1. The petitioner is landlord of premises situate at house No. 253, Ward No. 40, in Amravati, in a locality known as Khaparde Bagicha. He purchased this property on the 3rd October, 1970 and followed it up by riling this application before the Rent Controller requesting for permission to serve upon the tenant Laxmibai a notice to quit. The ground made out by him in his application is that he has been living in a rented house in Budhwara Amravati. That he wanted more accommodation and wanted his own house for his residence and convenience. He, therefore, purchased the suit house which he needs bona fide for his residence. These were the bare averments made in the application.

2. The application was resisted by the tenant. According to the tenant, the landlord does not bona fide need these premises for his occupation and residence. He has been in the habit of purchasing properties and selling them. That he had purchased a house in Aurangapura in about 1968 and sold it in March 1970. That in addition he has plots at other places. In short, the case of the tenant was that the landlord was dealing in real property, buying and selling at profit being his business. She seems to suggest that if the tenant is evicted the landlord owner would naturally be able to make more money by sale than otherwise.

3. The parties led evidence before the Rent Controller. The landlord examined himself and one Damodhar. On behalf of the tenant her son was examined. The Rent Controller came to the conclusion that the landlord has succeeded in proving his bona fide need. He, therefore, granted a permission to serve a quit notice under clause 13(3)(vi) of the Central Provinces and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as the Rent Control Order).

4. An appeal was filed by the tenant against the order of the Rent Controller to the Deputy Collector who allowed that appeal, set aside the order of the Rent Controller and held that the landlord had failed to prove that he needed the suit premises for his bona fide occupation. It is against this order of the Deputy Collector that the present petition is filed by the landlord.

5. Mr. Pradhan who appeared for the petitioner contended before me that the learned Deputy Collector came to the conclusion that the landlord's need was not bona fide on extraneous considerations and his judgment was based on surmises without there being any evidence whatsoever. According to him, the landlord was the owner of the premises, but he was living in a rented accommodation and if he wanted therefore to accommodate and stay in his own house there was nothing wrong about it. That it was not shown that his desire and intention to stay in the premises purchased by him was not honest. Merely because he had purchased a house and resold it would not mean that was his business. According to Mr. Pradhan, the landlord had given cogent and satisfactory reasons for selling that house on the ground that the locality in which it was situate was not good. He, therefore, submitted that the order of the Deputy Collector be set aside and that of the Rent Controller restored.

6. On behalf of the respondent it was submitted that the view taken by the Deputy Collector that the landlord has failed to prove that his need was bona fide was correct. It was pointed out that no sufficient or adequate grounds had been pleaded in the application. Whatever was pleaded was also not made out. The entire evidence adduced by the plaintiff-landlord, according to the respondent was vague and not sufficient to establish that the landlord bona fide needed the premises. That it is not merely enough for a landlord who happens to be an owner of the premises, to desire to have possession of the premises in the occupation of his tenant. There must be a real need to have those premises. It was contended that he being an owner and therefore, a landlord does not give a higher right to a person to take possession of premises from his tenant. The fact that he is an owner or landlord of the premises is only relevant for the purposes of his right to make an application. The real test was his bona fides and the need for the premises. Where that need and the honest intention to have those premises is not dictated by a necessity and need is not made out, the landlord would not be entitled to possession.

7. The relevant provisions of the Rent Control Order are to be found in clause 13(3)(vi). Sub-clause (1) of clause 13 places an embargo upon the rights of the landlords to terminate the tenancy of their tenants without a previous written permission of the Controller. The grounds on which such permission would be granted by the Rent Controller are specified in the following sub-clauses. Item (vi) of sub-clause (3) empowers the Rent Controller to grant such a permission where the “landlord needs the house or a portion thereof for the purpose of his bona fide occupation”. This right given to a landlord to obtain permission from the Rent Controller to serve a notice to quit upon his tenant is available to him, provided he does not occupy “any other house of his own in the City or Town concerned”. In other words if the landlord is in occupation of any other house of his own in the concerned City, then he has no right even under item (vi) of sub-clause (3) to apply to the Rent Controller for a permission.

8. We may now refer to sub-clause (5) of clause 13. It is sometimes said that this sub-clause affords protection to the tenants who have been deprived of their premises by virtue of the permission granted by the Rent Controller acting under item (vi) of clause 13(3) and he shall not let the said house or portion thereof to any person other than the evicted tenant except with the previous approval in writing of the Controller. In other words, where a landlord succeeds in obtaining possession from his tenant on the ground that he needs the premises for his bona fide occupation, he is prohibited from letting it out subsequently to any person other than the tenant who was so evicted without the previous approval in writing of the Rent Controller. It will be seen that this clause does not place any fetter or embargo upon the owner landlord thus acquiring possession, from selling the property as a vacant property or house to another. The only prohibition upon him is in letting it out to another and not selling. It also goes without saying that where apart from item (vi) of sub-clause (3) of clause 13 of the Order, there are other grounds on which permission is granted and possession recovered. It is doubtful if sub-clause (5) can have any operation.

9. The material words and expression which are required to be considered in the present case are that “the landlord needs the house for the purpose of his bona fide occupation.” It is necessary, therefore, before a landlord can make an application to the Rent Controller that there must be bona fides on the part of the landlord and he must “need” the premises. The word “bona fide” means honestly and in good faith. If the intention of the landlord in seeking possession of the premises is not honest and if his object in getting possession of the premises is not for the purpose of his occupation but for ulterior purposes, then it cannot be said that his application is bona fide or he bona fide wants the premises for nib occupation.

10. The word “need” however is a stronger word and cannot be equated with the word “desire”. The word need is used as a synonym of the verb require and is defined in the Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary as meaning when used as a verb “to want or to require”. When used as a noun it means “desire for something which one cannot well do without” and is equivalent to a necessity. It may be pointed out in this context that item (vii) of the said sub-clause uses the word ‘desire’ in distinction from the word “needs”. The word “require” has been similarly defined in the Chambers Dictionary when used as verb to mean “to demand or exact”. The word “requirement” has been correspondingly defined to mean “a need or a necessary condition”. It will thus be seen that the word “need” is synonymous with the word “require”. In Janba v. Rajeshkumar . 1975 Mh. L.J 746., my learned Brother Justice Dharmadhikari stated much the same view. He observed: “What is meant by bona fide need is that the landlord requires the premises for his reasonable needs.” He went on further to point out that “the need has to be reasonable and bona fide”. The onus of proof of this is certainly on the landlord. Although the word “reasonable” does not appear in the Rent Control Order, the question of reasonableness is relevant in deciding bona fides of the landlord. The word “reasonable” appears in the relevant provisions of the Bombay Rent Act. We are not concerned in the present case with the question as to whether the petitioner's request for possession of the suit premises was reasonable or otherwise. What is, however, patent and plain is that the expression “bona fide need” is synonymous and equivalent to “a bonafide requirement.”

11. As I pointed out earlier, the expression “need” or “requirement” is not equivalent to a mere desire. It postulates an element of necessity an urgency, a kind of pressure to have and not a thing which it would be fun to have or it would be advantageous to have something and not which must be had. A landlord seeking possession must, therefore, if the meaning of the word ‘require’ introduces an element of necessity or pressure, must establish that there is that element of compulsion or necessity, the necessity or “must have” for the premises which is present from the evidence. Where he fails to do so and not establish such a pressure, or the intensity of a desire amounting to a necessity, he will not succeed. That is the crux of the matter.

12. In Naresh v. Kanai Lal . AIR 1952 Cal. 852., it was observed that “the real distinction between “desire” and “require” lies in the insistence of that need. There an element of must have” in the case of “require” which is not present in the case of a mere ‘desire’. Ramaswamy, J. as he then was in Bhorilal v. Subramania Iyer . AIR 1954 Mad. 514. expressed himself in much the same way. He observed “the term” “bona fide requires” connotes something more than desire to have something and much less than absolute necessity.” Though, therefore, the element “must have” to any desire which has the edge of a need must be present, need not be of such a kind that one cannot do without and is an absolute necessity.

13. While considering similar provisions in the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, a Division Bench of this Court in Nimbibai v. Ragho . 1963 Mh. L.S 125 held: “The word “requires” imports an element of necessity. A mere desire or wish of the landlord to put the land to non-agricultural use is, therefore, not sufficient. He cannot get possession of the land merely because he would like to use the land for a non-agricultural purpose. He must prove some need or necessity for taking back possession of the land.” Now this need, need not be financial and can be of other kinds also, such as in the case of houses better surroundings, conveniences, facilities, the type and kind of accommodation and such other matters which would impart an element of urgency or necessity, to the fact of desire. Lord Du Pareq, J. observed in In re Newhill Comp. Purchase Order5 that the word “required” means “that without it there will be such a substantial deprivation of amenities or convenience that a real injury will be done to the property owner.” It will thus be seen that what is necessary to be established by a landlord who happens to be an owner, but thereby does not acquire any preferential right to obtain possession of premises merely on that ground from his tenant, that his desire to have the premises of his tenant is need based. As pointed out, the need need not be financial, but that is must be of such a character that the landlord “must have it” and if he does not have it he will be deprived of something which he cannot really do without. The evidence adduced by a landlord, therefore, must be tested against the background of this objective and subjective requirement. If these objective and subjective requirements are satisfied, then the landlord would be entitled to secure a permission from the Rent Controller to serve a notice to quit, not because he is an owner of the premises, but that being an owner has need of the premises.

14. It is not enough that this can be established by a landlord by adducing evidence. A tenant has to meet such a case and can only do so provided he is posted in advance as to what he has to meet. Where, therefore, an application by a landlord is devoid of such particulars and is bald, the tenant is necessarily prejudiced. I may in this connection refer to a decision reported in Ganpat v. Rameshwar . 1974 Mh. L.J 774.. In that case also the landlord had applied for permission on the ground that he required the premises bona fide for his personal occupation. He did not, however, give any details in his application and whether he needed it for the purpose of residence or for the purpose of “his business or for storing.” It was observed:

“Unless these details were given the tenant could not be expected to properly meet the case of the landlord. It is the landlord who has to make out a case for his need for bona fide occupation. For this purpose he must put before the Court all the necessary details which are required for granting him relief. On such vague allegation as made in the present application, the petitioner cannot expect to get relief on the ground of his bona fide occupation.”

In that case, the petitioner landlord had besides other houses which he owned. Though that may not be in the present case the position, the present application is also bereft of all details. The number of members in the family, the circumstance which was sought to be put forward during evidence that the locality where-in he stays in Budhwara is neither convenient nor good has also not been stated, as compared to the locality in which the premises in suit are situate. The landlord did not say how many members were in his family and in what manner it would be convenient to him to have the premises in question. He did not make out the needs of individual members of his family, nor did he point out the area which was actually in his occupation in the rented premises and the area which would become available to him after the tenant was evicted. In the absence of this comparative data and material being available and being put forward in the application, the tenant in meeting the case of the landlord would be gravely prejudiced. It would permit a landlord to make out a case at the time of trial in any manner he liked and the tenant would have no opportunity and occasion to meet such a case which is sprung in his face for the first time.

15. I have already pointed out that where a landlord requires premises bona fide, an element of necessity or compulsion must always be present. In what manner that compulsion or need was felt by the landlord is nowhere to be found in the present application. All that is said is that he wanted to have accommodation in his own house and for convenience. In what manner that convenience will be secured, the edge of necessity, is also left to guess. It would appear from the wording of the application that the landlord not only intends to keep the premises wherein he is a tenant, but wants additional premises, for, he says “He wanted more accommodation” and not that he wanted “the accommodation in suit”. It seems to me that the main object of the landlord is not to acquire accommodation in the suit house, but to have additional accommodation. If there did not exist any need for additional accommodation, then it would follow that the landlord's need was not bona fide. That aspect of the matter and in what way the landlord needed additional accommodation has nowhere been clarified during the evidence.

16. Lastly, it was sought to be contended that the petitioner in this case is the landlord owner of the house and as an owner if he desired to accommodate and stay in his house such a desire would be honest and there is no reason to doubt the landlord's bona fides. As I pointed out, the ownership of the premises does not under the Rent Control Order confer any special rights. The Order governs the relations between landlords and tenants and the word “landlord” as defined in clause 2(4) embraces categories of persons even other than the owners. Therefore, to say that a person is an owner does not place him at an added advantage as against his tenant. On the other hand, where the landlord owns premises besides the suit premises in question or owns other house, as pointed out, the proviso to item (vi) of sub-clause (3) of clause 13 takes away that right to apply for permission on the ground that the landlord needs the premises bona fide for his occupation.

17. The result, therefore, is that the petition fails and must be dismissed with costs.

Petition dismissed.