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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Second Appeal concerning Rent Arrears)

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff (now appellant) filed a suit against the sole defendant (now respondent) for a decree for arrears of rent totaling approximately Rs. 6,000 for the period 1 August 1966 to July 1969 (rent for an earlier period of 1 year 5 months was not claimed as barred by limitation). The plaintiff alleged that the defendant was inducted as a tenant from 1 December 1957 at a monthly rent of Rs. 170 and that the suit premises was a cloth shop run as "Minerva Store".

The defendant denied tenancy, asserting that her husband, Kedarmal Agarwalla, was the tenant; that he had purchased the land and filed a title suit against the plaintiff (pending); that the suit house did not belong to the plaintiff; and that the defendant, being a pardanashin Marowary woman dependent on her husband, had no business by the name "Minerva Stores".

The trial Court decreed the suit on the ground that the defendant took settlement of the suit premises from the plaintiff. The learned lower appellate Court reversed the trial Court and dismissed the plaintiff's suit, holding there was no landlord-tenant relationship. The present second appeal was filed on 30.12.1981, admitted on 3.5.1982. During the appeal process applications were made to call the record of Misc. Appeal No. 12 of 1972 and to take additional evidence; this Court directed calling for the records and reserved consideration of additional evidence to the final hearing. The record was before this Court and counsel argued both the merits and the request for remand to allow additional evidence.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Exhibits 5 and 7 (statements/evidence of the respondent's husband given in Title Suit No. 159 of 1966) can be treated as admissions binding on the respondent under Section 18 of the Evidence Act.
  2. Whether entries in the appellant's books of account are admissible and sufficient to prove liability where the writer of the entries was not examined (relevance of Section 34 of the Evidence Act and precedent).
  3. Whether the learned lower appellate Court wrongly placed the burden/onus of proof on the appellant in proving the landlord-tenant relationship.
  4. Whether the finding of the lower appellate Court on the factual question of landlord and tenant is binding in this Second Appeal or should be interfered with.
  5. Whether the appellate Court should allow additional evidence (including remand under the provisions of Order 41 Rule 27 or related provisions) at the appellate stage to enable the appellant to obtain a decree.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Mr. Sarma)

  • There is a clear admission by the respondent's husband (in Exhibits 5 and 7) that the respondent was a tenant, and the lower appellate Court overlooked this admission.
  • Exhibits 5 and 7, being admissions, are the best evidence and the lower appellate Court ought to have relied upon them to decree the suit.
  • The records of Misc. Appeal No. 12 of 1972 (called for by this Court) contain a clear admission by the husband that the respondent was a tenant; the appellant should be allowed to adduce additional evidence to prove that admission and, if necessary, the appeal should be remanded for taking additional evidence.
  • The entries in the appellant’s books of account ought to have been accepted (relying on authority that books properly kept can be proved even without the writer being examined).
  • The lower appellate Court incorrectly placed the onus of proof on the appellant.

Respondent's Arguments (Mr. Bhattacharjee)

  • Admitted that "admission is the best evidence" in principle, but disputed that there was any admission in the record that would bind the respondent.
  • Contended that admissions by the husband in other proceedings do not bind the respondent under Section 18 of the Evidence Act because the husband was not shown to be the respondent's agent or to have been authorized to make such admissions.
  • Argued that allowing the appellant to adduce further evidence at this late stage (after delay) is not legally tenable.
  • Maintained that the burden of proof to establish the landlord-tenant relationship lies on the plaintiff/appellant and that the lower Court correctly treated it as such.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Union of India vs. Mokesh Builders and Financers Limited, AIR 1977 SC 409 Adoption of the principle that an admission by a party is substantive evidence of the fact admitted; admissions duly proved are admissible even if the party did not appear in the witness box or was not confronted with the statement later. The Court relied on this authority to state the general proposition that admissions are substantive evidence, but then proceeded to analyse whether the statements in Exhibits 5 and 7 qualified as admissions binding on the respondent under Section 18.
Ram Janaki Devi vs. M/s Juggilal Kamlapat, AIR 1971 SC 2551 Books of account regularly kept in the course of business may be held proved even in the absence of the writer upon proof of proper maintenance and impossibility of producing the writer. The Court noted the precedent but observed that the lower appellate Court rejected the account entries not solely because the writer was not examined and considered other factors; the High Court found no illegality in that approach and did not re-appreciate that evidence in second appeal.
Raghavamma vs. Chenchamraa, AIR 1964 SC 136 Distinction between burden of proof (which remains upon the party who must prove a fact) and onus of proof (which may shift); shifting of onus is continuous in evaluation of evidence. The Court applied this principle to hold that the burden of proof remained on the plaintiff/appellant to prove the landlord-tenant relationship; therefore there was no merit in the appellant’s contention that the onus had been misplaced.
Singh vs. Tholu, AIR 1963 SC 361 In an ejectment suit, the question whether a person was a tenant is a finding of fact; such findings are generally binding in a second appeal unless perverse, based on no evidence, inadmissible evidence or misconstruction of documents. The Court held that the learned lower appellate Court's factual finding that there was no landlord-tenant relationship was not a matter for interference in the second appeal, as there was no material showing the finding was perverse or based on no/admissible evidence.
Rajunder Naraian Rao vs. Bijai Govind Singh, Moores Indian Appeals Vol. II (1837-41) p.253 Authority that admission/consent made by a Vakeel (advocate) with due authority will bind his client though the client is not present. The Court acknowledged the principle but examined whether there was authority in the record showing the respondent or her agent had authorized admissions; finding none, the Court did not treat the statements as binding admissions.
Raja Prithwi Chand vs. Sukhraj Rai, AIR 1940 Fed. Ct. 25 When counsel make statements of fact to the Court assuming responsibility, the Court may rely on them; such statements bind the client where made with due authority. The Court accepted the legal proposition but found no record support that the statements relied upon were made with such authority; hence the principle did not assist the appellant here.
Venkataramiah vs. Seetharam Reddy, AIR 1963 SC 1526 Consideration of appellate power to permit additional evidence (context for Order 41 Rule 27/Order 42 Rule 1 CPC). Referenced as background; the Court discussed the scope of appellate power to admit additional evidence and applied the principles to refuse the appellant's prayer for additional evidence due to no lacuna and delay.
Braja Behari Roy vs. Chitta Raojao Chakraborty, AIR 1968 (Assam & Nagaland) Interpreting Order 41 Rule 27 and Order 42 Rule 1 CPC — appellate court's power to allow additional evidence for substantial cause. The decision was noted for the proposition that appellate courts have power to allow additional evidence for substantial reasons; the Court nevertheless found no substantial cause here (no lacuna and undue delay).
Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay vs. Lala Pancham, AIR 1965 SC 1008 Order 41 Rule 27 does not permit admitting fresh evidence merely to enable the appellate court to pronounce judgment in a particular way; additional evidence is for removing a lacuna in the evidence. The Court applied this principle to conclude that admitting fresh evidence solely to obtain a favorable judgment at appellate stage is not permissible; since there was no lacuna, additional evidence was refused.
Bhanbhass Seikh vs. Union of India, ALR 1970 Assam & Nagaland 206 Consideration of prayer for additional evidence and relevance of delay in seeking such evidence. The Court referenced this decision to support refusal to admit additional evidence where there was an unexplained delay (two years) in seeking permission to produce additional evidence.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a stepwise manner, addressing the principal evidential and procedural contentions raised on appeal:

  1. Admissibility of Exhibits 5 and 7 as admissions under Section 18, Evidence Act:
    • The Court acknowledged the general rule (citing Union of India v. Mokesh Builders) that admissions by a party are substantive evidence.
    • The Court noted that Exhibits 5 and 7 were statements given by the respondent's husband in Title Suit No. 159 of 1966, where the respondent was not a party, and observed that the circumstances in which those statements were made were not clear on the record.
    • Relying on Section 18, the Court required proof that the husband was an agent expressly or impliedly authorised to make statements binding on the respondent. The appellant pointed to petitions and steps taken by the husband but the Court found that such acts did not establish authority to make the specific statements in Exhibits 5 and 7.
    • On perusal of Exhibits 5 and 7, the Court found that in cross-examination the husband had denied the suggestion that the respondent took the suit premises on rent from the appellant. That affirmative fact militated against treating the exhibits as admissions binding on the respondent.
    • Conclusion: Exhibits 5 and 7 could not be relied upon as admissions by the respondent for the purpose of proving the landlord-tenant relationship.
  2. Treatment of entries in books of account (Section 34, Evidence Act):
    • The Court observed that entries in books of account regularly kept are relevant but not conclusive under Section 34; such entries alone may be insufficient to fasten liability.
    • While the appellant relied on precedent holding books may be proved even without the writer's testimony, the Court examined the impugned judgment and found the lower appellate Court rejected the entries for reasons broader than merely non-examination of the writer.
    • Conclusion: There was no illegality in the lower appellate Court rejecting the entries, and it was not necessary for the High Court in second appeal to re-appreciate that evidence.
  3. Burden and onus of proof:
    • The Court accepted the authority distinguishing burden of proof (which remains on the party who must prove a fact) and onus (which may shift), citing Raghavamma v. Chenchamraa.
    • Applying that distinction, the Court held the burden of proving the landlord-tenant relationship remained upon the plaintiff/appellant. The Court found no substance in the appellant's contention that the lower Court had wrongly placed the burden.
  4. Interference with lower appellate Court's factual finding:
    • The Court recognized that factual findings about tenancy are generally binding in a second appeal (citing Singh v. Tholu) unless perverse or based on no/admissible evidence or misconstruction.
    • On review, the High Court found no material to show the lower appellate Court's finding was perverse or unsupportable and therefore declined to disturb the factual conclusion that there was no landlord-tenant relationship.
  5. Prayer for remand / allowance of additional evidence:
    • The Court reviewed the scope of appellate power to admit additional evidence (Order 41 Rule 27 and related provisions), noting authorities that allow additional evidence only to remove a lacuna and not merely to enable a party to secure a favorable judgment.
    • The Court found no lacuna in the existing evidence. The Misc. Appeal No. 12 of 1972 (in which the appellant had been a party) had been available earlier; the application for additional evidence was delayed (filed after two years), indicating an attempt to introduce fresh evidence to obtain a particular judgment.
    • Further, on perusal the memo of that misc. appeal did not contain a clear admission of tenancy. Even if the additional evidence were allowed, the Court found it would not enable the appellant to obtain a decree on the record as it stood.
    • Conclusion: The appellant’s prayer to admit additional evidence or remand the matter was refused.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The appeal is dismissed. No costs.

Implications and immediate consequences:

  • The judgment of the learned lower appellate Court, which reversed the trial Court and dismissed the plaintiff's suit for rent arrears (finding no landlord-tenant relationship), is upheld by this Court.
  • The Court refused to accept Exhibits 5 and 7 as admissions binding on the respondent, refused to re-appreciate the rejected books-of-account evidence in second appeal, and refused the appellant's request for remand or permission to adduce additional evidence at this stage.
  • No broader legal precedent is established by the opinion beyond applying established authorities (the Court explicitly applied and relied upon existing case law on admissions, burden/onus, appellate evidence rules, and fact findings in second appeals). The decision has the direct effect of dismissing the appellant's challenge and imposing no costs on the respondent.

This summary is strictly confined to the information contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond that text.

    D.Agarwalla v. B.Devi Agarwalla

    In this second appeal by the impugned judgment learned lower appellate Court reversed the judgment of the learned trial Court and dismissed the suit of the plaintiff.

    2. Appellant as plaintiff filed the suit against the sole defendant for a decree for a sum of Rs, 6,000/-and odd as arrears rent from 1st August, 1966 to July, 1969. The arrears of the rent for the earlier period of 1 year and 5 months were not claimed as it was barred by limitation. According to the plaintiff, the defendant was inducted as a tenant from 1st December, 1957 at a monthly rent of Rs. 170/-. There is no dispute that the suit premises is being issued as a cloth shop under the name and style as "Minerva Store". The suit was resisted by the sole defendant mainly on the ground that she did not take the suit premises on rent from the plaintiff. According to the defendant her husband, Kedarmal Agarwalla was the tenant of the said shop. It has been stated that the said Kedarmal has also purchased the land on which the suit house is situated and he has filed a title suit against the present plaintiff which is pending. It has been denied that the suit house belongs to the plaintiff. Defendant has also stated in the written statement that she is pardanashin 'Marowary' lady dependant on her husband and she has no business by the name Minerva Stores.

    The learned trial Court decreed the suit on the ground that defendant took settlement of the suit premises from the plaintiff. However learned lower appellate Court held that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties herein.

    3. The present appeal was field on 30. 12. 81 and it was admitted on 3. 5. 82. On 15. 3. 84 an application under Order 41 Rule 23 read with Order 13 Rule 10 and section 151, CPC was filed in this appeal praying for calling for the record of Misc. Appeal No. 12 of 1972 from the Court of learned District Judge, Kamrup. Though petition was registered as Misc. Case No. 21/84 in connection with the present Second Appeal, earlier to that, on perusal of the order dated 5. 3.84 passed in the main Second Appeal I find that an application for taking additional evidence was filed by the appellant before this Court. Both the matters were disposed of by order dated 11. 7.84 passed in the above Misc. Case and this Court directed calling for the records as prayed for and further directed that the question of additional evidence would be considered at the time of final hearing. The record is before this Court and learned counsel for both the parties have advanced arguments both on merit of the appeal as well as allowing appellant a chance to give additional evidence by remanding this appeal to the learned lower appellate Court. Before I consider the prayer for taking additional evidence let me consider the merit of this appeal.

    4. The main contention of Mr. Sarma, learned counsel for the appellant i$ that there is clear admission by the husband of the respondent and it has been overlooked by the learned lower appellate Court. In this connection Mr. Sarma has drawn my attention to Exhibits 5 and 7. On the top of that Mr. Sarma has further urged that in the memo of Misc. Appeal No. 12 of 1972 records of which has been called for, there is also clear admission by the husband of the respondent that in respect of the suit house present respondent was a tenant. According to Mr, Sarma admission being the best evidence the learned lower appellate Court ought to have decreed the suit relying on Exhibits 5 and 7. Mr. Sarma further urged that in the interest of justice additional evidence may be allowed to be adduced to prove the admission on behalf of the present respondent made in the memo of the said Misc. Appeal. Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel for the respondent does not dispute the fact that admission is the best evidence. The learned counsel has, however, urged that taking the entire evidence on record there is no admission in the case in hand. According to Mr. Bhattacharjee admission by the husband in other proceedings will not come under the provision of section 18 of the Evidence Act and can not bind the present respondent. Mr. Bhattacharjee has further urged that at this late stage the question of allowing the present appellant to adduce further evidence is not legally tenable,

    5. Relying on section 18 of the Evidence Act Mr. Sarma has urged that Exhibits 5 and 7 ought to have been accepted by the learned Court below for arriving at the decision that respondent was a tenant under the appellant. Exhibit 5 is the evidence of the husband of the respondent in Title Suit No, 159 of 1966. This statement was recorded on 22,5.69. Exhibit 7 is also the evidence of the husband of the respondent recorded in Title Suit No. 159 of 1966 and it was recorded on 2. 3 74. There is no dispute on the bar that in both the above suits the present respondent was not a party.

    6. The first part of section 18, of the Evidence Act which is relevant for the present purpose runs as follows :-

    "Statements made by a party to the proceeding, or by an agent to any such party, whom the Court regards under the cir cumstances of the case, as expressly or impliedly authorised by him to make them, are admission .

    Question is whether Exhibits 5 and 7 can be deemed to be admission made by the present respondent and whether her husband was expressly or impliedly authorised to make the above statements. I may however note relying on the decision of the Apex Court in Union of India vs. Mokesh Builders and Financers Limited, AIR 1977 SC 409, that admission by a party is substantive evidence of the fact admitted, and admission duly proved are admissible evidence irrespective of whether the party mating them appeared in the witness box or not and whether that party when appearing as witness was confronted with those statement in case it made a statements contrary to those admissions.

    7. As stated earlier in the above two suits where the husband of the respondent gave evidence on oath the present respondent was not a party. I am not aware under what circumstances such evidence was given. Before accepting such evidence as admission, it must be shown that the person making the statement was an agent, whether expressly or impliedly authorised. Mr. Sarma has drawn my attention to some of the petition etc. filed in the present suit by the husband of the respondent and has urged that he was an agent of the present respondent. I am unable to accept the contention of Mr, Sarma inasmuch as merely because the husband took some steps in this case it can not be held that it he was authorised expressly or impliedly to make the statement in Exhibits 5 and 7. In the other two suits as the present respondent was riot a party and in absence of any authority by the respondent on record, I am unable to accept that statements in Exhibits 5 and 7 made by the husband of the present respondent as admission of the respondent binding on her for the case in hand. That apart, I have also perused Exhibits 5 and 7 and I find that in Exhibits 5 in cross-examination the husband of the present respondent has specifically denied the suggestion that the present respondent took the suit premises on rent from the appellant. In view of the above position I hold that for the purpose of finding out the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties herein reliance can not be placed on Exhibits 5 and 7.

    8. Drawing my attention to the impugned judgment Mr. Sarma has urged that the learned lower appellate Court erred in law in rejecting the entries in the books of accounts maintained by the appellant only on the ground that the writer of these entries was not examined. Entries in books of account regularly kept in course of business are relevant 'but such statement shall not alone the sufficient evidence to courage any person with liability as laid down in section 34 of the Evidence Act. In Ram Janaki Devi vs. M/s Juggilal Kamlapat, AIR 1971 SC 2551, it was held that books of account must be held to have been proved even in absence of its writer on proof of its proper maintaining and keeping and of impossibility of arranging presence of its writer. I have perused the impugned judgment and I find that the entries were rejecting not solely on the ground that the writer was not examined. The learned Court below while rejected these entries took into consideration other factors as well. I do not find any illegality in the judgment of the learned lower appellate Court in rejecting these entries. Sitting in Second Appeal it is not necessary for this Court to re-appreciate this piece of evidence.

    9. Mr. Sarma has urged that the learned Court below placed wrongly the onus of proof on the appellant. Mr. Bhattacharjee has urged that the burden of proof was on the appellant as plaintiff can succeed only if he can prove the relationship of landlord and tenant. Mr. Bhattacharjse has placed reliance in Raghavamma vs. Chenchamraa, AIR 1964 SC 136. lathis case the Apex Court held that there is an essential distinction between the burden of proof and onus of proof; Burden of proof liss upon the person who has to prove a fact and it never shifts, but the onus of proof shifts. It was further held that such a shifting of onus is a continuous process in the evaluation of evidence. In the case in hand as the plaintiff has claimed the amount on the ground that defendant was a tenant the burden is on the plaintiff to prove this fact. I, therefore, do not find any substance in the contention of Mr. Sarma.

    10. Mr. Bhattacharjee has urged that the question of relationship of landlord and tenant being a question of fact the finding of the learned lower Court is binding on this Court in Second Appeal. In this connection the decision of the Apex Court in Singh vs. Tholu, AIR 1963 SC 361 has been placed before this Court. It was held by their Lordships that in an a ejectment suit the finding whether a person was a tenant is a finding of fact and can not set aside in Second Appeal by the High Court. However this Court can definitely interfere, in view of the settled law, even in Second Appeal such a finding of fact if it is perverse, based on no evidence or in-admissible evidence or misconstruction of documents etc. In the case in hand I do not find any material to interfere with the finding of learned lower Court.

    11. Regarding remand of the case for taking additional evidence Mr. Sarma has urged that in memo of appeal in Misc. Appeal No. 12 of 1972 there is a clear admission by the respondent that she was a tenant under the plaintiff. I have parused the case record and I find that neither the respondent nor her agent executed any power of attorney in favour of the learned counsel who filed the appeal. Mr. Sarma has placed reliance in Rajunder Naraian Rao vs. Bijai Govind Singh, Moores Indian Appeals, Vol. II (1837 -41) page 253 wherein it was held that admission and consent of a Vakeel made with due authority, will bind his client though not present at the time of making it. In Raja Prithwi Chand vs. Sukhraj Rai, AIR 1940 Federal Court 25 it was also held that when coun sel take on themselves the responsibility of making statement of fact to the Court, the Court is entitled to assume that those statements are true in every particular, so that it may implicitly rely upon them and this is a rule which admits of no qualification. On the above legal proposition there cannot be any dispute. Now the only question is at this stage whether a remand can be ordered.

    12. Relying under decision of the Apex Court in Venkataramiah vs. Seetharam Reddy, AIR 1963 SC, 1526 a Division Bench of this Court in Braja Behari Roy vs. Chitta Raojao Chakraborty, AIR 1968, Assam and N a gal and 19 this Court considered the provisions of Order 41 Rule 27 and Order 42 Rule 1 CPC and held that the appellate Court has power to allow additional evidence not only if it is required to enable it to pronounce judgment but also for any other substantial cause. In Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay vs. Lala Pancham, AIR 1965 SC 1008 the above question was considered and the Apex Court held that the provisions of Order 41 Rule 27 does not enable the appellate Court to let in fresh evidence at the appellate stage where even without such evidence it can pro nounce judgment in a case and it does not entitle the appellate Court to let fresh evidence only for the purpose of ^pronouncing judgment in a particular way and it is for purpose of removing a lacuna in the evidence that the appellate Court is empowered to admit additional evidence,

    13. Situated thus, under Order 41 Rule 27 the appellate Court may allow production of any document for examination or any witness to enable it to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause but in so doing it can not allow any party such- an opport unity for pronouncing judgment in a particular way. In the case in hand I also find no lacuna. That apart in Misc. Appeal No. 12 of 1972 the present appellant was a party and the said appeal was filed before the present appeal was disposed of by the learned lower appellate Court. Even before this Court the application for additional evidence was filed after two years. So I am of opinion that the appellant is trying to bring in fresh evidence to pronounce judgment in his favour in this case which is not permissible in view of the above law. I may refer to, a decision of this Court in Bhanbhass Seikh vs. Union of India, ALR 1970 Assam & Nagaland, 206 in which while rejecting the prayer for additional e vide ace the Court also took into consideration the delay of two years for making such a prayer. I am, therefore, unable to accept the prayer of the appellant to allow additional evidence. I have also perused the said memo of appeal and I am of the opinion that there is no such clear admission regarding the present tenancy. That apart, in view of other evidence of the record this piece of evidence, even if allowed, will not enable the appellant to get a decree.

    14. For the reasons stated above find no merit in the present appeal and as such it is liable to be dismissed.

    In the result appeal is dismissed. No costs.

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    Comments

    D.Agarwalla v. B.Devi Agarwalla
    (Dec 12, 1989)