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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (as delivered by Macklin, J., with an additional concurring opinion by Broomfield, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiffs sued for partition and separate possession of a share amounting to eight annas and ten and a half pies in properties known as the Shankar Khar and Shankar Wadi, and for a declaration of their right to receive a similar share in half the revenues of the village of Sape. They also sought an account of recoveries made by defendant 1, and by a purshis they dated their claim to an account from the year 1927.

A preliminary decree was granted for partition of the Shankar Wadi and Shankar Khar and for a declaration as to the assessment claimed of the village of Sape; the preliminary decree also ordered accounts to be taken of the plaintiffs' share in income received by the defendants from the year 1927. The Commissioner found Rs. 6,189-0-1½ to be due on accounts. By a final decree that sum was ordered to be paid by the defendants together with costs and future interest at six per cent from the date of the suit on a principal sum stated as Rs. 6,139. The defendants appealed both the preliminary decree (First Appeal No. 155 of 1940) and the final decree (First Appeal No. 294 of 1940).

The opinion recites relevant family-history facts (as pleaded and accepted for present purposes): an 1862 separation of three brothers (Trimbak, Ganesh and Shankar) with shares recognised, some property remaining joint; subsequent deaths, adoptions and litigation; a 1926 arrangement by which defendant 1 was to manage the property and pay an eight-anna share to the plaintiff; and a suit by plaintiff 1 in 1927 claiming breach of that arrangement. The litigation ultimately produced a conclusion that the plaintiffs' entitlement (if any) was to the share of eight annas and ten and a half pies in the properties in suit.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiffs may sue the defendants for partition and possession of the properties in the defendants' possession without at the same time bringing into hotchpot certain properties that are in the plaintiffs' possession (i.e., whether the coparcenary/hotchpot rule applies where the parties are tenants-in-common rather than coparceners).
  2. Whether plaintiffs can recover anything by way of mesne profits or, more precisely, whether the Court should order an account of income received by a co-owner and, if so, for what period (including the choice and application of the appropriate article of the Limitation Act governing the period of limitation).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants (Defendants) — main contentions as recorded

  • The written statement identified certain property in plaintiffs' possession and asserted that those properties must be brought into hotchpot before plaintiffs could be given any relief; the defence relied on the ordinary rule applicable to coparcenary suits that all family property (and properties in the plaintiff's possession) must be included to achieve a complete partition.
  • On limitation, the defendants contended that Article 62 of the Limitation Act (three years for suits for money had and received) applied, and alternatively suggested Art. 109 or Art. 89 might be relevant; they argued that if Article 62 applied, an account and recovery from 1927 would be barred because, as the court noted, the suit was not brought until a date after the plaintiffs' notice (the opinion refers to "the year 1985" in one passage and elsewhere to 1935).
  • They relied on authorities (including two cases cited as 1892 Bom P.J 1122 and 37 C.L.J 1123) treating the coparcenary rule as generally applicable to partition suits.

Respondents (Plaintiffs) — main contentions as recorded

  • Some properties the defendants said should be brought into hotchpot were asserted by the plaintiffs to be watan properties (and according to the Collector's report could not be partitioned) and one property was asserted to be exclusively theirs.
  • On limitation, plaintiffs (through Mr. Joshi) argued that Article 62 could not apply because the remedy sought was an account (not a suit for a specific sum of money), that if the defendants were agents Art. 89 would apply, but if they were not Art. 120 (the residuary article) should apply; and that in any event the account sought was for the period from 1927 onward.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mulla's Hindu Law, Edn. 9, p. 409 Statement of the ordinary rule applicable to partition suits between coparceners — that a plaintiff must bring into hotchpot all property in his possession to have a complete partition. The Court referenced this text to explain the ordinary coparcenary rule but distinguished its applicability because the parties here were held to be tenants-in-common rather than coparceners.
1892 Bom P.J 1122 Authority applying the coparcenary rule to partition suits (as cited by defendants). Cited by defendants for the proposition that the whole ancestral property must be before the Court; the Bench distinguished it on the basis that the parties here were tenants-in-common and that earlier decisions had not considered that distinction.
37 C.L.J 1123 Another reported authority treating the coparcenary rule as generally applicable to partition suits. Cited by defendants; Court noted these authorities but relied on contrary authority and principle to hold the coparcenary hotchpot rule did not automatically apply to tenants-in-common.
F.A. No. 129 of 1940 (this Bench) A recent Bench decision where the Court required a plaintiff suing for partition to bring into hotchpot all property in the plaintiff's possession (special circumstances). The Court acknowledged that special circumstances may require application of the coparcenary rule, and observed that in F.A. 129 of 1940 such a requirement was made, but found no comparable grounds here.
46 Mad. 8445 Held that a suit for partition of common (as distinct from joint/coparcenary) properties was not liable to be dismissed solely because not all common properties were included. The Court relied on this authority to support the proposition that suits between tenants-in-common need not be dismissed for failure to bring all common properties into hotchpot.
45 Mad. 6487 Held Art. 62 cannot apply to a suit where an account of rents received by one tenant-in-common from another is sought; appropriate remedy is an action for an account. The Court treated this decision as authoritative on the inapplicability of Art. 62 to co-owner account suits and accepted its reasoning.
45 Bom. 3138 Decision that Art. 89 applied (not Art. 62) in a relevant context. Referred to as limited support for the position that Art. 62 is not appropriate; Court noted that Macleod C.J. indicated Art. 120 would apply if no agency contract existed.
I.L.R (1940) 1 Cal. 1109 Direct approval of the Madras decision; held a suit by one joint owner against another for accounts is governed by Article 120 and not Art. 62. Used as direct authority for applying Article 120 to suits for accounts between co-owners.
80 Bom. L.R 91210 High Court authority referring to and approving the Madras decision. Relied upon as supporting the application of Article 120 rather than Art. 62.
26 Bom. L.R 116511 Earlier High Court case holding that either Art. 89 or Art. 120 may apply to suits between co-owners according to facts. Referred to as precedent supporting the court's approach of selecting Art. 120 on these facts (since agency had ceased by 1927 as found).
43 Bom. L.R 38812 (Privy Council) Privy Council authority applying Article 120 in analogous circumstances. Cited as part of the chain of authority favouring Article 120 for account suits between co-owners.
32 Bom. L.R 169613 (Privy Council) Privy Council authority applying Article 120. Cited to show consistent Privy Council support for using Article 120 in such cases.
32 Bom. L.R 1596 (Privy Council) Privy Council decision on the meaning of accrual under Art. 120 — accrual occurs when there is an infringement of or clear threat to the right to an account. The Court relied on this definition to determine when limitation would begin to run under Art. 120 and therefore whether the suit was time-barred.
33 Bom. L.R 16814 (Privy Council) Authority that a plea of limitation must fail when the defendant cannot specify the date at which the claim to an account was denied. Applied to hold that limitation could not bar the present suit given absence of evidence of a clear date of refusal by defendants.
32 Bom. 36416 (Davar J., single Judge of this Court) Held that in a suit under Art. 120 the plaintiff was entitled to accounts only for the six years preceding the suit. Noted by the Court as a case on the other side of the question of limitation-period for accounts; the Bench concluded that broader authority (including Privy Council decisions) supported a longer period in appropriate cases.
A.I.R. 1933 Mad. 200 Madras decision (unauthorised report) where accounts were ordered for a period longer than six years. Referred to as on the other side of the issue regarding the temporal extent of accounts; Court considered such decisions in determining the appropriate period here.
A.I.R. 1928 Mad. 1236 Madras decision (unauthorised report) where accounts for more than six years were ordered. Used as supporting material for the proposition that accounts beyond six years may be ordered under Art. 120 in suitable cases.
14 Cal. 14718 (Privy Council) Privy Council ordered an account to be taken of an agency for the whole period of the agency (about 20 years), decided under old Limitation Act provisions corresponding to present Arts. 89 and 120. The Court invoked this decision to support ordering an account from 1927 (i.e., for the whole relevant period) rather than limiting it to six years.
13 I.A. 123 (Privy Council) Privy Council case where a general account of dealings for twenty years was ordered when a defendant acted as plaintiff's Diwan. Mentioned by the concurring judge (Broomfield, J.) to support the proposition that extensive accounts covering long periods have been ordered by high authority.
8 Rang. 646 (Privy Council) Privy Council case involving account-related relief; referred to in the context of long-period accounts. Noted by the concurring judge as part of the authorities that suggest an account can extend over long periods where appropriate.
8 Cal. 78819 Case where suit for accounts was within time and Court limited accounts to six years (as cited and discussed). Considered by the concurring judge in surveying older authorities; the judge observed limitations on the precedential value of some older rulings.
5 Cal. 91020 An older Calcutta authority discussed in the context of applicability of limitation provisions. Examined by the concurring judge as part of the historical materials; judged to be of limited bearing on the present specific question.
14 Bom. 47621 Reported decision where the suit was held time-barred. Mentioned by the concurring judge in reviewing older cases; the point considered did not directly arise in that case.
18 Bom. 55122 Contains observations suggesting a possible six-year limit for accounts under Art. 120 (as discussed). Noted by the concurring judge but treated as not conclusively establishing a six-year maximum in light of later Privy Council authorities.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeds in discrete steps, each applying legal principle to the facts before it:

  1. Distinction between coparcenary and tenancy-in-common:
    • The Court began by stating the ordinary coparcenary rule (as per Mulla and authorities) that a coparcener suing for partition should bring into hotchpot all family property in his possession to effect a complete partition.
    • It then emphasised that the parties in this case were not coparceners but tenants-in-common, a factual and legal distinction that undermines the logical basis for importing the coparcenary hotchpot rule automatically.
    • The Court acknowledged that special circumstances may justify applying the coparcenary rule to common-property suits (and cited a recent Bench decision where that was done), but found no such grounds of convenience or equity in the defendants' pleadings here — the objection was characterised as technical and obstructive.
    • The Court accepted the reasoning of 46 Mad. 8445 which held that partition suits of common property are not unsustainable merely because they do not include all common properties; defendants could themselves bring a suit if prejudiced by exclusion.
    • Conclusion on this issue: plaintiffs were not bound to bring their properties into hotchpot and the preliminary decree should not be set aside on that ground.
  2. Nature of relief sought (account vs. mesne profits) and limitation:
    • The Court rejected the characterization of the award as mesne profits. Instead, it described the relief as an account of income received by a co-owner and a direction that the plaintiffs' share of sums found be paid; it was not alleged that receipt of the money was wrongful.
    • On limitation, the Court examined which Article of the Limitation Act applied. The defendants argued for Art. 62 (suits for money had and received), which would prescribe a three-year period; the plaintiffs, and a substantial body of authority, argued Art. 62 was inapplicable to co-owner account suits because such suits are for an account rather than for a specific sum and because a collecting co-owner is entitled to allowances which an action for money had and received cannot give.
    • The Court cited a sequence of High Court and Privy Council authorities (including 45 Mad. 6487, I.L.R (1940) 1 Cal. 1109, and others) applying Article 120 to suits between co-owners for accounts and rejecting Art. 62. It also noted that prior decisions had held either Art. 89 or Art. 120 might apply depending on whether an agency relationship existed.
    • On the facts, because the arrangement of 1926 (agency) was found to have come to an end by about 1927, Art. 89 (applicable where an agency relationship continues) prima facie did not apply for the period claimed; hence the residuary Article 120 was the appropriate provision.
  3. Accrual under Article 120 and whether suit is time-barred:
    • The Court applied Privy Council authority (as cited) that under Art. 120 the period of limitation begins to run when there is an infringement of or a clear/unequivocal threat to infringe the plaintiff's right to an account.
    • The Court found no evidence of any refusal by the defendants to account, or of a clear threat, until the defendants failed to reply to the plaintiffs' notice in 1935 (the opinion also contains a reference stating the suit was not brought until the year "1985" after notice — the Court's text includes both references in discussing timing). Because no specific date of denial was shown earlier, the accrual did not occur before the plaintiffs' action such that limitation under Art. 120 would bar the suit.
    • The Court therefore concluded that the suit was in time under Article 120.
  4. Temporal scope of the account:
    • The Court considered conflicting authorities on whether accounts under Art. 120 should be limited (some previous decisions suggested a six-year limit) or should extend for the whole relevant period of dealings.
    • Relying particularly on Privy Council authority (14 Cal. 147) where an account for about 20 years had been ordered, the Court concluded that an account could properly be directed for the whole period relevant to the plaintiffs' claim — in this case, from 1927 onward, as the trial Court had ordered.
    • Both members of the Bench (Macklin, J. and Broomfield, J.) agreed that the trial judge's order for accounts from 1927 should be upheld.

Holding and Implications

Holding (core rulings):

APPEALS DISMISSED.

More specifically:

  • The Court held that plaintiffs were not required to bring into hotchpot the properties in their possession before obtaining partition and related relief against the defendants, given that the parties were tenants-in-common (not coparceners) and no special grounds justified applying the coparcenary hotchpot rule.
  • The Court held that the relief granted by the trial Court was properly understood as an account of income received by a co-owner and that Article 62 of the Limitation Act was not the correct article to govern such a suit; Article 120 was the appropriate residuary article on the facts because any agency relationship had ended by 1927.
  • The Court held that the suit was not barred by limitation because there was no clear evidence of an earlier denial of the plaintiffs' right to an account such as would begin the running of time under Article 120.
  • The Court affirmed the trial Court's order directing an account to be taken from the year 1927 and directing the defendants to pay the amount found due for that period; the Commissioner had found Rs. 6,189-0-1½ due and the final decree ordered that sum be paid with costs and future interest at six per cent from the date of the suit on a principal sum stated as Rs. 6,139.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is to affirm the preliminary and final decrees in favour of the plaintiffs: partition and declaration were maintained and an account from 1927 was ordered with recovery of the sums found due; the appeals therefore fail and are dismissed with costs.
  • The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel legal principle beyond applying established authorities about the distinction between coparcenary and tenancy-in-common suits and the appropriate Limitation Act article (Art. 120) for accounts between co-owners; therefore, the Court did not state that a new precedent was being created beyond the application of existing case-law to the facts of this dispute.

Note: This summary strictly reflects the content and citations as they appear in the provided opinion. No information beyond the opinion text has been added or inferred.

    Sitaram Vinayak Hasabnis v. Narayan Shankarrao Hasabnis

    Macklin, J.:— The plaintiffs sued for the partition and separate possession of a share amounting to eight annas and ten and half pies in some properties known as the Shankar Khar and Shankar Wadi, and also for a declaration of their right to receive a similar share in half the revenues of the village of Sape. They also sued for an account of the recoveries made by defendant 1, who admittedly has been in possession of these properties; and by a purshis they dated their claim to an account from the year 1927. They have been given a preliminary decree for partition of the Shankar Wadi and Shankar Khar and also a declaration of their right to receive the assessment claimed of the village of Sape, and the preliminary decree ordered accounts to be taken of the plaintiffs' share in the income received by the defendants from the year 1927. The commissioner found a sum of Rs. 6189-0-1½ to be due to the plaintiffs on accounts, and by a final decree that sum was ordered to be paid by the defendants together with costs and future interest at six per cent, from the date of the suit on the principal sum of Rs. 6139. The defendants have appealed both against the preliminary decree (First Appeal No. 155 of 1940) and against the final decree (First Appeal No. 294 of 1940).

    2. Most of the defences raised to the suit have been abandoned in these appeals, and it is not necessary to do more than state the-facts in very brief outline. It is not disputed that in 1862 three brothers, Trimbak, Ganesh and Shankar, all sons of one Vinayak (the first two by his first wife and the last by his second wife) separated. The right of Shankar to a share of six annas and six pies was recognised, and Trimbak and Ganesh between them were given a share of nine annas and six pies. Some of the property was divided; but some of it was kept joint, including the property in the present suit. But it is not disputed that from that date the three brothers ceased to be members of a joint family and became tenants-in-common. Trimbak died in 1875, and on his son's death in 1879 no male member remained in his family. His widow Gangabai died in 1918. Ganesh died in 1871, and his widow adopted defendant 1 in 1883. Plaintiff 1 is the son of Shankar, who died in 1896; the other defendants 2, 3 and 4 are the sons of defendant 1 and plaintiffs 2, 3 and 4 are the sons of plaintiff 1. Defendants 5 and 6 are alienees. In 1883 defendant 1 on adoption brought a suit with respect to some of the properties of the family, and as the result of that suit the vahivat of the property as provided for in the arrangement of 1862 was confirmed. In 1918 there was more litigation, and on the death of Gangabai in 1918 further litigation arose as to the rights of the plaintiffs' branch or the defendants' branch as reversioners. Fending that litigation an arrangement was made in 1926 between the plaintiffs and the defendants by which it was provided that defendant 1 should manage the property and pay an eight annas share to the plaintiff. But, in the following year plaintiff 1 sued for possession of the property himself on the basis of the agreement having been broken by defendant 1. When the litigation as to the reversion was over, it was decided that the defendants and the plaintiffs each had a half share in the share to which Trimbak was entitled, Trimbak's share being half of nine annas and six pies. The plaintiff therefore claims to be entitled to eight annas and ten and half pies in the property in suit; and it is conceded that if he is entitled to anything at all, that is the share to which he is entitled. The only questions for decision in these appeals are whether the plaintiffs are entitled to bring the present suit against the defendants for partition and possession of, the property of which the defendants are in possession without at the same time bringing into hotchpot certain properties of which the plaintiffs are admittedly in possession, and secondly whether they can recover anything (and if so, what) by way of mesne profits on accounts being taken. No other point has been pressed in the appeals.

    3. The written statement of the defendants mentioned certain property in the possession of the plaintiffs and stated that it was necessary to bring these properties into hotchpot before the plaintiffs could be given any relief. In his reply to the written statement, the plaintiff pointed out that some of these properties were watan properties, and according to the report of the Collector could not be made the subject of a partition; and they also said that one of the properties was theirs exclusively. There is probably a good deal of substance in these contentions of the plaintiff; but it is not necessary to decide the point, since, in our view the, plaintiffs are not bound to bring these properties into hotchpot at all. The ordinary rule applicable to suits for coparcenary property is that when a suit for partition is between coparcener it should embrace the whole family property, and a member of a joint family suing his coparceners for the partition of joint family property is bound to bring into hotchpot all the property that may be in his own possession in order that there may be a complete and final partition: see Mulla's Hindu Law, Edn. 9, page 409. The rule is subject to exceptions arising out of convenience and from other causes. But it applies primarily to coparcenary property. The parties in this case are not coparceners but tenants in common; and, in our view, that may well make a substantial difference in the applicability of the rule. In theory no coparcener has a share in any particular property, because each coparcener is an owner of all the family property; and this is the real basis for the rule as to the partition of coparcenary property. But there is no such basis for the application of the rule to property which is held in common. Indeed there seems to be no logical basis for it at all in such a case. Special circumstances do sometimes exist which make it necessary or desirable to apply the rule to suits relating to land held in common; and this Bench decided one such case a fortnight ago in F.A No. 129 of 19401 and required the plaintiff suing for partition to bring into hotchpot all the property which was in the plaintiff's possession. But no ground of convenience or equity was put forward in the written statement to this suit, and the objection seems to have been based on purely technical grounds and is more obstructive than genuine. In support of the defence on this point two cases have been cited in which the Courts have applied the coparcenary rule to suits relating to the partition of property held in common. They are 1892 Bom P.J 1122 and 37 C.L.J 1123. In each of these cases the Court treated the coparcenary rule as generally applicable to suits for partition, and in the first of them (which was a suit between Mahomedans) the Court stated that (page 117):

    The relief sought for in these suits is a partition of the shares of the two plaintiffs; and such relief can only be given if all persons interested in the ancestral property are parties to the two suits and if the whole ancestral property is also brought into suit. Neither of these conditions is satisfied.

    4. On these grounds the suits were held to have been rightly dismissed. The decision in this case of the High Court of Bombay seems to have been approved in 24 Bom. 1284, where the ordinary rule relating to suits for the partition of coparcenary property was applied. But that itself was a suit for the partition of coparcenary property. In neither of the other two cases cited does it seem that the possibility of there being any distinction between the two kinds of partition suits was present to the minds of the learned Judges who decided them. On the other hand, there is clear authority to the contrary. In 46 Mad. 8445 it was held that a suit for partition of common properties as distinct from joint properties was not liable to be dismissed on the ground that the suit did not include all the common properties avail-able for partition. Their Lordships referred to certain cases in which an opinion had been expressed against the expediency of suits for partition of common property being brought without the whole of the property available for partition being included; but they went on to say (p. 846):

    We have not been shown any decision that such suits are actually unsustainable, and we are not prepared to hold that they are so. It is, we may point out, always open to the defendant in such a case as the present, if he thinks himself prejudiced by the exclusion of any property, himself to bring a suit in respect of it and have it tried with the suit already pending.

    5. With these observations we entirely agree. The next point relates to mesne profits. On behalf of the appellants it is contended that ordinarily in the case of joint enjoyment by the whole family, or enjoyment by different members of different portions of the family property, the Court will not, except in special circumstances, order an account to be taken of past transactions but will make a division of the property actual existing at the date of partition, 5 Bom. 5896. But even in suits for the partition of coparcenary property the ordinary rule does not apply if the plaintiff has been excluded; and a fortiori it will not apply if the plaintiff has been ex-eluded from property which is held in common as distinct from property which is coparcenary property. But whether the plaintiff has or has not been excluded need not now be considered, since we agree with Mr. Joshi's contention on behalf of the plaintiffs-respondents that properly speaking mesne profits have not been awarded at all. What has been ordered is an account of the income received by a co-owner of property and a direction that the amount found to have been received of the share of the plaintiffs should be given to them. It is nowhere suggested that the receipt of the money has been in any way wrongful.

    6. The real question is whether this suit for an account and for the recovery of the amount found due is barred by limitation, and, if it is not so barred, then what is the period for which the account ought to be taken and recovery ordered. On behalf of the appellants-defendants it is contended that the article properly applicable to this case is Art. 62 prescribing a period of three years from the date when the money was received in suits for money had and received by the defendants for the plaintiffs' use. It was also suggested that the suit might be governed by Art. 109; but in our view that article cannot possibly apply, since there is no question of the money having been wrongfully received. If Art. 62 applied to the case, the order of the trial Court directing an account and allowing recovery from 1927 would no doubt be wrong, since this suit was not brought until the year 1985 after the plaintiff had given notice to the defendants demanding an account. It was also suggested that Art. 89 might govern the case, since by the agreement of 1926 defendant 1 became an agent of the plaintiffs, and on the facts the suit would be barred if the agency came to an end (as has been found by the trial Court) in or about the year 1927. On behalf of the plaintiffs-respondents Mr. Joshi argues that whatever view may be taken of the facts of this case, Art. 62 cannot apply, since that article governs suits for a specific sum of money, whereas this is a case where it is impossible to award any sum of money to the plaintiffs until an account has been taken. He argues that if the defendants are to be taken to be the agents of the plaintiffs, then Art. 89 would apply to the case. But if they are not taken to be the agents of the plaintiffs, then no article can apply to the case except the residuary Art. 120, since there is no room for the application of Art. 62. We have been referred to a number of cases; and, in our view, there is overwhelming authority for the contention that Art. 62 cannot be applied to a case where an account has to be taken of money received by a co-owner of property as such.

    7. In 45 Mad. 6487, it was held that Art. 62 cannot apply to such a case, since a suit for money had and received does not lie by one tenant-in-common against another who has received more than his share, and that the appropriate remedy in such a case is an action for an account. The basis of the decision appears at p. 660, where the reasoning of Baron Parke in an English case was approved, the reasoning being that the rents remained undivided and no one tenant-in-common was entitled to any specific part, and further the collecting tenant-in-common would be entitled to all just allowances, which could not be given in that form of action but could be given in an action for an account. The English case proceeded largely upon the provisions of an English Statute, but the principle was applied to the case before the Madras High Court. That case receives some limited support from our own High Court in 45 Bom. 3138. The decision in that case was that Art. 89 applied and not Art. 62. But from the remarks of Macleod C.J it seems that if there had been no contract of agency, the Court would have applied Art. 120 rather than Art. 62 on principles similar to the principles governing the decision of the High Court of Madras. In I.L.R (1940) 1 Cal. 1109, there is direct approval of the decision of the Madras High Court, and it is stated that a suit by one joint owner of property against another for accounts is governed by Article 120 of the Limitation Act, and not by Art. 62. There is also the direct authority of this High Court in 80 Bom. L.R 91210, where again the decision of the Madras High Court was referred to with approval. Approval was also given to an earlier case of this High Court, 26 Bom. L.R 116511, where the Court had held that in such a case the article applicable would be either Art. 89 or Art. 120 according to the facts of the case. There are also two cases decided by the Privy Council, 43 Bom. L.R 38812 and 32 Bom. L.R 169613, and in each case Article 120 was applied. The question whether Art. 89 or Art. 120 applies would depend upon the facts of each case. In 1926 there was the arrangement by which the defendants could be regarded as having been appointed agents of the plaintiffs. But the plaintiffs' suit in 1927 shows (we think) that the agreement was then regarded as having come to an end. The plaintiff is suing for accounts not of the agency but from the year 1927, at which time the defendants cannot be regarded as agents of the plaintiffs, and therefore prima facie Art. 89 would not apply to the case; and as no other specific article applies the proper article to apply must be the residuary Art. 120.

    8. The next question is whether the suit is in time having regard to the fact that the appropriate Article is 120. The date from which time begins to run according to that article is the date of the accrual of the right to sue, and, according to the decision of the Privy Council in 32 Bom. L.R 1596 that means when there was an infringement of or some clear or unequivocal threat to infringe the plaintiffs' right to an account. Until that has happened, no bar of limitation can arise at all. It is argued on behalf of the defendants that cancellation of the agreement by the plaintiff in 1927 amounts to an infringement of the plaintiffs' right; but there does not seem to be any logic in this contention. There is, so far as we can see, no evidence to show any refusal of the plaintiffs' right or any threat of infringement of his right until the defendants failed to reply to the plaintiffs' notice in 1935. Indeed Mr. Joshi goes so far as to say that there has been no refusal even to this date, since the defendants' written statement did not specifically deny the plaintiffs' claim to an account except by a general request that the suit should be dismissed. There was litigation in 1927 and 1928, and it went on for some time longer than that. But nothing has been brought to our notice to show that the litigation was itself tantamount to refusal to give an account. As was pointed out by the Privy Council in 33 Bom. L.R 16814, a case governed by Art. 120, the plea of limitation must fail when the defendant is unable to specify the particular date at which the claim to an account was denied by him. We think therefore that the suit is in time.

    9. The last question arising in these appeals is the period for which the account should be taken and recovery ordered. In the nature of things cases of this kind must be rare. We have been referred to a decision of a single Judge of this Court in 32 Bom. 36416, where in a suit governed by Art. 120 the Court held that the plaintiff was entitled to accounts only for the six years preceding the suit. But we have also been referred to decisions on the other side. In two decisions from the unauthorised reports, A.I.R 1933 Mad. 200 and A.I.R 1928 Mad. 123617, accounts were ordered for a period much longer than six years. But we think that any doubts that might arise on this point are set at rest by the fact that in 14 Cal. 14718, which was decided under the old Limitation Act but under one or other of the articles corresponding to the present Arts. 89 and 120, the Privy Council ordered an account to be taken of an agency for the whole period of the agency, amounting to about 20 years. They did not in terms make an order that the amount found due should be recoverable;, but presumably if an account for 20 years is to be taken, the amount found due on accounts taken over a period of 20 years is recover, able. We think therefore that the learned Judge was right in ordering the account to be taken from the year 1927 and directing the defendants to pay the amount found due for that period. The appeals therefore fail on all the points argued, and they must be dismissed with costs.

    10. Broomfield, J.:— I only desire to add a few observations on the interesting question of limitation which arises in this case, or rather on one aspect of that question. The authorities cited by my learned brother show beyond the possibility of dispute that either Art. 89 or Art. 120 must apply to a suit such as this by one co-owner against another who has received more than his share of the in-come of the property. I agree with my learned brother that in the circumstances of this case Art. 120 is the appropriate one. But the question of the period for which the account is to be taken is by no means free from difficulty. In 32 Bom. 36415 Davar J. held that the account must be for six years only. He referred in the course of his judgment to a number of cases, but on examination it appears that few of them had any bearing on this particular point. 8 Cal. 78819 is a case where the suit for accounts was within time, and the Court limited the accounts to six years. But the decision is based on an older Calcutta authority, 5 Cal. 91020, and all that was held there was that Section 10 of the Limitation Act, did not apply and Art. 120 did, and that the suit would be barred if not brought within six years of the plaintiff's attaining his majority — a point which was left to be determined on remand. In 14 Bom. 47621 the suit was held to be time-barred, so the point I am considering did not really arise. In 18 Bom. 55122 there are some observations at page 566 which suggest that Farran J. thought that there could not be an account under Art. 120 for more than six years. The point is not quite clear but if he did think so it was evidently on the strength in 5 Cal. 910 which, as far as I can see, decided no such thing. In any case the authority of these old rulings seems to be doubtful in view of the fact that it has only recently been made clear by the Privy Council case to which my learned brother has referred, that the time does not run under Art. 120 until there has been an in fringement by the defendant of the plaintiff's right to sue.

    11. Reference has been made by my learned brother to 13 I.A 123. In that case their Lordships of the Privy Council did not think it necessary to decide whether the article corresponding to the present Art. 89 or that corresponding to the present Article 120 of the applied, but they held that the suit was in time in either case, and they ordered a general account of all dealings and transactions during the period of twenty years when the defendant Acted as the plaintiff's Diwan. In another Privy Council case, 8 Rang. 646, the prayer in the suit, which was instituted in 1924, was for an account inter alia of moneys received in an administration suit started in 1906 and of expenses incurred therein. But the final decree of the High Court which was affirmed by the Privy Council appears from the report to have been only for an account of the proceeds of the administration suit, and it is not clear whether these moneys had come to the hands of the defendants more than six years before 1924. Mr. Joshi for the respondents has cited two Madras cases not in the authorised reports, A.I.R 1933 Mad. 200 and A.I.R 1928 Mad. 1236, in which in suits under Art. 120 accounts have been allowed for periods of ten and thirteen years respectively.

    12. In suits for account under Arts. 89 and 106 it is clear that the account which may be ordered covers the whole period during which the defendant has realised the plaintiff's money. There is nothing anomalous therefore in holding that in a suit for account under Article 120 also the account should be for the whole period. On principle indeed it would seem that it must be so. To say that a suit for an account is in time but the sum to be recovered must be limited to moneys received by the defendant within six years of the suit seems to me to presuppose a right in the plaintiff to sue to recover the money distinct from his right to sue for an account of the money. But no such suit is provided for by any article of limitation.

    13. According to the authorities a suit to recover money after taking an account such as the one with which we are concerned, is one for an account under Art. 120, and in such a suit it cannot be disputed that the Court may not only ascertain what is due but make an order for payment thereof. I agree therefore that the order which the trial Court passed for accounts from 1927 should be upheld.

    14. Appeals dismissed.

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