Section 12 (as cited) further supports that a purchaser (other than a food inspector) may get an article analysed and the seller may be prosecuted; this reinforced the view that Pw.1's action was not opposed to law.
  6. On this combined statutory interpretation, the court concluded that the Sessions Judge's reasoning — that Pw.1 acted without authority — was erroneous.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: APPEAL ALLOWED; ORDER OF ACQUITTAL SET ASIDE.

Direct consequences for the parties:

  • The court set aside the Sessions Judge's order of acquittal and restored the trial Magistrate's conviction and sentence (six months rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/-).
  • The trial Magistrate was directed to take steps to take the accused into custody to enable him to undergo the term of imprisonment.
  • The preliminary objection to maintainability of the appeal was overruled: the appeal was held maintainable where the complainant obtained special leave and authorised the Public Prosecutor by vakalatnama to sign the petition.

Broader legal implications articulated by the court (as derived from statutory interpretation in the opinion):

  • A "local area" declared under S.9 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act continues to subsist until altered by a subsequent government notification under that section; the formation of new local government units (panchayats) does not automatically alter the scope of such a declared local area.
  • Section 10's language ("any") permits food inspectors to take samples and exercise powers even beyond the strict territorial limits of the area for which they were originally appointed, and S.12 supports the enforcement scheme that does not constrain prosecutions arising from analyses initiated by purchasers or food inspectors.

The court's decision restored the trial conviction and clarified the interplay between appointments under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and subsequent local government boundary changes, within the factual confines of this opinion.

Disposition: Allowed.

    Food Inspector v. Moidoo

    1. “New Mahe” is the name of a Paochayat comprising areas which once formed portions of two other Panchayats (Chokli and Kodiyeri). New Mahe was formed in 1982. The accused in this case is conducting a cool bar at New Mahe. On 14-1-1983, a food inspector (appointed by Government in 1978 for the local area called “Tellicherry Circle” consisting of a few pancbayats including Chokli and Kodiyeri) took sample of ice candy from the cool bar of the accused. The sample was found to be adulterated on analysis. Accused was convicted for the offence under S. 16(1)(a)(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (for short ‘the Act’) and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for six months and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/-. The Sessions Judge, in appeal, took the view that the sampling is unsupportable in law since the food inspector who took the sample was not appointed to exercise powers in the New Mahe Pancbayat. Accordingly, the conviction and sentence were set aside. Hence this appeal.

    2. The food inspector (Pw. 1) purchased 750 grams, of ice candy from the accused. Form VI notice was given to him intimating that the sample would be sent for analysis. A cash receipt was issued by the accused for the price paid by P.W 1. Sample was divided into three parts as provided by law and Ext. P.4 mahazar was drawn up by Pw. 1 which was signed by two witnesses. When one of the parts of the sample was analysed by the Public Analyst, it was revealed that the sample did not conform to the standard prescribed for ice candy and it contained artificial sweetner saccharine and dulcin During trial, one of the other parts of the sample was sent to the Director of the Central Food Laboratory, at the instance of the accused. Ext. P.25 is the certificate of analysis issued by the Director of Central Food Laboratory. It shows that the sample contained artificial sweetner identified as saccharine. Learned Sessions Judge accepted the contention that Pw. 1 was incompetent to take sample from the cool bar of the accused situate in New Mahi paochayat although the Sessions Judge repelled various other contentions raised by the accused. The conviction and sentence were set aside only on the ground of want of competence of the food inspector to take sample and to initiate prosecution against the accused since Pw. 1 was not appointed to exercise jurisdiction in New Mahe Paochayat.

    3. A preliminary objection has been raised by the learned counsel for the respondent (accused) that the appeal is not maintainable since it has been presented by the State Public Prosecutor and since it has not been presented by the complainant/food inspector. The factual position is that special leave petition was filed by the food inspector (who was the complainant in the trial court), but the perition has been signed by the State Public Prosecutor on behalf of the food inspector. Learned counsel refferred to tbs decision of Pareed Pillay, J. in State Of Kerala v. Sunder Raj (1985 KLT. 368) in support of the preliminary objection. In that case, complainant-food inspector was not the appellant nor did the Public Prosecutor figure as the appellant. It was the State of Kerala which was shown as the appellant therein. Public Prosecutor who signed the appeal memorandum in that case did not file yakalath of the complainant. In the aforesaid circumstances, learned single Judge found that the appeal has not been properly presented. In this case, the Public Prosecutor woo signed the appeal memorandum and the special leave petition has filed a vakalato signed by the complainant/food inspector. But the contention is that if the appeal has not been filed by the complainant as envisaged ia S. 378(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short ‘the Code’) the appeal is not maintainable under law.

    4. S. 378(1) says that “save as otherwise provided in sub-section (2) and subject to the provisions of sub-sections (3) and (5), the State Government may, in any case, direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the High Court from an original or appellate order of acquittal passed by any Court other than a High Court. Sub-section (4) reads thus:

    “If such an order of acquittal is passed in any case instituted upon complaint and the High Court, on an application made to it by the complainant in this behalf, grants special leave to appeal from the ordor of acquittal, the complainant may present such an appeal to the High Court”

    5. Sub-section (2) deals with appeal aga?nst order of acquittal passed in cases falling under Delhi Special Police Establishment Act etc. Sub-section (3) says that no appeal shall be entertained except with leave of the High Court. Sub-section (1) has nothing to do with Sub-section (4) The former is not in any manner controlled or restricted by what is provided in Sub-section (4). This means that an appeal can be filed by the Public Prosecutor against an order of acquittal in any case, provided leave has been granted by the High Court. For the application of Sub-section (I), it is immaterial that the order of acquittal was passed in a case instituted on complaint. Sub-section (4) provides a remedy of appeal for the complainant. If a complainant does not file an application for special leave against an order of acquittal, the State Government does not become helpless if they feel that an order of acquittal should be challenged. State Government can, in all cases of acquittals, whether instituted upon complaint or otherwise, direct the Public Prosecutor to present the appeal after obtaining special leave of the High Court. The provision under Sub-section (4) is thus only supplemental to the provision contained in sub-section (1) and not in derogation thereto. So when the accused in a case instituted on complaint is acquitted, the order of acquittal can be challenged in appeal either at the instance of the Public Prosecutor (on being directed by the State Government or at the instance of the complainant.) Here, the appeal having been presented by the food inspector on obtaining special leave is not bad in law even though the petition has been signed by the State Public Prosecutor who was authorised by the complainant through a vakalath. Hence the preliminary objection is overruled.

    6. There is no dispute that Pw. 1 Food Inspector has taken sample of ice candy from the cool bar owned by the accused. Ext. P.25 certificate issued by the Director of Central Food Laboratory is evidence to prove that the sample was adulterated. The only point urged in this appeal is regarding the jurisdiction of the Food Inspector to take sample from New Mahe panchayat area. Ext. P.1 is a copy of the notification appointing Pw. 1 as food inspector on 22-6-1978 for the local area designated as “Tellicherry Circle”. The local area comprises some panchayats including Chokli and Kodiyeri panchayats. There is no dispute that the cool bar of the accused is situate within the local area defined in Ext. Pl notification. The only contention is that when New Mahe Panchayat was formed, the areas falling within its limits would automatically have go fie out of the territorial limits of the local area and since Pw. 1 was not appointed as food inspector for New Mahe Panchayat, he ceased to have jurisdiction over that area from the date of the formation of New Mahe panchayat. This contention has found favour with the learned Sessions Judge. Counsel cited the decision in Abdulla Haji v. Food Inspector (1967 KLT. 577) to support the contention. Facts in that case show that Muliyar pan-. chayat came into existence in 1964 whereas the food inspector instituted a complaint on the strength of a notification issued in 1959 authorising “the food inspector appointed under the said Act” to institute prosecutions for offences under the Act. The argument advanced in that case was (hat the said notification cannot apply to the food inspector of the panchayat which did not then exist. Learned single Judge held: “in my view the not if cation is very clear and it has exercised the power only in favour of food inspectors appointed under the said Act and not also in favour of food inspectors appointed in the future under the Act”. The position here is different inasmuch as no food inspector has been appointed afresh for the areas constituting New Mahe panchayat. The question is whether Pw. 1 ceased to have jurisdiction over the areas comprised in New Mahe panchayat from the date of constitution of that panchayat.

    7. S. 9 of the Act empowers the Government to appoint such persons as it thinks fit to be food inspectors, for such “local areas” as may be assigned to tbem. S. 2(VII) defines “local area” as “any area whether urban or rural declared by the Central Government or the State Government by notification in the official gazette to be a local area for the purposes of this Act”. For declaring a local area, Government may adopt convenient expressions either by fixing the outer limits by measurements or by including named localities within that area. What is usually done, and what would be expedient either is to include places with reference to their names. If the name of a particular locality is changed for any reason whatsoever, it is no reason to conclude that the local area declared under S. 9 of the Act would become short of that locality. In 1973, Government declared a particular area consisting of some named panchayats to be the local area and called it “Tellicherry Circle”. Those panchayats were then known by the respective names indicated in the notification. The local area thus declared is local area for the purpose of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. The local area so declared would continue to remain as such until the area is altered by the Government through another notification issued under S. 9 of the Act, even if some of the localities may attain different names in the mean-while. A panchayat area is-forteed as per the provisions of the Kerala Panchayats Act for the purposes of that Act. If boundaries of an existing panchayat are altered or if any new panchayat is formed by carving out areas from existing panchayats, that cannot automatically affect or impaire the local area declared by the State Government under S. 9 of the Act. Of course, it is open to the Government to exclude the newly formed panchayats from the local area defined in the notification issued under the said Section. If it is not so excluded, the local area will continue to embrace the geographical territories included in the newly formed panchavat or municipality.

    8. The question can be approached from another angle also. What is the consequence even if New Mahe panchayat would have been excluded from the local area of Tellicherry Circle before Pw. 1 visited the cool bar of the accused? There is no contention that Pw. 1 is not a food inspector at all., Let me assume that Pw. 1 may not be a food inspector for New Mahe panchayat. Even then, he would continue to be a Food Inspector albeit for a different area. Can he take a sample from the shop in the New Mahe area? S. 10 of the Act deals with the powers of the Pood Inspectors. Subsection (1) empower, “a Food Inspector to take sample of “any” article of food from “any” person selling such article or “any” person who is in the course of conveying, delivering or preparing to deliver such article to a purchaser, Sub-section (2) empowers “any” Food Inspector to enter and inspect “any” place where any article of food is manufactured or stored for sale. Sub-section (4) empowers “any” food inspector to seize such articles as would appear to him to be adulterated. Sub-section (5) says that the powers conferred by this section includes power to break open “any” package or to break open the door of “any” premises where any article of food is stored for sale. The lavish employment of the word “any” in Sub-section 10 would indicate that the food inspector appointed for one local area may also take samples from persons or places outside the limits of his local area. Perhaps, a food inspector may not take the trouble to go out of him limits to take samples. But, there is no statutory inhibition and on the other band, the scheme of S. 10 otherwise indicates. This view is strengthened when a reference is made to S. 12 of the Act which says that “anything contained in this Act shall be held to prevent a purchaser of any article of food other than a food inspector from having such article analysed by the public analyst………”. If any such food article is found to be adulterated on analysis, the sellor thereof is liable to be prosecuted in the same way as other person who sells it to a food inspector. In this view of the legal position, Pw. 1's action cannot be held to be opposed to law, even if New Mahe panchayat is to be treated as outside the local area assigned to P.W 1.

    9. The reasoning adopted by the learned Sessions Judge cannot be supported in law and the order of acquittal was thus based on an erroneous view that Pw. 1 acted without authority. I, therefore, allow this appeal and set aside the order of acquittal. The conviction and sentence passed by the trial Magistrate are restored. The trial Magistrate is directed to adopt steps to take the accused into custody for enabling him to undergo the term of imprisonment.

    10. Allowed.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Food Inspector v. Moidoo
    (Jul 12, 1988)