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citation codes
Case Number
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Acts
  • S. 3 of Evidence Act, 1851, and S. 1 of Criminal Evidence Act, 1898.24.
  • Section 16 of the Prison Act of 1952 (15 and 16 Geo 6 and 1 Eliz 2),
  • SECTION 5 IDENTIFICATION OF PRISONERS ACT
  • Section 5 of the Madhya Bharat Identification of Prisoners Act
  • provisions of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act.18.
  • S. 73 and Section 45 of the illustration (c), Evidence Act,
  • IDENTIFICATION OF PRISONERS ACT
  • provisions of section 27, Indian Evidence Act.87.
  • Section 19(f) of the Indian. Arms Act.14. P.W 21
  • Section 19(f) of the Indian Arms Act.4. Pokhar
  • Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act.19.
  • Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act.
  • Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act,
  • Section 19(f) of the Indian Arms Act.6.
  • Section 19(f) of the Tnriian Arms Act
  • Section 19(f) of the Indian Arms Act
  • sections 457/380, Indian Penal Code,
  • SECTION 138 COMPANIES ACT
  • SECTION 73 EVIDENCE ACT
  • section 411, Indian Penal Code,
  • S. 19(f) of the, Indian Arms Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • S. 3 of Evidence Act, 1851, and S. 1 of Criminal Evidence Act, 1898.24.
  • Section 16 of the Prison Act of 1952 (15 and 16 Geo 6 and 1 Eliz 2),
  • SECTION 5 IDENTIFICATION OF PRISONERS ACT
  • Section 5 of the Madhya Bharat Identification of Prisoners Act
  • provisions of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act.18.
  • S. 73 and Section 45 of the illustration (c), Evidence Act,
  • IDENTIFICATION OF PRISONERS ACT
  • provisions of section 27, Indian Evidence Act.87.
  • Section 19(f) of the Indian. Arms Act.14. P.W 21
  • Section 19(f) of the Indian Arms Act.4. Pokhar
  • Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act.19.
  • Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act.
  • Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act,
  • Section 19(f) of the Indian Arms Act.6.
  • Section 19(f) of the Tnriian Arms Act
  • Section 19(f) of the Indian Arms Act
  • sections 457/380, Indian Penal Code,
  • SECTION 138 COMPANIES ACT
  • SECTION 73 EVIDENCE ACT
  • section 411, Indian Penal Code,
  • S. 19(f) of the, Indian Arms Act
Smart Summary

Opinion Summary — Criminal Revision Nos. 946, 947 & 948 of 1957

Factual and Procedural Background

This summary is drawn exclusively from the provided opinion.

The three criminal revisions arise from connected prosecutions concerning a burglary at an arms dealer's shop in Hissar on the night of 7–8 July 1955, in which several firearms were stolen. Two accused, Pokhar Singh (teacher, aged 24) and Mehtab Singh (college student, aged 19), were charged in relation to the theft and later for possession of recovered firearms.

Procedurally, Pokhar Singh was convicted by the First Class Magistrate, Hissar, under Sections 457 and 380 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to two years' rigorous imprisonment on each count (concurrent). Mehtab Singh was convicted under Section 411 IPC and, separately, under Section 19(f) of the Indian Arms Act. On appeal the Sessions Judge maintained convictions but reduced sentences in certain respects: Pokhar's IPC sentence was reduced to one year per count; Mehtab's sentence under Section 411 was maintained; both had sentences under the Arms Act reduced by the Sessions Judge. Each accused filed revision petitions to this Court respectively entered as Criminal Revisions Nos. 946 (both accused on IPC and related matters), 947 (Mehtab against conviction under Section 19(f) Arms Act) and 948 (Pokhar against conviction under Section 19(f) Arms Act).

The prosecution's case included: (a) discovery at the arms dealer's shop of glass panes and phials bearing fingerprint impressions; (b) interrogation of the accused which led to statements by Pokhar and Mehtab offering to get firearms recovered; (c) recoveries at places pointed out by the accused (various villages and a place called Gujri Mahal in Hissar); and (d) comparison evidence by a fingerprint expert that impressions on glass/phials corresponded to Pokhar Singh's impressions. Both accused denied guilt and alleged false implication.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the taking of thumb, finger and palm impressions of the accused (by order of the Magistrate) violated the protection against self-incrimination guaranteed by Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India.
  2. Whether the alleged discoveries (recoveries of firearms) made "at the instance" of the accused were admissible in evidence under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, particularly where other accused had previously given information or where the hiding places might have been known to the police.
  3. Whether the statutory provisions permitting taking of measurements, photographs and impressions (Identification of Prisoners Act and relevant provisions of the Evidence Act, e.g., Section 73) are repugnant to Article 20(3) and thus unconstitutional.

Arguments of the Parties

Pokhar Singh's Arguments

  • His counsel contended that obtaining his thumb, finger and palm impressions contravened Article 20(3) of the Constitution and that his conviction could not be based upon evidence obtained from comparison of those impressions with impressions found on the glass pane and phials.
  • His counsel further argued that the alleged discoveries of firearms at his instance were not genuine and were inadmissible under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act.

Mehtab Singh's Arguments

  • His counsel maintained that the recovery of the arms at his instance was not genuine and that the mode of recovery was not sanctioned by Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
R. v. Scott (1856) Dears and B CC 47 Cited for the maxim nemo tenetur seipsum accusare (no man can be compelled to criminate himself). Used to illustrate the historical pedigree and importance of the privilege against self-incrimination in common law.
ex parte Symes (1805) 11 Ves 521 Statement: "no man can be compelled to answer what has any tendency to criminate him." Quoted to support the proposition that testimonial compulsion is prohibited.
Udal v. Walton (1845) 153 ER 471 Proposition that a man "is competent to prove his own crime, though not compellable". Cited to show distinction between voluntary disclosure and compulsion; supports view that privilege must be claimed.
U.S. v. Monia (1943) 317 US 424 Privilege must be claimed; otherwise deemed waived. Cited to support the Court's conclusion that if privilege not claimed it is waived.
U.S. v. Murdock (1931) 284 US 141 Unless invoked, the benefit is deemed to have been waived. Applied in reasoning that the accused had not claimed Article 20(3) in lower courts and thus waived the privilege.
State v. Duncan (1906) 4 L.R. Annotated 1144 Authority cited on waiver of privilege. Used in discussion on waiver of the right against self-incrimination when not claimed.
Queen v. Coote (1873) 4 PC 599 Statement made in ignorance of right to claim privilege will not make the statement inadmissible. Cited to support that voluntarily given evidence is admissible even if claimant was unaware of the privilege.
State v. Ah Chuey (1881) 33 Am Rep 530 Whether an accused can be compelled to exhibit tattoo marks; held such exhibition not barred by constitutional privilege. Used to analogize that exhibition of bodily marks is not testimonial and so is admissible.
Holt v. United States (1910) 218 US 245 Prohibition targets compulsion to extort communications, not exclusion of the body as evidence. Quoted to support that corporeal evidence (appearance, clothing, marks) may be used even if obtained under compulsion; not protected by privilege.
Willis (Constitutional law of the United States) Textual authority noting taking of fingerprints is not a violation of privilege. Text cited to support the proposition that giving one's prints is giving the body, not testimony.
Underhill (Criminal Evidence) Finger prints given voluntarily or by force may be used in evidence; constitutional privilege does not forbid. Used as a scholarly authority to support admissibility of fingerprint evidence whether voluntary or involuntary.
U.S.A v. Mortimer Kelly (83 Am LR 122) Example cited in support of the proposition that prints taken by force are admissible. Referenced in support of academic authority (Underhill) and the court's conclusion on prints.
Swingle v. United States (151 F.2d 512) The prohibition is against compulsion to extort communications, not exclusion of the body as evidence. Cited to reinforce the distinction between testimonial compulsion and corporeal evidence.
People v. Sallow (165 N.Y. Supp. 915) Fingerprints do not violate privilege against self-incrimination. Cited to support admissibility of fingerprints as non-testimonial.
People v. Totten (38 N.E. Rep. 1) Lawful to obtain defendant's shoes (via wife) for comparison of heel markings. Used as an example that physical objects tied to person may be used for identification/comparison.
Novak v. District of Columbia (49 Atl. Rep. (2d) 88) Urine specimen analysis admitted; not infringement of constitutional right not to be a witness against self. Illustrative authority in support of taking physical samples (urine/blood) for evidentiary purposes.
People v. Tucker (198 Pac. Rep. (2d) 940) Blood tests for alcoholic content not violative of privilege. Referred to in support of admissibility of bodily samples for evidence.
State v. Cram (164 Am. L.R. 952) Similar authority on blood specimens and admission. Used as corroborative authority for the admissibility of physical tests/evidence.
M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra, AIR 1954 SC 300 Search or seizure of documents is not in itself to be treated as compelled production; Article 20(3) protects against testimonial compulsion; articulated components of Art.20(3). Applied by analogy: procurement of hand impressions is not within the ambit of Article 20(3); the Court relied on M.P. Sharma to define testimonial compulsion.
Ram Swarup v. The State, AIR 1958 All 119 Authority cited for waiver of privilege where not claimed in proceedings below. Applied to hold that the accused had waived Article 20(3) protection by not asserting it earlier in the trial process.
Subedar v. State, AIR 1957 All 396 Authority cited for waiver of privilege where not claimed. Relied upon to support the waiver conclusion.
Sailendra Nath Sinha v. The State, AIR 1955 Cal 247 Direction under Section 73 Evidence Act to take specimen writings of accused does not violate Article 20(3). Cited as authority that specimen writings/directions to produce non-testimonial material are valid against an accused.
Golam Rahman v. The King, AIR 1950 Cal 66 Section 73 Evidence Act applied to all persons including accused; specimen thumb impression permissible under Section 73 and Section 5 Identification Act. Cited to support that courts can direct specimen impressions under statutory provisions.
Kishori Kishore Mishra v. Emperor, AIR 1935 Cal 308 Indication that Section 73 may include an accused person. Referred to for the proposition that Section 73 can apply to accused.
Emperor v. Ramrao Mangesh, ILR 56 Bom 304 : AIR 1932 Bom 406 Specimen signatures/writings of accused during investigation admissible in forgery trials. Used to support admissibility of specimen writings/signatures from accused.
Emperor v. Nga Tun Hlaing, AIR 1924 Rang 115 Court has power under Section 73 Evidence Act to direct accused to make finger impression for comparison. Cited as a Full Bench authority holding the court's power to obtain finger impressions under Section 73.
Zahuri Sahu v. King-Emperor, ILR 6 Pat 623 : AIR 1928 Pat 103 Following Rangoon Full Bench: Court entitled to ask accused to allow thumb impression and may draw adverse inference on refusal. Referred to support the authority of courts to direct impressions and consequences of refusal.
Bazari Hajam v. King-Emperor, AIR 1922 Pat 73 Earlier case with contrary observations on thumb impression direction. Noted as a conflicting earlier view which later decisions did not follow.
Public Prosecutor v. Kandasami Thevan, AIR 1927 Mad 696 Taking of thumb-mark of an accused for comparison by Court was not objectionable. Cited to support permissibility of taking thumb impressions for comparison.
In re Sheik Muhammad Hussain, AIR 1957 Mad 47 Thumb impression taken by police and produced in court did not amount to testimonial compulsion under Article 20(3). Cited as authority consistent with the view that prints are non-testimonial.
Rajamuthukoil Pillai v. Perivasami Nadar, AIR 1956 Mad 632 Contrary view: direction to give thumb impression would amount to furnishing evidence forbidden by Article 20(3). Noted as an instance of judicial conflict in the Madras High Court; the Court considered and contrasted this decision with others.
Swarnalingam Chettiar v. Assistant Labour Inspector, AIR 1956 Mad 165 Objection to production of documents upheld in view of Article 20(3). Referred to as part of divergent High Court authorities; court did not adopt this restrictive approach.
In re Palani Goundan, AIR 1957 Mad 546 Though accused cannot be compelled to produce evidence, such evidence can be taken or seized if legally permissible. Referred to as supporting the proposition that taking/seizing physical evidence is permissible.
Brij Bhushan Raghuhandan Prasad v. The State, AIR 1957 Madh. Pra. 106 Held Section 5 of the Madhya Bharat Identification of Prisoners Act repugnant to Article 20(3); Magistrate's direction to take thumb impression illegal. Noted by the Court but expressly disagreed with; the Court stated it did not accept that view.
Nelvely Desom, Nattalam Pakuthy v. Sirkar Prosecutor, AIR 1950 Trav. Co. 5 Authority taking similar restrictive view about identification direction. Noted as an example of rulings the Court did not accept for reasons explained in the judgment.
Pulukuri Kottaya v. Emperor, AIR 1947 P.C. 67 Privy Council: S.27 operates where a discovery of a fact follows information by an accused in custody; discovery provides guarantee of truth that permits admission of that part of the information. Cited and its view adopted and endorsed for the application of Section 27 to recovery statements in this case.
Ramkishan Mithanlal Sharma v. (Original Accused 4), AIR 1955 SC 104 Endorsed Pulukuri Kottaya's view on Section 27 (discovery and admissibility). Relied upon to support the Court's finding that discovery at Pokhar's instance brought Section 27 into operation.
Kudaon v. Emperor, AIR 1925 Nag 407 Single Judge view: if one accused agreed to point out a place, section may not cover similar statements by other accused. Cited by counsel; the Court noted this single-judge view and contrasted it with subsequent Division Bench authority.
State Government, M.P. v. Chhotelal Mohanlal, AIR 1955 Nag 71 Division Bench held joint or simultaneous statements of accused persons were admissible. Referred to as authority contrary to Kudaon and noted by the Court in the context of Section 27 issues.
Aher Raja Khima v. State of Saurashtra, AIR 1956 SC 217 Discovery at instance of accused is inadmissible if police already knew the hiding places. Cited by defence; Court found it inapplicable here because it was not shown that police already knew the hiding places.
Trimbak v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1954 SC 39 Elements required to establish offence under Section 411 IPC (possession, prior possession by another, knowledge that property was stolen). Applied to assess whether Mehtab's recovery established receiver-of-stolen-property; Court found the elements not proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's reasoning proceeds in distinct stages that mirror the core disputes raised by the defence and the prosecution:

  1. Historical and doctrinal exposition of privilege: the Court traced the privilege against self-incrimination (nemo tenetur) from English and American authorities, recognising its long lineage and purpose: to prevent compulsion to give testimonial evidence which might be false or coerced. The distinction between testimonial compulsion and non-testimonial (corporeal) evidence was emphasized repeatedly.
  2. Scope of Article 20(3): relying on authorities (including M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra), the Court held that Article 20(3) protects against testimonial compulsion only — i.e., compulsion to give oral or written statements that furnish evidence by volitional act — and does not extend to compelling the exhibition or taking of physical features (fingerprints, palm prints, scars, photographs) for purposes of identification or comparison.
  3. Waiver point: the Court noted that in the proceedings before the lower courts the accused never claimed the privilege under Article 20(3); invoking authorities (U.S. cases and Indian All.-state cases), it treated the privilege as waived by non-assertion and therefore the accused could not rely on it belatedly to challenge the taking of impressions.
  4. Statutory permissibility and constitutionality: the Court examined the Identification of Prisoners Act, Section 5 and Section 6, and Section 73 of the Evidence Act, noting that these statutory provisions expressly authorise taking measurements, fingerprints and, where necessary, the use of force. The Court concluded there was no justification to hold these provisions unconstitutional as contravening Article 20(3), reasoning that to do so would impair criminal investigation and the administration of justice.
  5. Application to the facts (fingerprint evidence): on the record the fingerprint expert matched impressions on the glass pane and phials with Pokhar Singh's impressions. The Court held that admissibility and probative force of such non-testimonial evidence are not affected by whether they were obtained compulsorily or voluntarily; the physical characteristics themselves remain reliable. Consequently the Court held that taking of the impressions was not a violation of Article 20(3).
  6. Application of Section 27 (discovery at accused's instance): the Court explained the operation of Section 27 (citing Pulukuri Kottaya and Ramkishan Mithanlal Sharma) — that if a discovery follows information given by an accused in custody the portion of the information relating distinctly to the fact discovered may be proved. The Court analyzed the sequences of interrogation and recovery and concluded that the recoveries made at Pokhar Singh's instance were genuine and satisfied the condition for admission under Section 27.
  7. Assessment of evidence against Pokhar Singh: combining the positive recovery of firearms from places he identified and the fingerprint comparison linking him to impressions on items from the burglarised shop, the Court found no reasonable doubt and upheld his convictions under Sections 457/380 IPC and under Section 19(f) of the Indian Arms Act. The sentence reduction by the Sessions Judge (to one year's rigorous imprisonment on each IPC count and the adjusted sentence/fine under the Arms Act) was considered appropriate and not excessive in the Court's view.
  8. Assessment of evidence against Mehtab Singh: the Court found the recovery attributed to Mehtab (gun in three pieces from behind Gujri Mahal) insufficient to establish, beyond reasonable doubt, the ingredients of an offence under Section 411 IPC (possession with knowledge that property was stolen). The Court noted Gujri Mahal was accessible to the public and that recovery from such a public place did not permit a safe inference that Mehtab had possession or knowledge as required. Applying Trimbak v. State of Madhya Pradesh, the Court found the prosecution had not proved the necessary elements and therefore set aside Mehtab's conviction under Section 411 and under Section 19(f) of the Arms Act.

Holding and Implications

Final Rulings (as expressed in the opinion):

  • Criminal Revision No. 946 of 1957: The revision petition was accepted in part. Pokhar Singh's conviction under Sections 457/380 IPC was upheld; Mehtab Singh's conviction and sentence under Section 411 IPC were set aside and he was acquitted.
  • Criminal Revision No. 947 of 1957: Mehtab Singh's conviction under Section 19(f) of the Indian Arms Act was set aside and he was acquitted.
  • Criminal Revision No. 948 of 1957: Pokhar Singh's conviction under Section 19(f) of the Indian Arms Act was maintained (sentence as reduced by the Sessions Judge was affirmed for the reasons stated).

Implications: The immediate, direct consequences are: Pokhar Singh remains convicted both for the burglary-related offences (Sections 457/380 IPC) and for the Arms Act offence (Section 19(f)); Mehtab Singh is acquitted of both the receiver offence (Section 411 IPC) and the Arms Act offence on the grounds that the prosecution did not establish the required elements beyond reasonable doubt in his case.

On legal questions of broader import the Court held, on the authorities cited and statutory scheme, that:

  • The privilege against self-incrimination under Article 20(3) is confined to testimonial compulsion (oral or written communications) and does not extend to compelling an accused to exhibit bodily characteristics, fingerprints, palm prints, photographs or other non-testimonial physical evidence used for identification or comparison.
  • Statutory provisions (Identification of Prisoners Act and relevant provisions of the Evidence Act such as Section 73) authorising taking of measurements, photographs and impressions are not, on the facts and law as presented, repugnant to Article 20(3). The Court expressly rejected certain High Court decisions that had taken a contrary view.

The opinion did not announce any novel legal rule beyond the application and reconciliation of precedents and statutory provisions to the facts before the Court; rather, it resolved the immediate disputes by applying existing doctrine (testimonial vs non-testimonial distinction), statutory provisions, and precedent to the factual record and evidence.

Order accordingly.

    Pakhar Singh And Another v. The State .

    1. Criminal Revision Nos. 946, 947 and 948 of 1957 arise out of the same set of facts and may be decided by one order. Pokhar Singh accused, aged 24 years, is a teacher in District Board High School, Pabra, and Mehtab Singh accused, aged 19 years, is a college student. Pokhar Singh was convicted by Magistrate First Class, Hissar, under Ss. 457/380, Indian Penal Code, and sentenced to two years' rigorous imprisonment on each count. The sentences were to run concurrently. Mehtab Singh was sentenced to nine months' rigorous imprisonment under S. 411, Indian Penal Code.

    2. The conviction of Pokhar Singh was maintained by the Sessions Judge but his sentence was reduced to one year's rigorous imprisonment under each count. The conviction and sentence of Mehtab Singh under S. 411, Indian Penal Code, were maintained by the Sessions Judge and his appeal was dismissed. A revision petition has been filed in this Court against the above conviction and sentence by Pokhar Singh and Mehtab Singh which is entered as Criminal Revision No. 946 of 1957.

    3. Mehtab Singh was convicted by the Magistrate, Hissar, under Section 19(f) of the Tnriian Arms Act and sentenced to two years' rigorous imprisonment. On appeal, the Sessions Judge upheld the conviction but reduced the sentence to nine months' rigorous imprisonment. This sentence was ordered to run concurrently with, the sentence awarded in the connected case under S. 411, Indian Penal Code. Criminal Revision No. 947 of 1957 has been filed by Mehtab Singh from his conviction and sentence under Section 19(f) of the Indian Arms Act.

    4. Pokhar Singh was convicted under Section 19(f) of the Indian Arms Act and the Magistrate passed a sentence of two years' rigorous imprisonment & further ordered him to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/- or in default to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for six months. On appeal, the Sessions Judge maintained the conviction but reduced the sentence to nine months' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 200/- and in default Pokhar Singh was to undergo two months' further rigorous imprisonment.

    5. The sentence of imprisonment was ordered to run concurrently with the sentence passed on him under Ss. 457/380, Indian Penal Code, in the connected case. Criminal Revision No. 948 of 1957 has been filed by Pokhar Singh from his conviction and sentence under Section 19(f) of the Indian Arms Act.

    6. The prosecution story is that P.W 2 Anand Bhargava was dealing in arms and ammunition and had his shop on the railway road at Hissar. On the night between 7th and 8th of July, 1955, his shop was burgled and six firearms, four double-barrelled guns, one singlebarrelled breach-loading gun, and a rifle, were stolen. One of these guns belonged to P.W 1 Shri Malik Radha Kishan Advocate and was left with P.W 2 for safe custody.

    7. The theft of the fire-arms was discovered on the morning of 8-7-1955, and first information report, Exhibit P. A/1, was lodged on that very day. The Sub-Inspector investigating the case, took into possession several articles including a piece of glass pane from a show-case, Exhibit P. 13, and three glass phials, Exhibits P. 10 to P. 12, from the shop, per memo. Exhibit P.C They were taken into possession in the presence of Shri Fateh Chand, Finger Print Expert, as they appeared to have finger impressions on them.

    8. This case remained untraced for nearly a year. On information received by P.W 18 Shivdat Pal Singh, District Inspector of Police, the two accused were interrogated and as result thereof Pokhar Singh made a statement, Exhibit P.H, to the effect that he had buried one rifle, two double-barrelled guns, and one single-barrelled gun in his nauhra; in village Badesra under toori and offered to get the fire-arms recovered.

    9. This statement was signed by accused Pokhar Singh, and also by P.W 3 Ajmer Singh, P.W 4 Raj Mai, P.W 14 Rup Ram and P.W, 24 Ram Chander, Sub-Inspector, Station House Officer, Police Station Hissar. Pokhar Singh accused led the police party to his nauhra in his village and from there two double-barrelled breach-loading guns, Exhibits P. 3 and P. 4, one single-barrelled gun, Exhibit P. 2, and one rifle, Exhibit P. 1, were recovered.

    10. The recovery was witnessed by P.W 7 Shiv Datt and P.W 12 Kaiihya Lal of village Badesra. Pokhar Singh accused then led the police party to village Pharmana to the house of Bahai Singh and on the asking of the accused, Bahai Singh produced gun, Exhibit P. 5, with 33 cartridges. These fire-arms were taken into possession by the police. On interrogation by Shri Ram Chander P.W 24, Station House Officer, Hissar City, accused Mehtab Singh on 24-4-1956, made a statement, Exhibit P.K, in the presence of P.W 5 Mogh Singh Lambardar and P.W 6 Bawa Harparshad, to the effect that he had buried one gun in three pieces in a dilapidated place called Gujri Mahal in Hissar proper and offered to get it recovered.

    11. He then led the police party to the spot and after digging the earth, the gun was produced in three pieces wrapped in cloth, vide memo. Exhibit P.L

    12. An application, Exhibit P. A/A, was made to the Magistrate on 30-4-1956, for obtaining thumb, finger and palm impressions of the two accused for comparison with the impressions on the pieces of glass. On the same day, Magistrate's order was obtained and the impressions were taken in his presence. It does not appear from the record that the accused protested or expressed their unwillingness to the taking of the impressions of their thumbs, fingers and palms.

    13. After completion of the investigation, the accused were sent up to stand their trial under Ss. 457/380 and 411, Indian Penal Code, and by a, separate challan under Section 19(f) of the Indian. Arms Act.

    14. P.W 21 Sub-Inspector Fateh Chand, Finger Print Expert of Phillaur, compared the thumb, finger and palm impressions of the accused with those found on the glass pane and the phials. As a result of comparison he found that the impressions corresponded with the thumb and finger impressions of Pokhar Singh accused.

    15. Both the accused denied their guilt and also denied having got the respective fire-arms recovered and stated that they had been falsely Page: 297implicated on account of enmity. Both the Courts below found them guilty of having committed the offences as stated above.

    16. The case against the two accused may now be taken up separately. On behalf of Pokhar Singh, his counsel Shri H.C Sethi, raised two points. Firstly, he argued that obtaining of the impressions of the thumb, finger and claim of Pokhar Singh contravened the fundamental rights given under Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India and conviction could not be based upon the evidence furnished by comparison of the impressions with those found on the glass pane and the phials.

    17. His second argument was based on the contention that the alleged discoveries of fire-arms at the instance of Pokhar Singh were not genuine and in transgression of the provisions of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act.

    18. Shri H.S Doabia, learned counsel for accused Mehtab Singh, maintained that the recovery of the arms at the instance of his client was not genuine and the alleged mode of recovery was not sanctioned by Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act.

    19. I may take up the arguments of the learned counsel ad seriatim. The privilege given to the accused under Article 20(3) of the Constitution embodies a principle of criminal jurisprudence of very ancient lineage. The rule “nemo teneture seipsum accusare” or “nemo teneture prodere seipsum” (no man can be compelled to criminate himself) in the words of Coleridge, J., in R. v. Scott, (1856) Dears and B CC 47 at p. 61(A), is—

    “a maxim of our law as settled, as important and as wise as almost any other in it.”

    20. Lord Eldon in ex parte Symes, (1805) 11 Ves 521 at p. 525(B), said—

    “The proposition is clear, that no man can be compelled to answer what has any tendency to criminate him.”

    21. The rule regarding the privilege against self-incrimination has had a long and chequered history and has emerged in consequences of historical conflicts and convulsions dating from mediaeval times in English history. At common law, accused enjoyed no such immunity and he was required to answer upon oath as to charges made against him till the end of sixteenth century. The inquisitorial principle which then dominated and held sway in England has survived up till now on the continent of Europe where even today criminal trial still commences with a rigorous interrogation of the accused.

    22. The long struggle of the civil Courts to resist the usurpation of the ecclesiastical Courts led to the assertion of the maximum “nemo teneture seipsum accusare” which was put forward for the first time in 1590 in Cullier v. Cullier, (1582-1603) 78 ER 457 (C). The practice of questioning the prisoner died out after the Revolution of 1678 and the rule against selfincrimination was extended from criminal Courts to civil Courts and was made applicable to the parties as well as to witnesses.

    23. Under this privilege no witness or party is compellable to answer any question or to produce any document the tendency of which is to expose such a person to a criminal charge or penalty. In England, the principle received statutory recognition, vide S. 3 of Evidence Act, 1851, and S. 1 of Criminal Evidence Act, 1898.

    24. In America, it is embodied in the fifth amendment of the Federal Constitution and also in the several State Constitutions. It reads—

    “No person …………… shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,………….

    25. This constitutional immunity is not without its well recognised limitations. The privilege is restricted not to any and every compulsion but to testimonial compulsion.

    “The privilege protects a person from any disclosure sought by legal process against him as a witness.” Vide Wigmore on Evidence Vol VIII, S. 2263, page 363.

    26. It is to be noted that the prohibition is against compulsion. A man “is competent to prove his own crime, though not compellable” I per Alderson, B., in Udal v. Walton, (1845) 153 ER 471 (D). He cannot be forced to testify his incrimination. But this privilege has to be claimed or otherwise a person will not be considered to be compelled, vide U.S v. Monia, (1943) 317 US 424 (427) (E). Unless invoked, the benefit is deemed to have been waived vide U.S v. Murdock, (1931) 284 US 141 (148) (F); and State v. Duncan, (1906) 4 Lawyer's Reports Annotated 1144 (1151) (G).

    27. Evidence, which has been voluntarily given, is not under legal ban. A statement made in ignorance of the right to claim privilege will not make the statement inadmissible, Queen v. Coote, (1873) 4 PC 599 (H). As a condition of statutory immunity from prosecution, assertion of privilege against self-incrimination is necessary.

    28. In this case, at no stage of the proceedings of the case in the lower Courts, was the privilege against self-incrimination claimed by the accused and it is therefore deemed to have been waived, vide Ram Swarup v. The State, AIR 1958 All 119 (I); and Subedar v. State, (S) AIR 1957 All 396 (J).

    29. The next question that requires examination is whether, the order of the taking of finger and palm impressions by the Magistrate could be deemed a violation of the constitutional immunity. In the words of Professor Wigmore—

    “In preserving the privilege, however, we must resolve not to give it more than its due significance. We are to respect it rationally for its merits, not worship it blindly as a fetish ………………. Courts should unite to keep the privilege strictly within the limits dictated by historic fact, cool reasoning and sound policy.”

    30. See Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. VIII S. 2251, pages 317-319.

    31. The true scope of the constitutional inhibition seems to me to prohibit compulsion in the matter of testifying either by word of mouth or in writing. What is forbidden is the use of force in the process of disclosure by oral statements or by written words of testimonial character. The danger, prevention of which the Constitution visualises, is the interference with the volitional faculties of a person so that he may not be terrified into making depositions as a witness.

    32. The principle is confined to protecting disclosure as a witness. Truth runs the risk of being smothered if resort is had to compulsion in matter of testimonial utterances. This privilege is based on the policy of encouraging persons to come forward with evidence in Courts of justice by protecting them from injury or needless annoyance in consequence of so doing.

    33. But truth is not endangered where compulsion is used for exhibition of the body or of any identifying marks on it, for purposes of comparison with evidence produced at the trial. If finger impressions are taken from an unwilling accused person, with a view to compare them with marks of finger prints left by a culprit at the spot where the offence was committed, they cannot undergo any change by reason of the use of compulsion.

    34. Force or threat of force may endanger the truth by distorting it, where it is applied for bringing pressure in matters of vocal or written words. As a result of compulsion, the testimony of a witness can be made to deviate from truth, but by such a process the scars or lines on his body or his physiognomy cannot undergo any change.

    35. The constitutional immunity is not violated by compelling a witness to stand up and show his face for the purpose of identification. He can be ordered to disclose a tell-tale scar, for purposes of his identification. Similarly, the finger prints, foot prints, palm prints, photographs of the accused, for purposes of comparison with those found at the scene of the crime, do not lose their probative character, whether they have been obtained involuntarily or voluntarily.

    36. In principle, resort to compulsion requiring the accused to exhibit his body for purposes of establishing identity is not objectionable, because by doing so he is not being forced to give false testimony. In fact he does not testify at all and the physical facts which are noticed speak for themselves. Neither fear nor hope, neither coercion nor cajoling can make any difference to the finger prints or other physical peculiarities.

    37. They will reveal the true peculiarities unaffected by the manner in which the impressions have been taken, or scars or other marks have been revealed.

    38. In State v. Ah Chuey, (1881) 33 Am Rep 530 at p. 532(K), the question was whether an accused person could object to exhibit certain tatoo marks on his person. Judge Hawley said—

    “The object of every criminal trial is to ascertain the truth. The Constitution prohibits the state from compelling a defendant to be a witness against himself, because it was believed that he might, by the flattery of hope or suspicion of fear, be induced to tell a falsehood.

    None of the many reasons urged against the rack or torture, or against the rules compelling a man ‘to be a witness against himself,’ can be urged against the act of compelling a defendant, upon a criminal trial, to bare his arm in the presence of the jury, so as to enable them to discover whether or not a certain mark could be seen imprinted thereon. Such an examination could not, in the very nature of things lead to a falsehood.

    In fact, its only object is to discover the truth; and it would be a sad commentary upon the wisdom, of the framers of our Constitution to say that by the adoption of such a clause they have effectually closed the door of investigation tending to establish the truth.”

    39. Professor Wigmore says—

    “From the general principle (ante, S. 2263) it results that an inspection of the bodily features by the tribunal or by witnesses cannot violate the privilege, because it does not call upon the accused as a witness; i.e, upon his testimonial responsibility.

    That he may in such cases be required sometimes to exercise muscular action — as when he is required to take off his shoes or roll up his sleeve — is immaterial; unless all bodily action were synonymous with the testimonial utterances; for, as already observed (ante, S. 2263), not compulsion alone is the component idea of the privilege, but the testimonial compulsion.

    What is obtained from the accused by such action is not testimony about his body, but his body itself. Unless some attempt is made to secure a communication, written or oral, upon which reliance is to be placed as involving his consciousness of the facts and the operation of his mind in expressing it, the demand made upon him is not a testimonial one.” (Vide Wigmore on Evidence, S. 2265, page 375, Volume VIII).

    40. Justice Holmes, in Holt v. United States, (1910) 218 US 245 at p. 252(L), said—

    “Another objection is based upon an extravagant extension of the Fifth Amendment. A question arose as to whether a blouse belonged to the prisoner. A witness testified that the prisoner put it on and it fitted him. It is objected that he did this under the same duress that made his statements inadmissible, and that it should be excluded for the same reasons.

    But the prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material. The objection in principle would forbid a jury to look at a prisoner and compare his features with a photograph in proof.”

    41. Willis expressed himself thus—

    “Is the taking of finger prints a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination? This question seems to have been answered in the negative. The accused does not exercise a volition or give oral testimony. He is passive. He is not giving testimony about his body, but is giving his body.” (Constitutional law of the United States by Willis, page 522).

    42. According to Underhill—

    “Finger prints may be given voluntarily or they may be taken by force. It is invariably held that the use in evidence of prints voluntarily given does not violate the constitutional provision against self-incrimination. This is true even though the defendant did not know the use Which would be made of the prints and even where the defendant was induced to sign his name to a sheet of paper which act incidently impressed his prints on the sheet.

    The same thing is true of prints taken by force or taken involuntarily. Such prints may still be used in evidence.” Vide Underhill's Criminal Evidence, 1956 Edition, Vol. 1, S. 144, pages 270-271. See also U.S.A v. Mortimer Kelly, 83 Am LR 122 (M).

    43. It follows that the accused's right to immunity from self-incrimination is not violated when he is compelled to exhibit himself or a part of his body to the Court or to allow a record of his finger prints to be taken; Vide People v. Sallow, 165 New York Supp 915 (N).

    44. In People v. Totten, 38 North Eastern Rep 1 (O), in a larceny trial, it was held lawful to obtain from the wife of the defendant, without Page: 299the latters' consent, his shoes for comparison of heel markings with those found at the place of theft.

    45. In Novak v. District of Columbia, 49 Atlantic Reporter (2d) 88 (P), the defendant was prosecuted for driving an automobile under the influence of intoxicating liquor. It was held that his constitutional right was not infringed by offering in evidence the record of analysis of a specimen of urine taken from him immediately after his arrest. In similar circumstances, taking of blood specimen from a driver of an automobile for finding alcoholic contents was not considered violative of constitutional rights not to be compelled to give testimony against himself, vide People v. Tucker, 198 Pacific Reporter (2d) 940 (946-947) (Q); and State v. Cram, 164 Am LR 952 (R).

    46. In Swingle v. United States, the circuit Court of Appeals observed—

    “Moreover, the prohibition against compelling an accused person to be a witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, and not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material.” (Vide 151 Federal Reporter (2d) 512 (513) (S & T).

    47. In England, under Section 16 of the Prison Act of 1952 (15 and 16 Geo 6 and 1 Eliz 2), the Secretary of State may make regulations as to the measuring and photographing of prisoners. In addition to the measurements of various parts of the body and the description of every scar and distinctive marks, the finger prints are to be taken. If a prisoner refuses to allow his photographs and finger prints to be taken, a reasonable degree of force may be used, vide Halsbury's Laws of England, Second Edition, Vol. 26, page 175.

    48. In India, Section 5 of the Identification of Prisoners Act 33 of 1920, provides—

    “If a Magistrate is satisfied that, for the purposes of any investigation or proceeding under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, it is expedient to direct any person to allow his measurements or photograph to be taken he may make an order to that effect, and in that case the person to whom the order relates shall be produced or shall attend at the time and place specified in the order and shall allow his measurements or photograph to be taken, as the case may be, by a police officer:

    Provided that no order shall be made directing any person to be photographed except by a Magistrate of the first class:

    Provided, further, that no order shall be made under this section unless the person has at some time been arrested in connection with such investigation or proceeding.”

    49. Under S. 6 of this Act, it is permissible to use all means necessary to secure the taking of measurements or photograph in case of resistance or refusal. Such resistance or refusal to allow the taking of measurements or photograph is also an offence under S. 186 of the Indian Penal Code. The word “measurements” is defined so as to include finger print impressions and foot print impression.

    50. The learned counsel for the defence wants me to hold the above provisions of the Identification of Prisoners' Act as unconstitutional, being in contravention of Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India. I see no justification in striking them down as violative of the constitutional guarantee against testimonial compulsion, as that will have the effect of effecting and hindering administration of criminal justice in a large number of cases and that would result in effectively preventing Courts from arriving at truth.

    51. Apart from exclusion of finger prints as proof of identification in cases where consent of persons charged with crimes is not forthcoming, it will not be possible to detect or prevent crime by measuring or photographing the accused person, by removing or replacing of his garments or shoes for identification or even requiring him to move his body to enable this to be done.

    52. Medical examination without consent for ascertaining insanity, existence of contagious disease for purposes of segregation of the person, or disease in general, the making of a blood test to ascertain paternity or blood test or urine analysis for ascertaining alcoholic content, or finding of scar or other physical peculiarity for purposes of identity, or other scientific aids requiring co-operation of the accused for ascertaining his guilt or innocence, shall have to be placed under constitutional ban, which could never have been the intention of the framers of the Constitution.

    53. The argument of the learned counsel for the defence, if sound, will prevent a Court from getting the and of a physician in order to find out whether the defendant is malingering when he claims to be unable to attend Court. The consequence of the extended interpretation of similar constitutional privilege in America, was expressed by Professor Wigmore in the following words:

    “……………… for, if the privilege extended beyond these limits, and protected an accused otherwise than in his strictly testimonial status, — if, in other words, it created inviolability not only for his physical control of his own vocal utterances but also for his physical control in whatever form exercised, then it would be possible for a guilty person to shut himself up in his house, with all the tools and indicia of his crime, and defy the authority of the law to employ in evidence anything that might be obtained by forcibly over-throwing his possession and compelling the surrender of the evidential articles, — a dear ‘reductio ad absurdum.’” (Vida Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. VIII, S. 2263, page 363).

    54. The privilege, if extended beyond its reasonable scope, will give a licence to the guilty and result in abuses which cannot be over-estimated. If I were to concede all that has been demanded on behalf of the accused, that would be clearly beyond the purpose and intendment of the Constitution and to the detriment of justice and social security.

    55. The decision of the High Courts in India are divergent. The leading authority is a decision of the Supreme Court in M.P Sharma v. Satish Chandra, AIR 1954 SC 300 (U & V). In that case the Government had ordered an investigation into the affairs of a Company and the report of the inspector appointed under Section 138 of the Companies Act, indicated that an organised attempt was made from the inception of the Company to misappropriate and embezzle its funds and declare it to be substantial loss, and to conceal from the share-holders the true state of affairs by submitting false accounts and balance-sheets.

    56. The Special Police on the basis of the information which was recorded as first information Page: 300report, applied to the District Magistrate under Section 96 of the Cr PC, for the issue of warrants for the search of documents at different places. The District Magistrate ordered investigation of the offences and issued warrants for simultaneous searches at 34 places.

    57. Records were seized in consequence of the searches. The petitioners in that case presented a petition to the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution praying that the search warrants be quashed being illegal and unconstitutional, and asked for return of the documents seized. It was urged that a search to obtain documents for investigation into an offence amounted to a compulsory procuring of incriminatory evidence from the accused and was hit by Article 20(3) of the Constitution.

    58. Repelling the contention raised on behalf of the petitioners, their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that there was no basis in the Indian Law for the assumption that a search or seizure of a thing or a document was in itself to be treated as compelled production of the same. Analysing the terms in which this right had been declared in our Constitution, it was said that it consisted of the following components—

    (1) It is a right pertaining to a person “accused of an offence”;

    (2) It is a protection against “compulsion to be a witness”; and

    (3) It is a protection against such compulsion resulting in his giving evidence “against himself”.

    59. The guarantee in Article 20(3) was against “testimonial compulsion.” It was said—

    “…………… the word ‘witness’ must be understood in its natural sense, i.e, as referring to a person who furnishes evidence. Indeed, every positive volitional act which furnishes evidence is testimony, and testimonial compulsion connotes coercion which procures positive volitional evidentiary acts of the person, as opposed to the negative attitude of silence or submission on his part.”

    60. The dicta of their Lordships, by analogy, lends support to the conclusion, that procurement of the impressions of hand is not hit by Article 20(3) of the Constitution.

    61. In AIR 1958 All 119 (I), the accused was ordered to furnish a specimen of his writing under Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act. It was held, that no legitimate exception could be taken to this order of the Sessions Judge on the ground of its being in contravention of Article 20(3) of the Constitution. It was said, that the accused could not refuse to give the specimen writing when ordered by the Court to give it, as that would not amount to compelling the accused to be a witness against himself.

    62. It was also held that the identification proceedings of persons suspected of crime, recovery of incriminating articles from their possession, taking of their photographs, trying clothes etc., upon them, and the like, were proceedings which were valid.

    63. Sailendra Nath Sinha v. The State, AIR 1955 Cal 247 (W), is an authority for the proposition that the direction under Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act, to take specimen writings of a person who is accused of an offence, does not amount to a direction compelling him to give evidence against himself, and hence such direction does not offend Article 20(3) of the Constitution.

    64. In Golam Rahman v. The King, AIR 1950 Cal 66 (X), it was held that Section 73 of the Evidence Act, applied to all persons including the accused and it was permissible to take a specimen of the thumb impression of the accused under the direction of the Court in compliance with S. 73 and Section 45 of the illustration (c), Evidence Act, and also under Section 5 of the Identification of Prisoners Act, 1920.

    65. In Kishori Kishore Mishra… v. Emperor…Opposite Party., 39 Cal WN 986 : (AIR 1935 Cal 308) (Y), Jack, J., said that he would be inclined to hold that Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act included an accused person.

    66. The High Court of Bombay in Emperor v. Ramrao Mangesh, ILR 56 Bom 304 : (AIR 1932 Bom 406) (Z), also expressed the view that specimen signatures and writings made by an accused person during the course of investigation were admissible in evidence at the trial of the accused for the offence of forgery.

    67. In a Full Bench decision of Rangoon High Court in Emperor v. Nga Tun Hlaing, AIR 1924 Rang 115 (118) (Z1), May Oung, J., said—

    “…………… there does not appear to me to be anything in commpn between this power to examine the accused (under Section 342 of the Cr PC) and the power to take his finger impression under Section 73 of the Evidence Act, unless indeed it can be held that by directing the accused to make his finger impression the Court is, in effect, compelling him to provide evidence against himself.

    68. Such a contention is, however, in my view, inadmissible, since what really constitute the evidence, viz., the ridges on his thumb are not provided by him any more than the features of his countenance are provided by him. All that he is asked to do is to display those ridge; for better scrutiny the ridges are inked over and an impression is made on a piece of paper.

    “I would, therefore, hold that the decision under consideration is wrong and that a Court has power under Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act, to direct an accused person, present in Court, to make his finger impression for the purpose described in that section.”

    69. A Division Bench of the Patna High Court in Zahuri Sahu v. King-Emperor*, ILR 6 Pat 623 : (AIR 1928 Pat 103) (Z-2), following the view expressed in the above cited Full Bench decision of Rangoon High Court, held that the Court was entitled to ask the accused to allow his thumb impression to be taken for the purpose of comparison and to draw an inference adverse to him on his refusal to give his thumb impression. The observations to the contrary made by Bucknili, J. in an earlier judgment in Bazari Hajam v. King-Emperor*, AIR 1922 Pat 73 (Z-3), were not considered to be a correct exposition of the law.

    70. According to an earlier decision of the Madras High Court in Public Prosecutor v. Kandasami Thevan, AIR 1927 Mad 696 (Z-4), taking of thumb-mark of an accused person for comparison by Court was not objectionable and the view expressed in AIR 1922 Pat 73 (Z-3), was dissented from.

    71. In re Sheik Muhammad Hussain, AIR 1957 Mad 47 (Z-5), Somasundaram, J. expressed the view that the thumb impression of the accused taken by the police on a slip of paper which was later on produced in Court could not Page: 301amount to testimonial compulsion forbidden by Article 20(3) of the Constitution.

    72. In Rajamuthukoil Pillai v. Perivasami Nadar, AIR 1956 Mad 632 (Z-6), Somasundaram, J. expressed a different view. He said “it seems to me that this direction asking the accused to give his thumb impression would amount to asking him to furnish evidence which is prohibited under Article 20(3). The accused, therefore, cannot be compelled to give his thumb impression as directed by the Magistrate.”

    73. In Swarnalingam Chettiar v. Assistant Labour Inspector, Karaikudi, (S) AIR 1956 Mad 165 (Z-7), an objection was taken on behalf of the accused to the production of the documents. This objection was upheld in view of the guarantee under Article 20(3).

    74. In re Palani Goundan, AIR 1957 Mad 546 (Z-8), a Division Bench of the Madras High Court consisting of Somasundaram, J. and Ramaswami Goundar, J. held that though the accused cannot be compelled to produce any evidence against himself, such evidence can be taken or seized provided, of course, such taking or seizure is legally permissible.

    75. In Brij Bhushan Raghuhandan Prasad v. The State, AIR 1957 Madh. Pra. 106 (Z-9), a Division Bench held Section 5 of the Madhya Bharat Identification of Prisoners Act to be repugnant to Article 20(3) of the Constitution and remarked that the direction given by the Magistrate to take thumb impression and specimen handwriting of the accused was illegal. A view to similar effect was also expressed in, Nelvely Desom, Nattalam Pakuthy v. Sirkar Prosecutor, AIR 1950 Trav. Co. 5 (Z-10). For the reasons given in detail in the earlier part of my judgment, I do not and myself in agreement with the above view.

    76. My conclusion is that the taking of thumb, finger and palm impressions of the accused in the Court of the Magistrate under his directions was not in contravention of Article 20(3) of our Constitution.

    77. The prosecution has also based their case against Pokhar Singh on the recovery of fire-arms, Exhibits P. 1 to P. 5, at his instance. He was interrogated by P.W 18 Shri Shivdat Pal Singh, D.I Police, in the presence of P.W 24 Shri Ram Chander, S.H.O, P.W 3 Ajmer Singh, P.W 4 Raj Mal, and P.W 14 Roop Ram on 22nd of April, 1956. Pokhar Singh accused stated, vide his statement Exhibit P.H, that he had buried one rifle, two double-barrelled guns and, one single-barrelled gun in his nauhra in village Badesra under toori which he could get recovered. He also stated that he had given over one 12 bore double-barrelled gun to Bahai Singh of village Pharmana.

    78. On 24th of April, 1956, accused Mehtab Singh, led the police party to a place of concealment, and got recovered the gun Exhibit P. 6 in three pieces, wrapped in cloth.

    79. P.W 14 Roop Ram stated in cross-examination that Mehtab Singh was the first among the accused to be interrogated, then Dalip Singh, and last of all Pokhar Singh accused was questioned. It is argued by the learned counsel for accused Pokhar Singh that information had already been given to the police by Mehtab Singh and Dalip Singh and therefore Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, cannot apply to the statement of Pokhar Singh, which he says is not admissible.

    80. He has referred to Kudaon… v. Emperor…Opposite Party., AIR 1925 Nag 407 (Z-11), where it was held that where one accused has agreed to point out a place where a fact would be discovered in pursuance of his statement to point out that place, the section does not cover similar statements of the other accused in police custody. In that case, all the five accused were said to have points ed out the exact spot.

    81. But this view of a Single Judge was not followed by a Division Bench of that Court in State Government, M.P v. Chhotelal Mohanlal, AIR 1955 Nag 71 (Z-12), and it was held that the joint or simultaneous statements of the accused persons were not inadmissible in evidence.

    82. In this case, however, the guns were recovered not from the same spot but from different places. Discovery of the gun in consequence of the information given by Mehtab Singh was from Jujri Mahal in Hissar City, whereas the discoveries made in consequence of the information given by Pokhar Singh were from village Badesra and village Pharmana.

    83. The learned counsel for the accused also cited Aher Raja Khima v. State Of Saurashtra ., (S) AIR 1956 SC 217 (Z-13), to the effect that discovery of incriminating articles alleged to have been recovered by the accused is inadmissible in evidence if the police already knew where they were hidden, do not think how this authority can assist either of the two accused as it is not shown that the police were already aware of the hiding places of these articles.

    84. It is not a case of matter being already known to the police and the latter going through the formality of a re-discovery. As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Pulukuri Kottaya v. Emperor, AIR 1947 PC 67 (Z-14)—

    “The condition necessary to bring the section (S. 27) into operation is that discovery of a fact in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence in the custody of a Police Officer must be deposed to, and thereupon so much of the information as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered may be proved. The section seems to be based on the view that if a fact is actually discovered in consequence of information given, some guarantee is afforded thereby that the information was true, and accordingly can be safely allowed to be given in evidence;…………”

    85. In 1. Ramkishan Mithanlal Sharma v. (Original Accused 4), AIR 1955 SC 104, para 22(Z-15), the above view of the Privy Council was endorsed.

    86. I am of the view that the discovery of the fire-arms at the instance of Pokhar Singh was genuine and in no respect in contravention of the provisions of section 27, Indian Evidence Act.

    87. The evidence on the record which is based on finger impressions found on the glass pane and the phials, corresponding to those of Pokhar Singh, and on the discovery of guns at his instance, leaves no doubt as to his guilt. I uphold his conviction under Ss. 457/380, Indian Penal Code, and I do not think that the sentence of one year's rigorous imprisonment imposed upon him is excessive.

    88. I may now take up the prosecution case against Mehtaib Singh. He was sentenced under S. 411, Indian Penal Code, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for nine months. The case against him rests on the discovery of the gun Page: 302in three pieces from a concealed place behind Gujri Mahal in Hissar, at his instance on 24th of April, 1956, in the presence of P.W 5 Megh Singh and F.W 6 Bawa Harparshad. My attention has been drawn to a decision in Trimbak v. State Of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1954 SC 39 (Z-16). Mahajan, J. observed—

    “It is the duty of the prosecution in order to bring home the guilt of a person under section 411, Indian Penal Code, to prove, (1) that the stolen property was in the possession of the accused, (2) that some person other than the accused had possession of the property before the accused got possession of it, and (3) that the accused had knowledge that the property was stolen property.”

    89. These ingredients have not been substantiated beyond reasonable doubt in this case.

    90. Mahajan, J. in the above ruling further said—

    “The fact of recovery by the accused is compatible with the circumstance of somebody else having placed the articles there and of the accused somehow acquiring knowledge about their whereabouts and that being so, the fact of discovery cannot be regarded as conclusive proof that the accused was in possession of these articles.”

    91. Gujri Mahal, from where the discovery of the gun was made at the instance of Mehtab Singh, is a place accessible to all and sundry. From the fact of the recovery from a place near Gujri Mahal, it is not possible to conclude beyond reasonable doubt that the accused Mehtab Singh had concealed the gun there and therefore he was receiver of stolen property in terms of S. 411, Indian Penal Code.

    92. The facts of this case leave room for reasonable doubt as to the guilt of Mehtab Singh. On this evidence it will not be safe to uphold his conviction. Setting aside his conviction and sentence under S. 411, Indian Penal Code, I acquit Mehtab Singh.

    93. Criminal Revision No. 946 of 1957 is accepted to the extent indicated above.

    94. In Criminal Revision No. 947 of 1957, Mehtab Singh, on the above facts, was found guilty of the offence under S. 19(f) of the, Indian Arms Act for being in possession of the gun which was recovered at his instance from behind Gujri Mahal. It is not safe to hold that the gun which was concealed there, was in the possession of Mehtab Singh. I set aside his conviction and sentence under Section 19(f) of the Indian Arms Act and acquit him.

    95. In Criminal Revision No. 948 of 1957, Pokhar Singh, was found guilty under Section 19(f) of the Indian Arms Act and was sentenced to undergo nine month's rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 200/- was also imposed upon him. This sentence was ordered to run concurrently with the sentence imposed upon him under sections 457/380, Indian Penal Code, in Criminal Revision No. 940 of 1957. The recovery of firearms hidden under toori from his nauhra in village Badesra, leaves no room for doubt as to his being in possession of the arms in question, pis conviction and sentence under Section 19(f) of the Indian Arms Act are maintained.

    V.B.B

    96. Order accordingly.

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    Pakhar Singh And Another v. The State .
    (Mar 10, 1958)