M.S. Liberhan, J. - The plaintiff was recruited as a Constable in 1957. It is averred that the plaintiff proceeded on leave on 27.2.1973 and he was to report back on duty on 10.3.1973, but he could not do so as he was ill and remained as such till 25.6.1973. Plaintiff was charged for remaining absent from duty and was dismissed after enquiry. He claimed that it was not a case of absence from duty but over-stay on leave. 2. The plaintiff challenged the order of dismissal in the suit for declaration on ground that the order was void. It was averred that neitherenquiry was conducted according to the Police Rules nor was he given a proper and reasonable opportunity to defend, cross-examine and lead evidence; copies of documents relied upon were not supplied. The allegations did not disclose any misconduct. Order passed is non-speaking and punishing authority did not apply its mind to the facts of the case inasmuch as it was not a case of gravest act of misconduct in terms of Rule 16.2(1) of the Punjab Police Rules. The plaintiff could not have been dismissed from service for the act attributed. The punishing authority did not apply its mind before passing the impugned order of dismissal. The defendant controverted the allegations and challenged the maintainability of the suit. On the pleading of the parties' the trial Court framed the following issues :- 1. Whether the suit is not maintainable in the present form ? OPD 2. Whether the impugned order dated 27.9.1973 by the Commandant 75 Battalion P.A.P. Jullundur Cantt is illegal, void etc. as alleged ? OPP 3. Relief. 3. The trial Court came to the conclusion that the suit was maintainable but the order terminating the services of the plaintiff was valid, thus, dismissed the suit. The respondent challenged the judgment of the trial Court in appeal, which was accepted and the lower appellate Court came to the conclusion that the order terminating the services was bad because it was non-speaking order as well as the punishing authority had not complied with Rules 16.2(1) of the Punjab Police Rules inasmuch as the dismissal order could be passed only for the gravest act of misconduct or the cumulative effect of continued misconduct and complete unfitness for police service. In making such indictment one has to keep regard with respect to length of service of the offender and his claim to pension, and relying upon Gurdev Singh v. The State of Haryana and others, 1976(2) SLR 448, it came to the conclusion that the punishing authority was not alive to the said rule. Resultantly, the order of dismissal was bad. The judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court has been impugned by the state of Punjab in this Regular Second Appeal. 4. The only controversy raised is that the absence from duty is the gravest act of misconduct and in a disciplined force if a person remains absent from duty without leave, he deserves no leniency and order of dismissal is the proper order to which the punishing authority was alive which passed the impugned order of dismissal. For the said contention, the learned counsel for the appellant relied upon The State of Haryana and others v. Gurdev Singh, 1984(3) SLR 180. 5. The punishing authority came to the conclusion after show-cause notice and enquiry that the respondent remained absent on expiry of his leave. In my opinion, it does not constitute gravest act of misconduct inasmuch as it is not a case where a person remained absent from duty, it may be a case for over-stay on leave and in order to constitute the gravest act of misconduct resulting in the punishment of removal something more than this is required. Admittedly in the judgment cited by the learned counsel for the appellant reported in Gurdev Singh's case (supra), the Hon'ble Division Bench came to the conclusion on facts that the person was found in a drunken condition on duty and the Enquiry Officer after going into the evidence came to the conclusion in a 17 pages order that he was guilty of the gravest act of misconduct. 6. In the present case, Exhibit P-1, order of dismissal, is a non-speaking order. From this order, it can be inferred at all that the punishing authority was alive to the inbuilt ingredients in the Rule 16.2(1) of the Punjab Police Rules for awarding punishment of dismissal. Undisputedly the Court should not interfere with regard to the quantum of punishment with respect to a person or Police officer found guilty of dereliction of duty. The Courts have jurisdiction only to interfere where the punishment or the action has been taken unilaterally or arbitrarily. In view of my observation that the punishing authority was not alive to the ingredients, i.e. while awarding the punishment in terms of Rule 16.2(1) of the Punjab Police Rule, it has to be satisfied that the act attributed is one of the gravest acts of misconduct or the cumulative effect of continued misconduct resulting in his becoming complete unfit for police service. While making such an assessment or awarding punishment of dismissal, the punishing authority should also keep in view the length of service of the delinquent and his claim to pension. Here admittedly none of these things was taken into consideration. A reading of Exhibit P-1 makes it obvious that punishing authority was not alive to the situation at all. 7. Further the learned counsel for the appellant has made feeble attempt to contend that the order of dismissal stating that the period of absence shall count as leave without pay does not amount to condonation of the absence and it does not waive off the dereliction of duty committed by the delinquent. 8. Counsel for the respondents contends that it amounts to regularising the absence and only charge against the respondent being that he was absent from duty without leave, the charge is knocked out at its basis. He, in order to support his contention relied upon Tito Francisco Pereira v. Administrator of Goa Daman and Diu and others, 1978 SLJ 614; G. Papaiah v. Assistant Director, Medical Services Secunderabad, AIR 1976 Andhra Pradesh 75 and Bhursinh Hamsinh Rajput v. The State of Gujarat and another, SLJ 697. The consensus of the decision in the precedents relied upon by the respondent is that once the period of absence is treated as leave of any kind whatsoever, the fact that the delinquent remained absent no more survives. The charge of absence from duty cannot be sustained after the person has been treated on leave of whatsoever kind it may be, as admittedly in the case in hand the absence was treated as leave without pay and it amounted to as if there was no break in service. The counsel for the appellant only contends that the above precedents do not lay down the correct law as no reason has been pointed out for the same. In view of my above observations, I find force in the contention raised by the counsel for the respondent. In view of the observations made by the punishing authority in the order of dismissal that the period of absence shall be counted as leave without pay amounts to regularising the absence and as such the charge of absence no more survives. 9. In view of my above observations, I find no force in this appeal and the same is dismissed with no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.