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  • 7, rule 3 and order 20, rule 3 CPC
  • section 152 or section 47, CPC
  • Order VII rule 3
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • 7, rule 3 and order 20, rule 3 CPC
  • section 152 or section 47, CPC
  • Order VII rule 3
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff purchased a plot described as Schedule‑'A' (3K‑6L; Dag No. 686(Kha), K.P. Patta No. 280, village Kamakhya, Jalukbari mouza) on 22.9.1975 by a registered sale deed and has been in possession. The defendant purchased an adjacent plot described as Schedule‑'B' (3K‑10L; same dag and patta) and has been in possession of that plot. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant, taking advantage of a friendly relationship, extended construction from the defendant's Schedule‑'B' land into the plaintiff's Schedule‑'A' land, including construction of a sanitary latrine on Schedule‑'A', and upon objection the defendant denied the encroachment.

The plaintiff filed a title suit claiming declaration of right, title and interest over Schedule‑'A', recovery of khas possession, permanent injunction and consequential reliefs. The defendant filed a written statement denying encroachment and raised objections including want of cause of action, limitation, non‑joinder and inadequate description of the encroached portion (invoking Order VII, rule 3 CPC). The trial court framed six issues, appointed a Survey Commissioner, and after evidence (plaintiff examined three witnesses; defendant examined himself; Survey Commissioner as PW‑4) dismissed the suit holding the plaintiff had failed to give requisite particulars and the plaint contravened Order VII, rule 3 CPC.

The plaintiff appealed to the First Appellate Court (Title Appeal No. 21/1992) which allowed the appeal, set aside the trial court's judgment and decreed the plaintiff's suit. The defendant filed the present second appeal challenging the appellate court's reversal and raising two substantial questions of law set out by this Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the learned appellate Court committed illegality in reversing the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial court without setting aside the findings recorded by the learned trial court?
  2. Whether the learned lower appellate Court committed illegality in reversing the judgment and decree without considering the admissions of the plaintiff and his vendor in their evidence as PW‑1 and PW‑2, respectively?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Defendant's) Arguments

  • The plaint should have contained a Schedule‑'C' specifically describing the encroached portion (coordinates/dimensions); omission renders a decree for recovery of khas possession non‑executable.
  • The First Appellate Court relied solely on the Survey Commissioner's report (Exhibit 'AH'), which identified 14 lechas as encroached but did not clearly state who had encroached; therefore the appellate court ought not to have decreed recovery of khas possession as it may interfere with the defendant's enjoyment of Schedule‑'B'.
  • Admitted, in fairness, that the defendant is not claiming any title over Schedule‑'A' and concedes plaintiff's title and possession to an extent, so defendant does not object to a declaratory decree as to plaintiff's title over Schedule‑'A'.

Respondent's (Plaintiff's) Arguments

  • The First Appellate Court rightly relied on the Survey Commissioner's report (Exhibit 'AH'), supported by trace maps Exhibit 'E' (whole dag) and Exhibit 'EE' (Schedule‑'A' and Schedule‑'B').
  • The Survey Commissioner (PW‑4) was cross‑examined but no suggestion was made to him that his finding of 14 lechas of encroachment was erroneous; that failure to challenge in cross‑examination amounts to acceptance of encroachment by the defendant.
  • While the plaint could have included a separate Schedule describing the encroached area, omission of such Schedule is not fatal because there is no dispute about the plaintiff's title over Schedule‑'A'.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Pratibha Singh v. Shanti Devi Prasad, (2003) 2 SCC 330 Non‑compliance with Order VII, r.3 and Order XX, r.3 CPC in suits for immovable property can be cured; descriptions omitted can be supplied or ascertained under Section 152 or Section 47 CPC (preferably Section 47 depending on facts). The Court relied on this authority to hold that the plaintiff's failure to give a separate schedule describing the encroached portion was not fatal to the decree. The Court treated the omission as curable and accepted that execution procedures (Section 47 CPC) can supply or ascertain the exact description, thereby upholding the appellate decree while restricting execution so as not to disturb defendant's possession of Schedule‑'B'.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court first examined the pleadings and evidence. It noted that the plaintiff sought a declaratory decree and recovery of possession in respect of Schedule‑'A' land and that the plaint did not include a separate Schedule‑'C' describing the exact portion alleged to have been encroached. The Court acknowledged the trial court's view that omission contravened Order VII, r.3 CPC but proceeded to assess whether that omission was fatal in the light of other material on record.

The Court considered the Survey Commissioner's report (Exhibit 'AH'), which, after local inspection, recorded that 14 lechas of the plaintiff's Schedule‑'A' land were under encroachment. The Court observed that during cross‑examination of PW‑4 (the Survey Commissioner) no specific suggestion was put that his finding of 14 lechas being encroached was erroneous. The Court also noted that the Survey Commissioner did not expressly state in the report that the encroached 14 lechas were in the occupation of the defendant, but that the report nevertheless identified the encroached area within Schedule‑'A'.

The Court relied on the decision in Pratibha Singh v. Shanti Devi Prasad to conclude that non‑compliance with the requirement to describe the immovable property (Order VII, r.3 CPC) is capable of being cured and should not automatically defeat a decree where the defect is inadvertent and does not affect the merits. The Court explained that the exact description of decretal property can be supplied by the decree‑granting court under Section 152 CPC or ascertained by the executing court under Section 47 CPC; in many cases Section 47 would be appropriate. Applying that principle, the Court held that although the plaintiff omitted a separate Schedule for the encroached portion, the omission was not fatal because it was not disputed that Schedule‑'A' belonged to the plaintiff and the encroachment related to Schedule‑'A'.

However, the Court was cautious about practical consequences at the execution stage: while upholding the First Appellate Court's decree declaring the plaintiff's right, title and interest in Schedule‑'A', the Court made it explicit that the decree could not be executed in any manner that would disturb the defendant's possession of any part of Schedule‑'B'. In short, the Court limited the effect of execution: the decree is maintained as to title over Schedule‑'A', but possession of the defendant over Schedule‑'B' shall not be disturbed in purported execution of the decree.

Holding and Implications

Holding: This second appeal is disposed of by upholding the judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court (Title Appeal No. 21/1992) which declared the plaintiff's right, title and interest in respect of the Schedule‑'A' land.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The plaintiff's declaration of right, title and interest in Schedule‑'A' is sustained. The appellate decree in favour of the plaintiff is upheld.
  • Execution limitation: The Court expressly limited execution of the decree so that the possession of the defendant over any portion of Schedule‑'B' shall not be disturbed in purported execution of the decree passed by the First Appellate Court.
  • On procedural defect: The omission to describe the encroached portion in a separate schedule (Order VII, r.3 CPC) was treated as a curable defect in view of the Survey Commissioner's report and binding precedent; the Court did not treat the omission as fatal to the plaintiff's claim.
  • Costs and ancillary orders: There is no order as to costs. Registry directed to send back the LCR.
  • Precedential impact: The Court applied existing Supreme Court authority (Pratibha Singh v. Shanti Devi Prasad) to govern cure of descriptive omissions; the opinion does not announce a new legal principle beyond applying that authority and confining execution to avoid disturbing Schedule‑'B'.

This summary is prepared strictly from the text of the provided opinion. No information beyond the opinion has been added.

    Gita Rani Dhar And Ors. v. On The Death Of Milan Kanti Dey His Legal Heirs Ms. Anupama Dey (Widow) And Ors.

    1. Heard Mr. R.C Sanchati, learned counsel appearing for the appellants. Page: 13Also heard Mr. Sheeladitya, learned counsel representing the respondents.

    2. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree of reversal dated 24.12.2003 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Div.) No. 2, Kamrup, Guwahati in Title Appeal No. 21/1992 whereby the judgment and decree dated 24.4.1992 passed by the learned Sadar Munsiff, Guwahati in Title Suit No. 20/1982 was set aside and the suit filed by the plaintiff respondent was decreed on appeal, the defendant as appellant has preferred this second appeal before this court.

    3. The plaintiffs case, as setout in the plaint, is that he had purchased a plot of land measuring 3K-6L covered by Dag No. 686(Kha) of K.P Patta No. 280 of village Kamakhya under Jalukbari mouza, more fully described in Schedule-’A’ to the plaint from the pro forma defendant on 22.9.1975 by means of a registered deed of sale pursuant where to he has also been enjoying possession in respect thereof. The defendant had also purchased a plot of land measuring 3K-10L covered by Dag No. 686 of K.P Patta No. 280 of the same village, described in Schedule-’B’ to the plaint, from the pro forma defendant and has been enjoying possession in respect of the land purchased by him. The land purchased by the plaintiff is situated adjacent to the Schedule-’B’ land of the defendant and the plaintiff and the defendant had been peacefully residing in their respective plot of land having a friendly relationship with each other. Taking advantage of the friendly relationship between the parties the defendant started construction of his dwelling house in Schedule-’B’ land and thereafter, without the knowledge of the plaintiff, extended his construction into the Schedule-’A’ land of the plaintiff, thereby encroaching upon the plaintiff's land. When the defendant was constructing his sanitary latrine the plaintiff happened to visit the construction site and thereafter found to his utter surprise that the latrine has been constructed upon the Schedule-’A’ land belonging to the plaintiff. When the plaintiff raised objection to such construction made by the defendant, he had claimed that the construction has been made over his own land and not upon the land of the plaintiff. Since the effort on the part of the plaintiff to amicably resolve the dispute between the parties did not meet with any success, hence, the plaintiff was compelled to institute the aforementioned title suit praying for a decree declaring his right, title and interest over the Schedule-’A’ land (which is the suit land); recovery of khas possession of the suit land by evicting the defendant; for a decree of permanent injunction and for other consequential reliefs.

    4. The defendant contested the suit by filing written statement, inter alia, raising objection regarding the maintainability of the suit on the Page: 14ground of want of cause of action; suit being barred by limitation; suit being bad for non-joinder of necessary parties with a further prayer that the plaint be rejected under order VII, rule 11 CPC. The defendant has emphatically asserted that the construction of his house and latrine was being carried out upon the Schedule-’B’ land belonging to the defendant himself and not upon the land of the plaintiff. The defendant has also raised objection as regards failure on the part of the plaintiff to give a proper description by furnishing the requisite particulars as regards that portion of the land alleged to have been encroached by the defendant by taking the plea with in the absence of any such particulars no decree for recovery of khas possession can be passed in favour of the plaintiff.

    5. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties the learned trial court had framed as many as 6 issues which are as follows:

    1. Is there any cause of action for the suit?

    2. Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties?

    3. Whether the suit has been property valued and proper court fee has been paid by the plaintiff?

    4. Whether there is clear cut boundaries of the land of the plaintiff and defendant?

    5. Whether the defendant had encroached upon the land of the plaintiff and has constructed by structure upon the land of the plaintiff?

    6. To what relief/reliefs if any the plaintiff is entitled to?

    6. The plaintiff side has examined three witnesses whereas the defendant had examined only himself as a witness. The learned trial court had also appointed a Survey Commissioner so as to demarcate the suit land and furnish a report. The Survey Commissioner was examined as PW-4. On appreciation of the materials available on record the learned trial court has dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff by deciding the issue No. 5 against the plaintiff. The learned trial court was of the view that the plaintiff having failed to give proper description of the encroached area of land allegedly under the occupation of the defendant the suit was liable to be dismissed the plaint being contravention with requirement of Order VII rule 3 of the CPC.

    7. Being aggrieved by the judgment dated 20.4.1992 and decree dated 28.4.1992 respectively passed by the learned Trial court in Title Suit No. 20/1982 dismissing the suit filed by the plaintiff, the plaintiff as appellant had preferred Title Appeal No. 21/1992 before the court of learned Civil Judge (Sr. Div) No. 2, Kamrup, Guwahati. Upon hearing the learned counsel for the parties the learned lower Appellate Court had allowed the appeal filed by the plaintiff by setting aside the judgment and decree Page: 15passed by the trial court in Title Suit No. 20/1982 thereby decreeing the suit filed by the plaintiff.

    8. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 24.12.2003 passed by the learned lower Appellate Court allowing the Title Appeal No. 21/1992, the defendant as appellant had approached this court by filing the instant second appeal which was admitted for hearing by framing the following substantial questions of law:

    1. Whether the learned appellate Court committed illegality in reversing the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial court without setting aside the findings recorded by the learned trial court?

    2. Whether the learned lower appellate Court committed illegality in reversing the judgment and decree without considering the admissions of the plaintiff and his vendor in their evidence as PW 1 and PW 2, respectively?

    9. Mr. Sanchati, learned counsel for the appellant submits that having regard to the nature of grievance expressed in the suit the plaint ought to have contain a Schedule-’C’ giving a proper description of the area of the defendant. However, since the plaintiff has failed to give any such description by specifically indicating the co-ordinates and dimension of land alleged to have been encroached, hence, the decree insofar as the recovery of khas possession by evicting the defendant is concerned, cannot be granted in the eye of law as such a decree would not be executable in the absence of proper description of the land.

    10. Mr. Sanchati further submits that the learned First Appellate Court had decreed the suit of the plaintiff by solely relying upon Exhibit-’AH’ report of the Survey Commissioner. Even a perusal of the said report will go to show that although the Survey Commissioner has mentioned that 14 lechas of land on the Western side belonging to the plaintiff is under encroachment, he has not indicated clearly in his report as to who had encroached the said plot of land. In that view of the matter the learned First Appellate Court ought not to have decreed the suit for recovery of khas possession as the same has the potential of posing unnecessary obstruction in the way of enjoyment of the Schedule-’B’ land by the defendant, even though the plaintiff has not claimed any right, title and interest over the Schedule-’B’ land under the possession of the defendant. Mr. Sanchati has, however, submitted in all fairness that the defendant is not claiming any right over the Schedule-’A’ land and rather admits the title and possession of the plaintiff over the Schedule-’A’ land to that extent his client does not have any objection as regards the decree declaring right, title and interest of the plaintiff over the Schedule-’A’ is concerned.

    11. Per contra Mr. Sheeladitya, learned counsel appearing for the respondent submits that learned First Appellate Court had rightly decreed the suit of the plaintiff by relying upon the report of the Survey Commissioner (Exhibit-’AH’) which was duly supported by the Exhibit-‘E’, i.e, trace map of whole dag and Exhibit-’EE’ trace map of Schedule-‘A’ and Schedule-’B’ land. He submits that the Survey Commissioner (PW-4) was cross-examined by the defendants during the course of the trial but no suggestion was put to the PW-4 that his finding regarding encroachment of 14 lechas of land belonging to the plaintiff is an erroneous finding. Since the dispute was between the plaintiff and defendant pertaining to encroachment of a portion of Schedule-’A’ land, hence, the failure to make any suggestion to the Survey Commissioner challenging his findings in the report of the Commissioner would have to be understood to have on acceptance by the defendant about the fact of encroachment made by the defendant and nobody else. Although Mr. Sheeladitya admits that the suit could have been constituted in a better manner by giving the description in a separate Schedule indicating the land under encroachment, yet he submitted that failure to do so would not have any fatal consequence in the outcome of the suit primarily because of the fact that there is no question as regards the title of the plaintiff over the Schedule-’A’ land.

    12. I have considered the rival submissions made by and on behalf of both the parties. A perusal of the plaint goes to show that the plaintiff has claimed a declaratory decree in respect of Schedule-’A’ land which is his purchased land and also for recovery of possession of the same by evicting the defendant. Since the case of the plaintiff, as projected in the plaint, is that the defendant had encroached a portion of the Schedule-‘A’ land, the plaintiff ought to have describe the encroached portion of the land in the form of Schedule-’C’ which has not been done in the instant case. Be that as it may. Since it is not in dispute that the Schedule-‘A’ land belongs to the plaintiff and having regard to the fact that the plaintiff is not claiming any land beyond the Schedule-’A’ land therefore, in my considered opinion, the omission to describe the encroached land by giving a separate Schedule would not have any fatal consequence in the outcome of the plaintiff's suit.

    13. From the records of this case it appears that the trial court had appointed a Survey Commissioner to demarcate the land who had also submitted his report dated 14.9.1991 (Exhibit-’AH’) after carrying out a local inspection. In the said report it has been clearly mentioned the 14 lechas of land in the area falling under the ownership of the plaintiff is under encroachment. The fact that 14 lechas of land from the Schedule-‘A’ is under encroachment has not been disputed by the defendant during Page: 17the time of cross-examination of the PW-4. It is however, also a fact that the Survey Commissioner did not indicate in his report in specific terms that the aforesaid 14 lechas of land under encroachment was in the occupation of the defendant.

    14. It has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Pratibha Singh v. Shanti Devi Prasad, (2003) 2 SCC 330 that non-compliance of the requirement of order VII, rule 3, CPC cannot be a ground to defeat a decree passed by the court in favour of a party. Paragraph 17 of the said judgment is quoted herein below for ready reference:

    “When the suit as to immovable property has been decreed and the property is not definitely identified, the defect in the court record caused by overlooking of provisions contained in order 7, rule 3 and order 20, rule 3 CPC is capable of being cured. After all a successful plaintiff should not be deprived of the fruits of decree. Resort can be had to section 152 or section 47, CPC depending on the facts and circumstances of each case-which of the two provisions would be more appropriate, just and convenient to invoke. Being an inadvertent error, not affecting the merits of the case, it may be corrected under section 152, CPC by the court which passed the decree by supplying the omission. Alternatively, the exact description of decretal property may be ascertained by the executing court as a question relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of decree within the meaning of section 47, CPC. A decree of a competent court should not, as far as practicable, be allowed to be defeated on account of an accidental slip or omission. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, we think it would be more appropriate to invoke section 47, CPC.”

    15. From the above it is clear that although the plaintiff has failed to give specific description of the area of land under encroachment yet, from the report of the Survey Commissioner it is apparent that 14 lechas of land is under encroachment. Since the encroachment of the aforesaid 14 lechas of land pertains to the Schedule-’A’ land, hence, the decree passed by the learned First Appellate Court cannot be executed in any manner so as to disturb the possession of the defendant over the Schedule-’B’ land under his possession. In other words it is made clear that in purported execution of the decree passed by the learned First Appellate Court in Title Appeal No. 21/1992 the possession of the defendant over any portion of the Schedule-’B’ land cannot be disturbed.

    With the above observation, this second appeal is disposed of by upholding the judgment and decree passed by the learned First Appellate Court declaring the right, title and interest of the plaintiff in respect of the Schedule-’A’ land. The question of law framed by this court stands answered accordingly.

    However, having regard to the facts and circumstance of the case, there would be no order as to cost. Registry to send back the LCR.

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    Gita Rani Dhar And Ors. v. On The Death Of Mila...
    (Jun 17, 2015)