Devender Singh Dahiya v. State Of Haryana And Others

Ajay Kumar Mittal, J.:— The petitioner having been required to affix stamp duty on the document though termed as release deed has approached this Court through the present writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India impugning the order and notice dated 29.9.2011, Annexures P.1 and P.2 passed by the Collector, respondent No. 3 and affirmed by the Commissioner, respondent No. 2 vide order dated 13.12.2011, Annexure P.3

2. Brief facts as narrated in the petition may be noticed. Shri Dilbag Singh Dahiya, father of the petitioner executed a release deed No. 5144 dated 29.6.2011 in respect of half portion of House No. 25, Sector 15 A, Hisar in favour of the petitioner without any consideration. The said deed was registered on 29.6.2011 in the office of Sub Registrar, Hisar-respondent No. 4. The Sub Registrar, Hisar did not consider the said release deed as such and after registering it as a sale deed reported deficiency in the stamp duty to the tune of Rs. 1,22,905/- and registration fee of Rs. 9950/- Consequently, respondent No. 4 referred the case to the Collector-respondent No. 3 on 30.6.2011 respondent No. 3 passed the impugned order dated 29.9.2011 under Section 47A of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (in short, “the Act”) and also issued the impugned notice, Annexures P. 1 and P.2 respectively. Aggrieved by the order, the petitioner filed an appeal before the Commissioner who vide order dated 13.12.2011, Annexure P.3 dismissed the same. Hence the present petition by the petitioner.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner relying upon judgment of the Apex Court in Kuppuswami Chettiar v. S.P.A Arumugam Chettiar, AIR 1967 SC 1395 and judgment of this Court in Harjot Singh v. Gurjit Singh, RSA No. 3020 of 2010, decided on 7.3.2011 submitted that the document in question was relinquishment deed and as per provisions of the Act, it was fixed stamp duty which was leviable. The authorities were in error in ordering advalorem stamp duty by treating the same to be gift deed.

4. After giving careful consideration to the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioner, I do not find any merit therein.

5. In Kuppuswami Chettiar's case (supra), as noticed therein, the question for discussion before the Apex Court was “whether a deed of release was vitiated by misrepresentation, and, if not, whether it operated as a conveyance of the suit properties in favour of the respondents.” Since main thrust of the learned counsel for the petitioner had been on this pronouncement, it would be necessary to have closer scrutiny of the factual matrix and the legal proposition enunciated therein. By a Will dated 9.8.1931, Ponnuswami-grand father of the respondents had bequeathed the immovable properties to his paternal uncle's daughter, Kannammal. A suit was filed in January 1952 against several persons including Kannammal challenging inter alia the bequest made by Ponnuswami in her favour. Kannammal died on 1.2.1952 and the appellant survived as her legal heir who was her husband's brother's son. On February 25, 1952, a deed was executed by the appellant releasing the properties in favour of the respondents including certain outstandings due from third parties. The deed was registered on 26.2.1952 An application was filed on the same date for removal of the properties from the scope of the suit in view of the release deed. The Court allowed the application. A suit was instituted by the respondents on 22.1.1953 for the recovery of the outstandings in respect of an item specified in the release deed. The appellants before the Supreme Court were impleaded as defendants in the suit. In the written statement filed, release deed was challenged as invalid. The Munsif decreed the suit. Thereafter, another suit was filed for decree for setting aside recovery of suit properties and accounts. The release deed was challenged Page: 886being result of fraud, deceit and misrepresentation. It was also the contention of the appellants-plaintiffs therein that release deed could not take effect as a conveyance. The trial court accepted the plea that the release deed was procured by misrepresentation and it did not effectively convey the properties. The decree of the trial court was set aside by the High Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court while rejecting the appeal held that a deed styled as a release deed can transfer title to one who before the transfer had no interest in the property but it would be termed as deed of conveyance. In the facts as noticed herein above, the reliance of the counsel for the petitioners is totally misplaced. The learned counsel for the petitioner was unable to refer to any observations in this judgment which may advance the case of the petitioner. Rather, observations are to the contrary and demolish his contention. This Court in Harjot Singh's case (supra) had followed the Apex court judgment in Kuppuswami Chettiar's case (supra).

6. Now adverting to facts involved in the present controversy, the father of the petitioner had executed a deed in favour of the petitioner whereby he had relinquished his rights in half share of the property. No consideration had passed for transfer of the property. Furthermore, the petitioner could not establish that he had a pre-existing right in the self acquired property of his father in which he could claim any legal right on the basis of which it could be relinquished in his favour without consideration. In other words, though, it was termed as relinquishment deed but it was in the nature of a gift as defined under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, as held by the Honble Apex Court in Kuppuswami Chettiar's case (supra). The petitioner could not by nomenclature of the deed circumvent the payment of the stamp duty on the execution of the document. Once that was so, no error could be noticed in the order passed by the authorities below demanding ad-valorem stamp duty.

7. Finding no merit in the petition, the same is dismissed.

Petition dismissed.