S.B.Majmudar, J.:-
(1). In this petition under article 226 of the constitution, the petitioner who is working as assistant in the office of this court has brought in challenge the grant of selection grades to respondents nos. 2 to 10 herein and the promotions given to them as senior clerks - cum - assistants by this court on its administrative side.
(2). In order to appreciate the grievance of the petitioner, it is necessary to note the salient features of the service bio - data of the petitioner vis - a - vis contesting respondents nos. 2 to 10 herein. The petitioner was appointed as a section writer in 1967 in the office of his court. He is now working as assistant in the same office. The petitioner was appointed as section writer on 24 - 10 - 1967. He was promoted as junior clerk on 15 - 11 - 1967 and he was confirmed as junior clerk on 1 - 3 - 1972. He passed the lower standard departmental examination, (hereafter referred to as the said examination) on 30 - 10 - 1974. 10% of the posts of junior clerks were upgraded and made section grade post in the pay - scale of rs. 190 - 290 in may 1974. Respondents nos. 2 to 10 were given selection grade by order dated 5 - 6 - 1974, exhibit a, pre sumably because all of them by that time had passed the said examination by the said order, they were given selection grades from diverse dates retrospectively from 1 - 4 - 1972. So far as the petitioner is concerned, he passed the said examination on 30 - 10 - 1974. Consequently, by an order dated 7 - 12 - 1974, the petitioner was granted section grade. Thus respondents nos. 2 to 10 were fixed in the selection grades earlier as compared to the petitioner. There after concerned respondents nos. 2 to 10 were promoted to the cadre of assistants - cum - senior clerks on different dates from 1 - 10 - 1973 to 19 - 3 - 1976. Respondent no. 2 was promoted as senior clerk on 1 - 10 - 1973. Respondent nos. 3, 4 and 5 were promoted on 2 - 7 - 1975 :res - pondents nos. 6 and 7 were promoted on 9 - 2 - 1976 while respondent no. 10 was promoted on 19 - 3 - 1976. So fir as the petitioner concerned, he came to be promoted as senior clerk - cam - assistant on 16 - 8 - 1976. So far as seniority in the junior clerks cadre is concerned, admittedly, the petitioner was senior to these respondents and there is no dispute on this aspect. It is in the background of these facts concerning the relevant bio - data of the oncerned contesting parties that the twin question posed for my consideration by mr. Hathi for the petitioner will have to be considered and decided.
(3). The only grievance which survives for consideration in the present petition is the centering round the grant of promotions to respondents nos. 2 to 10 between 1 - 10 - 1973 and 19 - 3 - 1976 and claim of the petitioner that he should be given deemed date of promoting as senior clerk from 1 - 3 - 1973 or latest from 2 - 7 - 1975. So far as this grievance is concerned, the question of delay and laches assumes great importance. It cannot be disputed that the respondent no. 2 was promoted as senior clerk on 1 - 10 - 1973 while respondent nos. 2 to 10 were promoted from posts of junior clerks to higher posts of senior clerks between 1 - 10 - 1973 and 19 - 3 - 1976. All of them were earlier working as junior clerks in the same offence in the high court the petitioner naturally must have known about those promotions at that very time. It it therefore, obvious that nothing prevented the petitioner from challenging thesaid decision of this court on administrative side by filing a writ petition at least in 1976 itself when respondent no. 10 being the junior most clerk was promoted as senior clerk. It is to be kept in view that the petitioner representation against non - granting of selection grade to him as per order in june 1974 alongwith his juniors - respondents nos. 2 to 10 was turned down by the court on administrative side in 1974 itself and by a communication dated 23 - 7 - 1974, the petitioner was informed accordingly. The munication re - cording this decision is found at page 23 of the paper - book at annexure c. This representation obviously had nothing to do with the petitioners grievance regarding grant of promotion to respondents nos. 2 to 10 and especially respondents nos. 3 to 10 in particular as respondents nos. 3 to 10 cam to be promoted as senior clerks only from 2 - 7 - 75 onwards upto 19 - 3 - 1976. Nothing has been brought on record to show that the petitioner made any representation in connection with promotions of respondents nos. 3 to 10 as senior clerks for number of years after 1976 till wel - come 11 - 10 - 1982 when he made a representation in connection with fixation of his seniority as senior clerk on the basis that promotions given to respondents nos. 2 to 10 were not correct. Mr. Shelat for respondents was right when he contended that even representation dated 11 - 10 - 1982 was grossly belated as the last of the said promotions with which the petitioner was aggrieved was of respondent m. 10 and it was dated on 19 - 3 - 1976. Thus, after 6 years and 7 months the said representation was moved and even this representation came to be rejected by this court on administrative fide in april 1983 and the result them of was communicated to the petitioner by a letter dated 22 - 4 - 1983 at annexure f. It was, therefore, rightly contended by mr. Shelat that in the first instance, this belated representation cannot entitle the petitioner to file the petition at such a late. Stage. But even that apart after that representation was turned down on 22 - 4 - 1983, the petitioner waited for further one year and or month and them and the present petition. Thus from stage to stage, the petitioners grievance as ventilated in this petition is shown to be grossly belated and hence this grievance cannot be entertained on the ground of gross delay and lacks the aforesaid contention of the learned advocate for the respondents is unassailable. It is difficult to appreciate to why the petitioner did not respondents nos. 2 to 10 at the relevant time when they were given to them. He was in the same office. No one prevented him from filing the writ petition challenging these promotions in 1976. But even assuming that he would have been justified in not rushing to this court immdiately and he would haw expected justice to be done on administrative fide, nothing prevented him from filing a written epresentation immediately after promotions were effected of the respondents between 1973 and 1976. Instead, he waited for all these years before he moved written representation in october 1982 and even though such belated representation was rejected by the high court on administrative arose, he waited for more than one year before he filed the present petition. The preliminary objection as canvassed by the learned advocates for the respondents on the ground of gross delay and laches has to be accepted and the grievance centering round the question of granting deemed date to him as a senior clerk has to be rejected at the threshold on the ground that it is grossly belated and it reflects a stale claim. It is necessary to note one contention of mr. Hathi in this connection. He submitted that respondents nos. 2 to 10 were promoted as senior clerks between 1973 3nd 1976. Petitioner also was promoted in 1976 though in august as senior clerk. His real grievance arose when he is sought to be treated as junior to respondents nos. 2 to 10 in the cadre of senior clerks while considering their claims for further promoting to the posts of section officers. Then this question arose only in 1986. Hence, the petitioners grievance cannot be treated to be stale. It is not possible to countenance this submission. The petitioner is treated as junior to respon dents nos. 2 to 10 as senior clerks as a consequence of earlier promotions of respondents nos. 2 to 10 as senior clerks years back. Claims of further promotions as section officers would be decided as a consequence of earlier promotions of respondents nos. 2 to 10 as senior clerks. That would not give a a fresh cause of action to the petitioner to challenge earlier promotions of respondents nos. 2 to 10 as senior clerks in 1986. It is a mere fortuitous circumstance that no further promotions as section officers from senior clerks were being effected in 1986. If they were to be effected say ten more years hence 1996, could the petitioner in such circumstance have legitimately waited till 1996 for the filing of petition for challenging promotions of respondents nos. 2 to 10 as senior clerks effected years back between 1973 and 1976? the contention of mr. Hathi on this basis has to be rejected as devoid of any merit. In this connection, it is profitable to refer to a latest decision of the supreme court in the case of k. R. Mudgal and others v. R. P. Singh and others air 1986, sc 2086. In the case before the supreme court, the question was regarding inter - se seniority between the petitioners who were directly appointed as assistants in the intelligence bureau of the government of india in the year 1957 and certain other assistants in the intelligence bureau of whom some had been appointed prior to 1 - 2 - 1954 and the remaining had been appointed or absorbed as assistants prior to the induction of the petitioners into service as assistants. The supreme court noted that although in the first draft seniority list of the assistants issued in the year 1957, the petitioners had been shown below the other assistants. No objections were raised by the petitioners against the seniority list nor any objection was raised by the petitioners against the seniority lists issued in 1961 and 1965. It is only after 18 years that a writ petition came to be filed by the petitioners. Petition was filed 18 years after the first draft seniority list published in the year 1958 which was held to be grossly belated and liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches. In para 7 of the report, in the light of the aforesaid factual position, venkataramiah, j. Made the following ertinent observations:
The petitioners who filed the writpetition should have in the ordinarycourse questioned the principle on the basis of which the seniority lists were being issued from time to time from the year 1958 and the promotions which being made on the basis of the said lists within a reasonable time. For the first time, they filed the writ petition in the high court in the year 1976 nearly 18 years after the first draft seniority list was published in the year 1958. Satisfactory service conditions postulate that there should be no sense of uncertainty amongst the government servants created by the writ petitions filed after several years as in this case. It is essential that any one who feels aggrieved by the seniority assigned to him should approach the court as early as possible as otherwise in addition to the creation of a sense of insecurity in the minds of the government servants there would also be administrative complications and difficulties. Unfortunately in this case even after nearly 32 years the dispute regarding the appointment of some of the respondents to the writ petition is still lingering in this court. In these circumstances, we consider that the high court was wrong in rejecting the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondents to the writ petition on the ground of laces. The supreme court in the aforesaid decision relied upon the earlier decision of the supreme court in s. R. Makashi v. I. M. Menon air 1982, sc 101 and extracted with approval the following passage found in that decision
In these circumstances, we consider that the high court was wrong in overruling the preliminary objection raised by the respondents before it, that the writ petition should be dismissed on the preliminary ground of delay and laces, inasmuch as it seeks to disrupt the vested rights regarding the seniority, rank and promotions which had accrued to a large number of respondents during the period of eight years that had intervened between the passing of the impugned resolution and the institution of the writ petition. We would accordingly hold that the challenge raised by the petitioners against the seniority principles laid down in the government resolution of march 22, 68 ought to have been rejected by the high court on the ground of delay and laches and the writ petition insofar as it related to the prayer for quashing the said government esolution should have been dismissed. The supreme court also referred to the following observations made by the supreme court in malcom lawrence cecil v. Union of india, air 1975, sc 1269 at page 1272 in para 9 of the report, as under:
Although security of service cannot be used as a shield against administrative action for lapse of a public servant, by and large one of the essential requirements of contentment and efficiency in public services is a feeling of security. It is difficult no doubt to guarantee such security in all its varied aspects, it should atleast be possible to ensure that matters like ones position in the seniority list after having been settled for once should not be liable to be reopened after lapse of many years at the instance of a party who has during the intervening period chosen to keep quiet. Raking up old matters like seniority after a long time is likely to result in administrative complications and difficulties. It would, therefore, appear to be in the interest of smoothness and efficiency of service that such matters should be given a quietus after lapse of some time.
My attention was also invited to the following observations found in para 2 of the report which reads as under:
At the outset it should be stated that it is distressing to see that cases of this kind where the validity of the appointments of the officials who had been appointed more than 32 years ago is questioned are still being agitated in courts of law. A government servant who is appointed to any post ordinarily should at least after a period of 3 or 4 years of his appointment be allowed to attend to the duties attached to his post peacefully and without any sense of insecurity.
(emphasis supplied)
(4). On the basis of this decision,therefore, it was rightly submitted on behalf of the respondents that the petitioner ought to have challenged the promotions of respondents nos. 2 to 10 at least within five years from the dates of respective promotions and the petition filed in 1984 for hallenging promotions of the concerned respondents as effected between 1 - 10 - 1973 and 19 - 3 - 76 has to be rejected on the ground of gross delay and laches. The aforesaid decision of the supreme court gets squarely attracted to the facts of the present case. I, therefore, uphold the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondents insofar as the second and the solitary surviving grievance of the petitioner is concerned.
(5). However, even assuming that the reliminary objection is liable to fail and that the grievance should be examined on merits, in order to give completeness to my judgment, i propose alternatively to examine the grievance on merits. Mr. Hathi for the petitioner is right when he contends that the said rules are statutory in character. He is equally right when he contends that as per rule 3 of the said rules, the staff of the high court is categorised and classified in different categories and so far as class iii servants are concerned,non - gazetted ministerial staff consists of clerks and senior clerks and that there is no intermediate cadre of selection grade clerks as per the said rules. It must, also, be held that the decision of the high court on administrative side of upgrading 10% posts of clerks as selection grade posts did not amount to forming of a new cadre of selection grade clerks. Otification dated 8 - 5 - 1974 which is issued under the signature of registrar of the high court as found annexed to the affidavit of mr. M. A. Trivedi, shows that in exercise of the powers conferred under article 229 of the constitution of india, the honourable chief justice of the high court was pleased to direct that the scheme contained in government resolution finance department no. Ppa. 1072/280p dated 15th may 1972 read with government resolution no. Ppa - 1972 - 1290/f dated 30th august 1972 which relates to the conversion of the posts on the cadre of clerks/typists into the posts carrying selection grade of rs. 190 - 290 shall apply to the posts of junior clerks and section writers in the high court,and this did not amount to formation of a separate cadre of selection grade clerks by the learned chief justice in exercise of his powers conferred under article 229 of the constitution and all that was done by the learned chief justice as reflected by the said decision was to upgrade 10% posts of junior clerks in higher time scale, but the higher time scale was for the employees working in the same cadre of clerks. Decision of the learned chief justice in this connection produced before me as recorded in the relevant file. A xerox copy of the said decision alongwith office submission recording conversion of 10% posts of junior clerks into selection grade in the scale of rs. 190 - 10 - 290 has beenput on the record of this case and copies thereof have been directed to be furnished to the learned advocates of the contesting parties. Now this decision in connection with conversion of 10% of posts of junior clerks into selection grade posts is culled out from the agreement recorded by the learned chief justice on the following office submission: in view of the fact that the penalty for failure to pass the lower standard departmental examination within the prescribed time is stoppage of increment till examination is passed, it should be considered as a positive demerit and the junior clerk who has not passed the lower standard departmental examination should not be appointed to the selection grade post. Mr. Hathi relying on this decision of the then learned chief justice, rightly submitted that the then learned chief justice by his aforesaid decision had not decided or ordered to create a separate cadre of selection grade clerks. The cadre remained that of clerks only and in that cadre, the petitioner was the senior most clerk as compared to respondents nos. 2 to 10. No one has disputed before me that the petitioner was not senior to all respondents nos. 2 to 10 in clerical cadre. It must, therefore, be held that merely because the petitioner did not pass the said examination within the prescribed time, he did not lose his seniority as a clerk and he would become junior to respondents nos. 2 to 10 who had passed the said examination earlier to him. Mr. Hathi also rightly invited my attention to rule 42 (6a) which read as under:
Failure to pass the examination as prescribed above, will render a junior clerk liable to have increments withheld until he passes the examination. Any increment withheld shall become payable to him from the date on which he passes the lower standard departmental examination and all future increments shall accrue to him as if no increment had been withheld.
Therefore, the only consequence of not passing the departmental examination would be withholding of increment as clerks. But there is no rule which makes a senior clerk lose his seniority as clerk merely ecause a clerk junior to him has passed the departmental examination earlier. Reliance placed by the learned advocates for the respondents on rules 39 and 86 of the rules also cannot be of any assistance to the respondents. Rule 39 provides that nothing in the preceding rule shall be deemed to curtail the power of the chief justice to promote, in his discretion, any court servant to any post as he may deem fit. This rule only entitled the chief justice as a special case, to promote any one who otherwise may not have been promoted under the ordinary sweep of rule 38 (1) , (2) and (3). It is not the case of the respondent that they have been promoted as special cases by the chief justice in exercise of his powers under rule 38. So far as rule 86 is oncerned, it provides as under:
86 (1) nothing in these rules shall be constructed to limit or abridge the powers of the chief ustice to deal with the case of any court servant or any person to be appointed to the service in such manner as may appear to him to be fit and proper.
(2) the chief justice may from time to time alter, amend or repeal any of these rules and make such further rules or pass such orders as he may deem fit in regard to all matters herein or matters incidental or ancillary to these rules or in regard to matters which have not been provided or sufficiently provided for in these rules. Provided that if such orders relate to pay, salaries, allowances, leave or pensions of the servants of the high court, such orders shall be made with the approval of the governor.
Sub - rule (1) of rule 86 deals with consideration of the case of a given court servant as a special case. Respondents nos. 2 to 10 have not been promoted as senior clerks as special cases in exercise of the powers of the chief justice under rule 86 (1). Atleast no such decision was placed on the record of this case. It is true that under sub - rule (2) of rule 86, chief justice is empowered to alter, am nd or repeal any of the rules and make such further rules or pass such orders as he may deem fit in regard to all matters or matters incidental or ancillary to these rules or in regard to matters which have not been provided or sufficiently provided for in these rules. In exercise of these powers, the chief justice was of course entitled to create a new cadre of selection grade holder clerks which could be a buffer grade between lower grade of clerks and higher grade of senior clerks or assistants. I inquired of the learned advocates for the respondents whether there was any decision of the chief justice under rule 86 (2) carving out a separate cadre of selection grade holder clerks. They were not in a position to point out any such decision of the then chief justice. There fore, notwithstanding the fact that such power does inher in the chief justice, if he has not chosen to exercise that power and create such intermediate cadre of selection grade clerks, it would not be open to the respondents to submit that there did exist such interme diate grade entry in which would affect seniority of junior clerks who enters late in the selection grade cadre as compared to his erstwhile juniors in the cadre of clerks who might have been assigned selection grade earlier and who might have entered the higher cadre earlier. The only decision of the then learned chief justice to which nay attention was invited was the decision dated 22 - 2 - 84 prescribing criteria for being assigned selection grade to the junior clerks. That merely laid down criteria for getting selection grade and did not lay down that those who are granted selection grade will be treated to have been promoted to a separate cadre of selection grade holder clerks. Mr. Hathi is right when he contends that any amendment in any of the tatutory rules of 1964 will have to be done in the manner prescribed by the rules them selves. As it is seen earlier, there is no order brought on the record of this case as passed by the then earned chief justice exercising his power under rule 86 (2) for the purpose of creation of a separate cadre of selection grade holder clerks. It must therefore, be accepted that even though the petitioner was given selection grade later on as compared to respondents nos. 2 to 10, as them was no separate cadre of selection grade holder clerks on the establishment of the high court under the relevant rules,the petitioner did not lose his seniority as a clerk vis - a - vis espondent nos. 2 to 10 who were also clerks but who were enjoying selection grade in the same cadre from the time prior to the time the petitioner was placed in the selection grade in the same cadre. However,that is not the end of the problem for the petitioner. Even accepting that the petitioner remained senior to respondents nos. 2 to 10 as clerks, even though he had passed the said examination later on and he had obtained selection grade later as compared to respondents nos. 2 to 10, the moot question would remain about his right to be considered for promoting to the higher cadre of senior clerks. For that purpose rule 38 (1) gets squarely attracted, which reads as under:
Promotions shall be made on merit, but seniority in the cadre shall be ordinarily taken into account as far as possible.
A mere reading of that rule shows that promotions from the cadre of clerks to the cadre of senior clerks will be on the basis of pure merit. But seniority also will be taken into account, meaning thereby, criterion will be merit - cum seniority. In other words, those clerks who are positively found fit for promotion can aspire to be promoted as senior clerks and more meritorious junior clerks can steal a march over their seniors in the same cadre of clerks if these juniors are found to be less meritorious at a given point of time. Adopting this criterion, let us see whether promotions of respondents nos. 2 to 10 at the relevant time were in any way illegal or irrational. So far as respondent no. 2 is concerned, he was promoted as senior clerk on 1 - 10 - 1973. On that day, the petitioner had not passed the said examination. To recapitulate, he passed the same on 30 - 10 - 1974. Thus, on that day, he would be eligible to be considered for promotion to the post of senior clerk. Sub - rule (2) of rule 42 provides that no junior clerk shall be promoted to the post of senior clerk unless he passes the lower standard depart mental examination. In view of this mandate, the petitioner could never have been considered for promotion to the post of senior clerk on 1 - 10 - 1973 when respondent no. 2 was considered. In fact, mr. Hathi for the petitioner having realised this position conceded that he does not press his case of the petitioner for being given deemed date of promotion from 1 - 10 - 1973. He then concentrated his attack on the promotion given to respondents nos. 3 to 10 between 2 - 7 - 1975 and 19 - 3 - 1976. He submitted that atleast by 1 - 7 - 1975, the petitioner had not only passed the said examination on 30 - 10 - 1984 but he was already placed in the selection grade by an order dated 7 - 12 - 1974. Thus, in july 1975 when the question of giving promotion to eligible clerks to the posts of senior clerks in the higher grade cropped up, the petitioner was in all respects similarly situated as respondents nos. 3, 4 and 5 who were admittedly junior to him as clerks but who were promoted over his head as senior clerks on 2 - 7 - 1975. It is no doubt true that on 2 - 7 - 1975, not only respondents nos. 3,4 and 5 had passed the said examination but they had already been placed in selection grade and similarly the petitioner also at that time, had passed the said examination and had obtained selection grade. But their similarity pales into insignificance and recedes in the background once the criterion for promotion to the cadre of senior clerks is kept in view. As seen above, the criterion is pure merit or merit - cum - seniority. Thus, when the question of judging relevant merit and de - merit of selection grade clerks came up for consideration in those days, it was left for respondent no. 1 to consider whether the petitioner was more meritorious or his juniors who had already passed the said examination within specified chances earlier and who were placed in the selection grade of clerks earlier was mere meritorious. I have already refer red to the decision of the then learned chief justice dated 26 - 2 - 1974 which states that penalty for failure to pass the lower standard departmental examination within the prescribed time is stop page of increment till examination is passed and it should be considered as a positive demerit. Now if non - passing of the said examination within specified chances is considered to be positive demerit it cannot be said that while judging inter - se merits of the petitioner on the one hand and his juniors - respondents nos. 3 to 5 or for that matter, upto respondent no. 10 on the other, for the purpose of eligibility for being promoted as senior clerks, on the criterion of positive merit - cum - seniority, non - passing of the said examination within specified chances and non - obtaining of selection grade earlier, was to be held as factor which was totally irrelevant and should never have entered the process of selection as made by this court on administrative side at the relevant time. Once the then learned chief ustice decided that non - passing of departmental lower standard examination within specified chances will be considered as positive demerit of the concerned junior clerks, the first respondent on administrative side was perfectly justified in allowing the petitioner to be by - passed in the process of selection of senior clerks from junior clerks, who were all having selection grade and who had passed the said examination much earlier as compared to the petitioner. Rest of the contestants had obtained positive merit by passing the said examination in specified chances earlier to the petitioner and who had already obtained selection grade earlier as compared to the petitioner. Consequently, it is because of the mandate of rule 38 (1) that the petitioner can be said to have been rightly by - passed and respondents nos. 3 to 10 can be said to have been rightly promoted as senior clerks earlier than the petitioner by adopting the criterion of positive meritcum - seniority. As the petitioner was found to be having positive demerit as compared to respondents nos. 3 to 10 at the relevant time, on two grounds:
(i) that he had not passed the said examination within specified chances as compared to respondents nos. 3 to 10 and (ii) that respondents nos. 3 to 10 had obtained selection grade earlier on the criterion of positive merit earlier to the petitioner, the action of respondent no. 1 in allowing respondent nos. 3 to 10 to steal a march over the petitioner in the process of being selected as senior clerks from the cadre of junior clerks cannot be found fault with nor can it be said to have violated the constitutional right of the petitioner under articles 14 and 16 of the constitution. Respondents nos. 3 to 10 were found to be more meritorious as compared to the petitioner on the grounds stated above, and therefore, they were promoted earlier to the petitioner as senior clerks of course from the same cadre of junior clerks to which all of them belonged and in which lower rank cadre, the petitioner was senior to all of them. It is not as if by the aforesaid process, the petitioner is made to lose his semiority as a clerk as wrongly assumed by the learned advocate for the petitioner. He admittedly remained senior to respondents nos. 3 to 10 as clerk and that is how, gradation list of section officers (ii) and junior clerks has been prepared as seen at page 29. But the question is whether the petitioner who is shown to be less meritorious as compared to respondents nos. 3 to 10 can make any valid grievance regarding his being passed over by respondents nos. 3 to 10 in the process of selection to the higher cadre of senior clerks in the light of mandate of rule 38 (1). Mr. Hathi would have been on a stronger footing if rule 38 (1) was differently worded and if promotions were to be effected not on merit - cumseniority but on the criterion of senio rity simpliciter or on the criterion of seniority - cum - merit. Then, perhaps, it would have been said that as the peti tioner was senior most clerk, he could not be bypassed by his juniors when the petitioner was not shown to be possi tively unfit for promotion, absence of positive merit notwithstanding. But unfortunately for the petitioner, criterion for promotion is pure merit - cumseniority. When the then learned chief justice had taken a decision in exer cise of his power under the relevant rules that fact of passing departmental examination by a clerk will be consi dered to be a positive merit and nonpassing thereof a corresponding posi - tive demerit, the said criterion did not cease to operate till it was reconsidered and was rightly pressed in service by the first respondent on its administrative side in effecting promotions of respondents nos. 3 to 10 at the relevant time and in bypassing the petitioner and promo - ting him as a senior clerk only from 16 - 8 - 1976. In short, the said action of the respondent no. 1 on merits is not found to be arbitrary and illegal from any angle and hence the grievance of the petitioner even on merits is found to be devoid of any substance.
Rule discharged.
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