Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • SECTION 118 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ACT
  • provisions of Bombay Money Lenders Act, 1946
  • provisions of Bombay Money Lenders Act.
  • provisions of Money Lenders Act
  • Bombay Money Lenders Act, 1946.
  • Bombay Money Lenders Act
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • SECTION 118 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ACT
  • provisions of Bombay Money Lenders Act, 1946
  • provisions of Bombay Money Lenders Act.
  • provisions of Money Lenders Act
  • Bombay Money Lenders Act, 1946.
  • Bombay Money Lenders Act
Smart Summary

Concise Analytical Summary of the Court's Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal is brought by the Plaintiff (Appellant) Sureshchandra Nandlal against the dismissal of his Summary Suit No.3018 of 1974 by the City Civil Court at Bombay by Judgment and Decree dated 29 April 1980. A common judgment had been given in respect of two summary suits (3018/1974 and 3019/1974), but separate decrees resulted and separate appeals were preferred; this opinion concerns only Summary Suit No.3018/1974.

Material factual timeline (as recorded in the opinion):

  • 07-01-1971: Loan of Rs.20,000 was given to the Defendants by the Plaintiff Sureshchandra.
  • 03-05-1971: Cheque given by the Defendant in favour of the Plaintiff.
  • 19-07-1971: Cheque presented to the bank for the first time and dishonoured.
  • 24-09-1971: Cheque dishonoured for the second time.
  • March 1972: Kailashchand (manager of the Defendant) was removed from service.
  • 15-09-1972: First notice of demand given by the Plaintiff's advocate to the Defendant.
  • 14-10-1972: Defendant's reply to the Plaintiff's advocate.
  • 10-12-1973: Second notice of demand from the Plaintiff's advocate to the Defendant.
  • 19-12-1973: Reply of the Defendant to second notice of demand.
  • 20-03-1974: Suit filed.

Before the trial court, the Defendant contended that the cheque was an accommodation cheque without consideration and that the transaction was governed by the Bombay Money Lenders Act. The trial court found against the Plaintiff on material issues (Issue Nos. 1 and 4) and dismissed the suit. The Plaintiff appealed to this Court challenging the dismissal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the cheque issued in favour of the Plaintiff was an accommodation cheque (i.e., without consideration), and whether the Defendant discharged the burden of proving want of consideration under the presumption in Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
  2. Whether the transaction fell within the scope of the Bombay Money Lenders Act, 1946 — specifically whether the Plaintiff was a money-lender by reason of advancing loans "at interest" and thereby subject to the Act.
  3. Whether Kailashchandra, the manager in Bombay, had the authority (including by Power of Attorney and by virtue of his position as manager) to bind the Defendant firm for the loan and cheque in question.
  4. Whether the trial court's judgment was legally adequate — i.e., whether it contained proper findings and reasons or was vitiated by being a mere reproduction of arguments without conclusions.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Plaintiff's) Arguments

  • The suit was based on a negotiable instrument (cheque) and not on proving consideration; once the Defendant admitted issuing the cheque, the burden shifted to the Defendant to prove the cheque lacked consideration.
  • The trial court merely reproduced parties' arguments and failed to give findings on points raised; it overlooked that the cause of action was the negotiable instrument itself.
  • Additional procedural and evidentiary points were raised by counsel and reserved for consideration by the Court as appropriate.

Respondent's (Defendant's) Arguments

  • The Plaintiff failed to prove several aspects of his case, such as why he would advance Rs.20,000 to a person with no prior relation, and why no receipt was taken.
  • The Plaintiff did not plead or explain 'sarafi' dealings and did not mention sarafi loan in the notice or plaint.
  • If the transaction was a loan, interest was not charged in the Plaintiff's accounts despite alleged agreements about repayment times.
  • The cheque was not presented promptly (presentation occurred after roughly two months).
  • The Defendant had adequate funds and therefore did not need a loan on that date.
  • Kailashchandra (the manager) was not authorized to borrow money for the Defendant; the cheque was, therefore, a personal cheque of Kailashchandra not binding on the Defendant firm.
  • The Plaintiff's books of account were not maintained properly (erasures, written in pencil, not regular), and initially the accounts were not relied upon.
  • The Plaintiff was a money-lender and thus the transaction fell within the Bombay Money Lenders Act, 1946, rendering the suit liable to be dismissed under that Act.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded through several linked strands, each applied directly to the factual record:

  1. Application of the Bombay Money Lenders Act, 1946:

    The Court examined admissions in cross-examination that the Plaintiff advanced loans to various persons and that the transaction with the Defendant was denominated a loan. However, the Court held these admissions were not sufficient to attract the provisions of the Bombay Money Lenders Act because the Act's definitions require an advance at interest. The Court emphasized that to qualify as a "loan" under the Act and to carry on the "business of money-lending" a person must be advancing loans at interest. As neither party established that interest was charged or agreed upon, the Court concluded the Act did not apply.

  2. Burden of proof and negotiable instrument presumption (Section 118, Negotiable Instruments Act):

    The court treated the suit as one founded on a negotiable instrument (cheque). It stated that where issuance of a cheque is admitted and the defendant pleads want of consideration (e.g., that it was an accommodation cheque), the burden lies heavily on the defendant to rebut the statutory presumption under Section 118. The Court found that the defendant did not satisfactorily explain the term "accommodation cheque" or the circumstances under which the cheque was issued, and therefore failed to discharge the burden to rebut the presumption of consideration. The Court observed that once the defendant took the stand denying consideration, the defendant should have led evidence (for example by examining Kailashchandra) to explain and substantiate that contention; the defendant failed to do so.

  3. Authority of Kailashchandra:

    The Court accepted record evidence that Kailashchandra was manager of the defendant at Bombay, had been given a Power of Attorney, and had powers to operate the defendant's accounts in Bombay (including issuing cheques and acknowledgements). Given these admitted facts, the Court found that transactions carried out by Kailashchandra in his capacity as manager and Power of Attorney holder were binding on the defendant. The Court further noted the defendant's failure to produce the Power of Attorney (which the defendant was challenging) and treated non-production, in the circumstances, as suggestive of intentional withholding; the defendant could not benefit from its own omission.

  4. Evaluation of other evidentiary objections:

    The Court considered other points raised by the defendant (lack of receipt, delay in presenting cheque, account-book irregularities, availability of funds) and concluded that while some of these matters carried prima facie force, none sufficiently discharged the defendant's burden to rebut the presumption under Section 118. For example, the Court observed that availability of funds at a particular time does not preclude incurring a loan; not taking a receipt could be explained by close relations and a short promised repayment period; and flaws in account books were not decisive given the central negotiable-instrument claim.

  5. Adequacy of the trial court's judgment:

    The Court found that the trial court's judgment reproduced counsel's submissions at length but failed to address or decide the submissions with reasons. The appellate court characterized the trial court's judgment as "a judgment without reasoning, without finding and conclusion", making it impossible to ascertain why the trial court dismissed the suit. This material infirmity in the trial court's judgment formed a key basis for allowing the appeal.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The Appeal is allowed; the Judgment and Decree dated 29 April 1980 of the City Civil Court at Bombay in Summary Suit No.3018 of 1974 is set aside and the Plaintiff's suit is decreed.

Direct consequences and orders made by the Court:

  • The Defendant is ordered to pay the Plaintiff Rs.23,400.
  • The Defendant is ordered to pay interest on Rs.20,000 at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of the suit until realization.
  • The Defendant is ordered to pay the costs of the Lower Court.
  • Parties are to bear their own costs in the Appeal.

Broader implications:

The opinion does not set out to establish any novel legal precedent. The Court's decision rests on application of established evidentiary principles concerning negotiable instruments (the rebuttable presumption under Section 118) and statutory definitions in the Bombay Money Lenders Act (requirement of advances at interest to attract the Act). The decision's practical effect is to reverse the trial court for failure to give reasoned findings and to decree the Plaintiff's claim on the cheque; no new law is articulated beyond these applications to the facts of this case.

    Sureshchandra Nandlal v. Lala Gopikrishna Gokuldas Agencies

    Advocates appeared :

    Mr. Rajesh C. Shah for the Appellant.

    Mr. N.J. Devashray for the Respondent.

    : This is an Appeal filed by the Appellant-Plaintiff against the dismissal of his Suit being Summary Suit No. 3018 of 1974 by the City Civil Court at Bombay as per the JUDGMENT and Decree dated 29th April, 1980.

    2. The said JUDGMENT and Decree was a common JUDGMENT in respect of two Summary Suits. Summary Suit No. 3018 of 1974 was filed by Sureshchandra Nandlal against Lala Gopikrishna Gokuldas Agencies and the Summary Suit No.3019 of 1974 was filed by Krishnachandra Laxmichand against Lala Gopikrishna Gokuldas Agencies. Though the JUDGMENT was common, since the Decrees were different, two different Appeals were preferred before this Court by the Plaintiff and this Appeal is only in respect of Suit No.3018 of 1974. The other Appeal did not come for hearing and Mr. Rajesh Shah, Counsel for the Appellant-Plaintiff is the present Appeal informed me that he is not appearing for the Appellants-Plaintiff is the other Appeal arising out of the Summary Suit No. 3019 of 1974. So far as this Appeal arising out of the Summary Suit No. 3018 of 1974 is concerned, the facts are as under :-

    07-01-1971

    Loan of Rs.20,000 /- was given to the Defendants by the Plaintiff Sureshchandra.

    03- 05-1971

    Cheque given by the Defendant in favour of the Plaintiff Sureshchandra.

    19-07-1971

    Cheque presented to the bank for the first time and dishonoured.

    24- 09-1971

    Cheque dishonoured for the second time.

    March 1972

    Kailashchand Bhaiya manager of the Defendants was removed from the service by the Defendant.

    15- 09-1972

    First notice of demand given by the Plaintiffs Advocate to the Defendant.

    14- 10-1972

    Defendants reply to the Plaintiffs Advocate.

    10- 12-1973

    Second notice of the demand from the Plaintiffs Advocate to the Defendant.

    19- 12-1973

    Reply of the Defendant to second notice of demand.

    20- 03-1974

    Suit filed.

    3. The Defendant before the Lower Court had contended that the Cheque was without consideration and was an accommodation cheque and hence the Plaintiff was not entitled for any Decree. The Defendant also pleaded that the suit transaction was hit by the provisions of Bombay Money Lenders Act. After recording evidence, the Lower Court gave finding regarding the two material Issues i.e. Issue Nos. 1 and 4 against the Plaintiff-Appellant and since the main Issue was decided against the Plaintiff, the Issue about the provisions of Money Lenders Act was not considered and decided by the Lower Court and the Suit of the Plaintiff was dismissed. The Plaintiff has challenged the said Order of dismissal by this present Appeal.

    4. I heard Mr. Rajesh Shah for the Appellant -Plaintiff and Mr. N.J. Devashray for the Respondent -Defendant. Mr.Shah contended that the Lower Court in its JUDGMENT merely reproduced the arguments of parties and did not give finding on any of the points raised. He further contended that the Lower Court failed to see that the Suit of the Plaintiff was based on negotiable instrument and not on consideration and this important aspect was lost sight of by the Lower Court . Mr. Shah contended that once the Defendant admitted to have issued cheque, the burden shifted on the Defendant to prove that the cheque was without consideration and since the Defendant failed to discharge their burden, the suit of the Plaintiff should have been decreed. Mr. Shah also raised some other points with which I will deal at appropriate time.

    5. On the other hand, it was argued by Mr. Devashray that the Suit of the Plaintiff was rightly dismissed by the Lower Court because the Plaintiff failed to prove the following counts :-

    (1) That when there was no relation of the Plaintiff with the Defendant, it was not acceptable that the Plaintiff would advance such a huge amount of Rs.20,000/- to the Defendant.

    (2) If at all, any advance was made by the Plaintiff to an unknown person, the Plaintiff was required to obtain receipt for the same, but no such receipt was accepted and no satisfactory explanation was given by the Plaintiff in that regard.

    (3) The case of the Plaintiff was that it was a sarafi transaction. The word sarafi was nowhere pleaded in the Notice which preceded the suit or in the plaint and no explanation was given by the Plaintiff for this omission.

    (4) If the transaction was a loan transaction, the Plaintiff did not charge an interest in the Accounts Book when the Defendant failed to repay the loan within 15 days or within the time agreed.

    (5) The cheque that was given by the Defendant was not presented immediately, and the presentation of the cheque was only after two months.

    (6) That the Defendant was in sound financial position and was not in need of any loan or money.

    (7) That Kailaschandra was not authorised to borrow money and Plaintiff before advancing loan to Mr. Kailashchandra should have made necessary enquiry as to the right and powers of Kailashchandra to raise loan for the Defendant.

    (8) That Books of Account were not relied upon by the Plaintiff initially when the Plaint was filed though affidavit of document was filed in that regard and the books of account were not proper, not regularly kept in course of business, were written in pencil and therefore the Books of Account should have been rejected.

    (9) That the Plaintiff was admittedly the money lender and sine the Suit transaction was a money lending transaction, the suit was liable tobe dismissed under the Bombay Money Lenders Act, 1946.

    6. I would deal with the submission of the Defendants Advocate regarding the application of Bombay Money Lenders Act, 1946 to the Suit of the Plaintiff. In the cross-examination the Plaintiff had admitted that they are advancing loans to different persons and that this transaction of the Plaintiff with the Defendant was a loan transaction. In my opinion, these admissions are not sufficient to attract the provisions of Bombay Money Lenders Act, 1946 because neither it is the case of the Plaintiff that they had charged any interest on the loan advanced or that they claimed interest on the loan advanced nor it is the case of the Defendant that they had agreed to pay interest on the amount of the loan advanced. The definition of the word loan as given in the Bombay Money Lenders Act is that Loan means an advance at interest and to carry on business of money-lending, means : business of advancing loan. If these two definitions are clubbed together then it means that if a person advances loans at interest then he can be considered to be a money lender and the advance made by him can be considered as a loan. In the instant case the Defendant could not prove that it was an advance at interest and therefore the objection of the Defendant that provisions of Bombay Money Lenders Act are attracted cannot be accepted. Parties might have termed transaction as a loan in order to attract the provisions of Bombay Money Lenders Act, it is necessary to prove the factum of interest being charged on loan. In fact the argument of the Respondents Advocate that the Plaintiff-Appellant did not charge interest in their accounts, supports the case of the Appellant and not the Respondent that in the transaction there was no talk or agreement regarding interest. Therefore, not charging interest in the accounts by the Plaintiff goes against the Defendant so for as their objection regarding applicability of Bombay Money Lenders Act is concerned.

    7. Some of the objections raised by the Respondents Counsel prima facie appear to have some force. It is true that in the notice given by the Plaintiff before the Suit, there is no mention of any loan and the notice merely refers to the cheque given by the Defendant. It is also true that in the Suit no relief is based on accounts nor there is any mention of sarafi loan. However, as rightly argued by Mr. Shah, the case of the Plaintiff since the beginning was based on negotiable instrument and not on consideration. Mr. Shah contended that if the Notice preceding the Suit and the Suit were based on negotiable instrument then it was not at all necessary for the Plaintiff to make reference to any loan transaction either in the Notice or in the Plaint or to refer to sarafi loan or even refer to the accounts book of the Plaintiff.

    8. Mr. Shah further contended that since the execution of the cheque was admitted but consideration denied, the Defendant was required to enter the witness box first and after the Defendant gave his evidence then burden shifted on the Plaintiff as usually happens in the Civil Suit, and therefore the Plaintiff was required to give evidence of the loan transaction, give explanation about sarafi loan and was required to rely upon the accounts book. A perusal of the Plaint, notice given by the Plaintiff and the Issues framed by the Court, gives strong support to the argument of Mr. Shah and its reply to the objections of Respondents counsel. When the Plaintiff had given notice on the basis of negotiable instrument and filed suit on the same, then the Plaintiff was not required to make any mention about the loan transaction or about Sarafi loan and the mutual talk between the parties and to rely upon the books of account.

    9. The main contention of the Respondents counsel was that Kailashchandra with whom the Plaintiff had loan transaction was not authorised to raise loan for the Defendant and therefore the cheque issued by Kailashchandra was not in respect of any loan raised or incurred by the Defendant but it was the personal cheque by Kailashchandra given to the Plaintiff for the personal loan taken by him from the Plaintiff. The respondents counsel, therefore contended that this private loan transaction of Kailashchandra cannot bind the Defendant firm. This argument cannot be accepted as it is contrary to record. It is an admitted fact and proved by the evidence that Kailashchandra was the Manager of the Defendant in Bombay (Office of the Defendant was at Madras). It is also an admitted fact that Kailashchandra had Power of Attorney duly executed in his favour by the Defendant and that Kailashchandra had powers to operate accounts of the Defendant firm in Bombay which included the power to issue cheques and give acknowledgement. If this is a practice then it was not necessary for the Plaintiff to enquire whether Kailashchandra had powers to raise loan. In fact Kailashchandra was Agent of the Defendant in Bombay and in addition he was holder of Power of Attorney and as such any transaction by Kailashchandra with the third party in his capacity as Manager is bound to be binding on the Defendant.

    10. In this connection, it was rightly argued by the Plaintiffs Advocate that since the apportioned cheque was issued by Kailashchandra and since the Defendant was challenging the authority of Kailashchandra the Defendant should have produced the Power of Attorney executed by them in favour of Kailashchandra. Admittedly, the Power of Attorney is not produced by the Defendant and looking to the background of the case and the circumstance brought on record as quoted above non-production of the Power of Attorney in the Court appears to be intentional. At any rate, the Defendant cannot be permitted to reap the benefit of their own wrong.

    11. It was argued by Respondents Counsel that Kailashchandra was a dishonest man and was removed from the service. But in my opinion this cannot save the Defendant from the acts of Kailashchandra which he did in his capacity as agent and Power of Attorney holder of Defendant. D.W.1, the controller of accounts of the Defendant at Madras stated in his evidence that Kailashchandra was a manager of the firm of the Defendant at Bombay and he left the service in March 1972 as his services were terminated and that Kailashchandra died in August 1972. No documentary evidence is produced by the Defendant to show the termination of the service nor anything is produced on record to show that services of Kailashchandra were terminated on account of complain against him that he was borrowing monies from the market personally and was drawing excess money from the firm. In fact this was an important aspect because the Defendant was trying to disown its liability on the ground that the transaction between Kailashchandra and the Plaintiff was a personal transaction, having no connection of the Defendant. As quoted above it was argued by the Defendant/Respondents Counsel that if the Plaintiff had no relation with the Defendant they could not have advanced such huge amount and that too without obtaining receipt. It is true that prior to this transaction the Plaintiff did not advance any loan to Defendant. however, P.W.1 has stated that the relations of his father with Kailashchandra were close. My attention was drawn to the admission of D.W.1 on page 12, wherein he has stated that no dealing at any time with the Plaintiffs company. However, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in this regard. Similarly, not obtaining receipt for Rs.20,000/- from Kailashchandra cannot be considered as a circumstance creating suspicion about the transaction. Firstly, because Kailashchandra was known to the Plaintiff as Manager of the Defendant firm and he had promised to repay the loan within 7 to 15 days and therefore it is not unnatural that the Plaintiff did not obtain any receipt. P.W.1 in his evidence at internal page 27 had admitted that because of close relation of his father with the Defendant i.e. Kailashchandra , P.W.1 was not in a position to ask for any receipt or interest. The Counsel for the Defendant also attacked the case of the Plaintiff on the ground that account books of the Plaintiff were not maintained in the regular course of business, that there were erasures and alterations and they were written in pencil. The Respondents counsel also tried to contend that as against this the account books of the Respondent were maintained in regular course of business and they were properly proved and therefore their accounts books were liable to be accepted and account books of the Plaintiff were liable to be rejected.

    12. In my opinion when the Suit is based on negotiable instrument and particularly when the cheque was issued and given by the Defendant, burden lies mainly on the Defendant to prove want of consideration. In their reply notice, that Defendant has admitted that the cheque was issued as accommodation cheque, that none of the witness of the Defendant tried to explain what they mean by accommodation cheque . Examination of Kailashchandra by the Defendant was hence all the more necessary to explain the terminology of accommodation cheque. If the Defendant failed to explain the circumstance under which they issued cheque and what was meant by terms accommodation cheque , then in my opinion finding is required to be given against the Defendant for failure to prove its case or discharge its burden as fixed upon them by Issue No.1. In fact, once the cheque was issued by the Defendant and they take the stand that it was an accommodation cheque, then the accounts books of both the parties become irrelevant. It is true that presumption under Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is rebuttable, but in my opinion the Defendant has failed to discharge the burden.

    13. It was also further argued by Respondents Counsel that as per the accounts maintained and produced by the Respondent there was sufficient cash balance with the Respondent and this clearly indicated that they were not in need of any loan on that day. Availability of funds may be a circumstances in favour of the Defendant but not a strong circumstance to discard the case of the advancement of loan. In every case there cannot be any connection between availability of funds and incurring loan. Parties may require loan even if they have sufficient funds at their disposal.

    14. It was contended by Respondents Counsel that he has brought on record all the aforesaid circumstances to show that preponderance of probability should be held in favour of the Defendant. It is true that a Civil Suit is to be decided on preponderance of probability but every piece of evidence and every point of argument has to be considered and either accepted or rejected. I have dealt with most of the points raised by the Counsel for the Respondents and none of those points is strong enough to discharge burden which lies upon the Defendant to rebutt the presumption under Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

    15. The JUDGMENT of the Trial Court shows that the Trial Court had clearly reproduced the arguments of both the advocates at length but has nowhere dealt with any of the submissions made and not given any reason for accepting the case of the Defendant or rejecting the case of the Plaintiff. The JUDGMENT of the Trial Court therefore suffers from material infirmity. In fact, it is a judgment without reasoning, without finding and conclusion and therefore this Court is at a loss because it is not in a position to find out as to what weighed with the Trial Court in dismissing the Suit. For all these reasons the Appeal is required to be allowed hence the following Order :-

    -: ORDER :-

    Appeal is allowed. JUDGMENT and Decree dated 29th April 1980 passed by the City Civil Court at Bombay in Summary Suit No.3018 of 1974 is set aside and the Suit of the Plaintiff is decreed and the Defendant/Respondent are ordered and directed to pay to the Plaintiff/Appellant a sum of Rs.23,400/- with interest on Rs.20,000/- at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of the suit till realisation and costs of the Lower Court.

    Parties to bear their own costs in the Appeal.

    Order accordingly.

    .

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Sureshchandra Nandlal v. Lala Gopikrishna Gokuldas Agencies
    (Apr 26, 1996)