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Case Number

Civil Contempt Appeals Nos. 1 of 1980 and 6 of 1981 with Civil Application No. 4189 of 1981

Attorney(S)

— R.T Walawalkar with N.V Walawalkar.
— Madhukar Soochak.
— M.M Sakhardande.
For Advocate General:— M.R Kotwal, Govt. Pleader.
For State:— C.D Shenoy, Asstt. Govt. Pleader.
For State:— C.D Shenoy, Asstt. Govt. Pleader.

Judges

B.A Masodkar
S.J Deshpande, JJ.

Acts

CONTEMPT OF COURTS ACT 1971
clauses (b) and (c) of section 2
section 19, sub-section (1)
CONTEMPT OF COURTS ACT

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Smart Summary

Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion (B.A. Masodkar, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

Two consolidated appeals were heard and decided by a common judgment.

First appeal: Challenged an order of the learned Single Judge refusing to take cognisance of an allegation, made before the Joint Civil Judge, Junior Division, Poona (Civil Suit No. 93 of 1970), that the defendant had committed contempt of Court. The Civil Court had made a reference; after perusal and hearing, the Single Judge of the High Court found no case for taking cognisance and held that the plaintiffs' remedy lay in objecting to the new construction and obtaining a preventive order. The reference was rejected.

Second appeal: Concerned the dismissal in limine by the learned Single Judge of an application alleging civil contempt by reason of wilful disobedience to an order made by the learned Single Judge in Appeal from Order No. 842 of 1981.

It is common ground in both matters that the allegations involve "civil contempt" as defined by the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (see section 2(b)). The Single Judge in each matter declined to exercise contempt jurisdiction or take cognisance of the complaints.

Procedurally, when the first matter was listed the Court considered the tenability of the appeals under section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act and issued notices to the State of Maharashtra and the Advocate General; Mrs. Shenoy, Assistant Government Pleader, appeared on behalf of the State and the Advocate General.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether an appeal "as of right" lies under section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, against an order refusing to exercise jurisdiction and declining to take cognisance of allegations of civil contempt.
Whether clause 15 of the Letters Patent or other intra-court remedies can provide an appellate remedy where the special statute (the Contempt of Courts Act) limits appeals under section 19.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (represented by Mr. Walawalkar)

Relied on the Bombay High Court decision in Vishwanath Ramkrishna Rajwade v. Shri Cordeiro (ILR 1977 Bom. 1658) to submit that matters of civil contempt are independent proceedings and that a person who moves the Court for cognisance and punishment is an aggrieved party if cognisance is refused.
Argued that because civil contempt matters may permit effective orders and enforcement beneficial to the complainant, such a complainant should be entitled to appeal under section 19 of the Act when cognisance is refused.
Also relied on Hem Bala Dassi v. Sundar Shaw (AIR 1953 Cal 627) and invoked clause 15 of the Letters Patent to contend that an intra-court appellate remedy might lie notwithstanding the statutory scheme.

Respondent / State (as represented before the Court)

Opposing counsel countered the submissions, relying on the statutory language and the Supreme Court authority (Baradakanta v. Misra, C.J. Orissa H.C., 1975 3 SCC 535) that a refusal to initiate contempt proceedings is not a decision in exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and therefore is not appealable as of right under section 19.
The Court's reasoning also notes arguments that special statutory provision for appeals (section 19) cannot be undermined by a Letters Patent remedy (clause 15) and that appeals are creatures of statute; where the statute provides a limited right, that must govern.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Baradakanta v. Misra, C.J. Orissa H.C., 1975 3 SCC 535	Holds that where a Court rejects a motion or reference and declines to initiate proceedings for contempt, it has refused to assume jurisdiction to punish for contempt; such a decision is not a decision in exercise of jurisdiction to punish and is therefore not appealable as of right under section 19, sub-section (1) of the Act.	The Court relied on this Supreme Court decision as decisive: it concluded that appeals against orders refusing to take cognisance of contempt are not tenable under section 19 and that the point of tenability is no longer res integra.
Vishwanath Ramkrishna Rajwade v. Shri Cordeiro, Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, ILR 1977 Bom. 1658	Discussed the independent nature of civil contempt proceedings and suggested that a complainant may obtain effective orders if cognisance is taken.	The Court held that this decision did not address the tenability of an appeal under section 19 and was not authority for the proposition that section 19 is available as of right where no penal order is made; the Court rejected reliance on it for tenability.
Hem Bala Dassi v. Sundar Shaw, AIR 1953 Cal 627	Relied upon by counsel to support availability of intra-court Letters Patent remedy (clause 15) in contempt matters.	The Court held that this Calcutta High Court decision is not available in view of the Supreme Court judgment (Baradakanta) and that reliance on Letters Patent cannot override the special statutory scheme created by the Contempt of Courts Act.
Sukhdeo Singh v. Teja Singh, AIR 1954 SC 186	Cited for the proposition that Courts of Record possess inherent power to punish for contempt and that special jurisdiction underlies contempt jurisdiction.	The Court cited this authority (and Parashuram Detaram v. Emperor) to emphasize that the Act was enacted on the foundation of inherent jurisdiction and therefore remedial measures must be founded on the text of the statute.
Parashuram Detaram v. Emperor, AIR 1945 PC 134	Same general principle: existence of special jurisdiction in Courts of Record to punish for contempt.	Used to support the view that the Contempt of Courts Act embodies the special jurisdiction and that remedies (including appeals) must flow from the Act's provisions.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's reasoning proceeded by statutory construction and precedent:

Nature of orders under challenge: The impugned orders did not take cognisance of contempt nor impose any penal order; they were refusals to exercise contempt jurisdiction.
Binding Supreme Court authority: The Court relied on the Supreme Court decision in Baradakanta v. Misra (1975 3 SCC 535), which holds that a decision declining to initiate contempt proceedings is not a decision in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and therefore does not fall within the opening words of section 19(1) of the Act — hence no appeal as of right under that provision. The Court quoted this passage and treated it as dispositive of the tenability question.
Uniformity between civil and criminal contempt: The Court rejected any distinction that would allow appeals in civil contempt refusals but not in criminal contempt refusals. It reasoned that there is no principled basis in the statute to create different appealability for civil versus criminal contempt where the order under challenge is a refusal to take cognisance; either both categories should be appealable or none, and the Supreme Court’s ratio precludes such appeals.
Scope of Letters Patent / Clause 15: The Court explained that reliance on clause 15 of the Letters Patent to produce an intra-court remedy cannot be used to circumvent a special statutory scheme that enacts a limited right of appeal. Appeals are creatures of statute; where a special statute governs procedure and appeal rights (the Contempt of Courts Act), those statutory limits control and cannot be undermined by invoking Letters Patent.
Statutory structure and effect: The opinion analyzed provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act — notably sections 2 (definitions), 9 (declaratory provision), 12–14 (punishment and procedure), 15, 17, 18 (criminal contempt procedure), and especially section 19 (appeal remedy). The Court construed section 19 as a self-contained remedy that applies only to orders or decisions rendered in the exercise of the jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Because the impugned orders were refusals to assume or exercise that jurisdiction, they did not qualify for appeal under section 19.
Conclusion from combined analysis: For these reasons — statutory text, structure, and binding Supreme Court precedent — the Court held the appeals not tenable under section 19, and clause 15 of the Letters Patent could not be invoked to supply an alternative appellate remedy.

Holding and Implications

Primary Holding: The appeals were held not tenable and were dismissed. The Court concluded that orders refusing to take cognisance of civil contempt do not constitute decisions "in the exercise of the jurisdiction to punish for contempt" and are therefore not appealable as of right under section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.

Disposition in the Case: The appeals failed and were dismissed with no order as to costs. The Court made no order on Civil Application No. 4189 of 1981.

Implications:

Direct effect on the parties: The appellants' attempts to challenge the Single Judge's refusals to take cognisance of civil contempt were unsuccessful; those refusals stand and the appellants have no right of appeal under section 19 against such orders.
On remedies and precedent: The Court expressly relied on the Supreme Court's Baradakanta decision to conclude the point of tenability is settled; the opinion emphasizes that the Contempt of Courts Act provides the exclusive statutory scheme for initiation, procedure and appeals in contempt proceedings. The judgment does not purport to create new precedent beyond applying binding Supreme Court authority and construing the statute; it treats the appeals as non-appealable under the statutory framework.

Final remark from the opinion: "Appeal held not tenable." (Appeals dismissed; no order as to costs.)

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Vasant Vishnu Vartak By Heirs Lilabai And Others v. Padmakar Vishnu Vartak .

B.A Masodkar, J.:— These two appeals can be disposed of by common judgment. The first of it questions the order made by the learned Single Judge of this Court refusing to take cognisance with regard to the grievance that was made before the Joint Civil Judge, Junior Division, Poona, in the proceedings in Civil Suit No. 93 of 1970 and the reference made thereupon by the Civil Court. The prayer was that the defendant has committed contempt of the Court and suitable action should be taken. After perusing the reference and hearing the parties, the learned Single Judge of this Court found that no case existed for taking cognisance and the proper course for the plaintiffs was, in fact, to object to the new construction and obtain necessary preventive order from the Court. Observing thus, the reference was rejected.

2. In the second matter, the learned Single Judge dismissed in limine the appellant's application complaining that contempt has been committed because there was wilful disobedience shown by the respondents to the order made by the learned Single Judge of this Court in Appeal from Order No. 842 of 1981. It is not in dispute before us that both these matters are concerning “civil contempt” within the contemplation of the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”), which defines that category of contempt in section 2(b) of the Act. Further, it is apparent that in both these matters by the orders under challenge this Court, acting by the learned Single Judge, refused to exercise the jurisdiction and take cognisance of the alleged contempt. “Civil contempt” has been defined as meaning wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a Court. The learned Single Judge did not find sufficient reason to consider the matters, as having been covered by the definition and, in fact, in the first matter the Court observed that the remedy of the complainant lay somewhere else.

3. When the first of the matters came up for hearing, the question of tenability of the appeals, as is provided by section 19 of the Act, also was raised for consideration and notices were issued to the State of Maharashtra as well as to the Advocate General of Maharashtra. In both the matters, Mrs. Shenoy, the learned assistant Government Pleader, addressed us on behalf of the State as well as on behalf of the Advocate General.

4. After hearing the learned Counsel for both sides, we do not think that against such judgments or orders refusing to exercise jurisdiction and take cognisance upon the complaints concerning civil contempt, any appeal is provided or would lie, as of rignt, under section 19 of the Act. This is particularly so because of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Baradakanta v. Misra, C.J Orissa H.C . 1975 3 SCC 535, the ratio of which shows that the present type of question of tenability is no more res integra. That judgment indeed clearly concludes the controversy.

5. As we have indicated above, the character of the orders under appeal is such that this Court neither took cognisance of contempt nor made any order punishing any party for such contempt or made any other order of that character. No doubt, in the decision rendered by the Supreme Court, the matter with which the Court was concerned was one of criminal contempt and with regard to that the eventual judgment was rendered. But that would hardly make any difference with regard to the tenability of such appeals. It is indeed difficult to hold that on the ratio available in the judgment of the Supreme Court in the similar circumstances where the order under appeal does not take cognisance or the Court refuses to exercise the contempt jurisdiction in criminal contempt an appeal would not lie, while in the identical matter by reason that allegations were the one that would bring out civil contempt, an appeal is intended to be provided. The general principle with regard to such remedy against orders made in proceedings for punishing for civil contempt and in the criminal contempt does not admit any such differentia. Remedy of appeal will have to be made available either in both of the categories or none. This is more so when the matter is one of construction of the terms of the statute.

6. It is enough to quote from the decision of the Supreme Court, which categorically rules out such a remedy.

“It is only when the Court decides to take action and initiates a proceeding for contempt that it assumes jurisdiction to punish for contempt. The exercise of the jurisdiction to punish for contempt commences with the initiation of a proceeding for contempt, whether suo motu or on a motion or a reference. That is why the terminous a quo for the period of limitation provided in Section 20 is the date when a proceeding for contempt is initiated by the Court. Where the Court rejects a motion or a reference and declines to initiate a proceeding for contempt, it refuses to assume or exercise jurisdiction to punish for contempt and such a decision cannot be regarded as a decision in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Such a decision would not, therefore, fall within the opening words of section 19, sub-section (1) and no appeal would lie against it as of right under that provision.”

(Emphasis supplied.)

7. However, what Mr. Walawalkar argued may be briefly noticed so as to indicate that these submissions too are without any merit. Relying on the decision of this Court in the case of Vishwanath Ramkrishna Rajwade v. Shri Cordeiro, Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate . ILR 1977 Bom. 1658., Mr. Walawalkar submitted that the matters of civil contempt are independent matters and the person who moves the Court for taking cognisance and punishing contemnor for civil contempt has an additional entitlement, in that even effective orders and compliance by enforcement is possible as is indicated by this Court in this decision. From this, the learned counsel contended that such a party would be “the aggrieved party” if no cognisance was taken of such complaint. The party being aggrieved by reason of the refusal to exercise the jurisdiction, section 19 of the Act should be available, as of right, so as to question such refusal by filing an appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court. The learned counsel further relied on the decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Hem Bala Dassi v. Sundar Shaw . AIR 1953 Cal 627., so as to submit that even upon the principles underlying clause 15 of the Letters Patent read with section 19 of the Act, the party would be entitled to the remedy of appeal and that too as of right. All these submissions of the learned counsel are countered by the opposing learned counsel appearing in these matters.

8. As far as the decision of this Court in the case of Vishwanath Ramkrishna Rajwade v. Shri Cordeiro, Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (supra) is concerned, it is enough to observe that the Court was not concerned with the question of tenability of the appeal and is no authority for the proposition that in the matters of civil contempt, section 19 of the Act is available as of right even though no penal order is made. The observations that what could be done in the matters of civil contempt if cognisance is taken can hardly further such a submission. Even for giving reliefs of such a kind involving submission to the order, the Court must decide to exercise the contempt jurisdiction by taking cognisance and then make such order. Only after such decision, it is conceivable, as this decision states, that the orders of the type that may be in the interest of the complaining party, could be made by the Court apart from holding the person guilty for contempt. Such order then would be the order in exercise of the jurisdiction to punish for contempt.

9. The decision rendered by the Calcutta High Court in the case of Hem Bala Dassi v. Sundar Shaw (supra) similarly is not available in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court. Strictly speaking, remedy of appeal when provided by the special statute can hardly be spelt out by relying on clause 15 of the Letters Patent which itself is a remedy of intra-Court appeal. If the initiation of the proceedings as well as its procedure and further the matters of making competent orders are all the matters governed by the enacted statute and such statute provides for the remedy of an appeal, it is indeed difficult to find force in the submission that we should still rely on clause 15 of the Letters Patent so as to interfere with the orders which are non-appealable under the Act. Such a position bristles with the danger that affects the basic principles with regard to the uniformity in the administration of justice. Surely, we cannot conceive two remedies in the same and identical cause, particularly when we are concerned with a special statute. If the remedy has to be found out under the special statute like the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, undoubtedly, the foundation for the same must be the special statute particularly when it enacts a limited specific right of appeal. Appeals by their very nature are the creatures of the statute. Unless those are clearly provided, by mere implication, the remedy cannot be made available. We cannot, therefore, persuade ourselves to hold that such orders, which are non-appealable under section 19 of the Act, should be appealable under clause 15 of the Letters Patent of this Court. This is more so because no party can claim a right in the matter of contempt, the principle being that the matters of contempt are between the contemnor and the Court. If we were to hold otherwise, we would be providing two parallel remedies for appeals. Such a construction by the very reason of the fact that we are dealing with the special statute will be against the principles of harmonisation and providing for uniformity in the matters of administration of justice. The reliance placed on clause 15 of the Letters Patent, therefore, by the learned counsel is not of much avail.

10. Even in the text of the statute, we do not find that with regard to providing for the remedy like that of an appeal, any real distinction or differentiation can be made on the basis of categorisation of the matters in contempt. No doubt, the definition of the term “contempt of Court” indicates merely the categorisation of civil contempt or criminal contempt, as is available in section 2 of the Act. The principal distinction between these two categorisations is made clear by clauses (b) and (c) of section 2 which is the defining provision. As far as the procedural part is concerned, the contemnor is required to be dealt with by the same procedure. The provision of section 9 of the Act has been enacted by way of abundant caution and is a declaratory one so as to make it clear that nothing contained in the enactment will be construed as implying that any disobedience, breach, publication or other act would be punishable as contempt of Court which would not be so punishable apart from the Act. These provisions of section 9 of the Act are by themselves clarificatory and on the matters enacted in other parts of the Act, no further implication is possible. To the extent of the enactment, both the matters of contempt and punishment therefor will have to be treated as having been fully and exhaustively provided for by the special statute.

11. It is true that every Court of Record, like that one of High Court, should and is possessed of the power to punish for contempt so as to maintain the majesty and dignity of the Court and keep the administration of justice unsullied. But, nonetheless, the power to institute proceedings and impose punishment in such proceedings are the matters of special jurisdiction which is inherent in Courts of Record. (See Sukhdeo Singh v. Teja Singh C.J . AIR 1954 SC 186. and Parashuram Detaram v. Emperor . AIR 1945 PC 134.). That such special jurisdiction exists and is made the foundation of the enactment of the Contempt of Courts Act providing for the institution of the proceedings for contempt and also for making orders of penalty itself shows that all remedial measures must also be founded on the text of the said statute and not by recourse to any other law.

12. The provisions of sections 12 and 13 of the Act deal with matters of punishment for contempt of Court. The punishment can only be imposed after the cognisance is taken and the person is found guilty for contempt of Court, either civil or criminal, depending upon the allegations and facts in each case. Section 14 of the Act deals with the procedure where contempt is in the face of the Supreme Court or a High Court. Section 15 of the Act deals with cognisance in the matters of criminal contempt. Section 17 of the Act lays down the procedure after cognisance and section 18 of the Act deals with the hearing of cases of criminal contempt. Though the provisions of sections 15, 17 and 18 in this manner deal with the matters of criminal contempt, the following section 19 of the Act is not intended to apply only to the matters of criminal contempt. The provisions of section 19 of the Act are not, in other words, subject to nor are governed by sections 15, 17 and 18 of the Act. On the other hand, that is an independent provision with regard to the remedy of appeal. Read in its entirety, section 19 of the Act and its sub-sections are in the nature of self-contained remedy by which the orders or decisions made in exercise of the jurisdiction to punish for contempt can be subjected to the scrutiny at the higher forum, sub-section (1) enacting a right of appeal when the order or decision is in exercise of the jurisdiction to punish for contempt, sub-section (2) enabling the appellate Court to order suspension of such punishment or the order made in exercise of such jurisdiction and similarly providing for release on bail, sub-section (3) being of the same species, while sub-section (4) dealing with limitation. Sub-section (1) itself clearly indicates that the order or decision should be such which is rendered in exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and not of any other type. Such a decision would partake of that character which is provided for by section 12 of the Act and it would follow that unless the person is found guilty of contempt, he cannot be subjected to the order or decision of that character. These provisions equally apply to the matters of civil contempt and we see no reason to treat the matters of civil contempt differently for the purpose of an appeal under section 19 of the Act than the one arising under the category of criminal contempt. In the result, we hold that the present appeals are not tenable. Neither the provisions of section 19 of the Act confer any such right nor the provisions of clause 15 of the Letters Patent of this Court are available to the appellants to maintain such type of appeals, the matters being governed by the provisions of special statute and arising under special jurisdiction.

13. The appeals thus fail and are dismissed with no order as to costs. No order on Civil Application No. 4189 of 1981.

Appeal held not tenable.

Vasant Vishnu Vartak By Heirs Lilabai And Others v. Padmakar Vishnu Vartak .

Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion (B.A. Masodkar, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (represented by Mr. Walawalkar)

Respondent / State (as represented before the Court)

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Vasant Vishnu Vartak By Heirs Lilabai And Others v. Padmakar Vishnu Vartak .

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