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  • Section 13(b) of the CPC.
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  • Section 13(b) of the CPC.
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff, a Jewish inhabitant of Basra, Iraq, brought suit against the defendants, a firm doing business in Bombay, seeking enforcement of a foreign judgment obtained in Basra's Court of first instance (Suit No. 144 of 1923) for Rs. 5,000 plus court expenses. The foreign judgment arose from a dispute involving the sale of cigarettes and related contractual issues, including a deposit and a promissory note. The defendants contested the suit primarily on the ground that the Basra Court's judgment was not rendered on the merits. Procedurally, the plaint was initially signed by a person holding a special power of attorney rather than a general power of attorney, prompting a preliminary objection. The plaintiff subsequently amended the plaint by signing it personally, and the suit proceeded to hearing on the substantive issues.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaint was properly signed by a duly authorized person.
  2. Whether the foreign judgment from the Basra Court was given on the merits of the case.
  3. Whether there was an agreement permitting the defendants to retain Rs. 5,000 deposited with them.
  4. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to Rs. 2,000 out of the said sum of Rs. 5,000.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendants' Arguments

  • The plaint was not properly signed as it was signed by a person holding only a special power of attorney, not a general power of attorney as required by the Court's rules.
  • The foreign judgment was not given on the merits, thus allowing the defendants to defend the suit on merits in this Court.
  • There was an agreement that the defendants should retain the Rs. 5,000 deposit.

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The power of attorney was general, as evidenced by the stamp paid, and was sufficient to authorize signing the plaint.
  • No objection was raised in the written statement regarding the plaint's signature, so the point should not be allowed now.
  • The foreign judgment should be deemed conclusive under Section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure as it was given on the merits.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Vardaji Kasturji v. Chandrappa Definition of special power of attorney as limited to a particular matter. Used to determine that the power of attorney in this case was special, authorizing acts only in connection with one suit, thus not meeting the Court's rule for signing the plaint.
In re Gopalrao Consideration of stamp duty classification for powers of attorney. Distinguished as a Stamp Act case; Court emphasized each power of attorney must be considered on its own terms.
Ganpati Nana v. Jivanabai Section 99 CPC prohibits appellate interference for procedural irregularities not affecting merits or jurisdiction. Referenced to show that procedural defects in power of attorney may not affect merits, but differs because the present case had not yet been decreed when the point was raised.
Charles Palmer v. Sorabji Jamshedji Irregularity in power of attorney is procedural and does not affect merits or jurisdiction. Supported the view that defective power of attorney is an irregularity, but the present case differs in circumstances.
Keymer v. Visvanatham Reddi Section 13(b) CPC: A foreign judgment not given on merits is not conclusive. Applied to explain when a judgment is not on merits, specifically where a defendant was penalized for procedural default without adjudication on merits.
G.S.G Cole v. G.A Harper Distinguished Keymer; judgment given on merits where evidence was considered. Used to illustrate that a judgment following a full hearing is on merits and thus conclusive.
Janoo Hassan v. Mahamad Ohuthu Ex parte foreign judgment deemed on merits if defendant had notice and opportunity to appear. Applied to find that the Basra Court judgment was on merits because defendants had notice and representation, even if no defense was raised.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court first addressed the preliminary objection regarding the signature on the plaint. It examined the power of attorney's terms and concluded it was a special power of attorney, limited to acts related to the specific suit for recovery of Rs. 5,000. Under the Court's rules, only a general power of attorney authorizes signing a plaint. Therefore, the plaint was initially improperly signed. However, since the plaintiff was present in Court, he was permitted to amend the plaint by signing it himself, subject to payment of costs incurred so far.

Turning to the substantive issue of whether the foreign judgment was given on the merits, the Court relied on Section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which makes foreign judgments conclusive except in specified circumstances, including when not decided on merits. The Court examined the facts: the defendants were served and had representation through a pleader holding a power of attorney; an adjournment was sought but refused; the Court proceeded to examine evidence and passed the decree. The Court distinguished cases where judgments were penalties for procedural defaults without adjudication on merits.

Applying the principles from cited precedents, the Court found the Basra Court judgment was on the merits because the defendants had notice, representation, and the controversy was directly adjudicated. The defendants’ assertion that their representative lacked authority was rejected as incorrect. Consequently, the foreign judgment was conclusive and barred re-litigation of the merits in this Court.

Holding and Implications

The Court held that the plaint was initially improperly signed by a person holding only a special power of attorney, but allowed the plaintiff to amend by signing personally.

The Court further held that the foreign judgment from the Basra Court was given on the merits and is therefore conclusive under Section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

As a result, the Court decreed in favor of the plaintiff for Rs. 5,000 plus costs and interest at six percent. The judgment forecloses any further inquiry into the merits of the case in this Court, effectively upholding the foreign decree. No new precedent was established beyond the application of existing principles regarding power of attorney and conclusiveness of foreign judgments.

    Ephrayim H. Ephrayim v. Turner Morrison & Co.

    Baker, J.:— A preliminary point has been taken on behalf of the defendants that the plaint is not properly signed, inasmuch as it was signed by a person holding not a general power of attorney but a special power of attorney given by the plaintiff for the purposes of this particular suit. The case is governed by O. 3, R. 2, and the rule in the Code of Civil Procedure on that point has been modified by the rules of this Court which will be found at p. 1215 of Mulla's Civil Procedure Code. The persons who, under O. 6, R. 14, are held to be duly authorized by a party unable to sign the plaint himself, are, under the rules of this Court made under S. 122:

    “persons holding general powers of attorney from parties not resident within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court within which limits the appearance, the application or act is made or done, authorising them to make and do such appearances, applications and acts on behalf of such parties.”

    2. The plaintiff in this case is a resident at Basra in Iraq, and has given a power of attorney to a person residing in Bombay who has signed the plaint, and it is contended that this power of attorney is a special power of attorney and not a general power of attorney. The terms of the power of attorney are:

    “I, the undersigned Ephrayim Hiskail Ephrayim residing at Seef quarter Basrah, Iraq, do hereby constitute and appoint Mr. Khedoori Rubain Aboodi, residing at present at Bombay, India, to be my true and lawful attorney in connexion with realization of the amount of decree No. 144 of 1923 for five thousand rupees besides the Court expenses passed by the Court of first instance at Basrah against Turner Morrison & Co., at Bombay, India. The said attorney is further authorized to file suit, make application and sign documents and appoint pleaders relative to the above suit give receipt for the amount and make compromise, ask for attachment or the imprisonment of the debtor and generally do all what he thinks necessary in the above case in the same manner would I done if present to which I have absolutely no objection.”

    3. It is contended by the learned counsel for the defendants that this is a special power of attorney and not a general power of attorney. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the plaintiff that no point was taken in the written statement as to the signature on the plaint being insufficient, and so the point cannot be taken now. It is however not necessary under the section of the Code relating to pleadings that points of law should be taken in the written statement. It is only necessary to plead facts. It is also contended that this is a general power of attorney, and that the stamp paid on it at the stamp office is the stamp applicable to a general power of attorney. On reading the power of attorney I am of opinion that this is a special power of attorney, because it authorizes the attorney to act only in connexion with the one particular matter, i.e, the realization of the amount which had been obtained by the decree against the defendants in the Basra Court. Reference has been made to the case of Vardaji Kasturji v. Chandrappa (1), in which it was held that, where an attorney was authorized to act in one particular matter, the power was a special power of attorney inasmuch as the agent's authorization extended not to any class of business or employment, but was restricted to the doing of all necessary acts in the accomplishment of one particular purpose, and on reading the power of attorney which I have set forth above, I think there can be no doubt the authority of the attorney in this case extended only to the doing of acts in connexion with one particular purpose, viz., the recovery of the amount due to the plaintiff in one particular suit, although for the accomplishment of the purpose it might be necessary for the agent to do a number of acts in Bombay. The learned counsel for the defendants has referred to the case in In re Gopalrao (2). That however was a case under the Stamp Act. It was a reference under the Stamp Act, and the question was whether the instrument should be stamped as a general power of attorney or not. Each power of attorney has to be considered on its own terms and I have no doubt that in view of the ruling in Vardaji Kasturji v. Chandrappa this power of attorney must be considered as a special power of attorney, and therefore it does not fulfil the conditions laid down in the amended rule as framed by this Court. It has been contended that in any event it is only a matter of procedure not affecting the merits of the case, and reference has been made to Ganpati Nana v. Jivanabai (3), in which, in view of the provisions of section 99 of the cpc, the Court refused to interfere in a case where a suit had been instituted on a power of attorney which was liable to the same objection as the one in the present case. But it is a different matter where the suit has already been heard and a decree has been passed, as in that case the provisions of section 99 of the cpc, debar the appellate Court from interference in appeal on account of any error, defect or irregularity in any proceeding in the suit not affecting the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the Court. The same was the case in the case which is referred to in Vardaji Kasturji v. Chandrappa and Charles Palmer v. Sorabji Jamshedji (4). In that case also it was held that, although the power of attorney was defective, the appearance with a power of attorney for the particular case was at the most an irregularity not affecting the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the Court, and the Court therefore declined to interfere.

    4. It would however be a matter of regret in the present case, where the plaintiff is resident outside the jurisdiction of the Court, if he were deprived of an opportunity of having the case heard on the merits merely on an irregularity which does not affect the merits. It so happens however that in the present case the plaintiff has come from Basra and is actually present in the Court, and I shall therefore in the circumstances of is case, direct that he be allowed to amend his plant by signing it himself subject to this: that he must pay the costs of the proceedings up to day.

    5. (The plaintiff then himself signed the plaint and the suit was heard, on the remaining issues.)

    Baker, J.:— The plaintiff who is a Jewish inhabitant of Basra sues the defendants a firm doing business in Bombay on a foreign judgment obtained by him on the Court of the first instance at Basra against the defendants on 20th December 1923. The defendants by their written statement have raised several points the principal point being that the judgment was not given on the merits and they are therefore entitled to defend the suit in this Court on the merits. The following, issues have been framed:

    1. “Whether the plaint is properly signed?

    2. Whether the suit in the Basra Court was decided on the merits?

    3. Whether there was an agreement between the plaintiff and the defendants that the defendants should retain the Rs. 5,000 deposited with them in settlement of their claim against the plaintiff and one Darvesh as pleaded in para. 3 of the written statement?

    4. Whether in any case the plaintiffs are entitled to Rs. 2,000 out of the said sum of Rs. 5,000 as pleaded in para. 4 of the written statement?”

    6. I have already given an interlocutory judgment on Issue 1. The principal issue in the suit is Issue 2, whether the suit in the Basra Court was decided on the merits, as admittedly if that is decided against the defendants is will be unnecessary to go into the merits of the case. The facts of the case so far as it is necessary to go into them at this stage are that the defendants during the war and afterwards had a branch in Basra. In 1920 they sold some cases of cigarettes to one Darvesh. Darvesh transferred the contract to the present plaintiff. In the course of this contract a deposit of Rs. 5,000 was made at this stage we may say made on behalf of the plaintiff but that is a disputed question as well as a promissory note passed for Rs. 5,000 as security for the performance of the contract. Subsequently however as the defendants say owing to the termination of the war and the removal of the troops from Iraq and the consequently lessened demands for cigarettes the market fell and the plaintiff did not take delivery of the goods. The cigarettes were therefore sold by Messrs Turner, Morrison & Co., at a loss of Rs. 23,000. They brought a suit against the present plaintiff in the Court of Basra in 1921 to recover that amount. In the course of his written statement the defendant, the present plaintiff, counterclaimed for the amount of the deposit. The plaintiff's suit was dismissed but the counterclaim does not seem to have been awarded, the plaintiff says because he did not pay the court-fees on it acting under advice. However that may be, he subsequently instituted a suit in the Court of first instance at Basra, viz., Suit No. 144 of 1923. In that suit the present defendants were represented by their pleader who appeared and stated that he was unable to defend the suit as he represented the defendants for service process only. A decree was thereupon passed against the defendants for Rs. 5,000, the amount claimed, and on this foreign judgment against which no appeal was filed the present suit is brought.

    7. The case is governed by section 13 of the cpc, which says that:

    “a foreign judgment shall be conclusive as to any matter thereby directly adjudicated upon between the same parties or between parties under whom they or any of them claim litigating under the same title except”

    8. And then follow six exceptions of which we are only concerned with (b): “where it has not been given on the merits of the case.”

    9. The question of jurisdiction has not been raised in this case because it is obviously unsustainable. It appears from the proceedings in the case and from the evidence the proceedings in the Basra Court having been put in, that at the time when the suit was instituted the defendants were carrying on business in Basra through their manager Mr. Gillespie. The summons was served on the pleader of the defendants on behalf of the defendants and clearly no question of want of jurisdiction could arise as the defendants were actually resident and doing business within the jurisdiction of the Court and the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Court and the defendants were served. They were again served through the Court of Small Causes in Bombay, when after the Basra Office was closed Mr. Gillespie returned to Bombay about the and of March 1923.

    10. But the principal point which has been taken in this case is that the decision is not on the merits. The learned counsel for the plaintiff has quoted a number of English cases to show that where the decision is on the merits the Court cannot go into the question but it is unnecessary to refer to these cases in view of section 13 of the cpc, inasmuch as if the foreign judgment is given on the merits it is conclusive. The only question therefore in this case is whether the judgment of the Basra Court is given on the merits. What actually happened in this case was that the defendants as I have already said had been served with the summons and the correspondence shows that they had notice of this suit. It also appears that they had given a power of attorney to one Menasse, a pleader, in 1922, and as far as appears in this case, that power of attorney was still in force because, although Mr. Gillespie examined as a witness says that he cancelled all these powers of attorney, it seems that Menasse was still in possession of the power of attornay which was filed in the record of this case, and a certified copy is before this Court. Menasse produced the power of attorney in the Court when the case came on for hearing. Also from the correspondence of Messrs Turner, Morrison & Co., which has been filed in this case, and from the telegrams which have been put in, it is perfectly clear that the pleader Menasse had instructions from Turner, Morrison & Co., Bombay, to appear on their behalf and to act under the instructions of Messrs Andrew, Weir & Co. who were in Basra and to apply for an adjournment. The adjournment was refused. The Court then proceeded to go into the papers in the former proceedings and to pass a decree against the defendants. It is only necessary in this case to refer to very few cases. The learned counsel for the defendants has relied on the case of Keymer v. Visvanatham Reddi (5). In that case the plaintiff sued the defendant on a judgment obtained in the Court of King's Bench in London. The defence had been struck out because the defendants had refused to answer inter, rogatories. It was held by the Privy Council that the decision was not on the merits of the case within the meaning of Section 13(b) of the CPC. The principle on which that case was decided will be found at the end of the judgment where it is stated that S. 13, sub-S. (b), refers to those cases where, for one reason or another, the controversy raised in the action has not in fact been tbs subject of direct adjudication by the Court. The same question arose in G.S.G Cole v. G.A Harper (6), in which the case I have just referred to, Keymer v. Visvanatham Reddi was distinguished. In that case the defendant was sued for personal injuries caused in a motor car accident. The writ of summons was accepted by a solicitor, and an appearance was entered by him on behalf of the defendant. But before the hearing the defendant was recalled to India, but the case proceeded in his absence and resulted in a judgment for the plaintiff. Thera it was held that in the case of Keymer v. Visvanatham Reddi (p. 523):

    “the judgment followed as a penalty upon the defendant not complying with the order of the Court and the facts and circumstances of the case were never gone into at all. In the present case the evidence of the plaintiff herself, or some other evidence, had to be given before the jury could find a verdict in her favour,”

    11. And that the judgment was therefore one which was given on the merits. The present case, with which we are now concerned, is practically on all fours with that of Janoo Hassan v. Mahamad Ohuthu (7), where the notice of suit to the defendant in the Court in Ceylon was served on a person who was conducting business on the defendant's behalf in Ceylon, and had been given by him a power of attorney under which the agent was empowered to sue in the Courts of Ceylon and to appear in any Court of Justice in Ceylon either as plaintiff or defendant. The agent did not put in any appearance at all in the suit in the Ceylon Court, and the case was allowed to proceed ex parte against the defendant. It was held that the defendant must be deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the foreign Court by reason of the execution of the power of attorney. It was further held that ordinarily a judgment delivered ex parte is deemed to be on the merits, and it is only when a defence has been raised and for some reason or another has not been adjudicated upon that the decision can be said to be not upon the merits, and that the ex parte judgment in that case must be deemed to be one passed on the merits as the defendant did not at all appear in the case. This is practically on all fours with the present case. In the present case Turner, Morrison & Co. ware served while they were actually residents in Basra. Although at the time when the suit come on for hearing Mr. Gillespie was not resident in Basra, the pleader Manasse, who held a power of attorney from the firm and was retained to appear in the case, was in Basra. He represented the defendants in fact. That he did not receive any instructions to defend the case on merits does not, in my opinion, prevent the decision from being one on the merits. Applying the test that it is only when a defence has been raised and for some reason or another has not been adjudicated upon, that the decision can be said to be not on the merits, it is clear that the present case, where no defence was raised, but merely an adjournment was asked for and the judgment proceeded on the evidence of the plaintiff and the papers in the former suit, cannot be said to be a case in which the judgment is not one on the merits. The assertion in the written statement at the beginning that Menasse had no authority to represent the defendants is entirely incorrect.

    12. In these circumstances, I find on issue 2 that the suit in the Basra Court was decided on the merits. This being so, the judgment is conclusive, and the Court cannot go behind the judgment. I therefore cannot consider any of the other questions which have been raised in the case.

    13. The result is that there will be a decree for the plaintiff against the defendants as prayed for in the plaint with costs, subject to the order as to costs made in the interlocutory judgment on 25th February 1930. Interest on judgment at six per cent.

    B.V/R.K

    14. Suit decreed.

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    Comments

    Ephrayim H. Ephrayim v. Turner Morrison & Co.
    (Feb 27, 1930)