Khanna, J.:— This is a petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India filed by Karamjit Kaur for quashing the order of the Punjab University whereby the petitioner was disqualified for 1963 and 1964 for the Matriculation Examination. Prayer has further been made to direct the University to treat the petitioner as having duly passed the Matriculation Examination held in March 963.

2. According to the allegations of the petitioner, she was a student of Government High School, Bajakhana (Bhatinda) in 1963 and appeared in the Matriculation Examination of the Punjab University held in March 1963. The examination centre of the petitioner was in Government High School, Jaitu. It is stated that the petitioner fared well in the examination, but when the result was declared it was mentioned that the petitioner's result would be declared later on. On 8th July 1963 a notice was received by the petitioner from the Deputy Registrar, Examinations, with the subject “Confidential enquiry into the unfair means employed at Jaitu in the Matriculation Examination, March 1963”. The petitioner was advised to appear on 10th July 1963 before a senior officer of the Punjab University who had been deputed to hold confidential enquiry into the alleged complaint of unfair means employed at the above Centre. The petitioner at the time of the enquiry was asked to narrate some questions as well as a story of English Paper ‘A’. The petitioner replied that without sufficient time in advance it was not possible for her to write that story. Similar answers were made by the other students, who had also been called, because of the lapse of four months since the examination. The University subsequently sent a notification whereby the petitioner was disqualified for the years 1963 and 1964. The case of the petitioner is that the action of the University in disqualifying the petitioner is ultra vires, without jurisdiction and capricious as well as violative of principles of natural justice, because adequate opportunity was not given to her of explaining the allegations and making a defence.

3. The Punjab University in its reply through the Registrar has stated that on 3rd April 1963 Deputy Superintendent in the Matriculation Examination held at Jaitu Centre sent a complaint to the Punjab University that the candidates of Government High School, Jaitu, were given intensive training in the use of unfair means, and that the means adopted by them were both subtle and ingenious. Thirty-five students of that school were caught red-handed while using unfair means and their cases were reported by the Centre Superintendent to the Punjab University. It was also reported that the Headmaster of the Government High School, Jaitu, had helped his school examinees in their nefarious activities and had hurled threats on the supervisory staff. In consequence of that, the Head Examiners in English and Mathematics were asked to report if they suspected unfair means cases with regard to the candidates of that Centre. They were also requested to send the scripts of the suspected candidates along with their detailed Page: 676report about each case. According to the reports of the Head Examiners, apart from the thirty-five candidates who were caught red-handed at the Centre for having used unfair means, seventy-two candidates were involved. After considering the matter, the Assistant Registrar, Examinations, was deputed to conduct an on the spot enquiry at Jaitu. The said Enquiry Officer took down the statements of the candidates involved including the petitioner who had appeared under Roll No. 112043 at the said Centre at Jaitu. Certain other students admitted that they were encouraged by the Deputy Superintendent to use unfair means and were told the answers. Though the petitioner denied the charge, yet she was not in a position to re attempt the question which, it is stated, was copied by her in the Examination Centre. According to the report of the Head Examiner, the petitioner was found guilty of having received help from outside or to have copied from one another. Her answer-book contained the same answer to Question No. 4 as was contained in the answer-book of thirteen other candidates, including Roll No. 112042 who was just in front of Roll No. 112043. The Punjab University again referred the matter to an Expert for his considered opinion along with the answer-books and the re attempts of Question No. 4. The Expert observed that he was incline to believe that the candidates had either made use of their note books or some circulated solved copies. The whole matter was thereafter considered by the Standing Committee appointed for unfair means and it unanimously came to the conclusion that all the candidates including the petitioner had copied from the material supplied to them during the course of the examination and as such they were guilty of copying under Regulation 12(b) and were disqualified to appear in the Matriculation Examination for two years 1963 and 1964. Subsequently, the Vice-Chancellor himself examined the whole case and agreed with the unanimous decision of the Standing Committee. According to the respondent University, the above facts clearly established that the petitioner was rightly and justly punished under Regulation 12(b) and that the impugned order was not liable to be quashed. It was further averred that the petitioner was given full opportunity to present her case.

4. Regulation 12(b) which has been framed under section 31 of the Punjab University Act of 1947 and under which action has been taken against the petitioner, reads as under:—

“If an answer-book shows that the candidate has received help from or given help to another candidate or if he is found copying or to have copied from any paper, book, or note or to have allowed any other candidate to copy from his answer-book or to have taken the examination with notes written on any part of his clothing or body or table or desk or instruments (allowed in the Engineering examinations) like set squares, protectors, slide rules, etc., or is guilty of swallowing or destroying any note or paper found on him, or talking to a person outside the examination hall, while going to urinal or consulting notes or books, while outside the examination hall, he shall be disqualified for two years, including that in which he is found guilty, if he is a candidate for an examination held once a year, or for four examinations, including that in which he is found guilty, if he is a candidate for an examination held twice a year.”

5. The Standing Committee, which decided against the petitioner, was appointed by the syndicate under Regulation 19 and it reads as under:—

“The Syndicate shall appoint annually Standing Committee to deal with cases of the alleged misconduct and use of unfair means in connection with examinations. When the Committee is unanimous, its decision shall be final except as given in the proviso below. If the Committee is not unanimous the matter shall be referred to the Vice-Chancellor who shall either decide the matter himself or refer it to the Syndicate for decision.

Provided that in cases of the alleged use of unfair means in connection with examinations if in the opinion of the Vice-Chancellor facts have been brought to light within 30 days of the receipt of the decision by the candidate which, had they been before the Committee, might have induced them to come to a decision other than the one arrived at, then the Vice-Chancellor may order that such facts be reduced to writing and placed before the Committee.

The Committee shall then reconsider the case. A unanimous decision of the Committee shall be final. But in the event of a difference of opinion the case shall be referred to the Vice-Chancellor who may either finally decide the case himself or refer it to the Syndicate for final decision as he thinks fit.”

6. It is common ground that the proceedings taken against the petitioner in respect of the unfair means alleged to have been used by her at the examination, are in the nature of quasi-judicial Proceedings. This matter was dealt with by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in The Board of High School and Intermediate Education, U.P, Allahabad v. Ghanshyam Das Gupta, (1962) 64 P.L.R 575, and it was held that the Committee when it exercises power under regulations relating to examinations and deals with cases of examinees using unfair means at the examinations is acting quasi judicially and the principles of natural justice, which require that the other party must be heard, will apply to the proceedings before the Committee. Dealing further with the manner in which the Committee should give an opportunity to the examinee concerned to be heard, it was observed as under:—

“As to the manner in which it should give an opportunity to the examinee concerned to be heard, that is a matter which can be provided by Regulations or Bye-laws if necessary. As was pointed out in Local Government Board v. Alridge 1915 A.C 120, all that is required is that the other party should have an opportunity of adequately presenting his case. But what the procedure should be in detail will depend on the nature of the tribunal. There is no doubt that many of the powers of the Committee under Chapter VI are of administrative nature; but where quasi-judicial duties are entrusted to an administrative body like this it becomes a quasi-judicial body for performing these duties and it can prescribe its own procedure so long as the principles of natural justice are followed and adequate opportunity of presenting his case is given to the examinee.”

The matter was also considered by their Lordships of the Privy Council in University of Ceylon v. Fernando (1960) 1 A.E.L.R 631. In that case a General Act of the University of Ceylon provided that, where the Vice-Chancellor was satisfied that any candidate for examination had acquired knowledge of the nature or the substance of any question or the content of any paper, the Vice-Chancellor might suspend the candidate from the examination and should report the matter to the Board of Residence and Discipline Page: 678for such action as the Board might decide to take. The Vice-Chancellor appointed a Commission of Inquiry, consisting of himself and two others, to assist him in inquiring into certain allegations which had been made by a woman student against the respondent who was taking university examination. The respondent attended before the Commission, when he was informed the charge and was given an opportunity to state his case. When other witnesses, including the woman student who had complained against the respondent, gave evidence before the Commission, the respondent was not present. The respondent also did not ask that he should be allowed to question any of those witnesses, me Commission found that the allegation against the respondent was true and reported accordingly. The respondent was thereafter suspended from all university examination. The respondent brought an action against the university for a declaration to the effect that the decision was null and void on the ground that the inquiry had not been conducted in accordance with principles of natural justice. On appeal to the Privy Council it was not disputed that the inquiry was a quasi-judicial and not administrative proceedings. It was held that the fact that the Commission did not tender the woman student who had made the complaint against the respondent or any other witness for cross-examination of the respondent was not a failure to comply with the rules of natural justice, but the position might have been different if the respondent had asked to be allowed to cross-examine and had not been allowed to do so. It was further observed that as no special form of procedure had been prescribed, it was for the Vice-Chancellor to determine the procedure to be followed, as he thought best, subject to the obvious implication that some form of inquiry must be made such as would enable him fairly to determine whether he should hold himself satisfied that the charge had been made out. Reliance was placed on the following observations of Lord Shaw in Local Government Board v. Arlidge 1915 A.C 120, which required that the authority concerned:

“must do its best to act justly, and to reach just ends by just means. If a statute prescribes the means it must employ them. If it is left without express guidance it must still act honestly and by honest means.”

Reliance was also placed upon the following passage in the speech of Viscount Haldane in Arlidge's case:—

“I agree with the view expressed in analogous case by my noble and learned friend Lord Loreburn. In Board of Education v. Rice 1911 A.C at p. 182, he laid down that in disposing of a question which was the subject of an appeal to it, the Board of Education was under a duty to act in good faith, and to listen family to both sides, inasmuch as that was a duty which lay on every one who decided anything. But he went on to say that he did not think it was bound to treat such a question as though it were a trial. The Board had no power to administer an oath, and need not examine witnesses. It could, he thought, obtain information in any way it thought best, always giving a fair opportunity to those who were parties in the controversy to correct or contradict any relevant statement prejudicial to their view.”

Referring to the power of the Court to interfere with the decision of the University authorities, their Lordships observed:

“Their Lordships would also venture the criticism that the Supreme Court tended to regard the case much as if it involved an appeal from, Page: 679or re-hearing of, a trial held before the commission rather than an invocation of the limited jurisdiction of the court to restrain the abuse of quasi-judicial proceedings, where the sole issue, is whether the result, be it right or wrong, was arrived at with due regard to the principles of natural justice.”

7. The matter has been recently considered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Board of High School and Intermediate Education, U.P, Allahabad v. Bagleshwar Prasad 1963 A.L.J 676. In that case the respondent was alleged to have used unfair means in an examination. A charge was given to him and his explanation was obtained. His explanation was not found to be satisfactory. The Board of High School and Intermediate Education thereupon cancelled the result of the respondent which had already been declared. The respondent challenged the validity of the aforesaid order by means of a writ petition. The respondent's petition was allowed by the High Court and thereupon the above-mentioned Board came up in appeal to the Supreme Court. While accepting the appeal, their Lordships observed:

“In dealing with petitions of this type, it is necessary to bear in mind that educational institutions like the Universities or appellant No. 1 set up Enquiry Committees to deal with the problem posed by the adoption of unfair means by candidates and normally it is within the jurisdiction of such domestic Tribunals to decide all relevant questions in the light of the evidence adduced before them. In the matter of the adoption of unfair means, direct evidence may sometimes be available, but cases may arise where direct evidence is not available and the question will have to be considered in the light of probabilities and circumstantial evidence. This problem which educational institutions have to face from time to time is a serious problem and unless there is justification to do so, courts should be slow to interfere with the decisions of domestic Tribunals appointed by educational bodies like the Universities. In dealing with the validity of the impugned orders passed by Universities under Article 226, the High Court is not setting in appeal over the decision in question; its jurisdiction is limited and though it is true that if the impugned order is not supported by any evidence at all, the High Court would be justified to quash that order is not supported by any evidence must be reached after considering the question as to whether probabilities and circumstantial evidence do not justify the said conclusion. Enquiries held by domestic Tribunals in such cases must, no doubt, be fair and students against whom charges are framed must be given adequate opportunities to defend themselves, and in holding such enquiries, the Tribunals must scrupulously follow rules of natural justice: but it would, we think, not be reasonable to import into these enquiries all considerations which govern criminal trials in ordinary courts of law. In the present case no animus is suggested and no mala fides have been pleaded. The enquiry has been fair and the respondent has had an opportunity of making his defence. That being so we think the High Court was not justified in interfering with the order passed against the respondents.

8. I have given the matter my consideration and I am of the view that the following principles can be culled from the pronouncements made in the different cases:—

(1) The order made by an educational authority while dealing with a charge of unfair means against a candidate is not an administrative Page: 680order but a quasi-judicial order.

(2) The educational authority has to follow such procedure while determining the correctness of those allegations as is prescribed by the regulations or bye-laws.

(3) In case the regulations or bye-laws prescribe no procedure, it would be for the authority to devise the procedure as it considers necessary to satisfy itself with regard to the correctness of the charge.

(4) The procedure so adopted should be fair and not violative of the principles of natural justice. It need not, however, be the same as governs trials in ordinary courts of law.

(5) The candidate concerned must be informed of the charge and an adequate opportunity should be given to him to defend himself.

(6) In case such an opportunity has been given to the candidate and there is some material before the prescribed authority about the use of unfair means and the prescribed authority accepts that material and is not actuated by any hostile animus, the Court would not interfere with the decision of the aforesaid authority even if the Court disagrees with the conclusion of the authority.

9. Applying the above principles to the present case I find that there has been substantial compliance with the legal requirements and no violation of the principles of natural justice before the order was made for the disqualification of the petitioner. The regulations of the University apparently do not prescribe any procedure which was to be followed and in the circumstances the University authorities had the discretion to adopt such procedure as was fair to ascertain the truth of the allegations against the petitioner. For this purpose the University authorities deputed the Assistant Registrar to conduct an on the spot enquiry. The aforesaid officer contacted the petitioner. The petitioner was then called before the aforesaid Officer after being informed that it was in connection with a confidential enquiry into the unfair means employed at Jaitu in the Matriculation Examination of March, 1963. The Enquiry Officer then questioned the petitioner with regard to the allegation that there was wholesale copying at the Centre at which the petitioner appeared and the candidates resorted to unfair means. The petitioner pleaded ignorance regarding that allegation. The petitioner was then informed that her answer-books resembled with the answer-books of other candidates, to which the petitioner replied that she had not indulged in copying. Another question was put to the petitioner that her answer to Question No. 4 of English paper ‘A’ showed that she had used same papers or notes for answering that question. She was also asked as to what she had to say in her defence. The reply of the petitioner to this question also was that she had not indulged in copying. The petitioner was thereafter told to write an answer to Question No. 4 but the petitioner replied that she had forgotten the same. It would thus appear that the allegations against the petitioner were put to her and she was given an opportunity of explaining them, and to say what she wanted in her defence. After that the University authorities consulted an expert and had his report which went against the petitioner. Thereafter the matter was referred to the Member of the Standing Committee who unanimously were of the view that the petitioner had copied from the material supplied to her during the course of the examination and as such was guilty of copying. The Vice-Chancellor also agreed with the aforesaid decision. It was thereafter that the petitioner was ordered to have been disqualified for two years. I find nothing violative of the principles of natural justice in the above procedure. Further, as there was material before the members of the standing Committee on the basis of which Page: 681they could have come to a conclusion about the use of unfair means by the petitioner, this Court cannot sit as a Court of appeal on that decision and hold that even though the members of the Standing Committee were satisfied about the use of unfair means they should not have been so satisfied. It also cannot be said that the members of the Standing Committee were actuated by any bias or animus against the petitioner because there is no such allegation made against them. I, therefore, I am of the view that no case has been made for interference in this writ petition with the impugned order of the University authorities.

10. Mr. Amol, learned counsel for the petitioner, has referred to cases Ram Chander Singh v. Punjab University Chandigarh A.I.R 1963 Pb. 480 and L. Naga Raj L. Krishnamurthy Rao v. University of Mysore A.I.R 1961 Mysore 64, in which the orders of the University authorities against candidates, who were alleged to have used unfair means, were quashed by the High Court. As against that, Mr. Mittal, on behalf of the respondent, has referred to Shri Surrinder Kumar Bansal v. The Punjab University (1962) 64 P.L.R 944, Sham Sunder v. The Punjab University 1963 Cut L.J 537 and an unreported, case Shri Manmohan v. The Registrar, Punjab University, Chandigarh C.W No. 1992 of 1962, decided by Shamsher Bahadur J., on 20th March 1963, in which the High Court refused to interfere with the decisions of the University authorities against examinees who were found to have used unfair means. Perusal of all the above-mentioned cases goes to show that they were decided on their particular facts and do not affect the general proposition of law mentioned above.

11. The petition, as a result of the above, fails and is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, I make no order as to costs.

Mehar Singh, J.:— I agree.

Petition dismissed.