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  • Section 10(2) of the Bombay District Municipal Act, 1901,
  • clause of S. 5 of Bombay Regulation II of 1827.
  • SECTION 106 GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT
  • Section 9 of the High Courts Act, 1861,
  • S. 3 of the Bombay Civil Courts. Act
  • 14 rule 2
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • Section 10(2) of the Bombay District Municipal Act, 1901,
  • clause of S. 5 of Bombay Regulation II of 1827.
  • SECTION 106 GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT
  • Section 9 of the High Courts Act, 1861,
  • S. 3 of the Bombay Civil Courts. Act
  • 14 rule 2
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Coyajee, J. and Shah, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

In March 1922 a general election of Councillors for the Municipality of Nadiad resulted in 25 persons being elected for three-year terms commencing 1 April. In August 1922, 17 of those Councillors resigned and a bye-election returned eight Councillors, leaving nine vacancies unfilled. The Commissioner, Northern Division, purporting to act under Section 10(2) of the Bombay District Municipal Act, 1901, nominated nine persons who became defendants Nos. 1–9 in Suit No. 261 of 1922 brought in the Court of the First Class Subordinate Judge at Nadiad.

On 17 October 1922 rate-payers/voters (the plaintiffs, referred to as opponents 1 and 2 in the opinion) filed the suit seeking a declaration that the nominations of defendants 1–9 were illegal and a permanent injunction restraining those nominees and the Municipality (defendant No. 10) from treating or acting with them as members. The plaint alleged the cause of action arose on 14 October 1922 when the nominations were declared, and the plaintiffs obtained a temporary injunction the same day restraining the 10th defendant from allowing defendants 1–9 to sit as members.

On 20 October 1922 the Government Pleader applied that the Secretary of State for India in Council be brought on the record, alleging that plaintiffs had omitted to make the Secretary of State a necessary party. On 26 October the Subordinate Judge added the Secretary of State as defendant No. 11, but with a conditional observation that if the addition was merely to oust jurisdiction plaintiffs might later apply for his name to be struck off.

The Subordinate Judge framed four issues and tried the first two first: (1) whether Government is a necessary party in the suit; and (2) whether the Court has jurisdiction to hear the suit. On these issues he held that the Secretary of State was a proper but not a necessary party, and that section 22 (as the Judge understood it) of Act XIV of 1869 did not bar his trying the suit because the Secretary of State was brought on the record at his own application.

A rule was granted by the High Court on 1 December 1922 calling for the record under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the matter came on for argument before the High Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the High Court may exercise its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure in respect of an interlocutory stage of a subordinate court's proceedings (i.e., whether the application was competent while the suit had not been finally decided).
  2. Whether the Government (specifically the Commissioner or the Secretary of State for India in Council) is a necessary party to the suit challenging the validity of the nominations.
  3. Whether the Subordinate Judge had jurisdiction to try the suit in view of the statutory provision (referred to in the opinion as section 32 of Act XIV of 1869) that regulates suits in which Government or a Government officer in his official capacity is a party.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs / Opponents 1 and 2

  • The plaintiffs' plaint alleged that the Commissioner directly nominated defendants Nos. 1–9 and that the Commissioner had no authority to nominate in that way; accordingly those nominations were illegal and the nominees had no right to sit or act as members of the Municipality.
  • The plaint identified the cause of action as arising on 14 October 1922 when the nominations were declared, and claimed declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the nominees from acting as municipal councillors.
  • They obtained a temporary injunction restraining the Municipality from allowing the nominated persons to sit as members.

Government Pleader / Respondent-Party Argument

  • The Government Pleader at Kaira applied to have the Secretary of State for India in Council added to the record, asserting that the plaintiffs had "purposely omitted to make the Secretary of State a necessary party."

Opponents' Preliminary Objection (as framed before the High Court)

  • Opponents 1 and 2 objected that the Subordinate Judge had only decided certain preliminary issues of law and had not finally decided the suit; therefore, the High Court's revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC could not properly be exercised at this interlocutory stage.

Subordinate Judge's Reasoning (as described by the High Court)

  • The Subordinate Judge allowed the application to add the Secretary of State as a party but considered him only a proper party, not a necessary one, and indicated the addition might have been made by the Secretary of State himself.
  • The Subordinate Judge concluded that the presence of the Secretary of State on the record did not prevent the Subordinate Court from trying the suit; he relied on decided cases bearing on Section 80 of the CPC to reach that conclusion and expressed that there were few reported cases on the section of Act XIV of 1869 which he regarded as relevant.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Shiva Nathaji v. Joma Kashinath (Full Bench) Scope and limits of the High Court's extraordinary jurisdiction under the Code of Civil Procedure; when the High Court will interfere to enforce or restrain exercise of jurisdiction, and when it should refrain where appeal is available. The Court relied on and treated this Full Bench decision as authoritative in holding that Section 115 should be given a liberal construction and that the High Court may interfere in appropriate interlocutory situations affecting jurisdiction.
Bai Atrani v. Deepsing Baria That Section 115 is an empowering section and ought to receive a liberal rather than a narrow interpretation; the word "case" is wide in import. The Court cited this authority to support the view that revisional jurisdiction under S.115 may extend to interlocutory matters where appropriate within the High Court's discretion.
Vithal Krishna v. Balkrishna Janardhan (Full Bench) Approval of the Full Bench approach to the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction. The Court noted that the Full Bench decision in Shiva Nathaji was approved in this case and treated those principles as binding guidance.
Bai Kuvarbai v. Bhagwan Ichharam Illustration that the High Court has continued to exercise revisional jurisdiction even when appeal from final decree may be available. Referred to support the proposition that the existence of another remedy does not automatically preclude S.115 intervention.
Irbasappa v. Basangonda Observation that the Court should be slow to exercise revision under S.115 where the party has another remedy; that in purely summary proceedings not finally deciding dispute revision may not be appropriate. The opinion acknowledged these observations but treated them as consistent with the Full Bench principles and not dispositive of the present application.
Bami Rai v. Jaga Dvllabh Remarks that an application to exercise S.115 during the course of a trial in relation to interlocutory orders cannot be countenanced; the High Court has no power to call for the record of any case which is under trial by a Subordinate Court. The Court examined the facts and scope of that decision and concluded that the observations were directed to a particular class of cases; they did not displace the Full Bench authorities nor preclude the Court's jurisdiction in the present circumstances.
Somchand Bhikhabhai v. Chaganlal Authority where the High Court interfered on a question of jurisdiction arising at an interlocutory stage. Shah, J. relied on this decision as an example of the High Court exercising revisional jurisdiction where jurisdictional questions arose at interlocutory stage in circumstances akin to the present case.
Narayan Venku v. Sakharam Nagu An order of this Court was noted as possibly implying that jurisdiction of a Subordinate Judge was not necessarily ousted in some circumstances where a public officer is on the record. Shah, J. referred to this case to indicate that he was reserving a broader question (regarding S.3 of the Bombay Civil Courts Act) and did not adopt a categorical view beyond the necessity of a Government officer being a necessary party in the present case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The opinion contains parallel reasoning by Coyajee, J. (leading) and concurring remarks by Shah, J. Their joint analysis proceeds along the following lines:

  1. Competence under Section 115 CPC — preliminary objection:
    • Coyajee, J. examined prior Full Bench authorities (notably Shiva Nathaji) and related decisions, and concluded that Section 115 is an empowering provision that should be liberally construed. The High Court's extraordinary jurisdiction may be exercised to enforce or restrain jurisdictional excesses, even where other remedies exist, in cases appropriately calling for such interference.
    • He also relied on wide historical powers conferred by S.5 of Bombay Regulation II of 1827 (transmitted by Section 9 of the High Courts Act, 1861 and continued by Section 106 of the Government of India Act) as an additional basis supporting the High Court's jurisdiction to call for the record.
    • Shah, J. independently rejected a categorical bar on revisional interference at interlocutory stages. He emphasized that whether an interlocutory case is fit for interference depends on circumstances, especially when jurisdictional questions are involved, and relied on Somchand Bhikhabhai as an example where the Court had intervened.
  2. Whether the Government/Commissioner is a necessary party:
    • Both judges concluded that on the facts as pleaded the Commissioner (and, in the view of the Court, the Secretary of State for India in Council) is a necessary party. The plaintiffs' primary claim was to avoid nominations made by the Commissioner under statutory powers; those powers and their legality could not be effectively adjudicated in the officer's absence.
    • The Court distinguished between a merely "proper" party and a "necessary" party, and held that the relief sought (a declaration that nominations made by the Government were illegal and an injunction) made the presence of the Government or the officer essential to a complete and just adjudication.
  3. Jurisdiction of the Subordinate Judge in presence of Government as a necessary party:
    • Coyajee, J. found the Subordinate Judge's finding on jurisdiction to be manifestly wrong. He interpreted the statutory provision quoted in the opinion (set out by the Court as section 32 of Act XIV of 1869) as prohibiting a Subordinate Judge from receiving or registering suits in which the Government or a Government officer in his official capacity is a party, and directing such suits to the District Judge alone (subject to certain provisions).
    • The Court rejected the contention that the provision merely prevented receiving/registering but left trial jurisdiction untouched. Coyajee, J. reasoned that a Subordinate Judge receives and registers suits for the purpose of trying them; to construe the provision as excluding only registration but permitting trial would render the provision nugatory and permit litigants to circumvent the statute by contrivance.
    • Shah, J. agreed that where the Government/officer is a necessary party the statutory provision (referred to in the opinion as part of the Bombay Civil Courts Act regime) ousts the jurisdiction of the Subordinate Judge to try the suit; he reserved detailed opinion on a limited question about S.3 of the Bombay Civil Courts Act but accepted the conclusion warranted in the present circumstances.
  4. Fit for intervention and public interest considerations:
    • The Court considered the practical consequences: the nominations were for a three-year term, and allowing the suit to proceed through trial and appeal before final relief would, even if the plaintiffs ultimately succeeded, produce little practical benefit and cause waste of time and prejudice to public interests. This supported immediate intervention to prevent an illegal assumption of jurisdiction by the Subordinate Court.
  5. Relief directed:
    • On the basis of these findings the Court concluded that the case was appropriate for exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction and that the Subordinate Court should not proceed to try the suit; instead, the plaint should be returned to plaintiffs to be presented to the proper Court (i.e., the District Judge) and costs were awarded against the plaintiffs for the present application and in respect of one set of costs to the defendants in the lower Court.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: APPEAL ALLOWED; RULE MADE ABSOLUTE.

The direct operative consequences ordered by the High Court (per Coyajee, J., with concurrence from Shah, J.) are:

  • The rule calling for the record under Section 115 CPC is made absolute.
  • The Subordinate Court is directed to return the plaint to the plaintiffs so that it may be presented to the proper Court (i.e., the District Judge), because the Government (the Commissioner / Secretary of State for India in Council) is a necessary party and the Subordinate Court lacks jurisdiction to try the suit when such a necessary public party is involved.
  • Plaintiffs are to pay the costs of this High Court application, and also the costs of the defendants in the lower Court—one set.

Broader implications: The Court applied and reaffirmed established principles concerning the High Court's revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC and the consequence of statutory provisions (as cited in the opinion) that oust subordinate court jurisdiction when Government or a Government officer is a necessary party. The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel precedent beyond applying those principles to the facts; it resolves that immediate intervention was appropriate in the circumstances described.


Source: Summary prepared strictly from the provided opinion text of Coyajee, J. and Shah, J.; no information beyond the text has been added.

    Secretary Of State v. Patel Narsibhai Dadhabai

    Coyajee, J.:— The applicant asks this ??? the exercise of its Revisional ??? to call for the record ??? in Suit No. 261 of 1922 of the Court of the First Class Subordinate Judge at Nadiad, and to order that the plaint be returned for presentation to the proper Court, on the ground, inter alia, that the former Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit. A rule was granted on the 1st December 1922. It has now come on for argument before us.

    2. The material facts of the case are these. In March 1922, at a general election of Councillors for the Municipality of Nadiad, 25 persons were elected to hold office for a period of three years commencing with April 1st. In August following 17 out of that number resigned the office, whereupon a bye-election was held when eight Councillors were elected. As nine vacancies still remained to be filled, and as there was a failure to elect the full number, the Commissioner, N.D, purporting to act under Section 10(2) of the Bombay District Municipal Act, 1901, nominated the nine persons who figure as the first nine defendants in the plaint. On October 17th, the plaintiffs (now opponents 1 and 2) claiming to be rate-payers and voters brought the suit which has given rise to this application. By their plaint (paragraph 3) they contended that “the Commissioner Saheb of the Northern Division directly nominated the defendants Nos. 1 to 9. The Commissioner Saheb has got no authority to nominate in this way and as the appointment of such nominated members is illegal they have got no right to sit in the Municipality as members and to work therein. In spite of this, we stongly apprehend that they taking shelter of the unlawful orders of the Commissioner Saheb are about to sit in the Municipality as members and to work therein.” Then the plaint proceeds. “The cause of action has arisen on date the 14th October 1922 when the nomination of the defendants Nos. 1 to 9 was declared by the Municipality.” and relief is sought in these terms; “That it may be declared that the nomination of the defendants Nos. 1 to 9 as members of the Nadiad City Municipality made by the Government is illegal and that they may be restrained by a permanent injunction from attending the meetings of the Municipality and from doing any work on behalf of the Municipality, and that the defendant No. 10” (i.e the Municipality) “may be restrained by a permanent injunction from treating them as members, their nomination being illegal.” On the same day the Plaintiffs applied for and obtained a temporary injunction restraining the 10th defendant “from allowing the defendants 1 to 9 to sit as members of the Municipality, and from dealing with them.”

    3. On October 20th, the Government Pleader at Kaira applied to the Court praying that on the allegations contained in the plaint the Secretary of State for India in Council should be brought on the record of the case; it was also alleged that plaintiffs had “purposely omitted to make the Secretary of State a necessary party.” The learned Subordinate Judge, on October 26th, made him a party, as defendant No. 11, as in his opinion the powers of the Commissioner to nominate Councillors would have to be considered when deciding the suit on the merits. But he also said; “I allow the application but on condition that if it afterwards appears that the application has been made simply with a view to oust the jurisdiction of this Court and the plaintiffs are prejudiced thereby it will be open to the plaintiffs then to apply that the name of the appellant as defendant be struck off and the case be tried as if he was not a party. Of course, this does not mean that the plaintiffs' application will be granted as a matter of course. The order only means that the point will then be fully considered and final orders passed then.”

    4. Four issues were then framed by the Court the first two being: (1) “Whether Government is a necessary party in the suit;” (2) “Whether this Court has jurisdiction to hear the suit.” These two issues were tried first, probably on the ground that “the case or any part thereof: may be disposed of on the issues of law only” (Order 14 rule 2 of the CPC). On the 1st issue the Subordinate Judge held that although the Secretary of, State for India in Council was a proper, party, he was not a necessary party. On the 2nd he held that notwithstanding the fact that he had made the Secretary of State a party defendant, s. 22 of act xiv of 1869 did not stand in the way of his trying the suit, the reason being that the Secretary of State was brought on the record on his own application and not at the request of the plaintiffs.

    5. On the rule coming on for argument before us, a preliminary objection was raised, on behalf of Opponents 1 and 2, that inasmuch as the trial Judge had not finally decided the suit, by only given his decision on cerate issues of law, his order was ??? interlocutory, and therefore the present application made under section 115 of the cpc was no competent. This question has given rise to a diversity of judicial opinion Arguments on both sides of it have been sufficiently discussed and considered in a large number of decide cases. We are however bound to give effect to authoritative pronouncement, of this Court. The proper grounds ant limits of the Extraordinary Jurisdiction of this Court “under the Code of Civil Procedure or otherwise” were fully considered by a full, Bench ??? Shiva Nathaji v. Joma Kashinath(1) ??? The results of the earlier decision were summed up thus (p. 357): “The High Court will interfere to enforce, the exercise of jurisdiction, or to restrain an excess of jurisdiction, in case apparently calling for such interference, even though there may be remedy by suit. When there is remedy by appeal, the cases do no appear to warrant such interference except under circumstances in which an appeal would manifestly be ??? effectual and the principle, her pertinent, was laid down (p. 372) the “Where an appeal is provided, the Court will not interfere by an peremptory order with the ??? course of adjudication, save in ??? wherein a defect of the law, a ??? grave wrong are manifest, and irremediable by the regular ??? There is much to be said in ??? of this rule. The language of ??? confers on the High court powers—sufficiently vide to include an interlocutory order. Bai Atrani…Defendant Applicant; v. Deepsing Baria…Plaintiff Opponent.(3). The word “case” is not specifically defined in the Code; but it is a word of wide and comprehensive import; and” inasmuch as S. 115 is merely an empowering section granting certain jurisdiction to the High Court, and as the use or exercise of that jurisdiction will, within the prescribed limits, be regulated by the discretion of the High Court, the section ought to receive rather a liberal than a narrow interpretation” (40 Bom at 92). The Full Bench decision above referred to was approved by another Full Bench of this Court in Vithal Krishna v. Balkrishna Janardhan(4). In 18 Bom. 35 however, the opinion was expressed that the word “case” may be wide enough to include an interlocutory order, but a word of such general import must be controlled by due regard to the purpose with which the section was framed. That purpose was “to enable a party to a suit to get a decision or order of a lower Court rectified by the High Court, when there would otherwise be no remedy.” No reference was made to the opinions expressed in the two Full Bench decisions above alluded to; and it may be respectfully pointed out that the section itself does not make the absence of another remedy a necessary condition of its applicability. This Court, however, continued to exercise its revisional jurisdiction even in cases where a remedy by way of an appeal from the final decree was open; of Bai Kuvarbai v. Bhagwan Ichharam(5). In Irbasappa v. Basangonda(6), the appellant asked this Court to revise an order made by the Collector under the Mamlatdars Courts Act. The opponents before us rely on the following observations occurring in the judgment of the learned Chief Justice: “In our opinion the Court should be slow to exercise its powers of revision under S. 115 of the Code unless the party applying to the Court has no other remedy. But in a case where the proceedings which are sought to be revised are purely summary proceedings, which did not finally decide the dispute between the parties then, so far as we are concerned, we do not think that we should exercise our powers of revision.” This view is entirely consistent with the 6th principle laid down in the Full Bench decision in Shiva Nathaji's case.

    6. In support of the preliminary objection reliance is placed on the decision of Macleod C.J and Heaton, J., in Bami Rai v. Jaga Dvllabh(7). There are, no doubt, observations in the judgments which, if not read in their context, might favour the opponents' contention. But in order to be able to correctly appreciate those observations, it is essential to know the facts of that case. The applicant before the High Court was one of six defendants in the suit: although served with a summons to appear on October 18th, 1918, she failed to appear: an order was then passed directing the suit to proceed ex parte against her; on the 8th and 12th of December the case was heard and adjourned till July 12th: on that day she appeared and applied for leave to defend the suit; the Trial Judge rejected this application and declined to set aside its order of the 1st October. It was in these circumstances that the applicant invoked the revisional jurisdiction of this Court, under S. 115. In his judgment the learned Chief Justice fully sets out the above facts, and then makes the following observations on which the opponents now rely: “We have no power to call for the record of any case which is under trial by a Court Subordinate to the High Court. It seems necessary to point out that an application like this made during the course of a trial asking the Court to exercise its powers under S. 115 in the matter of interlocutory orders cannot, be countenanced. If such applications are made in future they should not be admitted.” and Heaton J. “If there is one kind of case which S. 115 most emphatically points to as not falling within its terms, it is a case like the present, where there is an interlocutory order on an incidental matter which does not prevent the further progress of the suit.” The remarks, it is true, are not confined to the particular case then before the Court; for they were obviously meant to apply to a class of cases. But the class intended was one, of which that particular case was but a type. The judgments contain no reference to the earlier Full Bench decisions of this Court; and it is impossible to say that their Lordships were dissenting from those authoritative pronouncements.

    7. I, therefore, hold that this application is competent under section 115 of the cpc. In any event, our powers derived from S. 5 of Bombay Regulation II of 1827 are very wide. The powers thereby conferred on the Suddur Dewanee Adawlut were transferred to this Court by Section 9 of the High Courts Act, 1861, and they continue still in force by virtue of Section 106 of the Government of India Act.

    8. The question then is whether the application before us discloses a fit case for the exercise of our Extraordinary Jurisdiction. In my opinion it does.

    9. The main question in the suit relates to the legality and validity of the nomination of nine Municipal Councillors, whose ordinary life is three years. The plaint was filed in October 1922. If we do not interfere now but allow the litigation to run its full course through the trial Court and the Court of Appeal, the applicant's ultimate success can yield no practical results, beyond a mere waste of time, energy and money. Moreover, delay in a matter of this feature must necessarily prejudicially affect public interests.

    10. On the 1st issue, there can be no doubt, on the case as made in the plaint, that the Commissioner ought to have been joined as a party defendant. The lower Court concedes that he is a proper party. I hold that he is also a necessary party. The sole aim and purpose of the suit is to avoid the nominations made by him, in the exercise of statutory powers. Those powers are conferred on him by the statute in the interests of the public. It is necessary to hear him before it could be decided that the; nominations made by him are illegal. For, what is the relief which the plaintiffs claim? The plaint says: “It may be declared that the nomination of the defendants Nos. 1 to 9 as the members of the Nadiad City Municipality made by the Government is illegal.” It is obvious then that Government is a necessary; party.

    11. On the 2nd issue, the finding of the Subordinate Judge is manifestly wrong. He has already added the Secretary of State for India in Council as a party to the suit; he is a necessary party: s. 32 of act xiv of 1869 comes in the way of his trying the suit. The learned Judge does not attempt to ascertain the meaning of the section itself. He says: “There are very few reported cases” on that section. He therefore proceeds to consider some decided cases bearing on section 80 of the cpc and concludes that “the Court has jurisdiction to hear the suit when the Secretary of state has been made a party by the Court at his own request and no suit has been instituted against, him by the plaintiffs.” It is not easy to follow his process of reasoning. S. 32 is in these terms.

    12. “No Subordinate Judge or Court of Small Causes shall receive or register a suit in which the Government of any officer of Government in his official capacity is a party, but in every such case such Judge or Court shall refer the plaintiff to the District Judge, in whose Court alone (subject to the provisions of S. 19) such suit shall be instituted.” It was urged before us that section merely prohibits a Subordinate Judge from receiving or registering a suit of the nature therein described, but that ??? does not prevent him from trying it I am unable to accept this desperate construction of the enactment, ??? Subordinate Judge is not a ministerial officer appointed for the purpose ??? receiving or registering suits. When he receives and registers a suit he does it for the purpose of trying it. There can be no object in preventing him from receiving and registering a suit, if it was intended to leave him free to try it. The section confers the exclusive jurisdiction of trying suits of: a specified description on the District Judge. The other construction would leave the enactment at the mercy of a litigant; he could avoid these provisions of, the Act by contrivances which are easy to imagine and not necessary to describe.

    13. For these reasons I would make the rule absolute and direct that the lower Court should return the plaint to the plaintiffs to be presented to the prosper Court. Plaintiffs to pay costs of this application; and also costs of the defendants in the lower Court—one set.

    Shah, J.:— I am of opinion that this Court has jurisdiction to interfere in a case of this kind, and that under the circumstances of this case we should interfere in the exercise of that jurisdiction.

    14. The preliminary objection as to the jurisdiction of this Court to call for the records of this case under section 115 of the cpc has been elaborately argued. But I am not prepared to accept the contention that at no interlocutory stage of a suit this Court can interfere under that section. Various decisions have been cited at the bar on both sides as to the meaning of the expression ‘any case which has been decided by any Court subordinate to the High Court, and in which no appeal lies thereto’. I do not think that it can serve any useful purpose to attempt to lay down any definition of a case which has been decided. Where the question of jurisdiction such as arises in this case is involved, and where the subordinate Court has decided that question the case cannot be held to be outside the scope of the expression. The interlocutory stage of the proceedings will evidently be a point to be considered in deciding whether it is a fit case for interference. On a question of jurisdiction arising at an interlocutory stage under circumstances which in essential particulars bearing on the preliminary point are similar to the circumstances in the present case, this Court interfered in Somchand Bhikhabhai v. Chaganlal(8). Among the decisions which have been cited I have not been able to find any case, where it is held by this Court that the High Court has no jurisdiction to call for the record of a case, in which the question of jurisdiction is involved at an interlocutory stage under section 115 of the cpc. The real safeguard against undue or improper interference at an interlocutory stage is not to put a restricted meaning upon an expression which is comprehensive enough to include a case like the present, but to exercise it with due regard to the circumstances of the case, and the nature of the question of jurisdiction. As pointed out in Shiva Nathaji v. Joma Kashinath “the Court cannot impose on itself limitations without regard to circumstances.” Even assuming that the case were not covered by S. 115, I think it would clearly be covered by the words of the second clause of S. 5 of Bombay Regulation II of 1827. Though the Regulation on this point is repealed, this Court still retains the power under the statutes, which the Sadar Divani Adalat had under the said repealed clause.

    15. As regards the second question, on the cause of action as disclosed in the plaint, and the nature of the relief claimed, I think that the Commissioner or the Secretary of State for India in Council is a necessary party. The distinction between a necessary party and a proper party is real; and it is not always easy to draw that distinction. The learned Subordinate Judge was of opinion that he was only a proper party and not a necessary party. It is true that the relief by way of injunction is directed against the other defendants and it may be said that the relief by way of declaration is not absolutely essential. But it is clear that the principle, if not the only question of real importance involved in the suit, relates to the validity of the Commissioner's order; and on the whole I think that the presence of the officer concerned or the Government before the Court is necessary in order to enable the Court to effectually and completely adjudicate upon the questions involved in the suit. This suit cannot be justly tried and decided and the declaration sought cannot be made in the absence of the officer or the Government. I therefore consider the applicant a necessary party. The judgment of the Lower Court proceeds upon the basis that he is not a necessary party. It is not essential for the purposes of this case to decide the question whether S. 3 of the Bombay Civil Courts. Act will necessarily oust the jurisdiction of a Subordinate Judge in a case where the Government or the public officer is not a necessary party but is kept on the record merely because the case between the private parties may be more effectually dealt with. It is conceivable that an order such as was made by this Court in Narayan Venku v. Sakharam Nagu(9) may imply that the jurisdiction was not necessarily ousted. I reserve my opinion on this point. But where the Government or any officer of Government in his official capacity is a necessary party, as in this case, it is clear that Section ??? of the Bombay Civil Courts Act must apply. It makes no difference in its application that the public officer of the Government has not been joined by the plaintiff as a defendant from the beginning before the suit is received or registered. The argument, advanced by the learned Counsel for the opponents that if the suit is once received or registered and if the Government or the public officer is made a party afterwards the bar created by S. 32 against the jurisdiction of a Subordinate Judge cannot apply, does not deserve any serious treatment. I reject that argument. It is clear to my mind that it would be futile to allow this suit to go on in the Court of a Subordinate Judge. It is a case in which we ought to prevent further proceeding in the Court, which according to law cannot entertain them. In the view which we take as to the Secretary of State for India in Council being a necessary party it would be a case of illegal assumption of jurisdiction, if that Court were to try the suit.

    16. I, therefore, concur in the order passed by my learned brother.

    17. Appeal allowed.

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    Secretary Of State v. Patel Narsibhai Dadhabai
    (Jul 23, 1923)