Dave, J.:— This is an application in revision against the judgment of the District Magistrate, Pali, dated 17th September, 1952.
2. The facts giving rise to this application are that one Chandmal filed a complaint under secs. 323 and 504 I.P.C in the court of the Second Class Magistrate, Desuri, against five persons namely Pukhraj, Anraj, Meghraj, Faujmal and Jaweerchand. It was alleged that the accused Pukhraj had purchased from him a tin of ghee. On Asoj Vadi 1, he came to the complainant's shop and told him that a quarter seer of chach was found in the tin and, therefore, he should repay to him the cost thereof. The complainant refused to comply with the demand and thereupon the accused Pukhraj gave him filthy abuses. At that very time, the other accused also came to the shop and began to shower filthy abuses on the complainant. It was further alleged that the accused Pukhraj gave two fist-blows on the complainant's ribs and caused him injury.
3. The trial court found the accused Pukhraj guilty of offence under secs. 323 and 304 I.P.C and sentenced him to one month's simple imprisonment. The accused Meghraj, Anraj and Jaweerchand were also convicted under sec. 504 I.P.C and each one of them was sentenced to a fine of Rs. 50/-. One of the accused Faujmal died during the course of trial and, therefore, he was not convicted.
4. An appeal against this judgment was filed in the court of the District Magistrate, Pali, who upheld the conviction of all the appellants but reduced the sentence of Pukhraj to a fine of Rs. 75/- only. His sentence of imprisonment was set aside. The sentence of the remaining accused was maintained. The applicants are not satisfied with this decision and, therefore, they have moved this Court.
5. The petitioners' learned advocate contends that the District Magistrate has not given his judgment according to law. It has been pointed out that he has only discussed the case against the accused Pukhraj and he has not given any consideration to the case of the remaining accused. He has not even referred to the evidence of the parties and dismissed the appeal almost summarily.
6. It appears that the copy of the judgment which was produced with the revision petition was not really the copy of the judgment of the District Magistrate. If was only a copy of the day's proceedings on the order-sheet and the court was perhaps misled in believing at the time of admission that the District Magistrate had not given any attention to the case. It appears from the record that he has given a judgment covering two pages. It is true that the judgment is not ideal and the learned District Magistrate has not properly discussed the evidence against the accused Anraj, Meghraj and Jaweerchand, but it cannot be said that he has not considered their case at all. It appears from the judgment that he was so well convinced of the propriety of the conviction that he did not care to discuss the evidence in detail. The applicants' learned advocate has led this Court into the evidence to show that the case against the petitioners Anraj, Meghraj and Jaweerchand is not proved. This argument does not appear to be correct. If it had appeared to this Court that the applicants have been prejudiced on account of the appellate Court's failure to discuss the evidence in detail. I would have considered the request of the applicants' learned advocate to send the case back to the appellate court for writing a fresh judgment, but looking to the evidence in this case, there seems no good ground for passing any such order.
7. The applicants' learned advocate contends that the complainant and his witnesses have vaguely stated that the accused had uttered abusive language and that it was not brought out as to what words were actually spoken by each one of the accused and whether they were uttered for intentionally insulting the complainant and thereby provoking him to break the public peace or commit any other offence. In support of his argument, he has referred to the cases of Philip Rangel…Applicant; v. Emperor…Opposite Party. A.I.R 1932 Bom. 193, Hukamchand v. Chandmal A.I.R 1950 M.B 25, and In re Karumuri Venkataratnam A.I.R 1948 Mad. 9.
8. In the first case of Philip Rangel…Applicant; v. Emperor…Opposite Party. A.I.R 1932 Bom. 193, there was a meeting of the members of a limited company and it was alleged against the accused that when he was proceeding to leave the room, he muttered the words “You damn bloody bastards and cads”. There words were not addressed to the meeting in general or to any particular person but were over-heard by some members who were present. It was in these circumstances that their lordships remarked that “mere breach of good manner does not constitute an offence under sec. 504 I.P.C and that when the charge is an insult by words, the words must amount to something more than what in English law is called fmere vulgar abuse.” It was further observed that if an abusive language is used in such circumstances that the court comes to the conclusion that it cannot possibly have been intended and cannot have been understood by those to whom it was addressed to have been intended, to be taken literally, the language cannot be held to amount to an intentional insult. Looking to the circumstances of that particular case, it was held that the words spoken did not amount to an insult and that even if there was a technical offence under sec. 504, the matter was covered by sec. 95 barring cognisance by courts in view of its triviality.
9. In the second case of Hukamchand v. Chandmal A.I.R 1950 M.B 25, the views expressed in the above mentioned case were followed. In this case the complaint itself was filed nine days after the alleged occurrence and it was remarked by the learned Judge that the evidence adduced by the complainant did not inspire confidence.
10. In the last case of In re Karumuri Venkataratnam A.I.R 1948 Mad. 9, it was observed that one of the essential elements constituting an offence under sec. 504 I.P.C is that there should have been an act or conduct amounting to intentional insult. Where that act is the use of abusive words, it is necessary to know what those words were in order to decide whether the use of those words amounted to intentional insult. In the absence of these words, it is not possible to decide whether the ingredient of intentional insult is present.
11. So far as the principle laid down in the said case is concerned. I respectfully agree with the remarks made by the learned Judges. It is true that any and every expression which shows only breach of good manners cannot constitute an offence under sec. 504 I.P.C This section requires that it should be proved against the accused that he insulted the complainant, that such insult was made intentionally and that he intended or knew that it was likely that such provocation would cause that person to break public peace or to commit any other offence. It is also necessary to prove that provocation was given to the person concerned. Mere abuse unaccompanied by an intention as mentioned above would not come within the purview of this section. It is also necessary that the particular words spoken by the accused should be proved in order to decide whether the use of those words amounted to intentional insult. In the present case, however, it cannot be said that the complainant had failed to Page: 238prove the actual words used by the accused or that the words uttered by the accused were simply expressive of their bad manners and were not meant to insult or provoke the complainant to commit the breach of the peace. The complainant himself has stated what filthy and abusive words were used against him by each one of the accused. His witnesses Rawat Singh and Nathia, who have been relied upon by both the courts below have also given in detail what abusive words were uttered by each one of the accused. Those words are so filthy and so abusive that decency requires that it would not be proper to reproduce them here. It also appears from the evidence of these witnesses that it was not one, two or three or for words but a number of all sorts of filthy abuses which were literally showered upon the complainant by the accused and the trial court was not wrong in inferring that the accused could not but intend by the use of such abuses that they wanted to provoke the complainant to break the public peace. The offence cannot be taken away from the purview of the section simply because the insulted person exercised self-restraint or being terrified by the number and offensive attitude of the accused he did not actually break the public peace or commit some offence.
12. Regarding Pukh Raj's conviction under sec. 323 I.P.C the District Magistrate himself has discussed the evidence in detail and found that he had caused injury to the complainant by giving him two blows with his fist.
13. There is no good ground for interference and the revision petition is, therefore, dismissed.
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