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  • provisions of S. 3 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958.
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  • provisions of S. 3 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958.
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

On September 10, 1963, Ladulal was at his shop in village Khandar when the accused Ram Gopal and Jagdish allegedly hurled abuses at him, accusing him of preventing their black-market sugar sales. A quarrel ensued during which Ram Gopal pulled Ladulal's dhoti, dragged him, and threatened to kill him. Intervention by bystanders prevented further violence. Ladulal filed a complaint under Sections 352 and 405 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). After inquiry, the Munsiff Magistrate registered a case under Section 323 IPC and summoned the accused. The accused denied the charges. Upon trial, Jagdish was acquitted, while Ram Gopal was convicted under Section 323 IPC but released on probation under Section 3 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. An appeal against the conviction was dismissed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Gangapur. The petitioner filed this revision against that dismissal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Section 95 of the Indian Penal Code, which excludes trivial harm from constituting an offence, applies to the case involving alleged hurt under Section 323 IPC.
  2. Whether the harm caused to the complainant was so slight that a person of ordinary sense and temper would not complain, thereby negating criminal liability under Section 323 IPC.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mrs. Veeda Menezes v. Yusuf Khan Haji Ibrahim Khan Interpretation of Section 95 IPC regarding the degree of harm that excludes criminal liability. The court relied on the precedent to emphasize that the heinousness of an injury cannot be judged solely by actual physical harm but must consider the context, relationship, and circumstances surrounding the harm.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined Section 95 IPC, which excludes from criminality acts causing harm so slight that no reasonable person would complain. It noted that the term "harm" includes physical injury and that Section 95 is a general exception applicable to offences under Section 323 IPC. The court referenced the Supreme Court's ruling in Mrs. Veeda Menezes v. Yusuf Khan Haji Ibrahim Khan, which clarified that the seriousness of harm depends on context rather than mere physical injury.

Applying these principles, the court considered the facts: the complainant, a respectable businessman, was verbally abused, physically dragged by his dhoti, and threatened. The court found that the harm was not so trivial that a reasonable person would not complain. Although different views of the evidence might be possible, the court found no justification to overturn the appellate court's decision and maintained the conviction.

Holding and Implications

The revision petition is dismissed, and the order of the appellate court is maintained.

The direct effect of this decision is the upholding of the conviction of Ram Gopal under Section 323 IPC. No broader precedent was established beyond affirming the applicability of Section 95 IPC's exception in the factual context presented.

    Ram Gopal v. State Of Rajasthan

    L.S Mehta, J.:— One Ladulal made a complaint in the court of Munsiff Magistrate, Sawai Madhopur, on September 12, 1963 with the allegation that on September 10, 1963, at about 10 or 10.30 a.m, when he was available in his shop in village Khandar, the accused Ram Gopal and Jagdish came to him and hurled abuses towards him. They told him that he was responsible for preventing them from selling sugar in black-market. Gapoolal intervened in the quarrel. But the accused also abused him. The accused Ram Gopal pulled the complainant's ‘Dhoti’ and dragged him and told him that he would be killed. Had some persons not intervened Ram Gopal would have administered lathi blows to him. The complainant, therefore, prayed that the accused should be punished under-Ss. 352 and 405, I.P.C On receipt of the complaint and after necessary inquiry, learned Munsiff-Magistrate ordered on 7-12-63 the registration of the case under S. 323, I.P.C, and the accused were also directed to be summoned. The accused put in their appearance and denied to have committed any offence. The complainant examined his witnesses. The accused produced Jamnalal, D.W 1. By its judgment, dated January 2, 1966, Jagdish was acquitted of the aforesaid offence. Ram Gopal was convicted under S. 323, I.P.C He was, however, released after due admonition in accordance with the provisions of S. 3 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. Dissatisfied with that judgment an appeal was filed in the court of Additional Sessions Judge No. 1, Gangapur, but the same stood dismissed on September 26, 1967. Hence this revision.

    2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the court below went wrong in not applying S. 95, I.P.C, to this case. S. 95 reads as follows:—

    “Nothing is an offence by reason that it causes, or that it is intended to cause, or that it is known to be likely to cause, any harm, if that harm is so slight that no person of ordinary sense and temper would complain of such harm.

    3. The maxim ‘de minimis non curat lex’ the law dots not take account of trifles is the foundation of this section. Intercourse in a civilized society will come to an end, if for petty things a person finds himself exposed to all the trouble and worry of a criminal trial.

    4. The expression ‘harm’ as used in S. 95, I.P.C has not been defined in the Indian Penal Code. In its dictionary meaning it means “hurt, injury, damage, impairment”. Thus, the word ‘harm’ will also include physical injury. S. 95, I.P.C, is a general exception, inclusive of physical injury or hurt. There is, therefore, not the least doubt that S. 95 can be applied to an offence under S. 323, I.P.C

    5. Implication of S. 95, I.P.C, received the consideration of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Mrs. Veeda Menezes v. Yusuf Khan Haji Ibrahim Khan (1). In para 5 of the judgment, it has been observed—

    “There can be no absolute standard or degree of harm which may be regarded as so slight that a person of ordinary sense and temper would not complain of harm. It cannot be judged solely by the measure of physical or other injury the act causes. A soldier assaulting his colonel, a policeman assaulting his Suprintendent, or a pupil beating his teacher, commit offences, the heniousness of which cannot be determined merely by the actual injury suffered by the officer or the teacher, for the assault would be wholly subversive of discipline. An assault by one child on another, or even by a grown up person on another, which causes injury may still be regarded as so slight having regard to the way and station of life of the parties, relation between them, situation in which the parties are placed, and other circumstances in which harm is caused, that the victim ordinarily may not complain of the harm.”

    6. With this background, it is to be considered how far the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner merits consideration.

    7. The definition of hurt, as given in S. 319, I.P.C, appears to contemplate the causing of pain etc., by one person to another. There is nothing in the definition of hurt to suggest that an injury must be received by the complainant by direct physical contact. If bodily pain is caused by some voluntary act, a hurt is caused. If the harm is so slight that no person of ordinary sense or temper would complain of it, it is excluded by S. 95, I.P.C Here complainant, a respectable business man, was sitting quietly and peacefully at his shop. The accused Ram Gopal came forward, used filthy words at the complainant, exhibiting disrespect or indignity towards him and pulled up his ‘Dhoti’ to drag him out of the shop. In that context, the evidence produced by the complainant does not justify the conclusion that the hurt was so slight that a person of ordinary sense and temper, placed in the circumstances in which the complainant was put, might not reasonably have complained for that harm. Here is the case, where heinousness of injury cannot be determined merely by the actual injury suffered by the complainant. Even granting that a different view may betaken of the evidence, I do not think that I would be justified in a revision in disagreeing with the order of the appellate court.

    8. 1, therefore, maintain the order of the appellate court and dismiss this revision petition.

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    Comments

    Ram Gopal v. State Of Rajasthan
    (Aug 22, 1969)