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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This suit was instituted under Order 37 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) against three defendants: Mohd. Shafi, Triloki Nath, and Hirday Nath. The latter two defendants applied on 9-9-1963 for leave to defend the suit, supported by affidavits. The first defendant, Mohd. Shafi, filed a similar application on 19-9-1963, accompanied by an application for extension of time. The defendants were served summons on different dates in August 1963. The grounds for seeking leave to defend included allegations that the promissory note in question was without consideration, improper presentation of the note, absence of a contract to pay interest, and denial of any outstanding sum. The court heard arguments regarding these applications for leave to defend.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether leave to defend the suit under Order 37 of the CPC should be granted to the defendants based on the affidavits disclosing a triable issue or plausible defence.
  2. Whether the first defendant, Mohd. Shafi, who applied for leave to defend after the statutory period of thirty days, can be granted leave to defend the suit.
  3. The applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to applications for leave to defend under Order 37 of the CPC.
  4. How to reconcile conflicting judicial authorities regarding the power of the court to condone delay in filing applications for leave to defend under Order 37.
  5. The interpretation and harmonious construction of provisions of Order 37 of the CPC and related provisions of the Limitation Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendants' Arguments

  • The affidavits accompanying the applications disclose multiple grounds of defence, such as the promissory note being without consideration, lack of proper presentation, absence of contract for interest, and denial of any outstanding amount.
  • Mohd. Shafi argued for extension of time to file the application for leave to defend, citing special circumstances including his injury in a fire breakout that confined him to bed.
  • The defence contended that the applications disclose triable issues and thus leave to defend should be granted.

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The plaintiff, through Mr. Bhan, contended that Mohd. Shafi's application for leave to defend should be refused as it was not filed within the statutory period of thirty days from service.
  • The plaintiff did not contest the factual assertion of Mohd. Shafi’s injury in the affidavit for extension of time.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
S. Murahari Rao v. K. Bapayya, AIR 1949 Mad 742 The court has jurisdiction to condone delay and grant leave to defend even if application is not made within prescribed time; procedural orders need not always have specific statutory provision and should be guided by common sense, justice, equity, and good conscience. The court preferred this view to allow leave to defend despite delay, emphasizing practical justice over strict technicality.
Srinvasan v. Bhakthavatsulu Naidu, AIR 1953 Mad 909 Court’s power to grant leave to defend before decree even if application is beyond prescribed period. Supported the principle that delay can be condoned in proper cases before decree is passed.
Shah Mohamed Khan v. H.N. Woodfall, AIR 1955 Mad 637 Court has no power to condone delay under Order 37 Rule 3 CPC as Section 5 of Limitation Act is not applicable; application beyond prescribed time must be dismissed. Although recognized as harsh and technical, this authority was distinguished and not followed strictly by the court.
James Manickam v. Jaya Narayan Daga, AIR 1953 Mad 767 Supported the view that delay cannot be condoned under Order 37 CPC beyond prescribed period. Reinforced the Division Bench view but was not preferred by the court in the present case.
Rajkrushna Bose v. Binod Kanungo, AIR 1954 SC 202 Statutory provisions appearing to conflict must be harmoniously interpreted. Guided the court’s approach to reconcile conflicting provisions of Order 37 and Limitation Act.
Babulal Bhuramal v. Nandram Shivram, AIR 1958 SC 677 Duty of courts to construe provisions of the same Act harmoniously to avoid conflict. Supported the principle of harmonious construction applied by the court.
Yugal Kishore Sinha v. B.N Rahtogi, AIR 1958 Pat 154 If two constructions possible, adopt one ensuring smooth operation of the law and avoid absurdity. Used to reject a strict, technical approach that leads to absurd or impractical results.
Shankarrao Madhavrao v. K.C Sen, AIR 1956 Bom 79 Provisions of a statute should be read to avoid conflict and reconcile differences. Supported the court’s approach to interpret Order 37 provisions harmoniously.
State of Bombay v. Bai Moti, AIR 1958 Bom 18 Plain words in statute must be given natural meaning; avoid superfluous words and absurdity in interpretation. Guided the court’s interpretation to avoid technical rigidity and absurd outcomes.
Bhole Main v. S.M Islam, AIR 1958 Pat 48 All parts of a section must be construed together harmoniously and consistently. Supported the court’s holistic approach to statutory interpretation.
Gulzara Singh Nanta Singh v. Smt. Tej Kaur, AIR 1961 Punj 288 Consider the enactment as a whole when construing different provisions. Used to emphasize a comprehensive reading of Order 37 and related provisions.
Colquhoun v. Brooks, (1889) 14 AC 493 Statutory provisions must be construed in light of other parts of the Act to ascertain legislative intent. Supported the principle of contextual and purposive statutory interpretation.
Cox v. Hakes, (1890) 15 AC 506 Look beyond the immediate provision to connected provisions to limit general words. Reinforced the court’s approach to limit strict interpretation by considering related provisions.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by stating the guiding principle under Order 37 CPC that leave to defend must be granted if the affidavit discloses a triable or plausible defence, irrespective of its ultimate success. Since multiple grounds of defence were raised by the defendants, leave to defend was warranted.

Regarding Mohd. Shafi’s delayed application beyond the thirty-day statutory period, the court acknowledged the difficulty but rejected the plaintiff’s contention that leave should be refused outright. The court reasoned that since the promissory note was jointly executed and the defence was common to all defendants, it would be contradictory to allow two defendants to defend and dismiss the suit while decreeing against the third on the same facts.

The court held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, which allows condonation of delay, was not applicable to applications under Order 37 in the State, though some High Courts have extended it. The court noted the need for legislative extension of Section 5 to such petitions.

The court examined conflicting Madras High Court authorities: while some judges held courts have jurisdiction to condone delay and grant leave to defend even after prescribed time, a Division Bench held otherwise, emphasizing the mandatory nature of limitation provisions. The court found the Division Bench’s view harsh and impractical, especially considering Order 37 Rule 4 which allows setting aside decrees in special circumstances and granting leave to defend.

The court emphasized the cardinal principle of statutory interpretation that conflicting provisions should be harmonized to avoid absurdity. It cited several Supreme Court and High Court precedents to support a purposive and harmonious construction of Order 37 and the Limitation Act.

Applying these principles, the court accepted the special circumstances presented by Mohd. Shafi—his injury in a fire that confined him to bed—as convincing grounds to grant leave to defend despite delay. The court found it reasonable to grant leave to all three defendants to avoid contradictory outcomes and duplication of judicial effort.

Holding and Implications

Application allowed and leave to defend granted to all three defendants.

The court’s decision permits the defendants to contest the suit by filing written statements, thereby ensuring that triable issues raised by them are adjudicated on merits. The ruling avoids anomalous and contradictory decrees against co-defendants on the same facts. No new precedent was set; rather, the court preferred a practical and harmonious interpretation of existing provisions over strict technicality, emphasizing justice and efficiency in judicial proceedings.

    Kishan Singh v. Mohd. Shafi And Others

    1. In this suit which is under O. 37, of the CPC there are three defendants: Mohd. Shafi, Triloki Nath and Hirday Nath. The defendants, Hirday Nath and Triloki Nath applied on 9-9-63 for leave to defend the suit. This application is supported by an affidavit. The first defendant, Mohd. Shafi, presented a similar application supported by an affidavit on 19-9-63. Along with this application he put in another application for extension of time. The defendant Mohd. Shafi was served on 16-8-63, Hirday Nath on 13-8-63 and Triloki Nath defendant was served on 10-8-63. The grounds taken in the applications for defending the suit are numerous. It is stated that the pronote in question is without consideration, that there has been no proper presentation of the pronote, that there has been no contract of paying interest and that there is no sum outstanding against the defendants, so on and so forth. I have heard the arguments of the learned counsel with respect to these applications for grant of leave to defend the suit. The guiding principle for either granting or refusing leave to defend the suit under O. 37 of the CPC is that the affidavit which accompanies a petition for leave to defend must disclose a defence, that is a triable issue or a plea which is at least plausible, no matter whether the defence is legal or equitable, even though it may not ultimately turn to be a good defence. In this case there are a number of points raised which can be the subject matter of different issues between the parties; therefore leave to defend the suit has to be granted.

    2. There is difficulty in the case of Mohd. Shafi who has not applied for leave to defend the suit within the statutory period of thirty days from the date of service. Mr. Bhan contends that in his case leave should not be granted and that his application should be refused without a final order this way or that being passed in the suit I have considered the arguments advanced by both the counsel on this point. There is a difficulty in accepting the arguments advanced by Mr. Bhan. The pronote is jointly executed by all the three defendants and the defence is again a common one. If I refuse permission to Mohd. Shafi to defend the suit, then under the provisions of O. 37 R. 2 of the CPC. I have to accept the allegations in the plaint as admitted and the plaintiff shall be entitled to a decree for the principal sum due and interest and costs and future interest. It would be a contradiction in terms if after leave has been granted to two other defendants to contest the suit and ultimately, for the sake of argument be it said at least, that the suit of the plaintiff does not succeed, it shall gland decreed against the third defendant on the same material on record.

    3. The application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act presented by Mohd. Shafi is misconceived. Section 5 of the Limitation Act has not been made applicable to such petitions in this State, though some other High Courts, for instance the High Courts of Lahore and Bombay, have extended S. 5 of the Act to such applications. It is high time that the legislature of the State extend the provisions of S. 5 to such petitions.

    4. I have come across two authorities of the Madras High Court reported as S. Murahari Rao v. K. Bapayya, AIR 1949 Mad 742 and Srinvasan v. Bhakthavatsulu Naidu, AIR 1953 Mad 909. In the former decision Mack, J. held that the court has jurisdiction to condone delay and give leave even if the application for leave to defend has not been made within the prescribed period of limitation. He further held that

    “it is not necessary that every procedural order of a court should be supported by a specific statutory provision, and when there is neither provision nor prohibition it has to be guided by ordinary principles of common sense, justice, equity and good conscience.”

    5. Similarly Govinda Menon, J. in AIR 1953 Mad 909 has laid down that a court has power in a proper case before the passing of decree, to grant leave to defend the suit even though the defendant has not applied for leave within the prescribed period of the service of summons upon him.

    6. But these two authorities were not considered good law in Shah Mohamed Khan v. H.N. Woodfall) AIR 1955 Mad 637 in which case a Division Bench of that Court consisting of Rajamannar, C.J and Somasundaram, J. held that a court has no power to condone the delay in filing the application under O. 37 R. 3 of the CPC as Section 5 of the Limitation Act has not been made applicable to it. Section 3 of the Limitation Act is mandatory, and when the application is filed beyond the time prescribed by Article 159 it must be dismissed.

    7. In James Manickam… v. Jaya Narayan Daga…., AIR 1953 Mad 767 Chandra Reddi, J. also took the same view as has been taken by the Division Bench in (S) AIR 1955 Mad 637 (Supra).

    8. The Division Bench authority of the Madras High Court, (S) AIR 1955 Mad 637 (Supra) is based on a reading of Section 5 and Article 159 of the Limitation Act on a deeper analysis of the provisions of O. 37 of the CPC, this authority appears to be not only harsh and too technical but ignores the other provisions of O. 37 R. 4 of this Order (which?) empowers a court under special circumstances to set aside a decree passed by the court under the provisions of this Order, and further empowers it to grant leave to the defendant to appear and defend file suit. A case can be envisaged wherein there exist special circumstances within the meaning of this rule which would satisfy a Judge to set aside the decree and allow the defendant to defend the suit under the provisions of R. 4. But if (S) AIR 1955 Mad 637 (Supra) is followed strictly, it means that the same set of special circumstances when brought to the notice of the Court under the provisions of R. 2 are to be rejected, because the application for leave to defend is not presented within the period of limitation prescribed therefor. The Judge being, therefore, powerless, has to pass a decree as envisaged by O. 37 R. 2. After passing the decree on the same set of facts, he can set aside the decree and grant the defendant leave to defend the suit. This would look not only anomalous, but I should even go Page: 41to the length of saying ridiculous, and would result only in duplication of work and waste of time of the court and the parties. If the court has power to allow the defendant to get a decree set aside in the special circumstances disclosed by him to the satisfaction of the court under R. 4 and be permitted to defend the suit, this power should be considered. Inherent in the court while disposing of his application for leave to defend under the provisions of R. 2. Otherwise the court has first to ignore the special circumstances, pass a decree, and then on the basis of the same circumstances set aside the decree and allow the defendant to defend the suit.

    9. It is a cardinal principle of interpretation of statutes that when two provisions of a statute appear conflicting with each other they should be so interpreted so that they harmonise. See Rajkrushna Bose v. Binod Kanungo, AIR 1954 SC 202. In another authority of the Supreme Court reported as Babulal Bhuramal v. Nandram Shivram, AIR 1958 SC 677 their Lordships have laid down that

    “If it is possible to avoid a conflict between the provisions of different sections of the same Act on a proper construction thereof, then it is the duty of a court to so construe them that they are in harmony with each other.”

    10. Similarly if is well settled that if two constructions are possible, the court must adopt that which will implement and which ensures the smooth and harmonious working of the Act or the rule and discard that which will stultify the apparent intention, and therefore, eschew the other which leads to absurdity or gives rise to practical inconvenience or makes wall established provisions of existing law nugatory. Yugal Kishore Sinha v. B.N Rahtogi, AIR 1958 Pat 154.

    11. In Shankarrao Madhavrao v. K.C Sen, AIR 1956 Bom 79 it was held:

    “It is well established principle of interpretation that as far as possible the various provisions of a statute must be so read as not to bring them in conflict with each other. That does not mean that reconciliation must be effected. But the various provisions must be so read, if at all it is possible to do so, that they do not conflict with each other.”

    12. Similarly is the principle well established that in interpreting statutes absurdity is to be avoided. In State of Bombay v. Bai Moti, AIR 1958 Bom 18 it was laid down:

    “When the words in a statute are plain, the words must be given their natural and ordinary meaning. In construing a statute, words should not be added to the statute. But there is also another rule of interpretation that the legislature in enacting a section does not use superfluous words and that every endeavour should be made to reconcile and, to avoid any absurdity in the interpretation of the section.”

    13. In Bhole Main v. S.M Islam, AIR 1958 Pat 48 their Lordships laid down that it is an accepted principle of construction that all parts of a section must be construed together and the interpretation given must be harmonious and consistent.

    14. Similarly when construing the different provisions of an enactment, the enactment as a whole should be considered. (Vide Gulzara Singh Nanta Singh v. Smt. Tej Kaur, AIR 1961 Punj 288).

    15. Lord Herschell in Colquhoun v. Brooks, (1889) 14 AC 493 at p. 506 observed:

    “It is beyond dispute…… that we are entitled and indeed bound when construing the terms of any provisions found in a statute to consider any other parts of the Act which throw light upon the intention of the legislature and which may serve to show that the particular provision ought not to be construed as it would be if considered alone and apart from the rest of the Act.”

    16. In another case Cox v. Hakes, (1890) 15 AC 506 at p. 529 the same learned Judge held:

    “It cannot, I think, be denied that, for the purpose of construing any enactment, it is right to look not only at the provision immediately under construction, but on any others found in connection with it, which may throw light upon it and afford an indication that general words employed in it were not intended to be applied without some limitation.”

    17. In the light of these observations when we interpret the provisions of O. 37 we have to so interpret them as would lead to a harmonious construction of the entire order and avoid results which) would result in absurdities and make one provision of the Act conflict with the other.

    18. In any view therefore, as already stated, the special circumstances which would entitle me to set aside a decree under the provisions of R. 4 would at the same time empower me to give leave to defend the suit, even if the application is beyond time if the special circumstances mentioned by the petitioner are convincing.

    19. In this case, for instance, the contention raised for extension of time is that the petitioner Mohd. Shafi got injured in a recent fire breakout at Bandipura and was confined to bed. Therefore he could not present the proper application and affidavit in court within time. The factual aspect of the affidavit has not been contested by the learned counsel for the plaintiff which means for the sake of disposal of this petition I must accept the contention as given in the application and affidavit for extension of time as correct. The facts would be special circumstances which would, in my opinion, entitle the petitioner Mohd. Shafi to leave to defend the suit—whether before or after the decree, that would be immaterial. If the Madras authority has to be followed, in that case I shall have first to pass a decree against Mohd. Shafi and then set it aside on the same grounds on which I am supposed to reject it under Article 159 of the Limitation Act. In this view of the matter I would prefer the view of Mack and Govinda Menon, JJ. to the view of the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in (S) AIR 1955 Mad 637. In this case there is another fact which has to be considered and has an important bearing on the question whether leave should be granted to Mohd. Shafi. On the same facts, in the same suit and on the same grounds leave has to be granted to the two other defendants and it would be self-contradictory, as already stated in an earlier portion of this judgment, to allow one set of defendants to contest the suit and to get it possibly dismissed also and yet pass a decree against the third defendant on the same material. I, therefore, accept the application of all the three defendants and grant them leave to defend the suit. They will present their written statements on a date to be fixed by the office.

    KG/S/D.V.C

    20. Application allowed.

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    Comments

    Kishan Singh v. Mohd. Shafi And Others
    (Oct 18, 1963)