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  • Section 15(5) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as `the Act').
  • Section 13(3)(a)(i)(a)(b)
  • Section 13(3)(a)(iv)(a)
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citation codes
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  • Section 15(5) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as `the Act').
  • Section 13(3)(a)(i)(a)(b)
  • Section 13(3)(a)(iv)(a)
Smart Summary

Written Summary of the Opinion (Gokal Chand Mital, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

Chetan Dass Gupta has been a tenant of the residential house in dispute at a monthly rent of Rs. 41.50 since the time of its previous owner, Ishwar Chand. After Ishwar Chand's death, his son Narinder Nath Gupta filed an ejectment application; the tenant tendered rent up to 31.10.1977. By registered sale deed dated 29.3.1978 Narinder Nath and his brother sold the entire house to Smt. Sushila Devi for Rs. 20,000/-, and Smt. Sushila Devi (the present landlady) thereafter filed an ejectment petition on 4.10.1978 claiming ejectment on the ground of personal necessity (paras. 6–9 of the petition were reproduced in the record).

The tenant contested the petition, alleging the sale deed was a fictitious transaction and that the landlady already had separate accommodation sufficient for her needs (more than nine rooms in an area exceeding 400 sq. yards). The Rent Controller, by order dated 27.5.1980, held that the applicant required the disputed premises for bona fide use and occupation of her son Subhash Kumar. The Appellate Authority dismissed the tenant's appeal by order dated 19.3.1981, upholding eviction.

The tenant filed the present revision under Section 15(5) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1959 (the Act). The High Court (Gokal Chand Mital, J.) heard the revision petition and rendered the opinion summarized below.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, under Section 13(3)(a)(iv) of the Act, an order of eviction can be sustained for the residence of a landlord's married son when that son is already occupying a residential building in the same urban area.
  2. Whether the two conditions in Section 13(3)(a)(iv) — (a) that the son should not be occupying any other building for residence in the urban area concerned, and (b) that the son should not have vacated such a building without sufficient cause after the commencement of the Act — were pleaded and proved in the ejectment petition.
  3. Whether this Court, in revision under Section 15(5), can examine the legality and propriety of orders of eviction to determine if they were passed on any of the grounds contained in the Act (i.e., whether findings of fact by lower courts may be revisited where the statutory requirements for eviction were not complied with).

Arguments of the Parties

Tenant's Arguments

  • The sale deed transferring the property to Smt. Sushila Devi was a fictitious transaction, executed as a device to obtain the tenant's ejectment; the tenant alleged the landlady was one of eight heirs of Ishwar Chand and that the transaction was unauthentic.
  • The landlady and her husband already had separate accommodation sufficient for their needs (allegedly more than nine rooms and over 400 sq. yards), so the claimed shortage of accommodation was denied.
  • It was denied that Subhash Kumar had been compelled to live separately due to a shortage of accommodation; instead it was pleaded he had separated of his own accord about two or three years earlier.
  • The tenant had tendered rent up to 31.10.1977 (relevant to tenancy status and conduct).

Landlady's (Applicant's) Arguments

  • The landlady pleaded in paras. 6–9 of the ejectment petition that she required the premises for personal use because the accommodation where she resided with her husband and family was insufficient; she asserted the house in dispute was required for the residence of her married son, Subhash Kumar.
  • The petition averred that the landlady was not occupying any other premises in her own right within the Patiala Municipal Committee area, and that her son Subhash Kumar was residing as a tenant in another house (at Anar Dana Chowk), implying the need for additional accommodation.
  • At argument Shri H.L. Sarin, for the landlady, urged that the findings of fact recorded by the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority were binding on this Court.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded by focusing on statutory requirements and the facts admitted on the record:

  1. Statutory framework: The Court relied on Section 13(3)(a)(iv) of the Act, which permits an eviction order for the residence of a married son, but only subject to two conditions expressly contained in clauses (a) and (b) — namely that the son must not be occupying another residential building in the urban area concerned and must not have vacated such premises without sufficient cause after commencement of the Act. The Court emphasized that these matters must be pleaded and proved.
  2. Admitted fact undermining eviction ground: It was an admitted fact that Subhash Kumar, the married son, was living with his wife and children in a rented house in the same urban area. Because the son was occupying another residential premises in the urban area, the statutory condition in clause (a) was not satisfied on the record.
  3. Deficiencies in pleadings and proof: The ejectment petition did not plead that the rented house occupied by the son was insufficient for his needs, nor did it plead or provide proof that the son had vacated prior accommodation without sufficient cause. The Court noted that the son's own examination-in-chief did not state that his rented accommodation was insufficient.
  4. Failure of lower courts to apply statutory test: Both the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority failed to advert to the two statutory conditions required by Section 13(3)(a)(iv). Because those statutory preconditions were not considered or established, the lower courts' eviction orders were held to be legally erroneous.
  5. Other factual points the Court rejected as insufficient: The Rent Controller relied on the fact that the landlord of Subhash Kumar had issued a notice to vacate; the High Court found that the mere issue of such a notice — without actual eviction proceedings or an order against Subhash Kumar (which had been pending for over four years and three months without result) — did not constitute a proper ground to infer a reasonable threat of eviction justifying displacement of the present tenant.
  6. Bona fides of the petition questioned: The Court observed documentary indications (an oral family partition recited in Exhibit A.1 and the subsequent sale deed) that suggested the partition and sale may have been devices to secure eviction on the ground of personal necessity; the Court found that the eviction petition did not appear bona fide on the record.
  7. Revisional jurisdiction and legal error: While accepting that factual findings of lower courts are ordinarily binding, the Court held that under Section 15(5) it may examine whether the eviction order was passed on any of the statutory grounds. Given the legal infirmity (failure to satisfy and/or plead the statutory conditions), the Court concluded that it had jurisdiction to interfere and to set aside the orders of the two courts below.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

REVISION PETITION ALLOWED; THE ORDERS OF THE TWO COURTS BELOW ARE SET ASIDE; THE EVICTION PETITION IS DISMISSED WITH COSTS THROUGHOUT.

The Court awarded costs and fixed the counsel fee in this Court at Rs. 100.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on parties: The tenant (Chetan Dass Gupta) remains in possession of the disputed residential house; the eviction order previously made by the Rent Controller and affirmed by the Appellate Authority is quashed.
  • Reason for decision: The dismissal rests on the statutory deficiency — the landlady did not plead or prove the two statutory conditions in Section 13(3)(a)(iv) (that the married son did not occupy another residential building in the same urban area and had not vacated such a building without sufficient cause after commencement of the Act). Because those conditions were not established, the ground relied upon for eviction was not attracted.
  • Broader precedent: The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel legal rule beyond applying the statutory requirements; it reverses the lower courts' orders for failure to meet the prerequisites in the Act. The Court expressly relied on the proposition that the ingredients of the relevant subsections of Section 13(3) must be pleaded and proved. The opinion does not announce any broader precedent beyond the statutory interpretation applied to the facts here.

Petition allowed. Counsel fee in this Court fixed at Rs. 100/-. (Order dated as recorded in the opinion.)

    Chetan Dass Gupta v. Sushila Devi

    Gokal Chand Mital, J. - Chetan Dass Gupta has been occupying the residential house in dispute as a tenant at a monthly rent of Rs. 41.50 since the time of its previous owners. Originally, the house was owned by Ishwar Chand. After the death of Ishwar Chand, Narinder Nath Gupta son of Ishwar Chand filed an ejectment application against the tenant in which the tenant tendered the rent upto 31.10.1977. Vide registered sale deed dated 29.3.1978, Narinder Nath and his brother sold the entire house to Smt. Sushila Devi for Rs. 20,000/-. She thus became the landlord and filed ejectment petition on 4.10.1978 claiming ejectment of the tenant on the ground of personal necessity. The exact averments in this behalf are contained in paras 6 to 9 of the petition, which are reproduced below. "6. That the petitioners require the premises in question for her personal use and occupation as the accommodation with her in the present house where she is residing is not sufficient for her needs. 7. The petitioner is presently residing in the house which belongs to her husband and there she, her husband and her son alongwith his family members are residing. Due to shortage of accommodation the other son of the petitioner, namely, Subhash Kumar had to be sent to a house which she had taken on rent situated near Anar Dana Chowk, Patiala, where he is living with his wife and children. This house in question is also required by the petitioner for the residence of his married son Subhash Kumar. 8. That the petitioner is not occupying any other premises within the area of Municipal Committee, Patiala, in his own right nor her son is occupying any house within the area of Patiala Municipal Committee is his own right. Subhash Kumar is residing as a tenant in a house situated in Anardana Chowk, Patiala and the petitioner is residing in the house belonging to her husband. 9. That the petitioner or her son Subhash Kumar has not vacated any premises within the area of Patiala Municipal Committee after the commencement of the said Act without sufficient cause. Subhash Kumar earlier to taking on rent premises situated in Anar Dana Chowk, Patiala, was residing with his father in the house owned by the father situated in Mohalla Soot Battan, Patiala." 2. The tenant contested the application and pleaded that the applicant was the daughter of Ishwar Chand, deceased landlord, and after his death, she was one of the owners along with other 7 heirs of Ishwar Chand and the sale deed, if any, was a fictitious transaction and was got executed as a device to seek his ejectment. In reply to paras 6 to 9 it was pleaded that the applicant and her husband had already in their possession separate accommodation which was more than sufficient for their living, which consisted of more than nine rooms in an area of more than 400 sq. yards. It was denied that due to shortage of accommodation Subhash Kumar son of the applicant was, living separately. On the other hand, it was pleaded that he separated from his father about 2/3 years ago and is living separately of his own accord. The Rent Controller by order dated 27.5.1980 came to the conclusion that the landlord needed the premises in dispute that the house already in occupation of the landlady, her husband and second son was not sufficient to accommodate the third son, namely, Subhash Kumar and, therefore, the house in dispute was needed for the residence of the third son and his family. The conclusion was recorded in para 14 of the judgment, as follows : "14. In view of the above discussion, I hold that the applicant requires the disputed premises for bona fide use and occupation of her son." The tenant felt aggrieved and took the matter to the Appellate Authority and the learned Appellate Authority dismissed the appeal vide order dated 19.3.1981 and upheld the order of eviction. The tenant has come to this Court in this revision petition under Section 15(5) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as `the Act'). 3. The admitted facts of the case are that Subhash Kumar, third son of the landlady, is living in the same urban area along with his wife and children in a rented house. Section 13(3)(a)(iv) of the Act does provide that the order of eviction can be obtained for the residence of her son, who is married, but it is subject to two conditions which have been mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) which provide that he should not be occupying in the urban area concerned any other building for residence, and the son should not have vacated such a building without sufficient cause after the commencement of the Act in the urban area concerned. In the ejectment petition, it was not pleaded that the rented house in occupation of the son was not sufficient for his residence. Therefore, if the son was occupying another residential premises in the urban area concerned, another house could not be got vacated for his residence. The aforesaid position of law will have to be kept in view while deciding this case. It is important to notice here that the Courts below did not advert to the aforesaid two matters while deciding this case. Therefore, it will be open to this Court even the revisional jurisdiction to see to the legality and propriety of the order passed by the Court below. 4. According to the legal position enunciated above, a landlord will have to plead that his married son is not occupying any residential premises in the urban area concerned besides pleading the other matters before an order of ejectment can be obtained. In the present case, this was not so done. On the other hand, it was admitted that he was living in a rented house. If the accommodation with her son was not sufficient, yet it was open to the landlady to plead that the accommodation with her son was sufficient for his residence and he would not be covered by exception (a) because what is meant by exception (a) is that there must be a reasonable accommodation in occupation of the married son. In this behalf, there is no plea on the record muchless the proof. The relevant part in the examination-in-chief of Subhash Kumar, who appeared as A.W.4, is as follows : "I left my residence with my father due to shortage of accommodation in that house. The house in dispute is sustained at a distance of 100/150 yards from the house of my father and is about 4 furlongs from the house on rent with me. There is no accommodation for my brother and sister to visit their families to my father's house. There is no accommodation for me in the house of my father." 5. Therefore, in his own statement also, he does not say that the house in his occupation as a tenant is insufficient for his need. Hence, I am clearly of the view that both the Courts below fell in grave error of law in not keeping the relevant provisions of the statute in view before entering into the facts of the case. Accordingly, the eviction order passed by the two Courts below is clearly erroneous in law being against the provisions of the statute and cannot be upheld. 6. The Court below has observed in its order that the landlord of Subhash Kumar had issued notice to him to vacate the premises and threatened to launch eviction proceedings against him. That by itself is no ground to order eviction of the tenant. It is not disputed that the ejectment proceedings from its beginning till today, have remained pending for four years and three months and yet neither any proceedings have been taken by the landlord of Subhash Kumar, nor any ejectment order has been passed against him. Therefore, merely issue of a notice to seek eviction would be no good ground to hold that he had a threat of eviction and, therefore, needed the premises to live in. 7. While the Rent Controller merely ordered eviction on the ground of personal necessity of the married son Subhash Kumar, there is some mention in the order of the Appellate Authority that if the landlady owns a house and is living in the house owned by her husband, yet she can in law have her house vacated for her residence. There is no quarrel with the proposition, but in the present case, she has not come to Court to seek eviction to live in the house in dispute by herself and separate from her husband. She never set up a case that she was wanting to live separate from her husband. In fact the entire reading of the ejectment petition shows that she wanted to have the house vacated for the residence of her married son, Subhash Kumar so that she could live also with him. 8. Admittedly, the house in dispute was owned by Ishwar Chand and in the absence of a Will, it would be inherited by his 8 legal representatives including Smt. Sushila Devi, who has filed the present eviction petition. On the record, document Exhibit A.1 has been produced, which is a copy of the memorandum of petition dated 14.10.1973, wherein it was recited that the property was divided orally about a month back and since the five daughters of Ishwar Chand were married so they did not get any share out of immovable properties and in the oral petition, and immovable property fell to the share of Narinder Nath Gupta, one of the sons of Ishwar Chand, who later on transfered the same to his sister Smt. Sushila Devi, the present landlady. The sale has been challenged by the tenant to be a sham transaction. Without going to any further detail in this matter, it is clear to the naked eye that the alleged oral family partition, the written memorandum of partition Exhibit A.1 and the sale deed between the brothers and sisters, did culminate in a device to seek eviction of the tenant on the ground of personal necessity, with effect has also failed in this Court. The eviction petition does not seems to be bona fide at all. 9. Shri H.L. Sarin, appearing for the landlady, seriously urged that the finding of fact recorded by the two Courts below was binding on this Court. There is no quarrel with the proposition but it is open to this Court under Section 15(5) of the Act to examine whether the ejectment order has been passed on any one of grounds contained in the Act. As already found, the main ground for eviction was to provide residential accommodation to a married son and that was subject to the two conditions that the married son was not occupying any residential house in the same urban area; nor had vacated any such premises without a sufficient cause. Since, he is occupying residential premises in the urban area concerned in his own right as a tenant, the ground for eviction was not attracted and, therefore, the two Courts below clearly exceeded their jurisdiction in ordering the eviction of the tenant. Hence on such a ground of law, this Court has jurisdiction to interfere. The highest Court had ruled that for personal necessity of the landlord, three ingredients contained in Section 13(3)(a)(i)(a)(b) and (c) had to be pleaded and proved. Similarly, if eviction is sought for a married son, the ingredients of Section 13(3)(a)(iv)(a) and (b) will have to be pleaded and proved. Both the Courts below did not keep in view that when a married son is already occupying a residential house in the urban area concerned, then for him another residential premises in the same urban area cannot be provided. On this legal infirmity, the decision of both Courts below is liable to be set aside and the same is hereby set aside. 10. For the recorded above, this revision petition is allowed; the orders of both the Courts below are set aside and the eviction petition is dismissed with costs throughout. Counsel fee in this Court being Rs. 100/-. Petition allowed.

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    Comments

    Chetan Dass Gupta v. Sushila Devi
    (Jan 11, 1983)