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  • r. 81(4) read with r. 121 of the Defence of India Rules
  • r. 81(4) of the Defence of India Rules
  • r. 121 of the Defence of India Rules
  • r. 81 of the Defence of India Rules.
  • INDIAN EMIGRATION ACT
  • s. 22 of the Arms Act,
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
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  • r. 81(4) read with r. 121 of the Defence of India Rules
  • r. 81(4) of the Defence of India Rules
  • r. 121 of the Defence of India Rules
  • r. 81 of the Defence of India Rules.
  • INDIAN EMIGRATION ACT
  • s. 22 of the Arms Act,
Smart Summary

Judicial Opinion Summary — Divatia, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an application in revision by two accused persons who were convicted by the Presidency Magistrate, 2nd Additional Court, Mazagaon, Bombay, for an offence under r. 81(4) of the Defence of India Rules read with the Commissioner of Police's Notification No. 14824/123-C dated 12 September 1944 (and r. 121 in the alternative).

Accused No. 1 was the proprietor of Islami Hotel, Grant Road, Bombay; Accused No. 2 was the hotel's manager. The hotel operated under a licence issued in 1941 and renewed thereafter. A notification issued 12 September 1944 (under r. 81(2)) prohibited sale or supply of articles of food or drink for consumption between 11 p.m. and 5 a.m. in the City of Bombay except under a police special permit. A special permit was issued to Accused No. 1 on 18 September 1944 authorising sale after 11 p.m. up to 1 a.m., so the accused were entitled to keep the hotel open from 5 a.m. to 1 a.m.

The prosecution's case was that a bogus customer attended the hotel at about 12:50 a.m. on 16 December 1944, was supplied food after 1 a.m., and that a police raid thereafter found 31 customers eating and drinking. A panchnama (inventory) was prepared between 1:45 a.m. and 2:00 a.m., including marked notes given to the bogus customer. The Magistrate found about 30 customers taking food after 1 a.m., convicted both accused under r. 81(4) (with r. 121 as an alternative), and sentenced Accused No. 1 to a fine of Rs. 25 and Accused No. 2 to a fine of Rs. 75. Both accused sought revision in this Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the alleged offence is an infringement of the terms of the licence only, or an infringement of the Defence of India Rules (r. 81(4)) by reason of the notification issued under r. 81(2).
  2. Whether the hours stated in the licence and the special permit (and hence the applicable prohibition hour of 1 a.m.) must be read in relation to the old standard time (when the licence was first issued) or the new standard time in force at the date of the notification and alleged offence.
  3. Whether the proprietor (Accused No. 1) is criminally liable for the offence committed by his servant/manager (Accused No. 2) under the Defence of India Rules and the notification — i.e., whether the master–servant exception to the general rule of non-liability applies.
  4. Whether charging Accused No. 1 alternatively under r. 121 (attempt or abetment) requires proof of intention and whether that affects the principal charge under r. 81(4).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' (Accuseds') Arguments — as advanced by Mr. Mehta

  • It was argued that the offence is essentially an infringement of the licence rather than of the Defence of India Rules; accordingly, the licence should be interpreted according to the standard time in force when it was issued (old standard time).
  • Because the original licence was issued under the old standard time, and renewals did not change the nature of that standard, the permit's reference to 1 a.m. should be read as 1 a.m. old standard time (i.e., 2 a.m. under the new standard time then in force). If so, the customers were not proved to have been supplied after 2 a.m., and no offence was made out.
  • Accused No. 1 (the proprietor) was not present at the time of the raid, had left management with two managers (names endorsed on the licence), and denied authorising managers to keep the hotel open after hours. He contended he should not be criminally liable for acts of the manager in his absence.
  • It was also urged that Accused No. 1 was charged under r. 121 (abetment) as an alternative, and abetment implies intention; thus, absence of intention would negate liability under r. 121.

Prosecution / Magistrate's Findings

  • The prosecution relied on the raid evidence showing customers served after 1 a.m. (police raid and panchnama, marked notes, panchnama timing 1:45–2:00 a.m.).
  • The Magistrate found that the proprietor, though absent, remained liable because, in his view, r. 81(4) creates an offence in respect of the licensed premises making personal guilty intention unnecessary; liability could be implied from the nature of the offence when committed by servants.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Halsbury's Laws of England (Hailsham Ed.), Vol. XXII, p. 232, art. 412 Summarises classes of cases where a master may be criminally liable for acts of his servant (four classes: (1) statute makes master liable in any event; (2) master liable unless he proves no default; (3) master liable if prosecution proves knowledge/connivance; (4) statute makes master liable for his own act only). The court used this classification to frame the analytical approach and to decide which class the present case falls into (first class).
Mullins v. Collins; Coppen v. Moore (No. 2); Parker v. Alder; Allen v. Whitehead Leading English cases illustrating situations where the legislature, by absolute prohibition or duty, renders the principal liable for acts done by servants without requiring proof of the principal's personal guilt. These cases were relied on to support the proposition that certain statutory prohibitions create strict liability of principals for servants' acts; the court treated them as guiding authorities for construing r. 81(4) and the notification.
Mousell Brothers v. London and North Western Railway Quoted for the proposition that the legislature may make prohibitions absolute so that principal is liable if act is done by servants, regardless of personal guilt; factors to consider include object of statute, words used, nature of duty, and on whom penalty is imposed. The court quoted this reasoning (via Allen v. Whitehead citation) to support construing the Defence of India Rules/notification in light of the rule's object and effect.
Mangat Ram v. Emperor (Full Bench, Lahore High Court — not reported) Dealt exhaustively with whether a servant (salesman/manager) is covered by the term 'dealer' under the Hoarding and Profiteering Prevention Ordinance; concluded proprietor could be held liable — the case fell within the first class of Halsbury's categories. The court treated this decision as directly applicable by analogy because the object of the notification under r. 81(2) (conserving and properly distributing food) is similar to the object of the Ordinance; it was used to support finding proprietorial liability.
Queen-Empress v. Tyab Alli An Arms Act case holding that a licence-holder was liable under s. 22 where the manager sold military stores without the licensee's knowledge or consent. The court cited this case as an example from its own High Court where licence-infringement led to proprietor liability even without knowledge, supporting application to the present licence/notification context.
Emperor v. A.M. Jeevanji Under the Indian Emigration Act: where servants commit a penal offence and proceedings are taken against the master, liability depends on true construction of the statute — statute must be construed with regard to language, subject-matter and object. The court relied on this principle to analyse r. 81 and the notification: the statute/notification must be construed regarding its object (preservation/distribution of food) and thus may impose absolute duties making the master liable.
Emperor v. Mahadewappa Hanmantappa Under the Indian Explosives Act: majority held that principle in A.M. Jeevanji applied and that the master was liable even without knowledge of the servant's breach of licence conditions. The court cited this as another High Court precedent applying the principle of construing licence/statute in light of its object to impose proprietor liability.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a series of analytical steps, applying statutory construction and precedents as follows:

  1. Time-standard issue:
    • Petitioners argued the times in the licence and special permit should be read with reference to the old standard time (licence originally issued under old standard time), meaning the permit's "1 a.m." would be 2 a.m. under the new standard time, and therefore the prosecution failed to prove supply after 2 a.m.
    • The Court rejected that contention: the special permit and the notification were issued at a time when the new standard time was in force, and absent specific mention to the contrary the hours in the notification and the special permit must be taken as being in the new standard time. The continuance of the licence without change did not preserve the old standard time for the purposes of the later permit/notification.
    • Conclusion: customers were found between 1 a.m. and 2 a.m. according to the new standard time; the time argument was without substance.
  2. Master–servant liability issue:
    • The Court acknowledged the general rule that a master is not criminally liable for acts of his servant but recognized established exceptions. It relied on Halsbury's classification of four classes of cases to frame the inquiry.
    • The Court examined whether the present case fell within the first class (statute makes the master liable in any event) by considering the object of the notification/statute and the words used. It noted that when Parliament/legislature enjoins an absolute prohibition for a public purpose (here, preservation and proper distribution of food), liability may attach to the principal irrespective of personal guilt.
    • The Court drew an analogy between the object of the Hoarding and Profiteering Prevention Ordinance (as considered in Mangat Ram v. Emperor) and the object of the notification issued under r. 81(2): both are concerned with conserving and properly distributing food articles. The full bench decision in Mangat Ram concluded proprietorial liability under the first class; the Court regarded that reasoning as applicable here.
    • The Court also cited several High Court precedents (Queen-Empress v. Tyab Alli; Emperor v. A.M. Jeevanji; Emperor v. Mahadewappa Hanmantappa) where licence-infringement statutes were construed with regard to object and language to impose liability on proprietors in similar circumstances.
    • Addressing a linguistic distinction urged by Mr. Mehta — that the notification uses passive language ("No article of food or drink shall be sold or supplied ...") focusing on the article rather than the person — the Court held that despite the grammatical difference the prohibition is absolute in either form and should be construed with the same practical effect: no article may be sold by any person in the prohibited period.
    • Conclusion: the notification and r. 81(4) create an absolute prohibition intended to achieve a public object, and the present case falls within the exception to the general rule; the proprietor (Accused No. 1) is criminally liable for his servants' acts in this context even without personal knowledge.
  3. Charge under r. 121 (attempt/abetment) as alternative:
    • The Court observed that Accused No. 1 was charged with the principal offence under r. 81(4) and, in the alternative, under r. 121. If convicted of the principal offence, the alternative charge need not be considered. The Court rejected the submission that abetment necessarily required proof of intention sufficient to negate the principal charge.
  4. Outcome of the analysis: Having resolved the time issue against petitioners and concluded that proprietorial liability applies under the Defence of India Rules/notification, the Court found the Magistrate's conviction sustainable.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court confirmed the convictions and sentences of both accused persons. The rule was discharged and the Magistrate's conviction and sentence were affirmed.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The conviction of Accused No. 1 (proprietor) under r. 81(4) of the Defence of India Rules and the Notification and the conviction of Accused No. 2 (manager) are confirmed; fines imposed by the Magistrate remain in force (Rs. 25 on Accused No. 1; Rs. 75 on Accused No. 2).
  • Reasoned consequence: The Court applied established principles and precedent to conclude that, in the context of an absolute statutory/notification prohibition enacted for a public and regulatory object (preservation/distribution of food), a proprietor can be held criminally liable for the acts of his servants even in the proprietor's absence or without his personal knowledge.
  • On precedent: The decision rests on application and analogy to earlier English and Indian authorities and a recent full-bench decision (Mangat Ram). The opinion does not purport to announce a new principle distinct from those authorities but applies them to the facts before the Court.
Conviction and sentence confirmed.

End of summary — based exclusively on the provided opinion text.

    Imperator v. Mahomad Bashir Ramjan No. 1 And Another No. 2 (Original Accused), Petitioners

    Divatia, J.:—

    This is an application by accused Nos. 1 and 2 who were convicted by the Presidency Magistrate, 2nd Additional Court, Mazagaon, Bombay, for the offence under r. 81(4) of the Defence of India Rules read with the Commissioner of Police's Notification No. 14824/123-C, dated September 12, 1944. Accused No. 1 is the proprietor of a hotel called Islami Hotel at the corner of Grant Road in Bombay, and accused No. 2 is a manager of the hotel employed by the first accused. The hotel served refreshments consisting of food and non-alcoholic drinks to customers by virtue of a licence issued to accused No. 1 in 1941 and renewed from year to year. The charge against the two accused was that they on December 16, 1944, kept their hotel open between the hours of 1 a.m and 5 a.m and did sell or supply for consumption on their premises food or drinks to customers and aided and abetted each other in doing so and thereby committed an offence punishable under r. 81(4) read with r. 121 of the Defence of India Rules and the above-mentioned notification. That notification was issued under r. 81, sub-r. (2), cl. (a), and it directed that from, September 20, 1944, 110 article of food or drink shall be sold or supplied for consumption between the hours of 11 p.m and 5 a.m at any place of entertainment in the City of Bombay except under and in conformity with the conditions of a special permit granted by the Police. The notification was issued on September 12, and it appears that such special permit was issued to the first accused on September 18, authorising him to keep open the said hotel for selling or supplying for consumption articles of food or drink after 11 p.m up to 1 a.m As a result of this special permit the accused were entitled to keep their hotel open from 5 a.m to 1 a.m on the next morning. The prosecution case was that a bogus customer was sent to the accused's hotel at about 12-50 a.m and he and other customers were supplied with food after 1 a.m Thereafter the police raided the hotel and found 31 customers eating and drinking in the hotel. Accused No. 2, i.e, the manager, was standing near the till. A panchnama was made of the things found in possession of the accused which included marked notes which were given to the bogus punter. The panchnama was begun at 1-45 a.m and concluded at 2 a.m Thereafter the accused were charged with the infringement of the terms of the notification under r. 81(4) of the Defence of India Rules. The bogus customer died after hearing of the case commenced, but the prosecution examined the panch witness, Deputy Inspector Soloman, and Sub-Inspector Khadke who had taken part in the raid.

    The learned Magistrate was satisfied on the evidence that about 30 customers were taking food in the hotel after 1 a.m On behalf of accused No. 1, the proprietor, it was urged that he was admittedly not present in the hotel at the time of the raid and he had left the entire management of the hotel in the hands of accused No. 2 and another manager, that he came to the hotel after the raid was over and that the licence was given to the hotel and not to accused No. 1 personally. The learned Magistrate was of the opinion that for the offence under r. 81(4) of the Defence of India Rules it was not necessary that there must be a guilty intention in the mind of the person charged, that it was sufficient if accused No. 1 was the proprietor of the hotel and that his servants committed the offence. The liability of the master for the crime of the servant was to be implied from the very nature of the offence created by that rule. He, therefore, held both the accused liable for the offence and convicted them and sentenced accused No. 1 to pay a fine of Rs. 25 and accused No. 2 to pay a fine of Rs. 75. Both the accused have come to this Court in revision.

    Mr. Mehta on behalf of the petitioners has urged two points before us. The first point is that the offence with which the accused are charged is really the infringement of the terms of the licence and not the infringement of the Defence of India Rules. His first contention is that the licence was given to the first accused in 1941 at which time the old standard time was in existence, and at the time when the accused was charged the new standard time had come into force which was one hour in advance of the old standard time. The hours of business originally mentioned, in the licence were 5 in the morning to 11 p.m standard time. The licence was renewed from time to time up to March 31, 1945. As the original licence was given under the old standard time, the renewal of the hours of business from time to time must also be considered to be under the old standard time even though the licence was renewed after the introduction of the new standard time. It is further urged that even under the special permit, which was issued in 1944, the time of 11 p.m which was extended to 1 a.m must also be read in reference to the old standard time because the time which was mentioned in the licence was extended by the special permit, and therefore the standard of time must be regarded as the same as it was when the original licence was issued. It was contended on that ground that 1 a.m mentioned in the special permit would be 2 a.m according to the present standard time, and that being so, no offence was committed because it has not been found that any food or drink was supplied to any customer after 2 a.m on that night. It is no doubt true that the licence was issued at the time when the old standard time was in force. It is, however, quite clear that the special permit was given in 1944 at a time when the new standard time was in force and after the issue of the notification on September 12 that notification read with the special permit prescribes, so far as the present accused are concerned, the hours of business between 5 a.m and 1 a.m, and in the absence of any specific mention, it must be taken that the hours of business which, are referred to in the notification must be the hours under the new standard time which was in force at that time and not under the old standard time. In our opinion, therefore, the time mentioned in the notification as well as the time mentioned in the special permit must be the new time which was then in force. The mere fact that the licence was continued from 1944 to 1945 without changing the nature of the standard time does not necessarily mean that even when the special permit was granted the time was intended to be the old standard time and not the new one. In our opinion, therefore, that argument is without any substance, and it must be taken that the customers were found in the hotel between 1 a.m and 2 a.m according to the new standard time.

    The second argument about the liability of accused No. 1 has some importance in law because there does not seem to be any authority on this point under the Defence of India Rules. It is common ground that accused No. 1, though the proprietor of the hotel, was not taking any active part in its management, and had left the management in the hands of two managers whose names were endorsed on the licence. He was also not present at the time when the raid took place, and his case is that he had not authorised the managers to keep the hotel open after the hours mentioned in the licence and the special permit. The question is whether accused No. 1, the master, is liable for the criminal act of his servant, accused No. 2. No doubt under the ordinary rule of law a master is not criminally liable for the acts of his servant, but there are certain well recognized exceptions to that rule, and in our opinion the present case falls under the exception and not under the general rule. A number of cases has been referred to by Mr. Mehta on this point. It is not necessary to refer to all of them. It is sufficient to say that the effect of the authorities has been summarized in Halsbury's Laws of England, Hailsham Edition, Vol. XXII, p. 232, art. 412, where the cases of the liability of the masters for the crimes of their servants are divided into four classes. The first class consists of cases where the statute might make the master liable for his servant's act in any event. In that case it was only necessary to show that the act was done by the servant in the course of his employment and within the scope of his general authority, and the liability of the master arose solely from his relation to the servant, and the absence of personal guilt was immaterial. The second class consists of cases where the statute might make the master liable for his servant's act unless he could prove that he himself was not in default. The third class consists of cases where the statute might make the master liable for his servant's act only if the prosecution proved affirmatively that he knew, either actually or constructively, of the servant's act or that he connived at its commission. The fourth class consists of cases where the statute might make the master liable, not for his servant's act, but only for his own. Under the first class the leading cases are Mullins v. Collins, Coppen v. Moore (No. 2), Parker v. Alder, and the latest case of Allen v. Whitehead. In the last of these cases the law has been summarized and it is observed, quoting from the case of Mousell Brothers v. London and North Western Railway,(5) as follows (p. 220):—

    “I think that the authorities cited by my Lord make it plain that while prima facie a principal is not to be made criminally responsible for the acts of his servants, yet the Legislature may prohibit an act or enforce a duty in such words as to make the prohibition or the duty absolute: in which case the principal is liable if the act is in fact done by his servants. To ascertain whether a particular Act of Parliament has that effect or not regard must be had to the object of the statute, the words used, the nature of the duty laid down, the person upon whom it is imposed, the person by whom it would in ordinary circumstances be performed, and the person upon whom the penalty is imposed.”

    On the facts of that case it was held that looking to the object of the statute, viz. the Metropolitan Police Act, the master was liable for the crime of his servant even though he was not aware of the offence committed by him.

    Mr. Mehta contends that the liability of the accused, if any, was under the licence, and not under the Defence of India Rules. But, in our opinion, although the basis of the liability is the conditions mentioned in the licence itself, the penalty for the infringement of the terms of the licence is provided in the Defence of India Rules. Reading rr. 81(2) and 81(4) together, it follows that the notification, which is issued under r. 81(2), enjoins the accused not to keep the hotel open after 1 a.m, and for a breach of the terms of the notification the penalty is provided in r. 81(4). It cannot be said, therefore, that the liability of the accused is only under the licence and not under the Defence of India Rules. If, therefore, the infringement is not merely of the terms of the licence but that of the terms of the notification issued under the Defence of India Rules, we have to see as to what the object of the Legislature was. In a very recent case (Mangat Ram v. Emperor), which is still not reported, of a full bench of the Lahore High Court the whole law, English as well as Indian, on this point has been exhaustively discussed by their Lordships. That was no doubt a case under the Hoarding and Profiteering Prevention Ordinance, and the question was “Whether a servant, be he a salesman or a manager, is covered by the term ‘dealer’ as used in the Ordinance”?

    The point which they had to decide was whether the proprietor of the shop was liable for the crime of his servant, which is exactly the question to be decided in the present case. No doubt that case was under the Hoarding and Profiteering Prevention Ordinance, while the present case is under r. 81 of the Defence of India Rules. In our opinion, however, that does not make any difference so far as the object of the Legislature is concerned. Just as the object of that Ordinance is to conserve the stocks of various articles for their proper distribution among the consumers, so also the object of the present notification issued under r. 81(2) is the preservation and proper distribution of articles of food by prohibiting their sale or supply after a certain hour at night. The object, therefore, of both these pieces of legislation seems to us to be the same, and therefore, the decision in the full bench case would, in our opinion, apply to the facts of the present case also. Their Lordships of the Lahore High Court after an exhaustive discussion of the point before them, came to the conclusion that the case fell under the first class of cases mentioned in Halsbury's Laws of England, because looking to the object for which the statute was enacted, it ought to be construed not merely with reference to its language, but also its subject-matter and object. We agree with the decision which the full bench arrived at in that case, particulary because we find that our High Court has also taken, the same view in several reported decisions. The first of these decisions is in Queen-Empress v. Tyab Alli. That was a case under the Arms Act, and it was also a case of infringement of the terms of the licence issued under that Act. It was held that where the manager of a licensed vendor of arms, ammunition and military stores sold certain military stores without previously ascertaining that the buyer was legally authorised to possess the same, the licensee was liable to punishment under s. 22 of the Arms Act, though the goods were not sold with his knowledge and consent. The leading cases of Mullins v. Collins, and Coppen v. Moore (No. 2), referred to by the above, were followed. The next case is Emperor; v. A.M Jeevanji.*. That was a case under the Indian Emigration. Act, and it was held, following the English case law, as follows (p. 627):—

    “Where a penal statute has been infringed by servants and criminal proceedings are taken against the master, although it lies upon the prosecutor to establish the master's liability, yet the question whether he is liable turns necessarily upon what is the true construction to be placed upon the statute … The Statute should be construed, not merely with reference to its language, but also its subject-matter and object.”

    The third case is Emperor v. Mahadewappa Hanmantappa*. That was also a case of infringement of the terms of a licence granted under the Indian Explosives Act. There it was held by majority of the Judges that the principle of English law enunciated in Emperor; v. A.M Jeevanji.* was applicable to the case of a crime committed by a servant in breach of the licence granted under the Indian Explosives Act, and that the master was also liable even though he had no knowledge of the crime committed.

    It is true that none of these cases was under the Defence of India Rules. In our opinion, however, that principle is much more applicable in a case coming under an emergency legislation, whether it is an ordinance or it is a notification issued under the Defence of India Rules.

    Mr. Mehta has further contended that the language of the notification is different from the language of the statutes which have been the subject-matter of judicial decisions in the English as well as Indian cases. Whereas all these statutes run to the effect that “No person shall do …”, in the present case the notification is worded in the passive voice and it says that “No article of food or drink shall be sold or supplied for consumption …” His contention is that what is prohibited is the sale of any article of food or drink, and that the liability is sought to be attached to the person who actually sells it and not necessarily to the owner or proprietor of the establishment. In our opinion, in spite of this difference between the language of the statutes and the notification in the present case, the prohibition of sale is absolute in both cases. It is true that in the statutes stress is laid on the person whereas in the notification stress is laid on the article of food or drink. But both of them are absolute in their nature inasmuch as no article of food or drink can be sold by any person. The object, as I said before, was that there should be preservation and proper distribution of the artioles of food and drink to the members of the public. If the object is the same in the Hoarding and Profiteering Prevention Ordinance where the language is in the active form and not in the passive form and where also the master is liable for the criminal act of his servant, we do not see any reason why the master should not be held liable for the criminal act of his servant in a case where the notification is worded in the passive form and not in the active form. We are, therefore, clearly of the opinion that the present case comes within the exception to the general rule that a master is not liable for the criminal act of his servant. That being so, the conviction of the first accused for the offence under r. 81(4) is, in our opinion, correct.

    It was lastly contended by Mr. Mehta that accused No. 1 was charged under r. 121 of the Defence of India Rules which applies to cases of attempt ox abetment, and that abetment necessarily implies an intention on the part of the doer of the act. In our opinion, the charge is not limited to the offence under r. 121. Accused No. 1 is charged with the principal offence under r. 81(4), and in the alternative of the offence under r. 121. If he is guilty of the principal offence, the question of his liability for the alternative offence would not arise.

    For these reasons we confirm the convictions as well as the sentences of both the accused, and discharge the rule.

    Conviction and sentence confirmed.
    J.G.E
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    Comments

    Imperator v. Mahomad Bashir Ramjan No. 1 And Another No. 2 (Original Accused), Petitioners
    (Aug 14, 1945)