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AMICUS AI
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citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • Section 69 of the Army Act read with Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code.
  • Rule 22, Rule 33 or Rule 34 of the Army Rules. 14.
  • ARTICLE 226 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • provisions of Rule 22 of the Army Rules
  • Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code,
  • Section 164(1) and (2) of the Army Act
  • Rule 33 of the Army Rules, 1954
  • SECTION 164 ARMY ACT
  • SECTION 69 ARMY ACT
  • Rule 22 of the Army Rules
  • sub- rule (2) of Rule 33,
  • Sub-rule 7 of Rule 33
  • sub-rule (1) of Rule 22,
  • Section 164(1)(2)
  • Army Rule 22
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 69 of the Army Act read with Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code.
  • Rule 22, Rule 33 or Rule 34 of the Army Rules. 14.
  • ARTICLE 226 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • provisions of Rule 22 of the Army Rules
  • Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code,
  • Section 164(1) and (2) of the Army Act
  • Rule 33 of the Army Rules, 1954
  • SECTION 164 ARMY ACT
  • SECTION 69 ARMY ACT
  • Rule 22 of the Army Rules
  • sub- rule (2) of Rule 33,
  • Sub-rule 7 of Rule 33
  • sub-rule (1) of Rule 22,
  • Section 164(1)(2)
  • Army Rule 22
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — R.L. Anand, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, No. 1082756 A SWR Dhir Singh Pundir, challenged the proceedings, findings and sentence of a General Court Martial (GCM) convened at Pathankot under Section 69 of the Army Act (read with Section 302 IPC) that convicted him of the murder of Naib Risaldar Dharampal Singh and sentenced him to imprisonment for life and dismissal from service. The petitioner alleged that the GCM proceedings were illegal, arbitrary, based on no evidence, without jurisdiction and violative of mandatory statutory provisions; he also challenged the rejection of his pre- and post-confirmation petitions under Section 164 of the Army Act as non-speaking orders.

Facts relied upon in the proceedings (as recited in the petition and the GCM findings) include: the petitioner was detailed for guard duty at 388 Coy Supply ASC, Kandrori on 17 April 1994 from 2000 to 2200 hrs; the JCO in charge (Naib Risaldar Dharampal Singh) was shot dead at about 2200 hrs on 17 April 1994; the petitioner was found absconding; a 7.62 mm SLR (Registration No. C-4792, Butt No. 21) and five live rounds allegedly issued to the petitioner were linked to the offence; five empty 7.62 fired cases recovered at the scene were forensically matched to that rifle; the weapon was later recovered and seized by Civil Police.

Procedurally, the petitioner filed pre- and post-confirmation petitions under Section 164 of the Army Act which were rejected by competent authorities; he then moved the High Court under Articles 226/227 seeking quashing of the GCM proceedings, findings, sentence and related orders. Respondents contested maintainability and merits, asserting compliance with Army Act and Rules, proper conduct of summary and trial, supply of documents to the petitioner, and rejection of statutory petitions after application of mind.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the General Court Martial proceedings, finding and sentence are liable to be quashed on grounds that they were illegal, arbitrary, based on no evidence and without jurisdiction.
  2. Whether mandatory provisions of Rule 22 (pre-trial hearing / summary of evidence) and related Army Rules (notably Rule 33 and Rule 34) were violated by depriving the accused of pre-trial findings or material, thereby rendering the GCM proceedings void for want of jurisdiction.
  3. Whether the High Court, in exercising judicial review under Article 226, may re-appraise the sufficiency of evidence led before a court-martial or is confined to testing for absence of evidence, jurisdictional defects or prejudice from failure to comply with mandatory provisions.
  4. Whether the rejection of pre- and post-confirmation petitions under Section 164 of the Army Act was a valid exercise of discretion or was a non-speaking, unlawful order requiring quashing.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The GCM proceedings, findings and sentence were illegal, arbitrary and based on no evidence and were passed without jurisdiction and in violation of statutory and mandatory provisions.
  • The petitioner alleged absence of notice at pre-trial stage and asserted that he was deprived of pre-trial findings (Rule 22) and other materials needed for defence, rendering the trial void.
  • He contended that prosecution withheld or produced only a photostat copy of the Arms Issue Register (with interpolations), that the register was tampered with, and that there were discrepancies on crucial facts such as time of occurrence and identity of weapon issued.
  • He asserted that the GCM findings were based on conjecture and surmise and that his pre- and post-confirmation petitions were rejected without proper consideration.
  • Petitioner also alleged arrest and torture by civil police prior to handing over to Army authorities (factual context raised in petition).

Respondents' Arguments

  • The writ petition was not maintainable because statutory remedies under Section 164(1) and (2) of the Army Act had been exhausted and rejected; High Court must be cautious in interfering with GCM findings under Article 226 and cannot re-appraise evidence as an appellate court.
  • The GCM was convened and conducted in accordance with the Army Act and Rules; the petitioner was given full opportunity to defend, was represented by defence counsel who cross-examined all prosecution witnesses, and made an unsworn statement.
  • All requisite documents (court of inquiry/exhibits, pre-confirmation rejection order, summary of evidence, additional summary and charge-sheet) were supplied to the petitioner; consequently Rule 22, Rule 33 and Rule 34 were not violated.
  • The findings of guilt were based on legal, reliable and cogent evidence (circumstantial and forensic) including issue of weapon, absconsion, recovery of fired cases and forensic ballistic match; pre- and post-confirmation petitions were considered and rejected on merits by competent authorities.
  • On merits, the respondent denied allegations of unfair trial and mala fide conduct and contended the petition be dismissed.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Union of India & others v. Major A. Hussain, 1998(1) RCR(Crl.) 300 : AIR 1998 SC 577 - High Court may judicially review court-martial proceedings under Article 226 but cannot exercise superintendence under Article 227.
- Where a court-martial is properly convened and proceedings follow prescribed procedure, the High Court must generally not interfere.
- Court-martial is a specialized judicial mechanism; procedural safeguards must be observed; sufficiency of evidence is not to be re-appraised unless jurisdictional or prejudice-causing defects exist.
- Proper/adequate pre-trial investigation is not jurisdictional; violation does not invalidate a court-martial unless prejudice or breach of mandatory provision is shown.
The High Court relied on these observations to frame its review: it limited itself to testing whether the GCM acted without jurisdiction or whether findings were based on no evidence, and refused to re-appraise the sufficiency of evidence. The court applied the ruling to maintain restraint in interfering with GCM findings unless a mandatory provision was breached or prejudice shown.
Subedar Mewa Singh v. Union of India, 1998(1) RCR 206 - Where an accused (charged with a serious offence) is denied the benefit of engaging a civil lawyer (despite request) and thereby prejudiced, findings of a GCM may not be sustained; a re-hearing may be required. The court observed that this authority was not helpful to the petitioner: unlike that case, the petitioner here had defence counsel who cross-examined witnesses. The court distinguished the case on facts and found no comparable prejudice.
Lance Dafedar Laxman Singh v. Union of India & others, 1993(1) RCR 357 - Emphasis on the mandatory nature of Rule 22 of the Army Rules (as argued by counsel) — i.e., compliance with pre-trial hearing/supply of summary of evidence and related duties. The court accepted the legal proposition in general but held that in the present case the petitioner had been served with a charge-sheet and supplied relevant material; moreover, the petitioner had not shown how any alleged non-compliance produced prejudice. Thus the precedent did not advance the petitioner's case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in the following analytical steps (as reflected in the opinion):

  1. Procedural posture and principles: The court first recorded that it had heard counsel and would proceed in light of binding Supreme Court authority (Union of India v. Major A. Hussain) which constrains the High Court's role in reviewing court-martial proceedings — the court may intervene under Article 226 but must not undertake a re-appraisal of evidence where a GCM was properly convened and procedures observed.
  2. Framing the primary contention: The petitioner's singular primary legal contention (advanced at hearing) was that mandatory provisions of Rule 22 of the Army Rules were violated because he was deprived of pre-trial findings and material, rendering the GCM trial without jurisdiction.
  3. Respondents' factual denial and claimed compliance: The respondents maintained that all statutory steps were complied with, that pre- and post-confirmation petitions were considered and rejected, and that necessary documents (court of inquiry/exhibits, charge-sheet, summary of evidence and related material) had been supplied to the petitioner and his counsel.
  4. Documentary record and supply of material: The court examined the annexures (Annexure P1 – charge-sheet; Annexure P3 – GCM findings; Annexure P5 – pre-confirmation appeal; Annexure P9 – correspondence showing documents supplied to counsel) and concluded the charge-sheet and summary material had been supplied to the petitioner and counsel, thereby undermining the contention of denial of Rule 22/33/34 rights.
  5. Scope of judicial review on evidence: Reiterating the Supreme Court's guidance, the High Court limited itself to determining whether the GCM findings were based on no evidence or whether a jurisdictional defect or prejudice existed. It declined to act as an appellate court to reassess the sufficiency of evidence.
  6. Examination of GCM findings on circumstantial and forensic evidence: The court set out and summarized the key factual findings of the GCM (Annexure P3). These included admitted facts (the petitioner was on duty at the material time), issuance of the SLR and ammunition to the petitioner on 17 April 1994 (supported by multiple witnesses and exhibits), the petitioner's failure to respond to calls after firing, his absconsion, recovery and seizure by police of the SLR and fired cases, the chain of custody surrounding five fired cases, and ballistic match by a forensic expert linking the fired cases to the rifle issued to the petitioner.
  7. Evaluation of the petitioner's challenges to evidence and register: The GCM considered and rejected the defence's claim that the photostat Exhibits (e.g., Exhibit 'GG') were forged, noting signatures, overwriting inconsistent with forgery, absence of timely objection at trial, and the improbability of a wide forgery conspiracy. The High Court accepted that the GCM had scrutinised the circumstantial evidence and reached conclusions supported by the record.
  8. Application of precedents distinguishing cases: The court considered the petitioner's reliance on Subedar Mewa Singh and Lance Dafedar Laxman Singh, but distinguished them factually — in Mewa Singh the accused was deprived of an opportunity to engage a civil lawyer, whereas the petitioner here had counsel; in Laxman Singh the question was compliance with Rule 22 but the present record demonstrated supply of documents and the petitioner did not show prejudice.
  9. Conclusion on merits: The court concluded that the petitioner had not established jurisdictional infirmity or absence of evidence; the findings of the GCM were based on legal and cogent evidence, and the petition lacked merit.

The court repeatedly emphasized that sufficiency or insufficiency of evidence is not a matter for the High Court in Article 226 proceedings except where the GCM acted without jurisdiction or the accused was prejudiced by breach of mandatory procedure.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petition was dismissed. The court recorded the result as: DISMISSED — the present petition was "totally devoid of any merit" and was dismissed with no order as to costs. The judgment concludes with "Appeal dismissed."

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The GCM proceedings, findings and sentence were not quashed by the High Court; the petitioner's challenge failed and the statutory rejections at pre- and post-confirmation stages were upheld by the court as properly made.
  • Scope of review reaffirmed: The decision reiterates established limits on High Court interference with court-martial findings under Article 226 — interference is warranted only where there is no evidence, a jurisdictional defect or shown prejudice from non-compliance with mandatory provisions; mere reappraisal of evidentiary sufficiency is impermissible.
  • Precedential effect: The opinion does not purport to create a new legal principle; it applies and distinguishes existing authorities to the facts. No new precedent beyond the court's factual conclusions was announced.

    Dhir Singh Pundir v. Union Of India

    R.L. Anand, J. - Shri Dhir Singh Pundir has filed the present writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India with a prayer that this Court should quash the proceedings of General Court Martial, its finding and sentence, order of confirmation and promulgation thereof as the same are allegedly illegal, arbitrary and based on no evidence and without jurisdiction, passed in violation of the various statutory and mandatory provisions. It has further been prayed by the petitioner that the order rejecting the post confirmation petition filed by the petitioner be quashed, being a non-speaking order.

    2. According to the petitioner, he was tried by the General Court Martial held at Pathankot for offence alleged to have been committed under Section 69 of the Army Act. According to him, he was directed to undergo imprisonment for life and he was also dismissed from service for that reason. The petitioner has alleged that the findings returned by the Court are based on no evidence at all; suffer from serious infirmities and violation of procedural safeguard. The petitioner preferred pre and post confirmation petitions against the finding and sentence in view of the statutory provisions as contained under Section 164 of the Army Act, but his fundamental right and legal pleas have been ignored by the authorities, who have finally rejected his appeals. The petitioner has stated that he was arrested by the Civil Police on 30th May, 1994 and was brought to Police Station Sadar, Pathankot, District Gurdaspur on 31st May, 1994. He was tortured and physically assaulted. He was produced before the Court of Judicial Magistrate, Pathankot on 13th June, 1994 and two days' remand was taken by the Police. He was produced before the Judicial Magistrate on 15th June, 1994 and the police took remand for one day. On 16th June, 1994 he was sent to Central Jail, Gurdaspur, and on 24th September, 1994 he was finally handed over to the Army Authorities.

    3. As per the petitioner, he was enrolled in the Army on 25th May, 1984. He served to the best of his ability to the entire satisfaction of his superior officers. The petitioner submits that while posted at 46 Armoured Regiment, he was detailed for guard duty along with 7 other Jawans to proceed to Supply Depot, Kandrori under the authority of Headquarter 2(I) Armoured BDE vide letter No. 3212/A dated 28th October, 1993. The petitioner and other Jawans were issued weapons as shown in the movement order and they were required to leave existing Guard Personnel at the Depot. The petitioner was detailed on guard duty on 17th April, 1994 and time of his duty was from 8 P.M. to 10 P.M. An incident took place in which Naib Sub. Dharampal Singh of the same unit was shot down by someone. The petitioner was ordered to be tried by the General Court Martial. According to the petitioner he was falsely implicated on the basis of suspicion, conjectures and surmises and without any evidence.

    4. The petitioner has challenged the General Court Martial proceedings, inter alia, on the grounds that there was absence of notice on his part; that all the prosecution witnesses had stated that neither on the date of occurrence nor on any previous occasion they had seen, heard or had any information about the alleged ill-will between the deceased and the petitioner. It is the grouse of the petitioner that the Arms Issue Register, which is the base of this incident, has been purposely and with ulterior motive has been withheld by the prosecution. What was produced before the Court is the photostat copy of that register and there are interpolations etc. in that sheet. It is further alleged by the petitioner that the Civil Police came into action on coming to know about the incident. The Civil Police was informed by Lt. Col.C.A. Chawade. That information has been suppressed with ulterior motive. Subsequently, the report which was given to the police was the result of deliberations and consultations. Also it is pleaded by the petitioner that there are discrepancies about the time of the occurrence and that it is not established on the record as to which S.L.R. was issued to him. The alleged recovery of the weapon, allegedly issued to the petitioner, is also doubtful. It has further been pleaded by the petitioner that the Court (General Court Martial) has based the findings on conjectures etc. His pre and post confirmation appeal has been wrongly rejected by the concerned authorities.

    5. With the above main allegations, the petitioner has filed the present petition through his wife Smt. Anita Pundir.

    6. Notice of the petition was given to the respondents, who filed the written statement and denied the allegations. According to the respondents, present writ petition was not maintainable as the statutory petitions under Section 164(1) and (2) of the Army Act submitted by the petitioner had already been duly considered and rejected, especially when the High Court was always reluctant in interfering with the findings of the General Court Martial and that the High Court could not appraise the evidence led by the parties before the Court in exercising the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. On merits the stand of the respondents is that the petitioner was tried and convicted by the General Court Martial, convened under Army Act for an offence committed under Section 69 of the Army Act read with Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. The petitioner was awarded sentence of life imprisonment and dismissed from service by the General Court Martial. The allegations of the petitioner with regard to unfair trial etc. are baseless and mala fide as the General Court Martial was conducted strictly as per army act and the rules made thereunder and the Court after affording all the opportunities to the petitioner to defend himself has found him guilty of the charges based on legal and cogent evidence on record and sentenced him keeping in view the gravity of the offence and the interest of maintenance of discipline in the Army. The pre and post confirmation petitions against the finding and sentence were rejected by the competent authorities after full application of mind and consideration of the case. It has also been submitted by the respondents that the petitioner did not serve to the satisfaction of his superiors. During his service in the regiment, he has been previously sentenced on 14th June, 1992 to suffer three months rigorous imprisonment in Military Custody for an offence of desertion. The petitioner showed lack of discipline.

    7. The petitioner was detailed for guard duty at the ration store area of 388 Coy Supply ASC (located at Kandrori) on 17th April, 1994 from 8 P.M. to 10 P.M. Naib Risaldar Dharampal Singh of 46 Armoured Regiment, the JCO incharge of the guard died at about 10 P.M. on 17th April, 1994 due to gun shot wound in the head, at `Bhoot Bangla' located in the premises of 388 Coy Supply, Kandrori. The petitioner was found absconding immediately after the firing incident resulting in the death of Naib Risaldar Dharampal Singh. The General Court Martial after appraisal of the entire evidence on record had returned the finding of guilt against the petitioner after affording full opportunity to him to defend himself. The charge against the petitioner was heard by the Commanding Officer in the presence of the petitioner and three independent witnesses wherein the petitioner was afforded full opportunity to cross- examine the prosecution witnesses, to make a statement in his defence and to examine his defence witnesses. Having been satisfied that there was prima facie case existed against the petitioner, the Commanding Officer ordered recording of summary of evidence against the petitioner. During summary of evidence also the petitioner was afforded full opportunity to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses, to make a statement and to examine his defence witnesses. Thereafter the petitioner was duly tried by a General Court Martial as per army act and rules made thereunder. During the trial, the prosecution examined 28 witnesses in support of the charge and the petitioner, who was represented by a defence counsel cross-examined all of them at length. The petitioner also made an unsworn statement at the trial and declined to examine any defence witness. The General Court Martial after appraisal of the entire evidence on record found the petitioner guilty of the charge. The finding of the General Court Martial is based on reliable, legal and cogent evidence on record. The pre-confirmation petition submitted by the petitioner was examined in detail by the competent authority, who after considering the issues raised therein had rejected the same being devoid of any merit. All the documents required to be supplied to the petitioner before and after the trial were supplied to him. The petitioner is not entitled to the proceedings under Army Rule 22 and pre-trial report and the same are not required to be handed over to him. Finally it has been submitted by the respondents by denying the main averments of the writ petition, that it is without any force and it may be dismissed.

    8. I have heard Shri B.S. Sehgal, Advocate, appearing on behalf of the petitioner and Shri D.D. Sharma, Advocate, appearing on behalf of the respondents and with their assistance have gone through the record of this case.

    9. Before I deal with the arguments raised by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties, I may refer to the citation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported as Union of India and others v. Major A. Hussain, 1998(1) RCR(Crl.) 300 : AIR 1998 Supreme Court 577 , wherein their Lordships of the Supreme Court have highlighted the powers of the High Court while raising the case of a Court Martial. It has been laid down therein that "though court- martial proceedings are subject to judicial review by the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution, the court-martial is not subject to the superintendence of the High Court under Art. 227 of the Constitution. If a court-martial has been properly convened and there is no challenge to its composition and the proceedings are in accordance with the procedure prescribed, the High Court or for that matter any Court must stay its hands. Proceedings of a court-martial are not to be compared with the proceedings in a criminal Court under the Code of Criminal Procedure where adjournments have become a matter of routine though that is also against the provisions of law." The Hon'ble Supreme Court further held, "It has been rightly said that court- martial remains to a significant degree, a specialised part of overall mechanism by which the military discipline is preserved. It is for the special need for the Armed Forces that a person subject to Army Act is tried by court-martial for an act which is an offence under the Act. Court-martial discharges judicial function and to a great extent is a Court where provisions of evidence act are applicable. A court-martial has also the same responsibility as any court to protect the rights of the accused charged before it and to follow the procedural safeguards." Finally it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, "When there is sufficient evidence to sustain conviction, it is unnecessary to examine, if pre-trial investigation was adequate or not. Requirement of proper and adequate investigation is not jurisdictional and any violation thereof does not invalidate the court-martial unless it is shown that accused has been prejudiced or a mandatory provision has been violated." Present case will be looked into in the light of the observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

    10. Mr. B.S. Sehgal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, advanced only argument to the effect that the mandatory provisions of Rule 22 of the Army Rules had been violated when the petitioner was deprived of the findings of the pre-trial stage and in these circumstances the entire trial before the General Court Martial was without jurisdiction and was violative of the provisions of the Army Act.

    11. On the contrary it was submitted by Shri D.D. Sharma, Advocate, appearing on behalf of the respondents, that the Army Authorities had complied will all the provisions before conducting the General Court Martial. The representations made by the petitioner under Section 164(1)(2) were also considered and duly disposed of as per procedure.

    12. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, I am of the considered opinion that the petitioner has no case and the submissions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner are totally devoid of any merit. Rule 33 of the Army Rules, 1954 deals with the preparation for defence by the accused and it has given some rights to the accused to prepare his defence. According to Rule 33(1), correspondence between the accused and his legal advisers shall not be liable to be censured. The accused shall inform his Commanding Officer of the names of such advisers and shall also inform him of any distinctive marks that such correspondence will bear. According to sub- rule (2) of Rule 33, the accused person shall have the right to interview any witness whom he may wish to call in his defence. Sub-rule 7 of Rule 33 is of some importance. According to this rule,

    "As soon as practicable after an accused has been remanded for trial by a general or district court-martial, and in any case not less than ninety-six hours or on active service twenty-four hours before his trial, an officer shall give to him free of charge a copy of the summary of evidence, an abstract of the evidence, and explain to him his rights under these rules as to preparing his defence and being assisted or represented at the trial, and shall ask him to state in writing whether or not he wishes to have an officer assigned by the convening officer to represent him at the trial, if a suitable officer should be available. ..."
    Rule 34 has also been incorporated for the benefit of the accused, who has a right to be informed of every charge for which he is to be tried. The accused has the right to give names of the witnesses, whom he desires to examine in defence.

    13. Rule 22 deals with the hearing of the charge at the state of investigation of charges and remand for trial power of Commanding Officers. As per sub-rule (1) of Rule 22,

    "Every charge against a person subject to the Act shall be heard by the Commanding Officer in the presence of the accused. The accused shall have full liberty to cross-examine any witness against him, and to call such witness and make such statement as may be necessary for his defence."
    Annexure P1 is the charge-sheet, which was given to the petitioner. A reading of this document clearly indicates that the petitioner was charged of committing a civil offence, that is to say murder, contrary to Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, on 17th April, 1994, when he allegedly intentionally caused the death of Naib Risaldar Shri Dharampal of the same unit. Thus it can be said that the petitioner was informed and was supplied a copy of the charge-sheet. It has been clearly stated by the respondents in the written statement that the petitioner was afforded full opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses etc. Even a reading of the present petition would show that the petitioner has not specifically alleged about the violation of Rule 21. Even in the pre-confirmation stage under Section 164 of the Army Act, he has not raised this issue, as is evident from Annexure P5, i.e., Pre-Confirmation Appeal. Annexure P9 is a document addressed to the counsel for the petitioner. A reading of the above would show that a request was made by the petitioner for supplying some documents pertaining to pre/post General Court Martial in respect of the present offence. The reply was given by the respondents to the counsel and he was appraised that the desired documents had already been handed over to the petitioner, such as, (a) Court of Inquiry and Exhibits; (b) Rejection order of the competent authority in pre-confirmation petition; (c) Summary of evidence; (d) Additional summary of evidence; and (e) Charge-sheet. So much so the receipt which was obtained from the petitioner was also sent to Shri B.S. Sehgal in response to his notice. This letter clearly indicates that there was no violation of Rule 22, Rule 33 or Rule 34 of the Army Rules.

    14. Now it is to be seen whether the findings of the General Court Martial are based on evidence or the same were without any evidence. I have already quoted the observation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court that this Court is not to sit as a court of appeal, but I have only to see whether the findings passed on the General Court Martial proceedings were, in fact, based on no evidence and that the Court Martial Authorities had acted without jurisdiction or not. Annexure P3 are the findings given by the Presiding Officer of the Court of General Court Martial. It is true that there was no eye-witness to the occurrence but it does not mean that when an offence is on circumstantial evidence, it cannot be proved. If the circumstances collected or relied upon by the prosecution/Investigating Agency are so strong that it talks of only hypothesis that the petitioner has committed the offence, there was no wrong on the part of Court to record the finding of conviction. Annexure P3 would show that the Court scrutinised scrupulously and examined carefully the circumstantial evidence of this case. Firstly, it tried to determine about the death of Risaldar Dharampal Singh to the effect that it took place on 17th April, 1994. In para No. 4 of Annexure P3 the General Court Martial gave as many as 9 strong reasons for coming to the conclusion that it was the petitioner alone who committed the murder of Shri Dharampal Singh, Risaldar. These findings are based on evidence. Sufficiency of evidence is not to be seen by the High Court in the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. At the cost of repetition I would like to incorporate the findings of the Court, which are to the following effect :-

    (a) That No. 1082756 A SWR Dhir Singh Pundir of 46 Armed Regt was detailed to perform guard duties from 2000 hrs to 2200 hrs at ration stores area of 388 Coy ASC Supply on 17 April 94. This fact has been admitted by the accused and there is no dispute on this issue. There is also adequate evidence on record to that effect.

    (b) That the accused was issued in the evening of 17 April 94, a 7.62 mm SLR bearing Registration No. CX-4792 and Butt No. 21 and five live rounds of ammunition for performance of duty. It has come in the evidence of LD Virpal Singh (PW-27) that he had issued a 7.62 mm SLR bearing Registration No. CX- 4792, Butt No. 21 and five live rounds of ammunition to the accused in the evening of 17 April 94. It has also come in the evidence of prosecution witnesses that the weapon which they had taken from their parent unit in their name, used to be the one which was issued to them for performance of guard duties at 388 Copy ASC Supply. The accused had been issued a 7.62 mm SLR Registration No. C-4792, Butt No. 21 from 46 Armd Regt on 01 April 94 is not in dispute in view of the deposition of LD Robidas KS (PW-12) Exhibit `FF' and the answer of the accused to the question by the Court. In Exhibit `GG' also the accused's signature has been identified by LD Virpal Singh (PW-27) for withdrawal of the said SLR and ammunition. The accused has also answered to a question by the court that on 17 April 94 he was issued with a 7.62 mm SLR bearing Butt No. 21 and five live rounds of ammunition. However, in the statement of the accused, the accused claimed that he was issued with a SLR with Butt No. 141 on 17 April 94, and that Exhibit `GG' is not the true photostat copy of the entries of 17 April 94 of the Arms Issue Register of attached guard personnel, but is a photostat copy of a forged document.

    After weighing the above issues objectively the court is fully convinced that Exhibit `GG' is not a photostat of a forged documents as overwriting exists in the column of Bult No. against the name of the accused, which would not have existed had it been a forgery prepared deliberately to fix the blame on the accused. Also the signature of the accused exists in Exhibits `GG'. The defence claim that Exhibit `GG' is a photostat of a forged document is an afterthought as at the time of producing it before the Court, the defence did not object to its production. Moreover concurrence of so many personnel from different units for forging the said documents is ruled out. It is unfortunate that the original Register has not been produced and that the maintenance of the said Register by the inexperienced Kote NCO LD Virpal Singh (PW-27) was not upto the standard required for an Arms Issue Register. It is a sad commentary that neither the said Register nor issue of arms and ammunition was checked/supervised by the Kote NCO's superiors. In view of the unequivocal deposition of PWs as stated above, Exhibit `FF', Exhibit `GG' and the answer given by the accused to a question by the Court, it is proved beyond any doubt that the accused was issued with a 7.62 mm SLR bearing Registration No. C-4792, and Butt No. 21 along with five live rounds of ammunition on 17 April 1994. The Court is satisfied from the evidence on record that Registration No. C-4792 in Exhibit `GG' and the said number pertains to one and the same rifle i.e. Butt No. 21 as reflected in Exhibit `FF'.

    (c) That on hearing firing sound at about 2145 hrs on 17 April 94, Sep Ram Singh (PW-13), Swr Satyavir Yadav (PW-4) and Shri Nahar Singh (PW-5) shouted and called for the accused, but the accused did not respond to their calls. The accused in his answer to the Court has stated that since he did not hear the calls, he did not respond. This circumstance of the accused not responding to the calls has been adequately corroborated by Sep Ram Singh (PW-13) and Swr Satyavir Yadav (PW-4). This circumstance indicates clearly that the accused was not present anywhere nearby, or intentionally did not respond to the calls for reasons best known to the accused.

    (d) It has come in the evidence of prosecution witnesses that the accused was missing along with his 7.62 mm SLR and five rounds of ammunition during and after the fall-in conducted after the incident. The Defence also has not disputed this fact that there is enough corroborating evidence on record to this effect.

    (e) It has come in the evidence of prosecution witnesses that accused had illegally absconded from duty after the incident having abandoned his 7.62 mm SLR and five rounds of ammunition. The accused has also not disputed this fact. However, the accused has stated that he absconded from his place of duty due to disillusionment of Army service, mental tensions of problems at his home, and he having been denied leave by Unit authorities. He also states that he had pre-planned that he would become absent without leave (AWL) in light of the circumstances and the conduct of human beings this statement does not inspire any confidence, let alone create any doubt in the mind of the court due to the facts that if the claim of the accused that he had pre- planned to be AWL is true, then he had ample opportunity and convenience to do so during day time and when not on duty or when not in possession of such an important item as a weapon with ammunition. The accused has not brought on record any compelling reasons to abscond during that particular point of time knowing fully well that firing incident had occurred and there being a lot of commotion at the main gate. Further not rejoining the Unit voluntarily and arrest by Punjab Police after a lapse of about 45 days, being the statement of the accused that he absented without leave due to the reasons stated by him.

    It has come in the evidence of Ris Bahadur Singh (PW-18) that the missing SLR was found by his search party in the bushes near old bath room area, in ration stores area, which SLR the Civil Police seized from the said place. Search for the said SLR was carried on from the night of 17/18 Apr 94 and its recovery in the morning of 18 Apr 94 has been corroborated by many prosecution witnesses. When viewed in the light of the above, the statement of the accused that he had left his SLR and five rounds of ammunition on his cot is neither believable nor true. From the evidence on record the defence contention that two persons, i.e, Ris Bahadur Singh and ASI Kashmiri Lal (PW- 19) had recovered the said SLR is incorrect. Both Army and Civil Police personnel had carried on the search, however, it was ASI Kashmiri Lal who had seized the SLR.

    (f) It has come in the evidence of Dfr Bachu Singh (PW3) that he had recovered five empty 7.62 mm fired cases from outside the window of the room of the deceased in the night of 17/18 Apr 94 and that he had handed them over to CBM S Jayakode (PW-23). This has been corroborated by the deposition of CBM S Jayakode (PW-23). The said fired cases, after being shown to Sub Maj PVC Kutty and Lt Col CA Chawade were handed over by CBM S Jayakode (PW-23) to LD Virpal Singh (PW-27) who kept them in the Kote of attached guard personnel for the night. The next morning i.e. on 18 Apr 94, LD Virpal Singh (PW-27) handed over the said fired cases to Civil Police through Ris Rama Shankar Singh (PW- 28). The deposition of ASI Kashmiri Lal that he recovered five fired cases outside the window of the room of the deceased after 0400 hrs on 18 April 94 is unbelievable, as his statement is totally uncorroborated, whereas on the other hand the recovery and movement of the said recovered fire cases are so linked and complete in its chain as deposed and adequately corroborated by PW-3, PW-23, PW-16, PW-27 and PW-28. In view of the above, the defence contention that a total of 15 empty fired cases had been recovered in unsustainable, more so when all other ammunition of attached guard personnel and that of 388 Coy ASC Supply were checked and found correct. LD Virpal Singh (PW-27) has stated that no empty fire cases other than the said recovered once given to him by CBM S Jayakode (PW-23) existed in the Kote of attached guard personnel. Lt Col CA Chawade (PW-16) has stated that ammunition magazine of 388 Coy ASC Supply was not opened at all either on 17 or 18 April 94. The above evidence conclusively rules out any replacement/tampering of the said five recovered empty fired cases.

    (g) It has come in the evidence of Dr. S.N. Sharma (PW-22) that the five fired empty cases marked `C-1' to `C-5' (ME-2) by him had been fired from 7.62 mm SLR bearing Registration No. C-4792 (ME-1). The said recovered fired cases had been packed and sealed by ASI Kashmiri Lal (PW-19) on 18 April 94 and handed over them at the Malkhana of Police Station Sadar, Pathankot, the same day rules out the possibility of tampering with the said material exhibits even though there was delay on the part of civil police personnel to despatch the recovered SLR to C.F.S.L. Chandigarh. However, it is pertinent to note that the seal was checked with sample seals forwarded and found correct by Dr. S.N. Sharma at C.F.S.L. Chandigarh. In view of the above and the scientific accuracy of the said ballistic examination of Dr. S.N. Sharma it is proved beyond doubt that the five recovered 7.62 mm empty fired cases had been fired from 7.62 mm SLR bearing Registration No. C-4762 which was issued to the accused on 17 April 94."

    A reading of the above findings would show that the authorities of the General Court Martial (sic) produced before them. All the pros and cons of the case, including the defence of the petitioner were taken note of and thereafter the finding of guilt was returned.

    15. Finally in para 5 of the report the authorities came to the conclusion that the prosecution has been able to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the petitioner was issued with a 7.62 mm. SLR bearing Butt No. 21, Registration No. C-4792 along with five rounds of live ammunition on 17 April 94 and these have been used in the commission of the offence and that the accused had been in possession of the said SLR at that point of time, as also the accused had crossed over the barbed wire fencing and perpetrated the crime charged against him and absconded abandoning his weapon to avoid apprehension with evidence on his person. Lack of apparent motive does not absolve the guilt of the accused when all other circumstances clearly and decisively bring out the guilt. It was also observed that lack of apparent motive does not absolve the guilt of the petitioner when all other circumstances clearly and decisively bring out his guilt.

    16. Finally it was remarked by the General Court Martial authorities that the prosecution has been able to prove the charge by leading evidence which conclusively establishes his guilt. After scanning through this finding it can be said that it was a case of no evidence. Sufficiency or insufficiency of evidence is not supposed to be seen by the High Court.

    17. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon Subedar Mewa Singh v. Union of India, 1998(1) RCR 206 . This citation is not helpful to the counsel. In the cited case, the army personnel, who was charged of an offence of bribery, made a request to engage a civil lawyer and this request was accepted by the authorities, but was not conveyed to the General Court Martial or to the accused. As a result thereof, the accused could not engage a civil lawyer for his defence. The Delhi High Court in this situation held that keeping in view the gravity of the charge, the findings of the General Court Martial could not be sustained and directions were given to it to re-assemble and benefit of a civil lawyer be provided to the accused. In the present case the petitioner was given a lawyer, who cross-examined the witnesses etc. The counsel for the petitioner also relied upon another authority of the Delhi High Court reported as Lance Dafedar Laxman Singh v. Union of India and others, 1993(1) RCR 357 , and submitted that the compliance of Rule 22 of the Army Rules if mandatory. So far as the legal proposition is concerned, there is no quarrel, but in the present case the petitioner was served with a charge-sheet. He was supplied with the findings of the Commanding Officer. Moreover it is not shown at all by the petitioner in what manner that alleged prejudice occurred to him.

    18. Net result is that the present petition is totally devoid of any merit and the same is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs.

    Appeal dismissed.

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    Dhir Singh Pundir v. Union Of India
    (Aug 10, 1998)