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  • provisions of sub-sec. (2) of sec. 69 of the Partnership Act
  • provisions of sec. 69(2) of the Partnership Act.
  • sub-sec. (3) of sec. 69 of the Partnership Act
  • sub-sec. (2) of sec. 69 of the Partnership Act
  • sub-rule (3) of rule 2 of Order 30 C.P.C
  • sec. 69(3) of the Partnership Act.11.
  • provision of Order 30, rule 1 C.P.C
  • sec. 69(2) of the Partnership Act.
  • sec. 4 of the Partnership Act.
  • Order 30 rule 2 C.P.C
  • sub-rule (1),
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citation codes
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  • provisions of sub-sec. (2) of sec. 69 of the Partnership Act
  • provisions of sec. 69(2) of the Partnership Act.
  • sub-sec. (3) of sec. 69 of the Partnership Act
  • sub-sec. (2) of sec. 69 of the Partnership Act
  • sub-rule (3) of rule 2 of Order 30 C.P.C
  • sec. 69(3) of the Partnership Act.11.
  • provision of Order 30, rule 1 C.P.C
  • sec. 69(2) of the Partnership Act.
  • sec. 4 of the Partnership Act.
  • Order 30 rule 2 C.P.C
  • sub-rule (1),
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff, a partnership firm, instituted a suit against the Union of India claiming compensation for goods lost in transit by the Western Railway. The suit was filed on December 3, 1955, through Mohanlal Lohia, who signed the plaint as a partner and manager. The defendant denied the claim and issues were framed for trial. The trial court held the suit to be not maintainable under section 69(2) of the Partnership Act because the names of three partners were not included in the Register of Firms. This decision was upheld by the District Judge on appeal, prompting the plaintiff to file the present second appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the suit was maintainable under section 69(2) of the Partnership Act when the names of certain partners were not shown in the Register of Firms at the time of institution of the suit.
  2. Whether compliance with section 69(2) requires all partners of the firm to be shown in the Register of Firms, or if it is sufficient that only the person(s) signing the plaint are so registered.
  3. Whether the plaintiff firm could rely on section 69(3) of the Partnership Act on the basis that the firm was dissolved before the suit was instituted.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • It was argued that compliance with section 69(2) of the Partnership Act is satisfied if the person or persons signing the plaint are shown as partners in the Register of Firms.
  • The appellant relied on precedents such as Pratapchand Ramchand & Co. v. Jehangirji Bomanji Chinoy, Sardar Singar Singh and son v. Sikri brothers, Maddi Sudarsanam v. Bogora Vishwanadhan Brothers, and Durga Das Janak Ram v. Preete Shah Sant Ram to support this view.
  • The appellant also contended that the plaintiff firm was entitled to the benefit of section 69(3) on the ground that the firm was dissolved after the expiry of its constitution period or after the death of certain partners.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The defendant contended that the suit was barred under section 69(2) because the names of certain partners, specifically Kunj Behari Lal and Shyam Behari Lal, were not shown in the Register of Firms as partners at the time of the suit.
  • It was argued that all partners of the firm at the time the cause of action accrued must be shown in the Register of Firms, not just the person(s) signing the plaint.
  • The defendant denied that the firm was dissolved before the suit and maintained that the partnership continued with the consent of legal representatives and other partners.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Pratapchand Ramchand & Co. v. Jehangirji Bomanji Chinoy Interpretation of section 69(2) of the Partnership Act regarding registration of partners and continuation of firm after death of a partner. The court noted that this case held the firm continued as a registered firm after a partner's death and that only partners shown in the register at suit date could sue; however, the court distinguished it as not supporting the appellant's position here.
Sardar Singar Singh & Son v. Sikri Brothers Compliance with section 69(2) of the Partnership Act. The court considered this precedent but relied on Dr. V.S Bahal’s case for the correct legal position, thus not discussing it separately.
Maddi Sudarsanam v. Bogora Vishwanadhan Brothers Showing names of existing partners in the Register of Firms and effect of death or retirement on registration. The court held this case was factually different and did not support the appellant's argument.
Durga Das Janak Ram v. Preete Shah Sant Ram Interpretation of "persons suing" under section 69(2) of the Partnership Act. The court rejected the view taken in this case that only the partner through whom the firm sues needs to be registered, emphasizing the plural "persons" in the statute.
Dulichand Laxminarayan v. Commissioner of Income Tax Firm not being a legal entity but a collection of partners. Used to explain that a suit by a firm is a suit by all partners, reinforcing the need for all partners to be registered.
Kapurchand Bhagaji Firm v. Laxman Trimbak Requirement of registration of all partners under section 69(2). Supported the court’s view that all partners must be shown in the Register of Firms.
Dr. V.S Bahal v. S.L Kapur & Co. Interpretation of section 69(2) and registration of partners. The court relied on this precedent as laying down the correct law, emphasizing that all partners must be registered.
Firm Butamal Devraj v. Chananmal Application of section 69(2) regarding registration of partners. Followed the legal position that all partners at the relevant time must be shown in the Register of Firms.
Hansraj Manot v. Gorak Nath Champalal Pandey Requirement of registration of all partners under section 69(2). Supported the court’s interpretation that all partners must be registered for the suit to be maintainable.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined the requirements of section 69(2) of the Partnership Act, which mandates that no suit by or on behalf of a firm against a third party can be instituted unless the firm is registered and the persons suing are shown in the Register of Firms as partners. The court emphasized that a firm is not a legal entity but a collective of its partners, and thus a suit in the firm's name is in fact a suit by all partners at the relevant time.

The court rejected the appellant's contention that it sufficed for only the person(s) signing the plaint to be registered partners. It noted the plural term "persons" in the statute is deliberate, requiring all partners to be registered to maintain the suit. The court distinguished precedents relied upon by the appellant, pointing out that some were factually different or misconstrued the statutory language.

Further, the court dismissed the argument that the suit could proceed under section 69(3) on the basis that the firm was dissolved, noting that the plaintiff had consistently maintained the partnership continued despite deaths and retirements of certain partners. Thus, the firm was not dissolved at the time of suit institution.

Accordingly, the court upheld the bar under section 69(2) due to non-registration of certain partners, rendering the suit not maintainable.

Holding and Implications

The appeal is dismissed.

The court held that the suit was not maintainable under section 69(2) of the Partnership Act because the names of all partners, specifically Kunj Behari Lal and Shyam Behari Lal, were not shown in the Register of Firms at the time of the suit. It was further held that all partners of the firm at the relevant time must be registered for a suit to be maintainable, not merely the partner(s) signing the plaint. The plea of dissolution under section 69(3) was rejected as the partnership was shown to have continued.

No order as to costs was made, and leave to appeal was refused. The decision directly affects the parties by dismissing the suit but does not establish any new precedent beyond reaffirming the strict compliance required under section 69(2) of the Partnership Act.

    Alwar Iron Syndicate v. Union Of India

    Shinghal, J.:— It is not disputed that the plaintiff was a partnership firm A consignment which is said to have been purchased by it and was deliverable at Alwar, was lost in transit. Pleading that the Western Railway was responsible for the loss, the plaintiff raised the suit against the Union of India on December 3, 1955 through Mohanlal Lohia who signed the plaint as a partner and manager of the firm. The claim was denied by the defendant and a number of issues were framed for trial. It will be sufficient to say that the trial court took the view that the names of three partners, Kunj Bihari Lal, Shyam Bihari Lal and Mansingh were not included in the Register of Firms and the suit was not maintainable under sec. 69(2) of the Partnership Act. On appeal, the learned District Judge took a similar view in his judgment dated December 19, 1961 and this is why the plaintiff has preferred the present second appeal.

    2. The names of the partners of the plaintiff firm were not disclosed in the plaint or until the framing of the issues. An application was therefore made by the defendant under Order 30 rule 2 C.P.C on March 24, 1953, before the closure of the plaintiff's evidence, praying that the plaintiff maybe asked to declare in writing the names and places of residence of all the persons constituting the plain-tiff firm. Thereupon a detailed reply was made on April 17, 1953 stating that the firm was constituted in November, 1944 and was registered in April, 1950 as a partnership firm having the following partners:

    (1) Narayan Das Lohia, (5) Badri Prashad and Ram Jiwan Lohia, (2) Ram Nath Lohia, (6) Sampat Ram Lohia, (3) Mohan Lal Lohia, (7) Madan Lal Vaishya. (4) Kanhaiya Lal Lohia,

    It was clarified that Badri Prashad withdrew before the suit transaction, while, Ram Jiwan withdrew thereafter, and that while Kanhaiya Lal died before the suit transaction, Narayan Das died in September, 1955. All the same, it was further stated that “the partnership continues with the consent of Shri Kunj Bihari Lal and Shri Sham Bihari Lal, the sons and legal representatives of Narayan Das and Shri Kansingh son and legal representative of Kanhaiyalal.” It was declared that the “existing” partners of the plaintiff firm were as follows:

    1. Kunj Behari Lal, Shyam Behari Lal sons of Narain Das Lohiya of Toli ka Kua, Alwar.

    2. Ram Nath Lohiya of Lohiyapari, Alwar.

    3. Mohan Lal Lohiya near Town Hall, Alwar.

    4. Man Singh Lohiya of Mohalla Shivpura, Alwar.

    5. Madan Lal Vaishya of Lohiyapari, Alwar.

    It was thus admitted that the above mentioned persons constituted the partnership “in their personal and individual capacity”. This reply of the plaintiff was important because it had a co-relation with the provision of Order 30, rule 1 C.P.C That rule provides that any two or more persons claiming or being liable as partners may sue or be sued in the name of the firm of which they were partners at the time of the accruing of the cause of action, and any party to a suit may in such case apply to the court for a statement of the names and addresses of the persons who were, at the time of the accruing of the cause of action, partners of such firm. It would thus appear that the disclosure having been made under Order 30 rule 2 C.P.C had the purpose and effect of showing the names and the places of residence of the partners of the plaintiff firm on whose behalf the suit had been instituted, for sub-rule (3) of rule 2 of Order 30 C.P.C makes it clear that where the names of the partners are declared under sub-rule (1), the suit shall proceed in the same manner, and the same consequence in all respects shall follow, as if they had been named as plaintiff; in the plaint.

    3. When such is the position as regards the names of the persons who raised the present suit, all that remains to consider is whether the defendant was entitled to raise the bar of sec. 69(2) of the Partnership Act. That sub-section provides as follows—

    “69.(2). No suit to enforce a right arising from a contract shall be instituted in any court by or on behalf of a firm against any third party unless the firm is registered and the persons suing are or have been shown in the Register of Firms as partners in the firm.”

    The question is whether the requirements of sub-sec. (2) could be said to be fulfilled. On this point also, there is no dispute as regards the facts. It is the admitted case of the plaintiff that, at any rate, the names of Kunj Behari Lal and Shyam Behari Lal were not shown in the Register of Firms as partners. As such there was no compliance with the provisions of sub-sec. (2) of sec. 69 of the Partnership Act and the defendant is quite justified in raising its bar against the maintainability of the suit.

    4. There has, however, been a controversy before me on the question whether it is the correct meaning of sub-sec. (2) of sec. 69 of the Partnership Act that all the partners of a firm should be shown in the Register of Firms as its partners at the time of the institution of the suit, or whether it would be sufficient if the person or persons actually signing the plaint on behalf of the firm are shown as partners in that register. I shall therefore deal with this point of controversy.

    5. It has been argued by Mr. J.P Jain on the basis of Pratapchand Ramchand & Co. v. Jehangirji Bomanji Chinoy (1), Sardar Singar Singh and son v. Sikri brothers (2), Maddi Sudarsanam v. Bogora Vishwanadhan Brothers (3) and Durga Das Janak Ram v. Preete Shah Sant Ram (4) that it is enough compliance of the provisions of sub-sec. (2) of sec. 69 of the Partnership Act to show that the person or persons signing the plaint is or are shown in the Register of Firms as partners in the firm.

    6. It appears to me, however, that there is really no room for any controversy in regard to the correct meaning and purpose of sub-sec. (2) of sec. 69. It is well settled that a firm as such is not an entity in law and is not a “person” within the meaning of sec. 4 of the Partnership Act. Its name is therefore a mere abbreviated name of all its partners: Dulichand Laxminarayan v. Commer. of Income Tax, Nagpur (5). It is for this reason that special provisions have been made in G. 30 C.P.C regarding suits by or against firms and persons carrying on business in names other than their own. So it is beyond doubt that even if a suit is brought in the name of a firm, it is really a suit by all its partners under the firm name. In other words, the persons suing are all the partners of the firm at the relevant date and none of them can, for obvious reasons, be left out for purposes of the suit. So it is incorrect to say that sub-sec.(2) of sec. 69 merely requires that only the person or persons actually signing the plaint on behalf of the firm should be shown in the Register of Firms as its partners. The word “persons” in the sub-section has been used in the plural by design and serves an important purpose for it brings out the real nature of a partnership firm which cannot consist of a single person. This is the view taken in Kapurchand Bhagaji Firm v. Laxman Trimbak (6) and Dr. V.S Bahal v. S.L Kapur & Co. (7). The decision in Dr. V.S Bahal's case (7) does not appear to have been noticed in Durga Das Janak Raj v. Preete Shah Santrarn (4) on which reliance has been placed by Mr. J.P Jain, but it has been followed in Firm Butamal Devraj v. Chananmal (8) it has also been followed in Hansraj Manot v. Gorak Nath Champalal Pandey (9) and, if I may say so with respect, these judgments lay down the correct law on the point.

    7. In Pratapchand Ramchand & Co. v. Jehangirji Bomanji Chinoy (1) cited by Jain, there were three partners at the date of the registration of the firm. One partner Pratapchand Ramchand died before the date of the suit transaction and it was held that notwithstanding his death, the firm should be deemed to have continued as a registered firm. As on that date the firm consisted of the two partners who alone raised the suit, it was rightly held that there was sufficient compliance with the provisions of sec. 69(2) of the Partnership Act. The real opinion of the learned Judge who decided the case is to be found in the last paragraph of his judgment where he has observed that if additional partners had come into the firm as partners since the date of registration and their names had not been entered in the register in accordance with notice of a change in the constitution of the firm Page: 556given to the Registrar, “it may well be that the firm as then constituted could not sue because although it was a registered firm some of the persons then suing would not be shown in the register of firms as partners in the firm at the date of the suit.” That judgment cannot therefore be of any avail to the plaintiff-appellant in the present case.

    8. Durgadas Janakraj v. Preete Shah Sant Ram (4) is a case in which reliance has been placed on Pratapchand & Co. v. Jehangirji Bomanji Chinoy (1), but it appears to me that the important portion of the judgment of the Bombay High Court referred to above was not properly noticed by their Lordships. This is why they held as follows—

    “Applying the same test here which with respect, I accept as the correct one, it must be held that in the present case the requirements of sec. 69(2) were fully satisfied inasmuch as the firm was registered and the name of the person through whom it sued appeared on the register as a partner at the relevant time which was the date of the institution of the suit.”

    Their Lordships used the word “person” in the singular, and brought into consideration the words “through whom” the firm sued even though they did not appear in sec. 69(2) of the Partnership Act. It is of the essence of the sub-section that it “has used word “persons” in the plural and has not used any words to suggest that the person suing can be one of its partners. On the other hand, as has been stated, it provides that “the persons suing” should be shown in the Register of Firms as partners in the firm. With all respect to the learned Judges who decided the case of Durgadas Janakram (4), I am unable to subscribe to the reasoning or the view taken by them.

    9. So far as Sardar Singar Singh & Son v. Sikri Brothers (2) is concerned, it will be enough to say that it has been considered in Dr. V.S Bahal's case (7) and I need not refer to it separately. Maddi Sudarsanam v. Borogu Vishwanadham Brothers (3) was quite a different case in which the names of the existing partners were shown in the Register of Firms, though the Register showed two other persons as partners, one of whom had died and the other had retired. That case cannot therefore be said to support the argument of the learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant. It would thus appear the cases cited by Mr. Jain cannot avail the plaintiff-appellant.

    10. Faced with such a situation, the learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant tried to argue that the plaintiff was entitled to the benefit of sub-sec. (3) of sec. 69 of the Partnership Act because the plaintiff firm was dissolved at the expiry of the period of 5-½ years for which it was constituted or, at any rate, at the death of Kanhaiyalal and Naraindas who were its two partners. I do not however think this point requires any serious consideration because, as has been stated, the plaintiff clearly took the plea in its reply dated April 17, 1958 under the provisions of O. 30, r. 2 C.P.C that “the partnership continues” and that the six persons mentioned in the petition were the “present partners of the plaintiff firm”. I have extracted the relevant portion of the reply already. In fact a similar plea was taken in the plaint where it was averred that the plaintiff firm was a firm which had continued in existence up to the date of the suit. Mohanlal P.W 7, who raised the present suit, has also stated in the trial court that the firm has continued to be in existence inspite of the death and retirement of some of the partners. It is therefore quite futile to contend that the suit was raised by a dissolved firm so as to attract the application of sec. 69(3) of the Partnership Act.

    11. There is thus no force in any of the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant and the appeal is dismissed. There will however be no order as to the costs. Leave to appeal is prayed for, but is refused.

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    Alwar Iron Syndicate v. Union Of India
    (Feb 5, 1969)