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Smart Summary

Summary of Judgment — Wanchoo, C.J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an application under Article 226 of the Constitution by Ram Pratap seeking a writ of certiorari to quash an order of the Revenue Minister of Rajasthan dated 30 August 1951.

Facts, as recited by the Court: prior to 1949 a piece of land belonging to the applicant was acquired by the former Jaipur State. The applicant was to receive Rs. 4,123 as compensation for constructions on the land and an equal piece of land in exchange. Certain persons who claimed an interest in the acquired land applied to the Land Acquisition Officer (LAO) to refer disputes as to distribution of compensation to the civil court under section 18 of the Jaipur Land Acquisition Act (No. XXVIII of 1943). The LAO refused to make a reference by order dated 1 July 1949 and reiterated that refusal on 6 February 1950, stating it was within his discretion whether to make a reference under section 30 of the Act.

Those objecting made a representation or revision to Government. The Revenue Minister, by order dated 30 August 1951 (with an apparent direction already given on 20 August 1951), directed the LAO to refer the case to the competent civil court. The LAO subsequently made a reference to the court in pursuance of that direction.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, when a Land Acquisition Officer refuses to make a reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, the proper remedy for the aggrieved parties is to apply to the High Court under section 45 of the Specific Relief Act (or the equivalent provision in the Jaipur Specific Relief Act / Article 226) for a writ of mandamus, rather than to obtain directions from the Government to the LAO.
  2. Whether an order of the Land Acquisition Officer under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act is purely administrative (thus amenable to Government direction) or of a quasi-judicial/judicial character (thus subject to judicial remedies such as mandamus).
  3. Whether the Revenue Minister's direction to the Land Acquisition Officer to make a reference (given the availability of a judicial remedy) was proper and, if improper, whether the Court should quash the Revenue Minister's order.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bhagaban Das Shah v. First Land Acquisition Collector, Calcutta (A.I.R. 1937 Calcutta 705) Illustrates decisions where the Land Acquisition Officer/Collector was treated as acting in an administrative capacity when passing orders under section 18; cases considered under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court noted these cases but distinguished them because they were decided under section 115 CPC and did not consider the applicability of section 45 of the Specific Relief Act; the Court disagreed with treating section 18 orders as purely administrative.
Bhajani Lal v. Secretary of State (A.I.R. 1932 Allahabad 568) Another instance where High Court decisions treated LAO/Collector's section 18 orders as administrative in the context of section 115 CPC. Cited as part of the group of High Court decisions whose administrative characterization the Court considered and from which it respectfully differed.
Alcock Ashdown & Co. Ltd. v. The Chief Revenue Authority, Bombay (A.I.R. 1923 P.C. 138) Authority for the proposition that if a statute requires a public officer to do a thing and he wrongfully refuses, the Specific Relief Act permits the court to compel performance (i.e., mandamus). Relied upon to support the view that where section 45 of the Specific Relief Act applies, a court has power to compel a public officer to perform the duty (here, to make a reference under section 18).
Provident Investment Co. Ltd. v. Land Acquisition Officer, Bombay (A.I.R. 1935 Bombay 319) Held that an applicant could require a reference to court under section 18(1) and that where compensation was said to be inadequate the LAO could be ordered, under section 45 Specific Relief Act, to make the reference. Used as supporting authority that section 45 can be applied to compel the LAO to make a reference when appropriate.
G.J. Desai v. Abdul Mazid Kadri (A.I.R. 1951 Bombay 156) Held that if the Collector is wrong as to the maintainability of a petition and refuses to make a reference, claimants may apply to the court under section 45 Specific Relief Act to compel a reference (subject to time limits). Cited to reinforce the position that section 45 provides a remedy to compel a reference where the LAO/Collector wrongly refuses.
Abdul Sattar Sahib v. The Special Deputy Collector, Vizagapatam Harbour Acquisition (A.I.R. 1924 Madras 442) Full Bench view: though the court could not interfere under section 115 CPC in that case, the order of the LAO/Collector was of a quasi-judicial character (not purely administrative) because section 18 (in Part III) required judicial determination of questions like time and compliance. The Court preferred and followed this Full Bench view, treating section 18 orders as quasi-judicial rather than purely administrative.
Ezra v. Secretary of State for India (I.L.R. 32 Cal. 605) Privy Council decision holding that proceedings under Part II were administrative in nature. The Court noted that the Madras Full Bench had distinguished Ezra; the present Court followed the Madras view and therefore distinguished Ezra for purposes of section 18 (Part III) matters.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Step-by-step analysis as reflected in the opinion (limited to what the text states):

  1. The Court set out the factual matrix: acquisition, awards of money and land, objections by certain persons, LAO refusals (1 July 1949 and reiteration 6 February 1950), representation to Government and the Revenue Minister's order dated 30 August 1951 directing the LAO to make a reference.
  2. The Court observed that there is a difference of opinion among various High Courts on whether the LAO's order under section 18 can be revised by the High Court. Many earlier decisions considered the matter under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure and treated the LAO's role as administrative.
  3. The Court distinguished the section 115 decisions from situations where section 45 of the Specific Relief Act is applicable. It emphasized that when section 45 applies, there exists a direct judicial remedy (mandamus) to compel a public officer to perform a statutory duty which the officer wrongfully refuses to perform.
  4. Relying on authorities (including Alcock Ashdown, Provident Investment and G.J. Desai), the Court concluded that where section 45 applies (or its state equivalent), an aggrieved party has the remedy of approaching the High Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the LAO to make a reference under section 18.
  5. The Court addressed the character of the LAO's order under section 18: it rejected the view that the order is purely administrative and adopted the Full Bench Madras view (Abdul Sattar Sahib) that such orders are of a quasi-judicial nature because section 18 (placed in Part III) requires judicial determination of questions such as compliance with section 18 and time limits.
  6. Given that the former Jaipur High Court (and now the Rajasthan High Court under Article 226) possessed the power under the Jaipur Specific Relief Act / Article 226 to issue mandamus to public officers, the Court held that the proper course for parties whose applications were refused on 1 July 1949 was to apply to the High Court for mandamus rather than seek Government directions.
  7. Turning to relief in the present application, the Court acknowledged that although the Revenue Minister should not have directed the LAO to make a reference (because the judicial remedy was the appropriate route), the actual effect of the Minister's direction produced the same practical relief that the parties would have obtained from the Court. For that reason, the Court found it unnecessary to interfere with the Minister's order.
  8. Conclusion drawn from analysis: the Government ought not to have intervened; the appropriate remedy lies by application to the High Court under section 45 (or Article 226), but since the Minister's order produced the relief sought by the objectors, the Court would not quash that order in the present proceeding.

Holding and Implications

APPLICATION DISMISSED.

Explicit holdings and immediate consequences (as stated in the opinion):

  • The Court held that where section 45 of the Specific Relief Act (or the state equivalent) applies, parties whose application for reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act was wrongly refused have a remedy by way of writ of mandamus to the High Court; accordingly, such parties should approach the High Court rather than seek directions from Government authorities.
  • The Court held that an order under section 18 is not a purely administrative order; it is of a quasi-judicial character (the Court preferred the Full Bench Madras view in Abdul Sattar Sahib over the purely administrative characterizations in some other High Court decisions).
  • Although the Revenue Minister improperly gave a direction to the Land Acquisition Officer (since the judicial remedy was appropriate), the Court declined to quash or interfere with the Minister's order because the direction produced the same relief that the High Court would have given on mandamus.
  • Practical effect on the parties: the application by Ram Pratap to quash the Revenue Minister's order was dismissed. The Court made no order as to costs because the applicant did not appear.

Broader implications: The opinion clarifies (within the facts and authorities considered) that judicial remedies under section 45 / Article 226 are the proper route to compel a Land Acquisition Officer to make a reference under section 18, and that Government directions should not substitute for such judicial process. The Court did not, however, set aside the Minister's order in the present case because it produced the substantive relief sought by the objectors.

    Ram Pratap v. Hon'Ble Revenue Minister, Rajasthan

    Wanchoo, C.J:— This is an application by Ram Pratap under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India praying that a writ of certiorari be issued quashing the order of the Revenue Minister of the State of Rajasthan dated the 30th August, 1951.

    2. The circumstances in which that order came to be passed are these. A piece of land belonging to the applicant was acquired by the former Jaipur State some time before 1949, and a sum of Rs. 4,123/- as compensation for the constructions standing on it and an equal piece of land as exchange were ordered to be given to the applicant. Thereupon, certain persons, who claimed to have an interest in the land acquired, made an application to the Land Acquisition Officer to refer the dispute as to the distribution of the compensation to the civil court under sec. 18 of the Jaipur Land Acquisition Act (No. XXVIII of 1943). The Land Acquisition Officer refused to make the reference by his order dated the 1st of July, 1949. Thereafter, it seems that further attempts were made to get the Land Acquisition Officer to make a reference, and finally on the 6th of February, 1950, he refused to make a reference, saying that it was within his direction whether to make a reference under sec. 30 of the Act or not. It was this order against which these persons submitted what may be called a representation or revision to the Government. The order of the Revenue Minister dated the 30th of August, 1951, was passed on this representation or revision. The Revenue Minister says in his order that “the case law on the subject would justify the view that in the interests of justice, the Collector as an Administrative Officer should adopt the course of making a reference to the competent civil courts in all bonafide disputes, rather than making his orders final in the matter of awards, so that no objector with a prima facie claim may be put to the hardship of instituting a civil suit. In this case, the Land Acquisition Officer should, therefore, be given a direction to do so now”. It seems that though the order was passed on the 30th of August, 1951, direction was already given on the 20th of August, 1951, and it further appears that the Land Acquisition Officer has, in pursuance of this direction, referred the case to the court.

    3. The reason why the Revenue Minister has made this order is that there is a difference of opinion in the various High Courts on the question whether the order of the Land Acquisition Officer can be revised by the High Court, and as such the Revenue Minister thought that the Land Acquisition Officer, who works as the agent of the Government with reference to proceedings under Part II of the Jaipur Land Acquisition Act, could be directed by the Government to take certain action in connection with proceedings under sec. 18 of the Act. We may, however, point out that sec. 18 of the Act appears in Part III, which is headed “Reference to Court and Procedure thereon”. There is no doubt that some of the High Courts have held that the Collector or the Land Acquisition Officer acts as an administrative officer, when he passes an order under sec. 18 of the Act. Reference in this connection may be made to Bhagaban Das Shah v. First Land Acquisition Collector, Calcutta (A.I.R 1937 Calcutta 705), and Bhajani Lal v. Secy. of State, A.I.R 1932 Allahabad 568). These were, however, cases under sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the courts considered whether the High Court Page: 366could interfere under sec. 115 with the order made by the Land Acquisition Officer. There was no discussion in these cases of the point whether the High Court could interfere under s. 45 of the Specific Relief Act. In our opinion, where sec. 45 of the Specific Relief Act is applicable, the position is materially different, and there is a remedy provided against the I order of the Land Acquisition Officer, who wrongly refuses to make a reference under sec. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, and in such a case it is not right that the parties should apply to Government or that Government should give directions to the Land Acquisition Officer. We may in this connection refer to Alcock Ashdown and Company Limited v. The Chief Revenue Authority, Bombay (A.I.R 1923 P.C 138), where it was held—

    “If the Legislature says that a public officer, even a Revenue Officer, shall do a thing, and he, without cause or justification, refuses to do that thing, the Specific Relief Act would be applicable and there would be power in the Court to compel him to give relief to the subject”.

    This view was based on the words of sec. 45 of the Specific belief Act.

    4. The next case to which we may refer is Provident Investment Co. Ltd. v. Land Acquisition Officer, Bombay (A.I.R 1935 Bombay 319). The Bombay High Court held that an applicant could require a matter to be referred to the Court whether his objection was on any of the four grounds mentioned in sec. 18(1). Where the applicant had stated that he questioned the amount of compensation, it might be safely inferred that the suggestion was that the amount of the compensation was too low, and the Bombay High Court in this case ordered, under sec. 45 of the Specific Relief Act, the Land Acquisition Officer to make the required reference.

    5. Lastly, we may refer to G.J Desai v. Abdul Mazid Kadri (A.I.R 1951 Bombay 156). In that case it was held that if the Collector was wrong in the view that he took as to the maintainability of the petition, and refused to make a reference, it would always be open to the claimants to come to Court under sec. 45 of the Specific Relief Act, and get the Court to compel the Collector to make a reference if they satisfy the Court that their application was within time.

    6. There is thus clear authority for the view that where sec. 45 of the Specific Relief Act applies, there is a remedy to a party whose application for reference under sec. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act was wrongly refused, to apply to the High Court for writ of mandamus. Where, therefore, such a remedy exists, the duty of the parties is to come to the High Court, and the Government should not give directions to the Land Acquisition Officer. We may also point out that the order of the Land Acquisition Officer under sec. 18 is not a purely administrative order, though in the Allahabad and Calcutta cases, to which we have already referred, the view was taken that the order was a purely administrative one. We, however, respectfully differ from the view that was taken in those cases, and prefer to follow the view taken by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Abdul Sattar Sahib v. The Special Deputy Collector, Vizagapatam Harbour Acquisition (A.I.R 1924 Madras 442). That case was also under sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and though eventually the Court held that it could not interfere with the order of the Land Acquisition Officer or the Collector under sec. 115, it was made clear that the order was, at any rate, of a quasi judicial nature, and the case of Ezra v. Secretary of State for India (I.L.R 32 Cal. 605) was distinguished. In that Privy Council case it was held that proceedings under Part II were of an administrative nature, and the learned Judges of the Madras High Court pointed out that sec. 18 was in Part III, and certainly required judicial determination of the question whether the application complied with the provisions of sec. 18 and was within time. The determination of these two questions was held to be judicial in nature, and, therefore, the order of the Land Acquisition Officer was a quasi-judicial order, even though the Land Acquisition Officer may not be a Page: 367Court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

    7. The next question that then arises is whether there was a remedy in this State open to those whose applications had been refused by the Land Acquisition Officer on the 1st of July, 1949. In this connection, reference may be made to sec. 45 of the Jaipur Specific Relief Act, which is in these words:—

    “The High Court may make an order requiring any specific act to be done or forborne by any person holding a public office, whether of a permanent or a temporary nature, or by any corporation or inferior Court of Judicature:”

    Thus the former Jaipur High Court, which was then in existence, had the power under sec. 45 to issue a writ of mandamus to the Land Acquisition Officer ordering him to refer the case to court, if in the opinion of the High Court the order passed by the Land Acquisition Officer was wrong. When the present High Court came into existence in August, 1949, by virtue of Ordinance No. XV of 1949, it was invested with the jurisdiction and power throughout the State to directions or orders in the nature of the writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari for the enforcement of such rights as are given by any law for the time being in force. These powers still continue in this Court by virtue of Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Under these circumstances, the remedy for those whose applications had been originally refused on the 1st of July, 1949, was to come to the then Jaipur High Court or to the Rajasthan High Court for the issue of a writ of mandamus, and in this view it was not proper for the Revenue Minister to interfere in the matter. We may point out that the real order of dismissal was passed on the 1st July, 1949, and the order dated the 6th of February, 1950, was only a reiteration of that order.

    8. The next question is as to what order we should now pass. As to that, we are of opinion that even though the Revenue Minister should not have given a direction to the Land Acquisition Officer to make a reference to the Court, and left it to the parties to come to this Court for relief, the actual order passed in the case need not be interfered with, for if those persons had come to this Court, they would only have got that relief which has been given to them by virtue of the directions given by the Revenue Minister.

    9. We, therefore, dismiss the application with the remarks given above. As the applicant has not appeared before us, we pass no order as to costs.

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    Ram Pratap v. Hon'Ble Revenue Minister, Rajasthan
    (Dec 20, 1951)