Shrimati Ram Piari And Others v. Prem Singh

None of the cases cited, however, dealt with a question of the inherent powers of the High Court, which is a Court of plenary jurisdiction. The learned counsel for the respondent, however, relied upon a decision of the Madras High Court in S. J. S. Fernandes v. V. Ranganayakulu Chetty, A. I. R. 1953 Madras 236 wherein Ramaswami J. was dealing with a case under the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, section 12 (B) of which was substantially to the same effect as sub-section (5) of section 15 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act. Ramaswami J. relying upon certain earlier decisions of the Madras High Court, came to the conclusion that the High Court could not review an order passed earlier in the exercise of its inherent powers and that Order 47, rule 1, Civil Procedure Code, did not apply, because this Code was not applicable to the proceedings under the Rent Act. There is however, a judgment of the Supreme Court in Shivdeo Singh and others v. State of Punjab and others, A.I.R. 1963 Supreme Court 1909. An order was passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. Later when it was brought to the notice of the learned Judge that the party who was interested in the case had not been heard, the matter reviewed and reheard. Against this order of review and rehearing the other party went to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court upheld if the action of the learned Single Judge. No doubt this was a case where a party was not heard, but the observations of their lordships of the Supreme Court in this matter are really very significant. In paragraph 9 of the report at page 1911, it was observed as under :- "The other contention of Mr. Gopal Singh pertains to the second order of Khosla, J., which, in effect, reviews his prior order. Learned counsel contends that Art 226 of the Constitution does not confer any power on the High Court to review its own order and therefore, the second order of Khosla J., was without jurisdiction. It is sufficient to say that there is nothing in Art. 226 of the Constitution to preclude a High Court from exercising the power of review inheres in every court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. Thus power of the High Court, which is a Court of plenary jurisdiction, to review an earlier order was fully recognised, though this power is to be exercised either for the purpose of preventing miscarriage of justice or for correcting grave and payable errors committed by it. In the case of East Panjab Urban Rent Restriction Act too there is nothing in sub-section (5) of section 15, which takes away this power and consequently the observations of the Supreme Court apply with full force. Observation to the same effect were also made by a learned Judge of this Court in Lal Singh and others v. The State of Punjab and others, I.L.R. (1970) Punjab & Haryana 177, at page 187. After discussing a number authorities it was observed as follows: "It is not necessary to multiply authorities and the proposition seems to be undisputed that the Court of records and the ultimate Courts of Appeal and revision have inherent powers to act for the securing of the ends of justice. This very principal as regards criminal matters before the High Court in India is embodied in the provisions of section 561-A of the Code in the following terms: Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or effect the inherent power of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice." In view of the above, therefore, it must now be taken as established beyond controversy that, as observed by the Supreme Court, High Court as a Court of plenary jurisdiction, has inherent power to review its order to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave errors committed by it. Order accordingly.