D.K KAPUR, J.:— The petitioner who is an Advocate has applied for a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash the appointment of the respondent as Registrar of this High Court. The petitioner has prayed for a declaration that the respondent was illegally appointed, and also, prayed that a writ of certiorari be issued to quash the notification. Annex. ‘P-1’ by which he was appointed. It is also stated that an order, direction or writ in the nature of quo warranto be issued against the respondent. Basically, the petition is one for a writ of quo warranto, but other aspects of the matter which may be open have also to be considered.

2. A show cause notice was issued to the respondent and we have heard learned counsel for the petitioner as well as the respondent.

3. It has been contended on behalf of the respondent that the writ of quo warranto has to be limited to the formal validity of the order appointing the respondent and no question of motive or other ground can be gone into, For this purpose reliance has been placed on the judgement of the Full Bench in P.L Lakhanpal v. A.N Ray, ILR (1974) 1 Delhi 725 : (AIR 1975 Delhi 66), wherein it was held that a writ of quo warranto is a writ of technical nature which merely asks the question as to whether there was a warrant of appointment for holding the office and the question of mala fides was completely irrelevant to the mailer. In that case, the appointment of Justice A.N Ray as Chief Justice of India was under challenge. In the present case, the order under challenge Annex. ‘P-1’ is, therefore, a complete answer to the petition viewed as a writ of quo warranto.

4. The petitioner has also urged that the appointment of the respondent as Registrar has not been made by considering all the possible persons who can be appointed and it has been submitted that a senior member of the Delhi Higher Judicial Service has to be appointed and as many as 24 officers of that service senior to the respondent have been overlooked. It is hence submitted that the appointment is contrary to Art. 16 of the Constitution as there is no equality of opportunity for appointment. In answer to this point, it was submitted for the respondent that only such person can move tha Court whose own fundamental rights are affected. (See Hans Muller of Nurenburg v. Superintendent, Presidency Jail, Calcutta, AIR 1955 SC 367, at p. 373). There can be hardly any quarrel with the proposition that the question of breach of fundamental rights can only be raised by a person who is adversely affected by the denial of equality of opportunity. It can also not be denied that the petitioner though he is an Advocate and could be appointed as Registrar does not himself claim denial of equality. The petition could, therefore, be disposed of on these two short grounds but, we do not think that we should confine ourselves in this manner, especially when a question, relating to this very Court is involved.

5. We, therefore, propose to deal with the matter in a somewhat different way. The Constitution provides the manner in which officers and servants of the High Court have to be appointed. Article 229 states that such persons have to be appointed by the Chief Justice of the Court or such other Judge or officer as he may direct. The proviso to Art. 229(1), which does not apply to the facts of this case, is to the effect lhat the Governor of a State may by rule require that a person who is not already attached to the Court may only be appointed after consultation with the Stale Public Service Commission. Article 229 (2) provides that the conditions of service of officers and servants of a High Court shall be such as may be prescribed by rules made by the Chief Justice or by some other Judge or officer of the Court authorised by the Chief justice for this purpose. Rules have actually been made and they have been placed before us for consideration.

6. There is some suggestion in the petition that the respondent is unfit for appointment as Registrar on certain grounds set out in the petition. The allegations are strongly denied. We are not concerned with those questions for reasons which will become plain later. The respondent had some experience as a Prosecutor in the Delhi Administration before he was appointed to the Rajasthan Judicial Service with effect from 5th July, 1965, on this basis of a competitive examination. On 2nd Aug., 1971, he was recruited to the Delhi Judicial Service. This was when the Service was initially constituted. Later, he was granted selection grade (Rs. 1200-1600) with effect from 5th July, 1973, and then became Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate from 2nd Jan., 1975. The respondent became Sole Member, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Delhi, and then was appointed Registrar (Vigilance and Re-organisation) of this Court in Oct., 1978, the scale of pay being Rs. 1200-2000. The appointment to the post of Registrar under challenge took place on 27th May, 1980. Hence, before this, the respondent had been Registrar (Vigilance) for nearly two years. As far as we are aware, the respondent had also functioned as Registrar for the purpose of the Original Side of this Court for some time during that period of two years and had also officiated as Registrar for some time. These are all uncontested facts.

7. The Chief Justice of the High Court made the appointment on 27th May, 1980, which was almost the last working day before the vacations when he himself (the Chief Justice) was to retire during the vacations. The appointment was on a permanent basis. The validity of the appointment has been challenged before us on the ground that it required the acquiescence of a Committee of Judges, but we do not find any substance in this point. From the affidavit in reply, it seems that the senior-most Judge was consulted by the then Chief Justice, but even this has no importance as the appointment has solely to be made by the Chief Justice under the terms of Art. 229 of the Constitution as well as the rules framed by the Chief Justice for this purpose.

8. The point that requires examination is whether this Court should examine the validity of the appointment at the instance of the petitioner on the ground that it is one of public importance and the petitioner is interested as a member of the Bar in the question that the appointment should be in accordance with some settled procedure. Although, the appointment is in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and Art. 16 is not available to the petitioner, we till must see, as a matter of public interest, that the appointment is in accordance with the procedure laid down by law. To examine the validity of this line of approach, we asked learned counsel for the respondent what would happen if a completely unlikely person was appointed as Registrar by the Chief Justice of the Court. Mr. Sorabjee frankly conceded that in such a case the Court could examine the question. Even on this concession, we are not sure whether the Court can do so, but we are satisfied that in the present case such a question does not arise because the respondent is certainly an experienced Judicial Officer; he had also the advantage of working as a Registrar in the Court for two years. He would certainly, therefore, be a person who might be considered for the appointment in normal circumstances.

9. The points we really have to examine are the principles on which a Registrar of the Court is to be appointed and what is the, procedure to be adopted for this purpose. Although, the Constitution and the Rules say that the Chief Justice has to make the appointment, there is no indication as to who he should appoint, neither is any procedure indicated. Counsel for the petitioner would have us hold that he should give equal opportunity to all to be selected for the post. This he says follows from the equality principle. Does this mean that the Chief Justice has to hold a written test by inviting applications from the public at random? Has he to consider all possibilities? In short how does he make his selection? Reference to the provisions of Art. 14 and Art. 16 of the Constitution are somewhat misleading in the contest of such appointments. No doubt, everybody has to have equality of opportunity to an office under the State. Also, the law cannot make any distinction between people for the purpose of appointment all this means is that no citizen of India can be treated as disqualified on some extraneous considerations. Still, when you are appointing the Registrar of the High Court, you are obviously not going to take a man-in-the-street. You have to select somebody who is capable of undertaking the duties of the Registrar which are mainly administrative and partly of judicial character.

10. Experience shows that different types of persons have been appointed Registrars in different High Courts. There have been members of the Indian Civil Service, there have been persons from the subordinate post in the High Court, such as Deputy Registrars: there have been Judicial Officers and there have been members of the Bar and conceivably there may have been some appointments from amongst persons who are neither members of the Bar, nor officials of the Court, nor Judicial Officers. These four categories of persons determine what may be described as the field of choice.

11. Coming back to the question as to how the selection has to be made; it must be said that Art. 229 of the Constitution does not give any guidelines as to how the person has to be selected. This leaves open the question, as to how the Chief Justice should make the selection? We do not think the equality clause means that the Chief Justice has to examine the records and histories of hundreds of persons before he can make the selection. This is neither a practical method nor one predicated by the constitutional provision regarding equality of opportunity. We fancy, that in this respect the Chief Justice may be likened to a Captain of a ship who seeks a steward on some dangerous voyage. It is the Captain who knows his requirements, it is therefore he who has to make the selection to carry his ship to safe harbour. If you have an expert, it is expected that he will know what sort of assistance he requires for a particular type of enterprise.

12. In making a selection of a person to hold a particular office, you can either device a set of rules as to how the selection can be made, or you can appoint a reliable person to make the selection. If you appoint a reliable person to make the selection, then it is expected that that person will know how to select the right person. This is the case with the Chief Justice of a High Court. The Chief Justice knows what are the problems in his Court; he knows what he wants to achieve and, therefore, his choice can be made according to the particular circumstances in which he finds himself-No doubt the Chief Justice may want an outstanding person to be the Registrar of the High Court. He may want an outstanding administrator. His choice is, however, limited by the fact that the salary is only Rs. 2,000/- per month which cannot be described as a princely amount in present day circumstances. If he wants to make the selection from the Bar, it may be difficult for him to find an experienced person; if he wants to make the selection from amongst the senior-most Judicial Officers in the Delhi Higher Judicial Service or from amongst officers of some other State Judicial Service, he may select a suitable person he may appoint a person already on the High Court staff such as Deputy Registrar or he may get a suitable person from amongst the Civil services of the State. For practical purposes and keeping in view the present day circumstances, his choice has to be limited from amongst the service officials of the High Court such as the Registrar or Deputy Registrars etc., or members of the Judicial Service.

If so happened that the respondent was both a member of the Delhi Higher Judicial Service and also had put in two years service as Registrar (Vigilance), so in a sence, if the Chief Justice drew a limited list for the purpose of making a selection in the category of Judicial Service or the High Court Service, the respondent might be in both those lists. In addition, the respondent was officiating as Registrar from 1st April, 1980, when the term of the previous Registrar came to an end. While considering the question as to what he should do, the Chief Justice might only consider whether he should appoint the respondent or he should appoint some senior member of the Higher Judicial Service in Delhi. Whichever way his choice went, it cannot be said that the appointment would be either irrational or contrary to the Constitution. There is thus no apparent infringement of the principles on which such an appointment can be made, in the circumstances of this case.

13. What may be said is that the Chief Justice made his selection only a few days before he retired and he might not have made the appointment on a permanent basis. We are not sure whether all appointments have been on an officiating basis and what is the practice in other High Courts. It may have been that they were officiating appointments in the Delhi High Court in the past because the incumbents of the post were on deputation. However, in the Punjab High Court, some of the appointments have been on a permanent basis as far as we are aware. In any case, we cannot probe into the manner in which the Chief Justice may have decided this question.

14. We have been referred to some other judgements concerning the matter of appointments under Art. 229 of the Constitution which have been challenged in Courts. Such cases are — Chief Justice of Andhra Pradesh v. L.V.A Dikshitulu, AIR 1979 SC 193; M. Gurumoorthy v. Accountant General. Assam and Nagaland, AIR 1971 SC 1850; Parmatma Sharan v. Chief Justice, Rajasthan High Court, AIR 1964 Raj 13, and H.K Agnihotri v. Delhi High Court, ILR (1974) 2 Delhi 450. None of those cases raised quite the same problem as has arisen in this case. In some cases, the appointment made by the Chief Justice was challenged on the ground of infringement of a fundamental right; in some cases the order was not given effect to by the State and in some cases the order had been passed under a provision other than Art. 229 itself.

We have, therefore, had to examine the question involved in the present case from a fundamental point of view as it is the first instance that has come to our notice in which a ‘Public interest’ question has arisen in challenging the validity of an appointment. As a pointed reference has been made to Art. 229 of the Constitution in this case, it would not be out of place to mention the historical background which has given rise to the powers of the Chief Justice. The High Courts were created by Letters Patent issued under the authority given to the King of England. The Delhi High Court is a successor to the Punjab High Court which in turn is a successor to the Lahore High Court, and consequently, the Letters Patent of the Lahore High Court is applicable to this High Court. Clause 6 of the Letters Patent authorised the Chief Justice of the High Court to appoint such clerks and other ministerial officers as may be found necessary for the administration of justice; the said clause also allowed the Chief Justice to fix such reasonable salaries for such clerks and ministerial officers which the Lt. Governor of Punjab may approve. This power was given to the Chief Justice at the time of constituting the High Court.

The provisions of Art. 229 of the Constitution are a continuation with some modifications of the Chief Justice's powers. Hence, the appointments have to be made by the Chief Justice and the conditions of service of such officials and officers have to be prescribed by the rules made by the Chief Justice. Those rules require the approval of the Governor of the State. The application of the Constitution to the Delhi High Court is modified by S. 4 of the Delhi High Court Act, 1966. As far as Art. 229 is concerned, instead of ‘Governor of the State’ the ‘Administrator of the Union Territory of Delhi has to be referred to, and as far as State Public Service Commission’ is concerned, ‘Union Public Service Commission’ has to be referred to. The administrative expenses of the High Court are referable to the Consolidated Fund of India and the Legislature of the State in Art. 229(2) is Parliament itself. Thus, in substance, the powers of the Chief Justice contained in the Letters Patent of the Lahore High Court are continued by Art. 229 as modified in its application to this High Court. The powers of the Chief Justice are, therefore, twofold. He can with the approval of the Administrator of the Union Territory of Delhi create posts, fix pay scales of salaries for those posts, but more important, he can select persons to fill those posts. The method of selection is left entirely to the Chief Justice, but has to be exercised, we fancy, on the lines we have analysed above.

15. Learned counsel for the petitioner had referred us to Chap. 9-A of the Rules and Orders of the Punjab High Court Vol. V (as extended to this Court) to contend that the appointment of the respondent had to be the subject matter of a decision by the Court itself because certain matters have to be decided by the Judges as opposed to the Chief Justice. One of the questions to be decided by the Full Court at a meeting is the promotion of Subordinate Judges and District and Sessions Judges or where it is proposed to pass over an officer; all matters involving questions of principle and policy. We do not think that these matters at all interfere with the powers of the Chief Justice specifically granted under Art. 229 of the Constitution. A post in the High Court is not promotion post, but an ex-cadre post. In any case, the respondent was working as Registrar (Vigilance) in this Court and we do not think that this question really arises or could arise even if the respondent was working as Additional District and Sessions Judge.

16. One other question which has been urged by the respondent may also be mentioned here. It has been urged that the petition has been inordinately delayed because it has been filed about an year after the respondent took over his appointment. We agree that the petition is delayed and we might have dismissed the same on this ground also. We have already observed in the beginning of the judgement that the petition can be dismissed on the short grounds set out there. However, if the respondent's appointment was contrary to the Constitution and we could have granted a writ of quo warranto delay would not have stood in our way. If the appointment had been unconstitutional then delay of the petition would not make the appointment valid. So, in a sense the petition has to fail on the ground that the conditions for issuing a writ of quo warranto are not made out in this case. The rest of the points have been analysed by us for the reasons we have already set out.

17. We accordingly dismissed the petition in limine.

Petition dismissed.