Cases referred :
Khushal Khemgar Shah Vs. Mrs. Khorshed Banu Dadiba Boatwalla , AIR 1970 SC 1147 [ 19 ]
:- This is an Appeal from the Order dated 23rd February, 2000 passed by the Court of Comarca Judge of Salcete and Quepem at Margao, directing the Appellant Shri. Rama Rao, partner in the firm of M/s. Veena Automobile Service Station wherein the deceased Joseph Wilfred DSouza was a partner, to deposit a sum of Rs.2,10,000/- being the share of the said deceased partner in the amount received on surrendering of leasehold premises in Bombay in the said Court on or before 23.03.2000.
2. The brief facts of the case are that Inventory proceedings were instituted by the Respondent herein Mr. Joseph DSouza, on 25.11.99 claiming right in inheritance of the deceased said Joseph Wilfred DSouza. The said Joseph DSouza who expired on 11.01.1999, was a bachelor and did not have any ascendants or descendants, but the other interested parties who have been mentioned in the Inventory Application dated 25.11.1999. The Respondent No.1 claims right to the estate as nephew of the deceased. Notices were issued to the interested parties. Notices were also sent to the Executor of the Will Shri. J.V.T. Cabral and also to one Shri. G. Rama Rao, Managing Partner of the firm, M/s. Veena Automobile Service Station (Appellant herein). The Respondent No.1 filed a list of assets of the deceased in these proceedings. The Executor Shri. J.V.T. Cabral opposed the Inventory Application, on the ground that the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the application of Inventory proceedings. It was contended that under Article 2009 of Portuguese C.P.C. the inheritance opens on the death of the estate-leaver and the place of opening of the inheritance shall be established in the following manner: If the deceased had domicile, inheritance opens at that place of domicile. In the absence of domicile, inheritance opens at the place where the deceased has immovable property. If the deceased has immovable properties at different places, inheritance opens where the greater part of such property is found, such part being calculated on the basis of the respective land revenue. Where the deceased does not have domicile nor immovable properties at any place, inheritance opens at the place where he dies.
3. It was argued on behalf of the Executor, that since greater part of the properties of the deceased are not in Goa , the said Court had no jurisdiction. It was argued in these circumstances, it would be appropriate to obtain probate of the Will in Bombay and, as the Will is in possession of interested party one Jude who is refusing to hand over the original Will, the probate could not be obtained.
4. Arguments were advanced on behalf of the other interested party Jude DSouza. It was argued that the Executor of the Will Shri. Cabral is not an interested party to the Inventory proceedings and, therefore, he had no locus standi. Learned Comarca judge upheld Judes contention that Shri. Cabral had no locus standi to take part in the Inventory proceedings and his only duty was to execute the Will and therefore he could not attack the jurisdiction of the Court.
5. The bone of contention so far as this Appeal from Order is concerned is the amount of Rs.2,10,00,000/- mentioned at Item No.2 of the list of assets filed in the Inventory Court being 35% of the share which the deceased had in the Company M/s. Veena Automobile Service Station of which the deceased Joseph DSouza was a partner. In order to ascertain the correct amount, being 35% share of the deceased in the said partnership assets, a show cause notice was sent to Shri. Rama Rao, partner of M/s. Veena Automobile Service Station. In his reply, the said Shri. Rama Rao stated that the amount mentioned in the notice was not correct; from the document executed by Rama Rao dated 19.10.1999 it was clear that a sum of Rs.6,00,00,000/- was received from M/s. Indian Hotels Co. Ltd. and since the deceased partner namely Joseph Wilfred DScouza had 35% share in the partnership firm, the amount receivable by the estate of the deceased Joseph Wilfred DSouza, works out to Rs.2,10,00,000/-. The Court held that the said Rama Rao has not shown any cause as to why the amount should not be deposited in the Court. In his reply dated 11.01.2000 the said Rama Rao contended that the Inventory Court had no jurisdiction to make any order for deposit of the said sum of Rs.2,10,00,000/- and further that the said amount directed to be paid was not correct since deductions towards capital gains tax, income tax, etc. had to be made. After considering all the rival contentions, the Comarca Judge passed the impugned order, directing Shri. Rama Rao, partner of M/s. Veena Automobile Service Station to deposit in Court an amount of Rs.2,10,00,000/-. The present Appeal is from this Order. The Appeal was admitted on 7th September, 2000.
6. The said order for deposit is impugned on the following grounds :-
(1) That there is a petition for probate pending before the Bombay High Court. Therefore jurisdiction would vest in the Bombay High Court in connection with the matter pertaining to the partnership business;
(2) That the appellant has no interest in the matter, as he is neither an heir nor legatee. The appellant is merely a partner in the business wherein the deceased was also one of the partners; that the deceased partner has his domicile in Bombay and died in Bombay; the partnership business was run in Bombay and therefore jurisdiction would lie in Bombay;
(3) That even assuming Inventory proceedings are competent, there is no power or jurisdiction given to the Inventory Court to issue directions against a person who is not party to the proceedings and that it is for the cabeca de casal as Administrator to take steps for recovery of the said amount by filing appropriate proceedings.
7. It is the contention of the learned Advocate of the appellant that the proper remedy for the respondents was to institute a suit for accounts and for recovery of money against the partnership firm which is a debtor to the estate and that to order deposit of the amount in Inventory proceedings without institution of any suit is not permissible and/or without jurisdiction. It is pointed out that in Inventory proceedings under the list of assets given by the said Joseph DSouza, there are two Items pertaining to M/s. Veena Automobile Service Station namely (i) Item No.2 - Amount of Rs.2,10,00,000/- which the deceased was entitled to receive and which amount is in the custody of the firm of M/s. Veena Automobile Service Station; and (ii) Item No.3 - Right to receive assets from the partnership firm run in the name and style of M/s. Veena Automobile Service Station which stands dissolved on the death of Shri. Joseph Wilfred DSouza, which is to be calculated on account being taken. It is contended that Item No.3 ex facie pertains to taking of accounts which are to be finalized along with the goodwill and therefore Item No.2 ( Rs. 2.10 crores ) cannot be treated differently. It is contended that these questions cannot be agitated in Inventory proceedings in view of summary nature of listing and allotment of properties in view of Article 1436 of Portuguese C.P.C. and as final relief cannot be granted, grant of interim relief of deposit is also without jurisdiction. It is also contended that the tenanted premises of the partnership of M/s. Veena Automobile Service Station being situated at Bombay cannot be subject matter of the Inventory proceedings instituted at Margao in view of Art.24 of the Civil Code read with Section 5 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925.
8. It is further argued that even assuming that Listing of Assets of the deceased could be done in Goa, such list can only be in respect of the share of the deceased partner in the estate for allotment to an heir in the Inventory and thereafter it is for the allottee of the said share to initiate proceedings for recovery of the amount or for taking accounts or for adopting any other proceedings for recovery of the said amount.
9. Advantage is sought to be taken of the conflict of interest between the interested party Jude and nephew of the deceased, Joseph DSouza who applied for the inventory. It is pointed out that the said Joseph DSouza while applying for Inventory, mentions that the deceased left heirs, nine in number with their spouses, but has failed to disclose the existence of the Will. Subsequently an application dated 7.12.1999 has been filed by Jude DSouza stating that he is the sole legatee under the Will which he brings on record and therefore there is no room to proceed with the Inventory. Thus it would appear that there is conflict of interest between the said Jude (sole legatee) opposing the inventory and Joseph DSouza seeking partition of the estate through inventory. It is contended that despite there being apparent conflict at least on the face of the record, Joseph moves an application dated 9.12.1999 for direction to the partnership to return the entire amount with interest accrued thereon to the Administrator Joseph DSouza and direction to the said Joseph DSouza to invest the said amount and within less than one month there in an application dated 4.01.2000 made by the said Jude praying for issue of notice to M/s. Veena Automobile Service Station to show cause as to why the amount should not be deposited in Court. It is further pointed out that an application is moved by the executor of the Will namely Shri. J.V. Cabral dated 10.02.2000 praying that Inventory proceedings be kept in abeyance since he has filed a petition for probate of the Will. It is pointed out on a comparison of the list given in the Inventory proceedings and the list given in the probate proceedings, it will be found that they are substantially the same.
10. It is the contention of the learned Advocate for the Appellant that from the steps taken by the respondents, it is clear that Inventory proceedings are instituted for oblique purpose. Reliance has been placed by the respondents on Art.77 and Art.429 of the Portuguese Civil Procedure Code in support of the contention that there is power in the Inventory Court to direct deposit of the amount. However, it is the contention of the learned Advocate for the appellant that Art.77 is merely procedural and cannot go beyond the substantive provisions of Art.24 of the Civil Code. Further, it is pointed out that Art.429 is of no avail to the respondents, since Art.429 only comes into play when there is apprehension of dissipation or loss of any of the assets whether moveable or immovable and in that case only a prayer can be made for sealing or for enrolment. It is pointed out that neither in the application of Joseph Wilfred DSouza dated 9.12.1999 nor in the application of Jude, there is any whisper or apprehension of dissipation or loss of the assets. There is no prayer for sealing or enrolment, but only for a direction to deposit of the amount which is not contemplated under Art.429 and hence reliance under Art.429 is misplaced.
11. It is further contended that under Art.431 the applicant has to substantiate his interest and the grounds for relief and the Judge hearing the application and examining the proofs may order to deposit being satisfied that without such an order the interest of the applicants would suffer serious risk. However, in the order of the Court for deposit, there is no whisper of apprehension or loss of dissipation and therefore the order directing the deposit is not covered under Art.429.
13. It is also contended that the amount due is not ascertained or quantified. That the claim of 35% of Rs.6 crores has not been admitted as correct; that Rama Rao, the appellant, is only one of the partners of the firm; proceedings for accounts was necessarily to be filed against all the partners and not against one of them. Rama Rao being only one of the partners, cannot acknowledge or admit any liability in view of Section 19(e) of the Indian Partnership Act.
14. It is lastly contended that it is the case of the respondents that the order for deposit is by way of an interim relief. It is pointed out that when the application dated 9.12.1999 for deposit was made by the Administrator, the same was opposed on the ground that the partnership continued by the surviving partners and did not get dissolved. Clause 9 of the Partnership Deed dated 7.11.1974 reads as under :-
9. Death or insolvency of a partner shall not dissolve the firm and the other partners shall be entitled to carry on the partnership business.
15. It is stated that the Partnership Deed dated 1.04.1993 was executed only because a new partner Gangadharan Rao was admitted. Otherwise the surviving partners are carrying on the same business and therefore the Firm does not get dissolved. This is clearly amplified in clause (a) of the Partnership Deed dated 1.04.1993 which reads as follows :-
(a) The parties to the first, second, third and fourth part has been carrying on Partnership business in the name and style of M/s. Veena Automobile Service Station since 15th Feb. 1979 upon the terms and conditions contained in the Partnership dated 7th Nov. 1974.
16. It is therefore contended that the claim of the legal representatives of a deceased partner is governed by Section 37 of the Partnership Act; that the Inventory Court are meant only for listing and allotment and not for deciding questions which require larger investigation as stipulated in Art.1436 of the Portuguese Civil Code. Hence it is contended that the impugned order for deposit is without jurisdiction.
17. On the other hand, it is contended by the learned Advocate on behalf of the respondent no.1 that the impugned order for deposit was passed ex debito justitiae in order to avoid dissipation of the assets and to protect the estate of the deceased partner. Admittedly, deceased J. DSouza was a partner of M/s. Veena Automobiles Service Station; he had 35% share in the said partnership Firm; one of the assets of the partnership firm was leasehold rights in premises occupied by the firm; the leasehold rights were surrendered for a sum of Rs.6 crores which were received at the time of surrender; the Executor of the Will Mr. Cabral had signed the said Surrender and admitted that he had jointly received the said sum of Rs.6 crores. The share of the deceased as per the said receipts, on surrender of the said leasehold property works out to Rs.2,10,00,000/-. It is pointed out by the learned Advocate for the Respondent No.1 that after filing of the present appeal against the impugned order for deposit and even before passing of ad-interim order to deposit the said amount by this Court, respondents No.2(a) and (b) Jude DSouza and his wife filed an application before the High Court of Bombay in testamentary proceedings to direct the partnership firm to deposit the said sum of Rs.2,10,00,000/-. The appellant objected to the said application, alleging that the matter was pending before this Court and, as such, by Order dated 19.04.2000 the High Court at Bombay observed that the matter with regard to the said deposit is not pending before the High Court at Bombay . Vide Order dated 28th April, 2000 this Court was pleased to direct a sum of Rs.1,04,73,744/-be deposited and in connection with further deposit, the same would be considered at the time of hearing of the stay application. At that time no documentary evidence was adduced to substantiate the claim of the appellant regarding deductions sought for by the appellant.
18. Probate proceedings were stayed by the High Court by Order dated 31st August, 2000 on the motion of the Respondent No.1.
19. The appellant has raised several technical objections in order not to comply with the directions of the Inventory Court for the deposit of Rs.2.10 crores being the amount due to the estate of the deceased partner which is more or less ascertained except to the extent of the appellant claiming deductions on account of capital gains and other expenses. However the share of the deceased partner i.e. 35% in the partnership business is not disputed. The leasehold properties in Bombay have been surrendered and a sum of Rs.6 crores was received, the share of the deceased partner coming to Rs.2.10 crores. The objections raised by the appellant about the necessity of the Will being probated and about application of Section 37 of the Partnership Act on the question whether the partnership subsists or dissolved on the death of the deceased partner are not, strictly speaking, germane to the issue at hand and therefore not relevant for deciding whether the Order of the Inventory Court for deposit is proper or not. The question of the Will being probated is immaterial because the learned Trial Judge in passing the order of deposit has not invoked the Will. Furthermore, he has not directed that the amount be paid to any particular person. The Trial Judge has only directed the appellant to deposit the amount in the Inventory Court in order that the same can be custodia leges. The question regarding the partnership subsisting or not and consequent reliance on Section 37 of the Indian Partnership Act, is also irrelevant. It is pointed out by the learned Advocate for the respondent, that under the Partnership Act where there is no stipulation for continuance of the partnership after the death of the deceased, the partnership stands dissolved under Section 42(c) of the Partnership Act. However for the purpose of the legal representatives of the deceased partner claiming right to the assets of the partnership firm, it is immaterial whether the partnership dissolves or continues. The legal representatives of the deceased partner have a right to claim the value attributed to the share of the deceased partner in the assets of the partnership firm. In Khushal Khemgar Shah and others v. Mrs. Khorshed Banu Dadiba Boatwalla and another reported in A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1147 it has been categorically held that even if the partnership continues under an agreement between surviving partners, the share of deceased partner including good-will will devolve on his legal representative.
20. The main grievance of the appellant seems to be that by giving the said direction for deposit, the Inventory Court has executed a fait accompli, in that the interim order for deposit is, in fact, a final adjudication of the dispute in the sense that there is no scope left for the appellant for getting the exact amount payable to the estate of the deceased partner ascertained and in the event of the amount deposited being more than the amount attributable to the share of the deceased partner, then the appellant will be left without a remedy for recovering the excess amount deposited. It is contended that since the appellant is not a party to the Inventory proceedings, the appellant or the partnership firm will not be in a position to agitate the question that the appellant has deposited more than the share due to the estate of the deceased partner. As stated earlier, it is the case of the appellant that the proceedings in the Inventory Court are not proceedings meant for taking accounts or ascertaining the quantity of amount payable as against strangers to the Inventory. They are only meant for listing properties of the deceased. No adjudication of any kind is permitted at the end by the Inventory Court and therefore the proper remedy for the heirs or legatees is to institute recovery proceedings as prescribed under Art.2385 of the Civil Code or to take accounts, assuming there is a case for dissolution of partnership. There are no proceedings instituted against the firm. The firm or the partner is neither heir nor legatee. The partners are strangers to the proceedings. Furthermore, there is no suit for recovery of accounts; that the amount due is not ascertained or quantified and proceedings for recovery of the amount or accounts was necessarily to be filed against all the partners and not just against one of them. The appellant Rama Rao could not admit or acknowledge any liability in view of Section 19(e) of the Partnership Act.
21. By directing the appellant to deposit the amount, the Inventory Court has not decided any claim of the legal representatives to the estate of the deceased partner. All that the Inventory Court has done is direct the appellant to deposit in Court the amount which the appellant is admittedly holding and coming to the share of the deceased partner and this direction has been given in view of the apprehension of the respondents of danger of dissipation of the accounts admittedly held by the appellant. Though the appellant may not have expressly stated this apprehension, the same can be implied from the prevailing circumstances. The share of the deceased partner in the consideration received by the said partnership firm on surrender of the leasehold properties is mentioned at Item No.2 of the list in the Inventory proceedings. Item No.3 in the said list is a right to receive the assets from the partnership firm run in the name and style of M/s. Veena Automobile Service Station which stands dissolved upon the death of Joseph Wilfred DSouza which is to be calculated and accounts are to be finalized along with the good-will the share of the said Joseph Wilfred DSouza being 35%. The amount due under Item No.3 would require taking of accounts which will have to be done by the partners at some point of time. Upon taking of accounts, the share coming to the estate of the deceased will have to be paid over to the heirs. Obviously the amount received on surrender of the partnership property will have to be taken into account. If the amount deposited in the Inventory Court by the appellant turns out to be more than the share of the deceased in the said partnership business and assets, then the excess amount deposited will have to be adjusted in the final accounts. Therefore, it is not correct to say that the appellant or the partnership firm will be without a remedy in the event of depositing more than the due share of the deceased in the Inventory Court . In these circumstances, I do not find any substance in the objection of the appellant to the order for deposit of the amount as directed by the Inventory Court . The share of the deceased Partner is ascertained at Rs.2.10 crores. Since the appellant claims to have paid a sum of Rs.46,20,000/- towards capital gains tax on the share of the deceased partner, the same may be deducted. The appellant has already deposited a sum of Rs.1,04,73,744/-. After deducting the sum of Rs.46,20,000/- the Appellant is directed to deposit the balance amount in the Inventory Court within two weeks from the date of this order.
22. The Appeal from Order stands dismissed with no order as to costs.
Mr. Usgaonkar, learned Senior Advocate for the Appellant, prays for stay of the Order. The Order is stayed for a period of four weeks from today.
Appeal dismissed.