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  • Sections 7 and 12 of the Police Act, 1861
  • Sub-Inspector.10. Since Rule 668
  • authority.16. Rule 660C
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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  • Sections 7 and 12 of the Police Act, 1861
  • Sub-Inspector.10. Since Rule 668
  • authority.16. Rule 660C
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — S.N. Jha, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioners in two writ petitions sought a mandamus directing respondents to confirm them in the rank of Inspector of Police on completion of the two-year probation and to grant consequential benefits including re-fixation of seniority and promotion to the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police.

The petitions arose from out-of-turn promotions granted under Rule 660C of the Bihar Police Manual: Mohammad Hasnain was granted promotion on July 4, 1985 with effect from February 15, 1983; Kumar Amar Singh was granted promotion on February 3, 1988 with effect from January 17, 1983. The core dispute was whether the term "vacancies" in Rule 660C includes temporary vacancies or only permanent vacancies.

Both petitioners and the State filed affidavits and documents. The court noted that, because the matter turned on a specific point of law, extensive traversal of factual pleadings was unnecessary.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the expression "vacancies" within the meaning of Rule 660C of the Bihar Police Manual includes temporary vacancies as well as permanent (substantive) vacancies.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • Counsel relied on Rule 649 (promotion procedure) and Rule 668 (probation period of two years) of the Bihar Police Manual to contend that upon completion of the probation period the officers should be deemed confirmed in the posts they occupied.
  • They argued that confirmation on completion of probation should not be made contingent on the existence of permanent vacancies if the posts occupied are part of the cadre, and that temporary posts that have existed for an extended period should be treated as part of the cadre.
  • They sought confirmation without accelerated seniority; petitioners indicated they would not object if officers above them were also confirmed, but sought confirmation for themselves after having held the posts for many years (more than 14 years at the time of judgment).

Respondents' / State's Arguments

  • The respondents accepted that officers are entitled to confirmation on completion of probation under Rule 668 but maintained that such confirmation could only be made against permanent (substantive) vacancies.
  • Counsel for the State pointed out that the petitioners were placed at serial numbers 435 and 436 in the gradation list while only officers up to serial number 390 had been confirmed, expressing reservations about granting accelerated seniority or re-fixation of seniority beyond that point.
  • The State also submitted that the object of Rule 660C was essentially to give one accelerated promotion out-of-turn and that once such promotion is given, petitioners could not claim further accelerated seniority.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officers' Association v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1990 SC 1607; 1990 (2) PLJR 23 (SC) Principle that where appointment is made according to rules (and is not purely ad hoc), the incumbent is entitled to count the entire period of officiation for seniority. The court relied on this Constitution Bench decision to support the view that continuous officiation should be reckoned for seniority and related benefits, reinforcing that confirmation should not be withheld merely because the post was temporary in name.
S.P. Patwardhan v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1977 SC 2051 Principle that "confirmation is one of the inglorious uncertainties of government service" and that lack of formal confirmation does not prevent reckoning seniority and service benefits. Cited for the proposition that non-confirmation does not bar reckoning of seniority or service benefits; followed in later cases and used to argue against denying confirmation on the basis of absence of substantive vacancies.
A.K. Subraman v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 483 Statement that a cadre may consist of permanent posts or of temporary posts as well. Applied to support the conclusion that cadre posts may include temporary posts and hence vacancies may include temporary ones.
O.P. Singla v. Union of India, AIR 1984 SC 1595 Principle that all posts in a service, whether permanent or temporary, are generally regarded as cadre posts. Used to reinforce the view that temporary posts, being part of the cadre, can be treated as substantive for purposes of confirmation and seniority.
P.K. Dixit v. State of U.P., AIR 1988 SC 260 Statement that when appointment under a rule is contemplated in the service of substantive vacancies, it may be to temporary or permanent vacancies provided the vacancy is in the cadre. Relied upon to conclude that substantive vacancies contemplated by rules may include temporary posts if they form part of the cadre.
O.P. Garg v. State of U.P., AIR 1991 SC 1202 Observation that appointment under a rule can be to a permanent post as well as to a temporary post and that a temporary post with independent existence and forming part of cadre must be treated as substantive. Applied to support the proposition that temporary posts with independent existence are substantive for appointment/confirmation purposes.
Baleshwar Das (reported in AIR 1981 SC 41) Referenced as one of the Supreme Court judgments dealing with related service-law principles (including confirmation and cadre issues). Referenced by the court as part of the body of Supreme Court authority that informed the framing/amendment of the Rule and supported the court's interpretation that temporary posts in a cadre cannot be excluded from substantive vacancies.
Shridhar Mandal (CWJC No. 55 of 1992; MJC No. 1827 of 1992) — High Court order disposed 31 January 1994 High Court decision granting relief where the amended Rule no longer required confirmation against "substantive vacancies". The court noted that relief was granted in this case on the basis that the amended Rule omitted language requiring confirmation against substantive vacancies; used as a local precedent illustrating the effect of the rule amendment.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in a step-by-step textual and contextual analysis strictly based on the record and the Rules:

  1. The court identified the single point for decision: whether "vacancies" in Rule 660C include temporary vacancies.
  2. It examined Rule 660C as originally framed in 1978 (quoted in the opinion) and noted the amendment by GSR 65 dated November 29, 1982, and a later substitution in 1989. Because the petitioners' promotions had effect dates in 1983, their cases were governed by the 1982 amendment.
  3. The court reviewed related provisions of the Bihar Police Manual: Rule 649 (promotion procedure), Rules 653 and 659 (allocation of vacancies and filling vacancies by promotion/direct recruitment), and Rule 668 (probation periods — two years for executive officers). The Manual was noted to have been framed under Sections 7 and 12 of the Police Act, 1861 and therefore to carry statutory force.
  4. The court observed that the Manual did not expressly define terms such as 'substantive vacancies', 'permanent vacancies', 'temporary vacancies', or 'cadre', but that these are well-known expressions in service jurisprudence and are to be understood in their usual sense.
  5. Interpreting the Rules together, the court found nothing in the Manual that excluded temporary posts from the cadre or from consideration when giving promotions or confirmations. Thus, it was legitimate to hold that the cadre includes temporary posts and that the Rules do not distinguish between temporary and permanent vacancies for promotions (including to Inspector).
  6. The court relied on a body of Supreme Court authority (cited cases) establishing principles that: (a) incumbents who officiate under rules are entitled to count the period of officiation for seniority unless rules expressly provide otherwise; (b) confirmation does not stand in the way of reckoning seniority and other benefits; and (c) cadre may include temporary posts which, if they have independent existence, are to be treated as substantive for appointment/confirmation purposes.
  7. The court also noted the practical purpose of Rule 660C — to give an out-of-turn promotion as a meaningful benefit — and observed that making confirmation contingent on future substantive vacancies (if those were construed to exclude temporary posts) could nullify the benefit by the time substantive vacancies arise (for example, by superannuation).
  8. The court pointed out that the phrase "and confirmed against substantive vacancies as and when vacancies arise in the order of the list" which originally formed part of Rule 660C was omitted in the amended Rule, and that a previous High Court order (Shridhar Mandal) had granted relief on this basis. The court inferred that the framers, in amending the Rule, intended to remove the uncertainty created by a requirement of confirmation only against substantive vacancies.
  9. Addressing the State's concern about seniority positions and "accelerated seniority," the court accepted the petitioners' position that they were not seeking further accelerated seniority beyond the promotion already granted; they sought confirmation in the posts they had held for many years. The court found the petitioners' submissions well-founded in law and fact.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petitions were allowed. The court directed the respondents to consider the petitioners for confirmation in the rank of Inspector of Police in the light of the observations made in the judgment and to consider them, along with others, for consequential benefits in accordance with law.

Implications

  • Direct effect: The respondents are required to reconsider the petitioners' cases for confirmation and consequential benefits (including re-fixation of seniority and consideration for promotion) consistent with the court's analysis that vacancies under Rule 660C include temporary posts that form part of the cadre.
  • Scope of relief: The court ordered consideration of confirmation and consequential benefits but did not, in its operative direction, independently re-fix seniority or promote the petitioners without due process; it directed respondents to act in accordance with law and the observations in the judgment.
  • Precedential effect: The court relied upon and applied existing Supreme Court authority and prior High Court practice in interpreting the Rules. The opinion gives a reasoned application of those authorities to the facts at hand; it does not announce a novel legal principle beyond the application of existing authorities to the Rules quoted in the opinion.

This summary is based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion and does not add or infer information beyond that text.

    Mohammad Hasnain (In 3359) v. Kumar Amar Singh (In 3360)

    S.N Jha, J.:— The petitioners in these two writ petitions seek a mandamus to the respondents to confirm them in the rank of Inspector of Police on completion of period of probation of two years and to give them the consequential benefits of such confirmation by way of re-fixation of their seniority in the gradation list of Inspectors, promotion to the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police, etc.

    2. Both the petitioners and the State have filed exhaustive affidavits enclosing documents in support of their respective case. But as the writ petitions involve a short (though not simple) point of law it is unnecessary to traverse the facts pleaded by them.

    3. The petitioners were granted out-of-turn promotion to the rank of Inspector of Police in terms of provisions of Rule 660C of the Bihar Police Manual. While Mohammad Hasnain, petitioner in CWJC No. 3359 of 1996 was granted such promotion on July 4, 1985 with effect from February 15, 1983, Kumar Amar Singh, the petitioner in CWJC No. 3360 of 1995 was allowed the said promotion on February 3, 1988 with effect from January 17, 1983. The dispute between the parties is whether they are to be confirmed only against the permanent vacancies in the rank of Inspector, as asserted by the respondents, or against either permanent or temporary vacancies in the rank, as contended by the petitioners. The only point for consideration is whether the vacancies within the meaning of Rule 660C includes temporary vacancies as well.

    4. Rule 660C as originally stood in the Bihar Police Manual framed in 1978 was as follows:—

    “660C. Out of turn promotion.— Selection Boards may recommend out of turn promotion of officers with outstanding records of service and competant authorities may order such promotion in deserving cases as they deem fit and proper with the approval of next higher authority.

    Officers so promoted should be placed below the officers of the approved existing list of respective rank prepared by Selection Boards and confirmed against substantive vacancies as and when vacancies arise in the order of the list.

    Criteria taken together for determining outstanding records of service will be as follows:—

    (i) Award of President's Police Medal and Indian Police Medal for gallentry and distinguished Service;

    (ii) should not have been awarded any major punishment till the date of consideration and order of out of trun promotion;

    (iii) very good entries in permanent Charactor Roll;

    (iv) citation regarding high standard of investigation, detection and control of crime and intelligence work;

    (v) should have ability for shouldering higher responsibility consonant with the proposed promotion. [See Home (Police) Department notification no. GSR 54 dated 12th May, 1976.]”

    5. The Rule, it would appear is in two parts. While the first part contains the substantive provisions regarding out of turn promotion, the second part contains the eligibility clause for such promotion. By notification No. GSR 65 dated November 29, 1982 of the Home (Police) Department the Rule was amended. The petitioners have filed the Hindi text of the amended Rules. Translated into English, the amended Rule reads as follows (omitting the eligibility/criteria part):

    “Selection Boards may recommend out of turn promotion to officers who have been awarded police medal, having outstanding record of service, and the competent authority may order such promotion if it considers fit and proper with approval of the next higher authority. The officers so promoted shall be placed below the officers of the existing approved list of respective rank prepared by Selection Boards.

    The following criteria shall be adopted for determining outstanding records of service

    …………………

    6. The Rule was amended again by notification no. GSR 1463 dated February 4, 1989. A new Rule was substituted in place of the existing one. The amended Rule now provides for only the criteria and procedure to be adopted for giving out of turn promotion. The first part of the Rule as it stood originally in 1978 or amended in 1982, quoted hereinabove, no longer forms part of the Rule. But we need not detain ourselves on this point because it is not in dispute between the parties that the petitioners having been granted out of turn promotion in 1985-1988 with effect from February 15, 1983 and January 17, 1983, respectively, their cases are governed by the Rule as amended in 1982 which was then in force.

    7. Mr. Ganesh Prasad Singh, learned counsel for the petitioners contended that in terms of Rule 649 of the Police Manual which provides for promotion of Sub-Inspector to Inspector and Rule 668 which provides for probation of two years, on completion of the probation period, the officers so promoted should be deemed to have been confirmed in the posts. The respondents do not deny that in terms of provisions of Rule 668 the officers are entitled to confirmation on completion of the probation period; they however contend that such confirmation can be made only against permanent vacancies in the posts.

    8. The Bihar Police Manual has been framed by the State Government in exercise of the powers conferred upon it under Sections 7 and 12 of the Police Act, 1861 and has therefore statutory force. The Manual does not define the expressions ‘substantive vacancies’, ‘parmanent vacancies’, ‘temporary vacancies’ or ‘cadre’. But they are well known expressions in service jurisprudence and therefore in the absence of any specific definition they will have the same meaning and be understood in the usual sense of the term. The Police Manual, however, lays down the procedure for appointment/promotion to different posts including Inspectors. Rule 649 which provides for promotion of Sub-Inspectors to the rank of Inspector may be quoted, so far as relevant, as follows:—

    “(a) The promotion of Sub-Inspectors to Inspectors and Reserve Sub-Inspectors to Reserve Inspectors will be made by the Inspector General on the decision of Inspector General's Selection Board. [Appendix 72(1)] (For period of probation, see Rule 668).

    (b) In July the Deputy inspector General will call for nomination for promotion to reach him on the date fixed. The form of nomination and list of enclosures are given in PM form No. 102.

    (c) ….…..….

    (d) The Range Selection Board [Appendix 72(3)] shall scrutinise the district nominations and shall select from among them in order of merit those whose nominations are to be sent before the Inspector-General's Selection Board [Appendix 72(1)] on a date to be fixed by the Inspector-General.

    (e) The Inspector General's Selection Board [Appendix 72(1)] shall scrutinise the nominations of the Range Selection Board and compile a list of selections which should ordinarily be in order of seniority for promotion as vacancies occur. If an officer is placed higher in the list then his seniority warrants a full note giving reason shall be recorded. This list shall be of as many Sub-Inspectors as there are vacancies plus few anticipatory vacancies depending on average of last few years….”

    9. The post of Sub-Inspector is filled up both by promotion as well as direct recruitment. Rule 659 provides that 50 per cent “vacancies” shall be filled by selection from the rank of Assistant Sub-Inspector who have at least done minimum five years of service. As regards direct recruitment, Rule 653 lays down that—

    “In July the Inspector General will intimate to each Deputy Inspector General the number of vacancies allotted to each district and the Criminal Investigation/Intelligence Department and the number to be filled by direct recruitment and by promotion of Assistant Sub-Inspector.”

    10. Since Rule 668 has been relied upon by the counsel for the petitioners it would be proper to quote the relevant part of that Rule as well, as hereunder:—

    “The following rules shall govern first appointments and the promotion of police and ministerial officers as detailed in Appendix 41:—

    (a) All officers shall in the first instance be appointed or promoted on probation. Where the period of probation is not otherwise provided for in rules which shall be for a period of two years in the case of executive officers and one year in the case of ministerial officers.

    11. It would thus appear that the Rules do not make distinction between temporary vacancies or permanent vacancies for giving promotion to the post of not only Inspector of Police but also other posts. It would therefore be quite legitimate to hold that the cadre of these ranks includes temporary posts as well. At least there is nothing to indicate that the temporary posts are excluded.

    12. It is well settled that where appointment is made according to Rules, except where the same is purely ad hoc or fortuitous, made as a stop-gap arrangment, the incumbent of the post is entitled to count the entire period of officiation by virtue of such appointment for purposes of his seniority. Reference may be made to the of cited decision of the Constitution Bench in Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officers' Association v. State of Maharashtra. AIR 1990 SC 1607 : 1990 (2) PLJR 23 (SC). It is also well settled that confirmation in service is one of the “inglorious uncertainties” in government service and does not stand in the way of the incumbent for either reckoning his seniority in service or for other service benefits. This was said so in the case of S.P Patwardhan v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1977 SC 2051, followed in innumerable cases later. It may be useful to quote the well known passage from the judgment, “confirmation is one of the inglorious uncertainties of government service depending neither on the efficiency of incumbent nor on the availability of substantive vacancies”. It is, again, well settled that the cadre may consist of both permanent and temporary posts. If it is so, ‘substantive vacancies’ would include temporary posts as well.

    13. In A.K Subraman v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 483 it was stated, “a cadre may consist only of permanent posts or sometimes, as is quite common these days, also of temporary posts”. In O.P Singla v. Union of India, AIR 1984 SC 1595, again it was stated, “therefore all posts in the Service, whether permanent or temporary are generally regarded as cadre posts”. In P.K Dixit v. State of U.P AIR 1988 SC 260 while dealing with the case of appointment to U.P Higher Judicial Service and considering the provisions of U.P Higher Judicial Service Rule, 1975, the Supreme Court stated, “It therefore could not be doubted that when the appointment under Rule 22 is contemplated in the service of substantive vacancies, it may be both temporary or permanent but the vacancy must be in the cadre”. Again, in O.P Garg v. State of U.P, AIR 1991 SC 1202 the Apex Court considering the same very provisions of the U.P Higher Judicial Service Rules observed.

    “Appointment under Rule 22 can be made to a permanent post as well as to a temporary post. So long as the temporary post has an independent existence and is a part of the cadre strength the appointment against the said post has to be treated as substantive appointment.”

    14. I am conscious of the fact that these decisions have been rendered in the context of and on interpretation of particular rules. So far as the rules governing appointment/promotion to the post of Inspector/Sub-Inspector of Police etc. are concerned, as noticed above, there is nothing in the Bihar Police Manual which makes distinction between permanent vacancies and temporary vacancies or excludes the temporary vacancies from the cadre. In my opinion, therefore, there is no basis for the argument that the ‘substantive vacancies’ would include only the permanent posts and not temporary posts for the purpose of giving consequential benefits of out of turn promotion under Rule 660C.

    15. It is significant to point out here that the words “and confirm against substantive vacancies as and when arises in the order of the list” occurring in Rule 660C, as it originally stood in 1978, are no more part of the amended Rule. In other words, while under Rule 660C as it originally stood the officers promoted on out of turn basis were to be confirmed against ‘substantive vacancies’ as and when vacancies arose, there is nothing like confirmation against substantive vacancies in the amended Rule. On this logic relief was grented to one Shridhar Mandal in CWJC No. 55 of 1992 and the corresponding MJC No. 1827 of 1992 (disposed of on January 31, 1994). I have every reason to think that while amending the Rule in 1982, the framers had in their mind the judgments of the Supreme Court, some of which have been rendered in the context of the officers of the Bihar Police, following Patwardhan's case (supra), Baleshwar Das's case reported in AIR 1981 SC 41 and many others on the point. The framers must have intended to do away with the “inglorious uncertainties” in one's service carear on account of non-confirmation and the distinction between ‘substantive’ and ‘non-substantive’ vacancies. If as per the judgments of the Supreme Court the distinction between the temporary and permanent posts does not exist, provided the posts are in the caders, and for the purpose of seniority and other service benefits, the employees are entitled to reckon the entire period of continuous officiation, except where there are express rules otherwise, the officers granted out of turn promotion must be held to be confirmed against the post to which they are promoted on expiry of the probation period unless any order otherwise is issued by the competant authority.

    16. Rule 660C as it stood in 1983 intended to give out of turn promotion to officers who had outstanding record of service and had been awarded police medal in recognition of their services. If they have to wait for confirmation against ‘substantive vacancies’ as and when they arise it may well mean that they would not get real benefit of such promotion, for before they are confirmed against ‘substantive vacancies’ they may well be out of the service after superannuation. The provision of Rule 660C has a salutary object and the same should be given full effact so as to achieve the object.

    17. Counsel for the State submitted that the petitioners are placed at sl. nos. 435 and 436 in the gradation list of Inspector and the officers only upto sl. no. 390 have been confirmed. He expressed his reservation as to whether it is possible to give further accelerated seniority to the petitioners in the rank. He submitted that the object underlying Rule 660C is to give one accelerated promotion to the next higher rank out of turn, and after the same is given they cannot claim further accelerated seniority. Counsel for the petitioners states that the petitioners would not mind if the officers placed above them in the gradation list of Inspectors are also confirmed. What they are interested in is to get confirmation in the rank/post which they are holding for more than 14 years by now, that is, much than the required period of probation of two years, and not accelerated seniority. Counsel submitted that denial of the benefit of confirmation only on the ground of absence of substantive vacancies being illegal, they merely seek direction to the respondents for their own confirmation without disturbing the seniority of others in the gradation list.

    18. The submissions of the counsel for the petitioners, according to me, are well-founded. In view of the legal position as briefly indicated above, in my opinion, the petitioners can not be denied the benefit of confirmation. If the posts against which they were promoted have remained in existance for 14 years it would be misnomer to call them ‘temporary’ posts. These temporary posts are as much part of the cadre as the permanent posts are and, therefore, they can be considered for confirmation against such temporary posts.

    19. In these premises, I would allow these writ petitions and direct the respondents to consider the cases of the petitioners for confirmation in the rank of Inspector of Police in the light of the observations made hereinabove and further consider them, along with others, for the consequential benefits in accordance with law.

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    Comments

    Mohammad Hasnain (In 3359) v. Kumar Amar Singh (In 3360)
    (May 6, 1997)