Chatterji, J.:— This is an appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent by the plaintiffs in a suit which was originally instituted under Order 21, rule 63 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The defendant no. 1, Volkart Brothers, a firm carrying on business in motor parts and accessories in Calcutta, obtained, in February 1940, a decree for Rs. 585-3-0 in the Small Cause Court at Calcutta against Ojha Das and Co., a firm carrying on business in motor accessories at Patna, of which the defendant no. 2, Sripat Ojha, is the proprietor. The decree was transferred for execution to the First Munsif's court at Patna, and in execution. Volkart Brothers took out attachment, on 14th January 1941, against certain motor accessories and other movables said to belong to their judgment debtors, Oiha Das and Co. On 16th January, 1941, the plaintiffs, Ojha Brothers, a firm also carrying on business in motor accessories at Patna, of which the proprietors are the two younger brothers of defendant no. 2. Sripat Ojha, preferred a claim under Order 21, Rule 58 of the Code of Civil Procedure, asserting that the goods sought to be attached belonged to them and not to the judgment-debtors, Ojha Das and Co. They prayed for stay of the execution proceeding whereupon they were ordered to furnish security. In obedience to this order, they filed, on 20th March 1941 a registered security bond executed by one Raghubir Tewari. The claim was eventually dismissed on the 5th of September 1941. The execution then proceeded.
On 20th January 1942 the plaintiffs brought the present suit under Order 21, rule 63, Civil Procedure Code for a declaration that the properties sought to be attached belonged to them and not to the judgment debtors Ojha Das and Co.
In August, 1942 the attached goods were sold and out of the sale-proceeds, Rs. 70-10-0 was paid to defendant no. 1 Volkart Brothers, by way of rateable distribution. The surety. Raghubir Tewari made three payments, two of Rs. 60 each and the other of Rs. 50 to Volkart Brothers and these payments were duly certified in court. As he did not make any further payment, the property given by him in security was proceeded against and sold in June 1943. To set aside that sale, the plaintiffs made an application under Order 21. Rule 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure on depositing Rs. 357-8-6. Thereupon the sale was set aside. Volkart Brothers also realised from the plaintiffs a sum of Rs. 85 as the costs of the claim case.
On the 14th December 1943 the plaintiffs, by leave of the Court, amended the plaint by adding a further prayer for recovery of the said sums of money, that is, (1) Rs. 70-10-0, (2) Rs. 60, (3) Rs. 60, (4) Rs. 50, (5) Rs. 357-8-6 and (6) Rs. 85.
The suit was contested by defendant no. 1, Volkart Brothers, and their defence in substance was that the firms Ojha Das and Co., and Ojha Brothers were one and the same concern, belonging to the three brothers, and that the attached goods really belonged to the judgment-debtors, Ojha Das and Co.
The learned Additional Subordinate Judge, who tried the suit, held that the attached properties belonged to the judgment-debtors Ojha Das and Co., and not to the plaintiffs. He accordingly dismissed the suit. On appeal, the learned Additional District Judge held that the attached goods belonged to the plaintiffs, Ojha Brothers and not to Ojha Das and Co., and were, therefore, not liable to attachment or sale in execution of the decree obtained by Volkart Brothers against Ojha Das and Co. He accordingly allowed the appeal and decreed the suit in these terms:—
“Declaration sought for in the suit is allowed. Plaintiff shall be further entitled to refund of the money actually realised from him by the decree-holder (defendant no. 1) in Execution Case no. 1587/40”.
On second appeal, Shearer, J. held (1) that the claim for recovery of Rs. 70-10-0 was barred by limitation, (2) that the three payments, two of. Rs. 60 each and the other of Rs. 50 being made by the surety Raghubir Tewari, the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover these sums, (3) that the payment of Rs. 357-8-6 made by the plaintiffs under Order 21, Rule 89, Civil Procedure Code was voluntary and no suit could lie for recovery of that amount and (4) that the sum of Rs. 85 which the plaintiffs had to pay as costs, was also not recoverable. He accordingly allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit.
Before coming to the points raised on behalf of the appellants it is necessary to dispose of the objection taken by Mr. R.S Chatterji on behalf of the respondents that the court of appeal below did not come to any definite finding that the attached goods belonged to the plaintiffs. This objection is without any force. The court definitely found
“In the above circumstances we cannot but hold that those moveables of Ojha Brothers were not liable to attachment and sale in that execution case”.
Shearer, J. proceeded on the footing that the court of appeal below was satisfied that
“Messrs Ojha Das and Co. and Messrs Ojha Brothers were two separate and distinct firms and that the property which had been attached by Messrs Volkart Brothers in execution of their decree belonged to the latter and not to the former firm”.
He appears to have accepted this as a finding of fact binding in second appeal.
Mr. G.P Das on behalf of the appellants does not press the appeal with regard to the three items, two of Rs. 60 each and the other of Rs. 50, which were paid by the surety Raghubir Tewari. He presses the appeal with regard to the other three items, (1) Rs. 70-10-0, (2) Rs. 357-8-6 and (3) Rs. 85.
With regard to the item of Rs. 357-8-6, Mr. Das's contention is that the plaintiffs had to pay the amount under compulsion of legal process and, therefore, the payment could on no account be said to be voluntary. He relies on the decisions of the Privy Council in Dooli Chand v. Ram Kishen Singh and Seth Kanhaya Lal v. The National Bank of India, Limited(2). In the first case, the plaintiff, who had paid to the defendant a sum of money to prevent the sale of a certain mouza which had been attached and put up for sale in execution of a decree obtained by the defendant against a third person, sued to recover back the money. It was contended that the payment was voluntary. This contention was rejected by their Lordships in the following words:
“But the objections taken to the action were that the payment was voluntary, and that the remedy, if any, was in the execution proceedings, their Lordships think that there is no presence for saying that the payment was voluntary. It was made to prevent the sale which would otherwise inevitably have taken place of the mouza which the respondents had purchased, and was made therefore under compulsion of law; that is, under force of these execution proceedings”.
In the second case (40 Indian Appeals, 56) the defendant Bank obtained a decree against a certain limited company and, in execution of that decree, attached and took possession of certain mills of which the plaintiff claimed to be the sole proprietor. The plaintiff paid the decretal amount under protest and subsequently instituted a suit to recover back that amount. It was held that the money was paid under “coercion” within the meaning of section 72 of the Indian Contract Act and was, therefore, recoverable. The following passage from their Lordships' judgment is instructive; “A wrongful interference with the plaintiff's lawful enjoyment of his own property is alleged. The plaintiff was clearly entitled to rid himself of that unlawful interference by any lawful means without thereby affecting his right to hold the defendants liable for that which they have thus caused him to do. It is true that paying under protest the sum demanded was not the only course open to him. He might have taken legal proceedings, by which, sooner or later, he might have rid himself of the interference. But to do so would have involved his submitting to the wrong for all the period necessary for those proceedings to be effective, and that might have been a serious aggravation of the wrong. To this he was no wise bound to submit. He was free to choose a course which did not involve any such prolongation of the trespass. Accordingly he paid under, protest the sum demanded, and under English law he was unquestionably entitled to demand a repayment of that sum because it was an involuntary payment produced by coercion, namely, the wrongful interference of the defendants with his full and free enjoyment of his own property. By English law it is not open to the wrongdoer to prescribe by which of two lawful alternatives; the injured man puts a stop to the wrong under which he is suffering. His choice of any one alternative does not make it as between him and the wrongdoer a voluntary act or stop him from claiming that it was done under coercion”. Though the money was paid “under protest their”, Lordships do not appear to have attached any importance to that fact. In their view, the payment was made under the force of the execution proceedings and must, therefore, be regarded as being made under compulsion.
Here, in execution of the decree against Ojha Das and Company, attachment was taken out against the goods belonging, not to them but to the plaintiffs. In the claim case preferred by the plaintiffs, they had to furnish security, as ordered by the court. The surety's property was sold, and in order to save the property, the plaintiffs had to pay the sum of Rs. 357-8-6. The plaintiffs were not liable under the decree, and the payment made by them to save the property cannot but be regarded as being made under the force of the execution proceedings.
Shearer, J., in his judgment referred to the aforesaid Privy Council decisions, but apparently he felt bound by the decision of this Court in Raghu Ram Pandey v. Deokali Pandey. In that case it was held that where a property has been sold in execution of a money decree and a payment is made under Order 21, Rule 89, Code of Civil Procedure, the person making such payment must accept the validity of the sale and cannot, therefore, maintain a suit for refund of the money deposited by him. Kulwant Sahay, J., who delivered the judgment to which James J., agreed, observed:
“A payment under rule 89 must be an unconditional payment with the object of the money being paid to the decree-holder. Once a payment is made under Order 21, Rule 89 it is clear that the person, making the payment cannot be heard to say that the sale was not a valid sale and that the money deposited should not be paid to the decree-holder. The judgment-debtor or the person interested is under no compulsion to make the deposit under Order 21, Rule 89. Such a deposit is a voluntary deposit and the person making the deposit cannot in my opinion maintain a suit for a refund of the money deposited by him.”
The reason why the deposit was held to be a voluntary deposit will appear more clearly from the following passage:
“If the property sought to be sold does not really belong to the judgment-debtor, then the sale of the property in execution of a money decree will not affect the rightful owner of the property and he can ignore the sale and resist the auction purchaser in his attempt to take possession of the property after the sale. A person who is the owner of the property is not affected by a sale of the right, title and interest of the judgment-debtor to whom the property does not belong.
In other words, if a person, who is the true owner of the property and is, therefore, not affected by the sale, makes payment under Order 21, Rule 89, he does so as a mere volunteer.
In this Patna case there is no reference to the aforesaid Privy Council decisions. But Kulwant, Sahay, J., followed the decision in Narayan Vasudevacharya Katti…Defendant v. Amgauda Malagauda Patil…Plaintiff . in which those Privy Council decisions were considered. In that Bombay case, the defendant, who had obtained a decree against a third person, got certain property sold and purchased it himself, and the plaintiff, who claimed to be the owner in possession of the property, got the sale set aside under Order 21, Rule 89 by paying into court the decretal amount and five, per cent of the purchase money, and on the amount being paid to the decreeholder, the plaintiff sued to recover it back. It was held that under Order 21, Rule 89 the amount must be taken to have been deposited for payment to the decree-holder voluntarily and unconditionally and, therefore, no suit could lie to recover it back. Macleod, C.J, who delivered the leading judgment observed:
“If the true owner allows the attachment to continue, and the property to be sold as belonging to the judgment-debtor, he can treat the sale as a nullity and resist the auction-purchaser. There is no necessity for him to get rid of the sale of what in his opinion does not exist. The attachment of the property itself is a different matter, that may seriously inconvenience him, but if he is the true owner the sale of a non-existent interest in it does not affect him. If he pays in money to get that sale set aside it can only be treated as a voluntary payment”.
The said two Privy Council decisions were distinguished on the ground that “a payment made under protest to get rid of an attachment or to prevent a sale in execution stands on a different footing and that the ratio decidendi of these cases cannot be applied to a payment made under rule 89 in support of an application to set aside a sale of the right, title and interest of a third party held in execution of the decree”. But it is to be observed, in the first of these Privy Council cases, there was no question of payment “under protest”.
In a later case, Shankarrao Keshavrao Deshmukh v. Vadhilal Mulchand Gujarathi, the Bombay High Court took the same view, though not without some hesitation. In that case, the plaintiffs sued to recover back the amount which they had paid under Order 21, Rule 89 to set aside a sale held in execution of a mortgage decree under which the plaintiffs' property was not liable. The mortgage decree was satisfied by the sale of that portion only of the mortgaged property which belonged to the plaintiffs. The mortgagee as well as the mortgagors were made defendants in the suit. It was held that the plaintiffs were entitled to a declaration that the land belonging to them was not liable to be sold in execution of the mortgage decree, but they were not entitled to recover the amount claimed, from the mortgagee, because the amount must be taken to have been deposited for payment to him voluntarily and unconditionally. Patkar, J., who delivered the leading judgment, after referring to the said two Privy Council decisions, stated:
“If the owner, in order to save the property from sale, pays the amount to the decree-holder, he can recover back the money so paid under section 72 of the Indian Contract Act on the ground that the payment was involuntary or obtained by coercion.
In the present case, the plaintiffs paid the money after the sale under Order 21, Rule 89, to set aside the sale on payment to the decree-holder of the amount of the decree and five per cent of the sale price to the auction purchaser. If the matter were res integra, it might have been possible to hold that the plaintiffs are entitled to recover back the amount under section 72 of the Indian Contract Act. The action of the plaintiffs would not be a voluntary payment of the debts of the other defendants nos. 2 to 6 who were liable, but it was a payment made to save their property and get it back from the mortgagee-decree-holder who had wrongly allowed it to be sold in execution of the mortgage-decree.”
His Lordship then quoted the passage, cited above, from 40 Indian Appeals, 56 and proceeded as follows:—
“The sale of survey no. 159 was a wrongful interference with the plaintiffs' enjoyment of their own property and the plaintiffs were entitled to rid themselves of the unlawful interference by any lawful means without thereby affecting their right to hold defendant no. 1 liable for what he had caused them to do. After the sale the only lawful means by which the plaintiffs could get rid of the unlawful interference of defendant no. 1 was by payment under Order 21, Rule 89, and it was not competent to defendant no. 1 to prescribe some other way to put a stop to the wrong to which they were subjected”.
In conclusion, however, his Lordship followed the decision in the earlier case in I.L.R 45 Bombay, 1094 which was also followed by this court in I.L.R 7 Patna, 30. Barlee, J., who agreed with him, but delivered a separate judgment, stated with reference to the Privy Council decision in 40 Indian Appeals, 56:
“Their Lordships of the Privy Council held that he was entitled to succeed inasmuch as he had paid under legal coercion and was entitled to rid himself of the unlawful interference of the Bank by any lawful means. Thus a payment into Court made to remove a trespass can be recovered by suit”.
His Lordship then proceeded as follows:
“But according to the view adopted by a Bench of this Court in Narayan v. Adgauda a payment made under Order 21, Rule 89, to have a sale set aside is not a payment to remove a trespass……………… Kanyaya Lal's case was cited but distinguished and the main ground of distinction was that what had been sold was not the property which A claimed but the right, title and interest of S, in it. There had been no actual trespass and on the assumption that the property belonged to A and not to the judgment-debtor S there was no threat of trespass, their Lordships considered, against the property of A for A by paying the debt of S, was protecting not his own property which was not in danger, but the non-existent right, title and interest of S, in the property.”.
Thus, according to the said Patna and Bombay, decisions, if the payment under Order 21, Rule 89 is made by a third person who claims to be the real owner of the property sold, the payment is voluntary, because he is thereby protecting not his own property which is not in danger, but the non-existent right, title and interest of the judgment-debtor in that property.
In the present case, the property given in security by Raghubir Tewari was sold and the plaintiffs made the payment under Order 21, Rule 89 to save that property from sale. It cannot be said that they made the payment to protect any non-existent right, title and interest. It was in obedience to the order of the court that the plaintiffs had to furnish security which was actually given by Raghubir Tewari. According to the finding of the lower appellate court, the goods which were attached by Volkart Brothers belonged not to their judgment-debtors, but to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs had to pay the money under the force of execution proceedings. The principle laid down in the said Patna and Bombay decisions, therefore, has no application here. In my opinion, the payment made by the plaintiffs can on no account be said to be voluntary.
Mr. R.S Chatterji further relies on the Full Bench decision in L.A Krishna Ayyar v. Arunachalam Chettiar in which the real question for decision was whether a deposit under Order 21, Rule 89 could be accepted subject to any condition or protest. It was held that no condition could be attached to such deposit. The facts of that case are quite distinguishable from those of the present.
Mr. Chatterji next contends that Raghubir having stood surety, the decree could be valid executed against him under section 145 of the Code of Civil Procedure and therefore, the plaintiffs cannot recover the money paid under Order 21. Rule 89 which went to satisfy the decree. But Raghubir stood surety not for the judgment-debtors, but for the plaintiffs, as ordered by the court in the claim case and he undertook the responsibility for payment of the decree in case the claim was rejected. The claim, no doubt, was disallowed by order, dated the 5th September, 1941, but that order was subject to the result of the present suit which was in the meantime brought under Order 21, rule 63. Raghubir's property was sold long after the institution of this suit. As Pointed out by the Privy Council in Phul Kumari v. Ghanshyam Misra, a suit under Order 21, rule 63 (section 283 of the old Code) is substantially a suit to set aside the summary decision in the claim case. On the finding of the lower appellate court, there could be no valid attachment of the plaintiff's goods, and consequently Raghubir as surety could not be held liable for payment of the decree.
In this view, it is unnecessary to consider the further question raised by Mr. Chatterji, namely, whether there was a good consideration for Raghubir, standing as surety.
Next, as regards the item of Rs. 70-10-0, Mr. G.P Das contends that the suit is governed not by Article 29 but by Article 49 of the. Limitation Act. Article 29 refers to a suit
“For compensation for wrongful seizure of moveable property under legal process”.
for which the period of limitation is one year from
“the date of the seizure”.
Mr. Chatterji relies on the decision in Madras Steam Navigation Co., Ltd. v. Shalimar Works, Ltd. in which the plaintiff company sued the defendant company for wrongful arrest of a ship belonging to the former. The suit as framed was based on malice or its equivalent, but at the hearing the plaintiff company proceeded on the footing of the suit being one for mere trespass. It was held that in the absence of proof of malice or its, equivalent, a suit for simple trespass would not be for the arrest of a ship. On the question of limitation raised, it was held that assuming that an action would lie in the absence of proof of malice or its equivalent, the action would be for wrongful seizure under legal process and would be barred by Article 29 of the Limitation Act. But the present suit is not for compensation for wrongful seizure of the plaintiffs' goods, but for recovery of the money which was realised by the decree-holders by sale of those goods. Mr. G.P Das contends that the suit will be governed by Article 49 which refers to suits
“For other specific moveable property or for compensation for wrongfully talking or injuring or wrongfully detaining the same”.
The period of limitation for such suit is three years from
“when the property is wrongfully taken or injured or when the detainer's possession becomes unlawful”.
Mr. Das relies on the case of Maharaj Bahadur Singh of Baluchar, District Murshidabad v. Sm. Achala Bala Devi in which it was held that a suit for value of crops wrongfully attached, cut and removed by the defendant would be governed by Article 48 or Article 49 and not by Article 29 or Article 36 of the Limitation Act. Upon the facts of the present case, I think the proper article applicable will be Article 49. The cause of action for the suit arose when the attached goods were sold and the proceeds were paid to the decree-holders. The attached goods were sold and Rs. 70-10-0 out of the proceeds was paid to the decree-holder in August 1942, and the suit, so far as it related to the recovery of money, must be deemed to have been instituted on the 14th December 1943 when the plaint was amended. The suit was, therefore, well within three years. Consequently the claim for recovery of Rs. 70-10-0 cannot be said to be barred by limitation.
As regards the last item of Rs. 85, the objection taken by Mr. Chatterji is that this amount having been allowed as costs in the claim case, the plaintiffs are not entitled to recover it. He relies on the decisions in Shama Purshad Roy Chowdhery v. Hurro Purshad Roy Chowdhery and Dwarka Nath Kundu v. Mohendra Nath Roy. It was held in these cases that money realised under a decree or judgment cannot be recovered back in a new suit or action, while such decree or judgment under which it was recovered remains in force, as the original decree or judgment, must be taken to be subsisting and valid until it has been reversed or superseded by ulterior proceeding. As already pointed out, a suit under Order 21, rule 63 is substantially a suit to set aside the summary decision in the claim case. Here, the order in the claim case was in effect set aside by the court of appeal below. Consequently, the said decisions do not stand in the plaintiffs' way of obtaining a refund of Rs. 85. The order in the claim case having in effect been set aside, the decree-holders are not entitled to retain this sum which they realized on then strength of that order.
It is further contended by Mr. Chatterji that in any case the remedy of the plaintiffs with regard to this Rs. 85 is not by a separate suit, but by an application under section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But section 144 by its terms has no application to the present case. Here, the claim for refund of the sum of Rs. 85 is made in the very suit under Order 21, rule 63. If by the decree passed in this suit the order in the claim case is set aside, there is no reason why in this very suit the plaintiffs will not be entitled to a refund of the amount.
In the result I would allow the appeal in part, set aside the decision of Shearer, J., and decree the suit for recovery of the three sums of (1) Rs. 70-10-0, (2) Rs. 357-8-6 and (3) Rs. 85. The plaintiffs will also be entitled to a declaration as sought for. Both parties will be entitled to their respective costs throughout in proportion to their success, the plaintiffs' costs to be recovered from defendant no. 1.
Lakshmikanta Jha, C.J:— I agree.
Appeal allowed.
G.N.P