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  • provisions of Ss.19, 20, 21, 79 and 80 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, Civil Court
  • Section 79 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950
  • Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 Civil Court
  • Bombay Public Trusts Act.
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Cites
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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  • provisions of Ss.19, 20, 21, 79 and 80 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, Civil Court
  • Section 79 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950
  • Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 Civil Court
  • Bombay Public Trusts Act.
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an appeal concerning a civil suit in which the principal question for consideration was whether the present suit is barred by res judicata by reason of a decision in a previous civil suit filed by one of the plaintiffs (referred to as plaintiff No. 2). The previous suit is identified as Regular Civil Suit No. 113 (referred to with variants of 71/73 in the text) and was dismissed by the trial Court because the plaintiffs failed to produce necessary certificates or required decisions of the competent authority under the Bombay Public Trusts Act. The appellants appealed to the District Court, and thereafter this appeal reached the Court whose judgment is summarized here. The Court has directed that the matter be remanded to the District Court (Jamnagar) to pass an appropriate decree after hearing both sides and considering the trial Court's findings and this Court's finding on res judicata, within four months; the District Judge's judgment in Regular Civil Appeal No. 76/75 was set aside. There is no order as to costs.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the present suit is barred by res judicata in view of the decision in the previous civil suit filed by plaintiff No. 2.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The learned advocate for the appellant submitted that the finding of the Courts below that the suit filed by the plaintiffs was barred by res judicata is illegal because the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to decide whether the plaintiffs were trustees of the trust or whether the trust was the owner of the suit property in view of Section 80 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act; therefore the decision of the Civil Court in the previous suit is without jurisdiction.
  • The incidental finding given by the Court in the previous suit cannot be the basis of res judicata.
  • Because the previous suit was dismissed on a technical ground (non-production of necessary certificates from the Charity Commissioner's office), there was no decision on the merits.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The learned advocate for the respondents submitted that the decisions given by both the Courts below are legal and that the plaintiff cannot be permitted to file a fresh suit on the same cause of action.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kuberbhai Shivdas v. Mahant Purshottamdas Kalyandas, (1961) 2 Guj LR 564 Holds that decisions under the Bombay Public Trusts Act have the effect of a judgment in rem by virtue of provisions including Ss.50, 70–72, 79 and 80; jurisdiction of Civil Court to decide whether properties belong to a public trust is barred; decisions of the Charity Commissioner are final and conclusive subject to appellate review. Relied upon to support the proposition that Civil Courts lack jurisdiction to decide trusteeship and trust-ownership questions and that a Civil Court's findings on such matters would be without jurisdiction and void.
Ishwarlal Nanalal v. Ghanchi Chimanlal R., ILR (1963) Guj 767 After considering provisions of the Trusts Act, held decisions under the Act operate as judgments in rem and Civil Court jurisdiction on such questions is barred. Followed with Kuberbhai to substantiate the statutory bar on Civil Courts in deciding trust existence/ownership questions under the Bombay Public Trusts Act.
Saji Alavadi Momin v. State of Gujarat, 1985 Guj LH 597 (AIR 1985 Guj 180) Followed the principle that decisions under the Trusts Act are final and bar Civil Court jurisdiction on those matters. Cited as an authority following the settled position that the Charity Commissioner's decisions are final and Civil Court jurisdiction is barred in such matters.
Bai Shakri v. Bapusinghji Takhatsinhji, AIR 1958 Bom 30 Demonstrates that if a prior judgment is without jurisdiction the subsequent suit may not be barred by res judicata. Used as part of the authorities to show that a previous judgment without jurisdiction cannot operate as res judicata to bar the present suit.
Bhikhabhai v. J.V. Vyas, (1963) 4 Guj LR 873 Authority listed among cases supporting the principle that prior decisions without jurisdiction do not create res judicata. Relied on to support the proposition that res judicata cannot be based on a prior decision that was without jurisdiction.
Gandabhai Jinabhai v. Dalpatbhai, 23(1) Guj LR 531 (AIR 1982 Guj 142) Authority listed in the group of cases showing limits to res judicata where prior decisions lacked jurisdiction or were not on merits. Cited among the decisions establishing that a prior judgment without jurisdiction does not bar a subsequent suit.
Pragdasji v. Ishwarlalbhai, AIR 1952 SC 143 Explains that a suit under S.92 Civil P.C. is special; a declaration as to existence of a trust may be ancillary but when the main cause fails for want of cause of action, any finding as to existence of trust is obiter dictum and cannot form part of the final decree as a declaratory relief; incidental findings unconnected with disposal cannot constitute final decision. Quoted and applied to hold that an incidental finding in a previous suit regarding existence of a trust would not constitute a binding final decision for purposes of res judicata where the previous suit failed on other grounds.
Abdur Rahim v. Abu Md. Barkat Ali, 55 Ind App 96 (AIR 1928 PC 16) Referenced within Pragdasji to illustrate that a declaration that property appertains to a religious trust may lie under general law but S.92 prescribes specific reliefs; thus incidental declarations may be obiter. Used as supporting authority within the Pragdasji passage relied upon by the Court to limit the binding effect of incidental findings.
Gangabai v. Chhabubai, AIR 1982 SC 20 Holds that a finding as to title rendered by a Court of Small Causes cannot be pleaded as res judicata in a subsequent regular civil suit unless the issue was directly and substantially in issue and heard and finally decided; title findings in Small Causes Court are often incidental and not res judicata. Relied on to reinforce that incidental or collateral findings (for example, title in a Small Causes Court) do not operate as res judicata in subsequent suits where title is directly raised; applied analogously to incidental findings in the prior suit here.
(Firm) Sonalal-Hansraj v. Sadashiv Dasaras, AIR 1937 Nag 146 States that for res judicata the cause of action must be heard and determined — mere hearing and determination of a suit is not enough if the cause of action was not adjudicated on the merits. Applied to the facts that the prior suit was dismissed on technical grounds (e.g., non-production of required certificates) and therefore its dismissal did not constitute a decision on the merits barring the subsequent suit.
Sheodan Singh v. Daryao Kunwar (Smt), AIR 1966 SC 1332 Holds that when the former suit's decision was not on the merits (dismissed for jurisdiction, default, technical grounds, etc.), it cannot operate as res judicata. Relied upon to support the proposition that dismissal of the previous suit on technical grounds (failure to produce certificates) does not bar a subsequent suit by res judicata.
Subramania (AIR 1931 Mad 641) Discussed (as reported) for the proposition that negligence of previous trustees in defending a suit may not bind subsequent trustees; decision considered but the Court said the point was not required to be decided in the present proceedings. Mentioned by the appellants' counsel and quoted; the Court noted the authority but declined to decide that aspect in this appeal.
Vadlamudi Sastrulu v. Venkalaseshayya, AIR 1928 Mad 614 Referenced in the context of discussing analogy between an idol (temple) and a minor regarding representation by a trustee and negligence; used in reasoning in the Subramania discussion. Quoted within the Appellants' cited materials; the Court noted it but did not decide the trustee-negligence point in this appeal.
Dada Sahib v. Gajraj Singh, AIR 1925 Mad 204 Referenced in support of the principle that a decision against trustees attributable to negligence may not bind successors (as applied in the Subramania analysis). Cited within the discussion of trustee-negligence authorities; the Court observed the authority but did not rule on that issue here.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded primarily by reference to the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 and authorities interpreting its provisions and the doctrine of res judicata.

  1. Statutory framework: The Court examined Sections 19, 20, 21, 79 and 80 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 and observed that:
    • Section 79(1) and (2) confer on the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner (and the Charity Commissioner on appeal) the authority to decide questions whether a trust exists and whether particular property is the property of a trust, and that such decisions are "final and conclusive" unless set aside by a Court on application or by the High Court on appeal (text of S.79 quoted in the opinion).
    • Section 80 deprives Civil Courts of jurisdiction to decide questions which by the Act are required to be decided by the statutory officers/authorities or in respect of which the decision of such officers is made final and conclusive.
    • Sections 19 and 21 require inquiries and registrational entries by the Deputy/Assistant Charity Commissioner about whether property is trust property and as to trustees/managers, and that entries made in the register are final and conclusive subject to the Act.
  2. Jurisdictional conclusion: Applying these statutory provisions, the Court concluded that a Civil Court would have no jurisdiction to decide whether the plaintiffs were trustees of the relevant trust or whether the suit property belonged to that trust. Therefore the Court considered the decision of the Civil Court in Regular Civil Suit No. 113 (which decided those two issues) to be without jurisdiction and the findings given by that Civil Court to be void (the opinion states that the Civil Court's decision on those issues is without jurisdiction and void).
  3. Interaction with res judicata: The Court then addressed the res judicata question. It held that once a previous judgment is found to be without jurisdiction (or when the prior suit's determination on the issue was incidental or the prior suit was dismissed on technical grounds), such a prior decision cannot operate as a bar by res judicata to a subsequent suit on the same cause of action. To support this, the Court relied on a series of authorities (including Pragdasji, Gangabai, Sonalal-Hansraj, Sheodan Singh and others) holding that:
    • An incidental finding (one not directly and substantially in issue and not heard and finally decided) cannot be the basis of a plea of res judicata (Pragdasji and Gangabai are discussed in this context).
    • If the prior suit was dismissed on technical grounds (for example, failure to produce a required certificate, want of jurisdiction, default, misjoinder, premature suit, registration technicality, etc.) and not on the merits, the cause of action was not heard and determined and res judicata does not apply (authorities such as Sonalal-Hansraj and Sheodan Singh are cited).
  4. Application to present facts: The Court found that in the previous civil suit the Civil Court lacked jurisdiction to decide whether the suit property was trust property and whether the plaintiffs were trustees, and that the prior suit had been dismissed because the plaintiffs failed to produce the necessary certificates from the competent authority under the Bombay Public Trusts Act. The Court characterized that dismissal as a technical dismissal (not a decision on the merits).
  5. Conclusion from analysis: On the combined basis that (a) the Civil Court lacked jurisdiction to decide the trust/ownership questions and (b) the previous suit was dismissed on technical grounds without determination on merits, the Court concluded that the earlier judgment could not operate as res judicata to bar the present suit.
  6. Remedies and further directions: Noting that other issues in the trial Court had been decided in favour of the plaintiffs and were not challenged on appeal by the defendant, but given that the suit was dismissed by the lower appellate Court on the ground of res judicata, the Court considered it appropriate and reasonable to remit the matter to the District Court. The District Court was directed to pass an appropriate decree after hearing the parties and taking into account the trial Court's findings and the present Court's finding on res judicata within four months from receipt of the writ of the Court, after issuing notices to both sides. No order as to costs was made.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal was partly allowed. The judgment and decree passed by the District Judge, Jamnagar, in Regular Civil Appeal No. 76/75 was set aside. The matter was remanded to the District Court to pass an appropriate decree after hearing both sides and after taking into consideration the trial Court's findings and this Court's finding on the issue of res judicata, to be done within four months after issuing notices to both sides. There was no order as to costs.

Implications:

  • The Court held that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction under the Bombay Public Trusts Act to decide whether the plaintiffs were trustees or whether the disputed property belonged to the trust; the Civil Court's findings on those issues were treated as without jurisdiction and void.
  • Because the previous suit was dismissed on technical grounds (failure to produce necessary certificates/decisions of competent authorities) and not on the merits, the prior dismissal does not operate as res judicata to bar the present suit.
  • The direct practical consequence is that the dispute remains justiciable and the District Court has been directed to pass an appropriate decree after further proceedings; the Court did not purport to lay down any novel or new precedent beyond applying established authorities and statutory interpretation of the Bombay Public Trusts Act in the context of res judicata principles.

No other orders regarding costs were made: "There will be no order regarding costs all throughout."

    Trustees Of Jam-Jodhpur Sthanak Vasi Vardhman Vanik Jain Sangh And Others v. Thambaklal Jivaram And Others

    Judgement

    JUDGEMENT :- 1. to 6. x x x x x x

    7. In this appeal the only question which would require considerations is whether the suit is barred by res ***** in view of the decision in the previous civil suit filed by plaintiff No. 2.

    8. The learned advocate for the appellant vehemently submitted that the finding of the Courts below that the suit filed by the plaintiffs was barred by res judicata is on the face of (it) illegal because -

    (1) Civil Court has no jurisdiction to decide whether plaintiffs were the trustees of the trust and that the trust was the owner of the suit property in view of S.80 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act. Therefore the decision of the Civil Court in previous suit is without jurisdiction;

    (2) The incidental finding given by the Court in the previous suit cannot be the basis of res judicata;

    (3) as the previous suit was dismissed on technical ground as the necessary certificates from the Charity Commissioners office were not produced, therefore there was no decision on merits.

    As against this, the learned advocate for the respondents vehemently submitted that the decisions given by both the Courts below are legal. He submitted that the plaintiff cannot be permitted to file fresh suit on the same cause of action.

    9. In my view, the finding given by the Courts below that the suit is barred by res judicata is on the face of it illegal. Section 79 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 provides as under :

    "79.(1) Any question, whether or not a trust exists and such trust is a public trust or particular property is the property of such trust, shall be decided by the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner or the Charity Commissioner in appeal as provided by this Act.

    (2) The decision of the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner or the Charity Commissioner in appeal, as the case may be, shall, unless set aside by the decision of the Court on application or of the High Court in appeal, be final and conclusive."

    Under S.80 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 Civil Court has no jurisdiction to decide or deal with any question which is by or under the Act required to be decided or dealt with by any officer or authority under the Act or in respect of which the decision or order of such officer or authority has been made final and conclusive. Under S.19 of the Act the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner is required to hold an inquiry in the prescribed manner for the purpose of ascertaining inter alia whether any property is the property of trust and the names and addresses of the trustees and manager of such trust. Under S.21 of the Act the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner is required to make entries in the register kept under S.17 in accordance with the findings recorded by him under S.20 or if appeals or applications are made as provided by the Act, in accordance with the final decision of the competent authority. Sub-Sec. (2) of S.21 provides that the entries so made shall subject to the provisions of the Act and subject to any change recorded under the provisions of the Act be final and conclusive. In view of the provisions of Ss.19, 20, 21, 79 and 80 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, Civil Court would have no jurisdiction to deal with and decide whether the plaintiffs were trustees of the aforesaid trust or that the suit property was the property of such trust. Therefore, the decision given by the Civil Court in Regular Civil Suit No. 113/73 deciding the following two issues is without jurisdiction and the findings given by the Civil Court would be void :

    (1) Whether plaintiffs are trustees of Shri Jam-Jodhpur Sthanakvasi Vardhaman Vanik Trust ?

    (2) Whether the property mentioned at para twelve of the plaint belongs to plaintiff No. 2 ?

    This Court in the case of Kuberbhai Shivdas v. Mahant Purshottamdas Kalyandas, (1961) 2 Guj LR 564, and in the case of Ishwarlal Nanalal v. Ghanchi Chimanlal R., ILR (1963) Guj 767, after considering the provisions of the trusts act held that the decisions given under the Act have the effect of a judgement in rem by virtue of Ss.50, 70 to 72 and 79 and 80 of the Act, that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to decide whether properties belong to the public trust or not is barred; that decision given by the Charity Commissioner is final and conclusive subject to the decision of the appellate or revision authority and is binding to the Civil Court. The said decisions have been followed in the case of 5herasiya Saji Alavadi Momin v. State of Gujarat, 1985 Guj LH 597 : (AIR 1985 Guj 180). In view of this settled position of law it cannot (can ?) be said that the decision of the Civil Court in Regular Civil Suit No. 113/71 deciding that the plaintiffs are not trustees and the suit property is not trust property is without jurisdiction null and void.

    10. Once it is held that the judgement in previous suit is without jurisdiction, then it cannot be said that the present suit is barred by res judicata for principles of res judicata. This position is clear from the following decisions :

    (1) Bai Shakri v. Bapusinghji Takhatsinhji, AIR 1958 Bom 30.

    (2) Bhikhabhai v. J.V. Vyas, (1963) 4 Guj LR 873.

    (3) Gandabhai Jinabhai v. Dalpatbhai, 23(1) Guj LR 531 : (AIR 1982 Guj 142).

    Further, even if any incidental finding is given by the Court while deciding the previous suit, it cannot be said that the said finding is binding in the next suit or it can be the basis of res judicata.

    11. The Supreme Court in Pragdasji v. lshwarlalbhai, AIR 1952 SC 143, has held as under :

    "A suit under S.92, Civil P.C. is a suit of a special nature which presupposes the existence of a public trust of a religious or charitable character. Such suit can proceed only on the allegation that there is a breach of such trust or that directions from the Court are necessary far the administration thereof, and it must pray for one or other of the reliefs that are specifically mentioned in the Section. It is only when these conditions are fulfilled that the suit, has got to be brought in conformity with the provisions of S.92, Civil P.C. As was observed by the Privy Council in Abdur Rahim v. Abu Md. Barkat Ali, 55 Ind App 96 : (AIR 1928 PC 16), a suit far a declaration that certain property appertains to a religious trust may lie under the general law but is ***** scope of S.92, Civil P.C. In the ***** the prayers made in the plaint ***** appropriate to the terms of S.92 and the suit proceeded on the footing that the defendant, who was alleged to be the trustee in respect of a public trust was guilty of breach of trust. The defendant denied the existence of the trust and denied further that he was guilty of misconduct or breach of trust. The denial could not certainly oust the jurisdiction of the Court, but when the Courts found concurrently on the evidence adduced by the parties, that the allegations of breach of trust were not made out, and as it was not the case of the plaintiffs, that any direction of the Court was necessary for proper administration of the trust, the very foundation of a suit under S.92, Civil P.C. became wanting and the plaintiffs had absolutely no cause of action for the suit they instituted. In these circumstances, the finding of the High Court about the existence of a public trust was wholly inconsequential and as it was unconnected with the grounds upon which the case was actually disposed of, it could not be made a part of the decree or the final order in the shape of a declaratory relief in favour of the plaintiffs. It has been argued-by the learned counsel for the respondents that even if the plaintiffs failed to prove the other allegations made in the plaint, they did succeed in proving that the properties were public and charitable trust properties a fact which the defendant denied. In these circumstances, there was nothing wrong for the Court to give the plaintiffs a lesser relief than what they actually claimed. The reply to this is, that in a suit framed under S.92, Civil P.C., the only reliefs which the plaintiff can claim and the Court can grant are those enumerated specially in the different clauses of the Section. A relief praying for a declaration that the properties in suit are trust properties does not come under any of these clauses. When the defendant denies the existence of a trust, a declaration that the trust does exist might be made as ancillary to the main relief claimed under the Section if the plaintiff is held entitled to it; but when the case of the plaintiff fails for want of a cause of action, there is no warrant for giving him a declaratory relief under the provision of S.92, Civil P.C. The *****ding as to the existence of a ***** in such circumstances would be no more than an obiter dictum and cannot constitute the final decision in the suit. The result is that in our opinion the decision of the High Court should stand, but the decree and the concluding portion of the judgement passed by the trial Court and affirmed by the High Court on appeal shall direct a dismissal of the plaintiffs suit merely without its being made subject to any declaration as to the character of the properties. To this extent the appeal is allowed and the final decree modified."

    12. In the case of Gangabai v. Chhabubai, AIR 1982 SC 20, the Supreme Court has held as under :

    "It seems to us that when a finding as to title to immovable property is rendered by a Court of Small Causes res judicata cannot be pleaded as a bar in a subsequent regular civil suit for the determination or enforcement of any right or interest in immovable property. In order to operate as res judicata the finding must be one disposing of a matter directly and substantially in issue in the former suit and the issue should have been heard and finally decided by the Court trying such suit. A matter which is collaterally or incidentally in issue for the purpose of deciding the matter which is directly in issue in the case cannot be made the basis of a plea of res judicata. It has long been held that a question of title in a Small Cause suit can be regarded as incidental only to the substantial issue in the suit and cannot operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit in which the question of title is directly raised."

    Therefore, the incidental finding of the Court in the previous suit that plaintiffs of that suit had failed to produce any evidence to prove that they were trustees and the trust was the owner of the disputed land, would not be the basis of holding that the present suit is barred by res judicata.

    13. Further, if the previous suit is not decided on merits and if the cause of action is not determined but the Court has dismissed the suit merely on technical grounds, then on the basis of the said finding it cannot be said that the subsequent suit is barred by res judicata and the fact that the Court has passed a decree dismissing the suit does not alter the character of the determination. In the case of (Firm) Sonalal-Hansraj v. Sadashiv Dasaras, AIR 1937 Nag 146, the Court has held that for the operation of the principle of res judicata it is not enough that the former suit has been heard and determined but the cause of action must be heard and determined. In that case the suit was dismissed on the ground that the firm was unregistered and the second suit was instituted on the same cause of action after registration of the firm. The Court held that the suit was not barred by res judicata as the subject matter of the previous suit was not determined. The Court has relied upon the following passages from the Law of Estoppel by Everest and Strode :

    "In order to create an estoppel, the adjudication itself must be a final one, and the matter itself must not only have been determined but controverted as well. The rule in chancery was that an order dismissing an action was a bar to a fresh action for the same matter, if the dismissal was upon hearing and was not in terms directed to be without prejudice, and if the Court determined that the plaintiff had no title to the relief sought; so that in pleading a former suit as a bar, it was not sufficient to show that the bill was dismissed; but you must plead further that which will show that the same matter in dispute in the subsequent suit was res judicata in the first;

    and in para 686 of Caspersz on Estoppel, Edn. 4, it is stated :

    It is not enough that the former suit has been heard and determined. The cause of action must be heard and determined.

    14. Again there is to be found in the same paragraph the observations of Phear, J. in (1874) 21 Suth WR 105 :

    "It seems to be clear then that the objection to a suit on the ground of multifariousness or misjoinder of causes of action is an objection to the hearing of the suit; and if it prevails at whatever time it has the effect of preventing a determination.............. The fact that the Court has, in form, passed a decree dismissing the suit, does not alter the character of the determination."

    15. In the case of Sheodan Singh v. Daryao Kunwar (Smt) ., AIR 1966 SC 1332 the Court has held that it is the Court which decides the former suit whose jurisdiction to try the subsequent suit has to be considered and not the Court in which the former suit may have been filed. The Court held that if the decision in the former suit was not on merits, then it cannot be said that there would be a bar of res judicata. In paragraph (13) the Court has held as under :

    "Reliance in this connection is placed on the well settled principle that in order that a matter may be said to have been heard and finally decided, the decision in the former suit must have been on the merits. Where, for example, the former suit was dismissed by the trial Court for want of jurisdiction, or for default of plaintiffs appearance, or on the ground of non-joinder of parties or misjoinder of parties or multifariousness, or on the ground that the suit was badly framed, or on the ground of a technical mistake, or for failure on the part of the plaintiff to produce probate or letter of administration or succession certificate when the same is required by law to entitle the plaintiff to a decree, or for failure to furnish security for costs, or on the ground of improper valuation or for failure to pay additional court-fee on a point which was undervalued or for want of cause of action or on the ground that it is premature and the dismissal is confirmed in appeal (if any) the decision not being on the merits would not be res judicata in a subsequent suit."

    (Underlines added)

    As stated above, in the previous civil suit the Court had no jurisdiction to decide the question whether the suit property was trust property, that plaintiffs were trustees or not and that the suit was dismissed on the ground that the plaintiffs have failed to produce the necessary certificates of the competent authority under the Bombay Public Trusts Act. The suit was dismissed solely on technical ground of non-production of necessary certificates or necessary decision of the authorities under the Bombay Public Trusts Act. Hence it cannot be said that the trial Court has decided the suit on merits and it cannot be the basis for dismissing the present suit on the ground of res judicata.

    16. The learned advocate for the appellants relief ***** the decision in the case of Subramania ***** AIR 1931 Mad 641, wherein the Madras High Court has held that if the trustees are negligent in filing written statement and defending the previous suit and the suit is decreed against them because of gross negligence on the part of the then trustees in not putting forward a valid defence, the said decision is not binding on the subsequent trustees. This point is not required to be decided in the present proceedings. The learned advocate or the appellants, however, heavily relied upon the following observations in that judgement :

    "As already stated, it is clear that if the then trustee had defended O.S. No. 550 of 1920, no decree would have been passed in it against the temple. On principle I do not see any reason why an idol of a temple should not be treated in the same manner as a minor with respect to the gross negligence on the part of the trustee in not defending the suit, the trustee representing its interests just in the same way as the guardian represents the interests of the minor. An idol can act only through the trustee of the temple. As Mr. Muthukrishna Aiyar has pointed out it is possible in certain respects to distinguish the position of a trustee representing an idol from the position of a guardian of a minor but on broad principle I cannot find any satisfactory ground for treating the case of a trustee representing an idol in a suit differently from the case of a guardian representing a minor. In Vadlamudi Sastrulu v. Venkalaseshayya, AIR 1928 Mad 614, the learned Judges assumed without deciding the question that the idol is in the position of a minor but held that there was no negligence in the course of the previous litigation in that case. In the absence of specific authority cm the point I am inclined to hold that the principle underlying the decision in Dada Sahib v. Gajraj Singh, AIR 1925 Mad 204, may well be applied to the facts of the present case and I would therefore hold that the decision in O.S. No. 550 of 1920 would not operate as res judicata in the present suit."

    However, in my view, because of the aforesaid discussion it is not necessary to deal with this aspect in this appeal.

    17. As the suit was dismissed solely on the ground that it is ***** by res judicata and the other issues were decided in favour of the plaintiffs against which no appeal or cross-objections were fried by the defendants before the District Court, the said findings on the said issues were not challenged by the learned advocate for the defendants, but however, he submitted that for passing appropriate decree in the matter, the matter may be remanded to the District Court. In my view, this submission is just and reasonable.

    18. Hence the appeal is partly allowed. The judgement and decree passed by the District Judge, Jamnagar, in Regular Civil Appeal No. 76/75 is set aside, The District Court is directed to pass appropriate decree after hearing both the sides and after taking into consideration the finding of the trial Court and the finding of this Court on the issue of res judicata within four months from the date of the receipt of the writ of this Court after issuing notices to both the sides. There will be no order regarding costs all throughout.

    Appeal partly allowed.

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