Malimath, C.J:— The learned Single Judge has declined to grant police protection to enable the appellant to get the work of loading and unloading done by engaging labourers of his choice. Respondents 4 and 5 are the two unions of workers. So far as the fourth respondent is concerned, their counsel told us that the members of their union are not, in any manner, interested in causing obstruction to the appellant in getting the work of loading and unloading done by engaging labourers at the choice of the appellant. We record that statement. In view of the stand taken by the fourth respondent, the question of granting any police protection in favour of the appellant as against the fourth respondent does not arise.
2. So far as the fifth respondent is concerned, their counsel submitted that the members of their union have a right to claim the work of loading and unloading and that, therefore, the appellant has no right to get the work done with the help of other labourers. In other words, the stand taken by the fifth respondent makes it abundantly clear that the members of the fifth respondent-union are causing obstruction to the appellant in the matter of engaging labourers of his choice in getting the work of loading and unloading done. It is in this background that the question as to whether police protection should be afforded to the appellant or not was required to be examined.
3. What the learned Single Judge has said in Para. 5 of the judgment is that in the light of the objections raised by the fifth respondent-union, the appellant cannot be given police protection to carry out the loading work to the detriment of the members of the fifth respondent union. After taking this view, the learned Single Judge has proceeded to issue certain directions to the Assistant Labour Officer concerned to initiate conciliation proceedings as per S. 21 of the Head Load Workers Act. A decision is required to be taken under S. 21(4) of the Act within a period of one month. It is the said judgment that is challenged in this appeal.
4. We fail to see how it can be said that police protection cannot be given because the fifth respondent is objecting and because the granting of police protection would be detrimental to the interests of the fifth respondent union. What the learned Single Judge was required to examine was as to whether there was obstruction by the fifth respondent. As already stated, from the very stand taken by them it is clear that they are obstructing. The next question for examination is as to whether they have a legal right to obstruct the appellant and insist that the work should be got done by engaging the members of the fifth respondent. The learned Single Judge has not examined this aspect of the matter. Merely because the fifth respondent is obstructing, police protection is denied to the appellant. It is necessary to bear in mind that the appellant has come to this Court for relief on the ground that the fifth respondent is obstructing and that the obstruction is illegal. When we asked the learned counsel for the fifth respondent to point out the provisions which confer on them the right to get employment under the appellant, in the matter of the work of loading and unloading, the learned counsel was not in a position to point out any provision which confers such a right. In the absence of such a statutory provision conferring such a right on the members of the fifth respondent, the right of the appellant to carry on his business by engaging labourers of his choice cannot be denied to him. That precisely is what has been ruled by this Court in the two decisions in Writ Appeal No. 124 of 1988 and Writ Appeal No. 228 of 1988.
5. As regards the resolution of the dispute contemplated by the Head Load Workers Act is concerned, there is no injunction or prohibition for resort being had to the authorities concerned for resolution of their disputes in accordance with the provisions of that Act, if the provisions of that Act are applicable. But, that has nothing to do with the right of the appellant to engage labourers of his choice, there being no statutory prohibition against such an action, and when there is no statutory right conferred on the members of the fifth respondent. Hence, the view taken by the learned Single Judge that he cannot grant police protection because the fifth respondent is obstructing cannot be sustained.
6. This Court has consistently held that the question of granting police protection would arise when there is likelihood of a breach of peace or there is a reasonable apprehension of commission of offences. It is in such situations that the police has a duty to intervene and prevent breach of peace and commission of offences. The appellant's stand that the respondents have no right to obstruct and the fifth respondents' stand that they have a right to obstruct the appellant may give rise to a situation of breach of peace or commission of an offence. In such an event, it becomes the duty of the police to intervene and to ensure that there is no breach of peace or the likelihood of a commission of offence is averted. It is in that background that police protection can be afforded to the appellant.
7. For the reasons stated above, this appeal is allowed and the judgment of the learned Single Judge is set aside. There would be a direction to respondents 1 to 3 to give police protection to the appellant, in the event of the fifth respondent or the members of their union obstructing the labourers of his choice for getting the work of loading and unloading done, if the police authorities apprehend that obstruction is likely to cause either breach of peace or is likely to result in commission of offences. It is obvious, that the party who apprehends commission of an offence or likelihood of breach of peace has to apprise the police authorities to the relevant facts to enable them to give police protection.
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