Sankaran Nair, J.:— The short question for determination is, whether an agreement to withdraw the proceedings under the Insolvency Act is unenforceable in law.
2. We shall briefly refer to the factual backdrop, to bring into sharp focus, the question for consideration. One Joseph Mariamma, was a subscriber to chitties conducted by the respondent-plaintiff. She had executed Exts. A 1 to A 15 bonds on her behalf, and on behalf of the firm of which she was a partner. Rs. 33,496.95 was outstanding from her. On 6-11-1971, she executed a simple mortgage of her properties, in favour of the appellants for a consideration of Rs. 56,300/-. Upon this, the respondent initiated proceedings, in I.P 9/71 to adjudge the said Mariamma an insolvant, alleging fradu-lent preference and act of insolvency. The appellants were impleaded to the proceedings, with a prayer to annul the hypothication bond. In the meantime, one Thomas Chacko moved the Land Tribunal, claiming tenancy right, in respect of the mortgaged properties. While so on 10-12-1973, the appellants and respondent, entered into an agreement (Ext. A 19), the respondent agreeing to withdraw I.P No. 9/71 and the appellants agreeing to file a suit to enforce the mortgage and satisfy the claim of the respondent. I.P 9/71 was dismissed and thus came to an end. But, the appellants did not file a suit for over three years. Later they filed a suit without the knowledge of the respondent. Nor did they pay the plaintiff. Shorn of the details, the respondent-plaintiff, then filed the suit for damages, from which arises the appeal.
3. The appellants-defendants contested the suit on various grounds. The central issue was the enforceability of Ext. A 19 agreement. The suit was decreed as prayed for, and hence the appeal. Counsel for appellants rested his case solely on the ground aforementioned. He would say that Ext. A 19 agreement is unenforceable in the face of the prohibition in S. 23 of the Contract Act. It is alternately called an agreement ‘forbidden by law, or “opposed to public policy”. To draw substance for this argument, counsel refers to S. 14 of the Insolvency Act (Act 2 of 1956). S. 14 states that ‘no petition whether presented by a debtor or by a creditor, shall be withdrawn without the leave of the court’ (underlining supplied). It is contended that an agreement to withdraw, is therefore forbidden by law. To our mind, the contention is too transparent to stand scrutiny. We do not read the section as imposing any prohibition against withdrawal. The modalities of withdrawal are indicated, and withdrawal is conditioned by leave of the court. Otherwise put, leave of court is a condition precedent to withdrawal. This is not in the realms of prohibition, or illegality.
4. It is then urged, that the agreement is against public policy, embodied in S. 14. Considerations of policy may be involved, such as protection of creditors/debtors. But, prohibition is not engrafted in the section. As noticed earlier, there is no prohibition against withdrawal and the section is only regulatory in character. The argument reads into the section, what is alien to it.
5. Besides, the argument presupposes a disposition to do unlawful acts. When there is an agreement to do an act, it is presumed that the agreement is to do it lawfully. An agreement to sell property is normally understood as an agreement to sell, paying the requisite stamp duty. Likewise, an agreement to make payment is understood as an agreement to pay in legal tender, even without reciting so. A variety of acts are done in the normal course and it is not necessary to make exhaustive recitals of all normal incidents. The absence of such recitals does not indicate that it is intended to be done in violation or departure of the mode of doing it. A presumption of illegality cannot be raised except where it is warranted by rules relating to presumption. Familar are such presumptions under the Essential Commodities Act, the Prevention of Corruption Act and similar enactments. A-presumption of legality-not a presumption of illegality—is the rule. It is so indicated in Motilal v. Nanhelal (AIR. 1930 PC. 287). The Judicial Committee noticed the provisions in S. 50(1) of the C.P Tenancy Act requiring sanction of Revenue authorities to transfer proprietory rights in ‘sir’ land. Sir Lancelot Sanderson said:
“………there was an implied convenant to do all things necessary to effect such transfer which would include an application to the Revenue Officer to sanction the transfer………”
6. The Mysore High Court, considering the scope of S. 23 of the Indian Contract Act in Nemineth Appayya v. Jamboorao (AIR. 1966 Mysore 154), observed:
A bare possibility of such transgression, if there be also a possibility of performance without such transgression, does not invalidate the agreement. It is a familiar principle that the presumption of law is in favour of the legality of a contract and that if it reasonably admits of two meaning or two modes of performance one legal and the other not, the interpretation which the Court should prefer is one which supports it and makes it operate, the burden being on the person who impeaches its validity to establish illegality”.
7. We are in respectful agreement with this view. Unless ex facie illegal, an agreement cannot be presumed to be against the prescriptions or tenor of S. 23 of the Indian Contract Act. The Supreme Court in Lachoomal v. Shri Radhey Shyam ((1971) 1 SCC 619 : AIR. 1971 SC. 2230) noticed with approval the Mysore case. Their. Lordships observed:
“What makes an agreement, which is otherwise legal, void is that its performance is impossible except by disobedience of law”.
8. The law in England is also no different. In Chitty on Contract (25th Edition para 1191) it is stated:
“……if the contract be reasonably susceptible of two meanings or two modes of performance, one legal and the other not, the legal burden of proving its illegality is undischarged and that interpretation is to be put upon the contract which will-suppor tit and give it operation”.
9. The mere possibility of transgression of law, is no ground to say that the agreement is opposed to S. 23 of the Indian Contract Act. The agreement must be shown to be ex facie illegal, or capable of being performed only by unlawful means] The presumption-more precisely the interpretation-leans in favour of legality. It is well to remember the counsel of Jessel M.R in Printing and Numerical Registering Co. v. Sampson, (1875) L.R 19 Eq. 462):
“It must not be forgotten that you are not to extend arbitrarily those rules which say that a given contract is void as being against public policy, because if there is one thing which more than another, public policy requires, it is that men of full age and competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, and that their contracts when entered into freely and voluntarily shall be held sacred and shall be forced by courts of justice. Therefore, you have this paramount public policy to consider-that you are not likely to interfere with freedom of contract”.
10. For the reasons aforesaid, we are of opinion that the agreement Ext. A 19, is not unenforceable, either by reason of a prohibition, or being opposed to public policy.
11. The appeal roust therefore fail. In the result, we affirm the judgment and order of the court below, and dismiss the appeal with costs.
12. Dismissed.